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The Sāṅkhya Philosophy

A Critical Evaluation of Its Origins and Development

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To
My Revered Guru
Professor O.H. de A.Wijesekera
(1909-1990)
with
Gratitude, Devotion and Affection.

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Statement of Scope and the Title of the Thesis

The Sāṅkhya Philosophy

A Critical Evaluation of its Origins and Develepent

The purpose of this thesis is, primarily, to trace historically the origins of the *Sāṅkhya* concepts in the prievious literature, namely the *Vedas, Brāhmaṇas* and the *Upaniṣads*. The method to be followed has been briefly indicated by Professor A. Berriedale Keith in his monograph, The *Sāṅkhya System* (Heritage of India Series, pp. 9-23). The Epic and *Sūtra* literature too will be drawn upon whenever necessary for the purpose of elucidation. The principal branches of the *Sāṅkhya* Philosophy-metaphysics, cosmology, ethics, theory of knolwdge and philosophy of mind - as presented, mainly, in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* too are subjected to a close analytical study. The connection between the doctrines of the *Sāṅkhya* and those of Early Buddhism is also examined in detail.

An attempt will be made in the light of such data to solve the problem (often posed but not fully examined up till now), how far the doctrines expounded in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* are genetically connected with the thought of the *Vedas, Brāhmaṇas* and the *Upaniṣads*, and how far there is extraneous influence on the genesis of the *Sāṅkhya* ideas. In this connection, the historical background of the *Sāṅkhya* system, its cultural and geographical position in the evolution of Indian thought, will be closely inquired into. It is also intended to examine the claim that there may be some Western (Greek) influence in the formulation of the system (*Die Sāṅkhya Philosophie, pp. 85- 105)*, and the possibility of there being any historical connection between *Sāṅkhya* and *Avestan* concepts.

Abstract

This study consists, primarily, of an inquiry into the origins of the *Sāṅkhya* concepts in the *Vedas, Brāhmaṇas* and the *Upaniṣads.* The principal branches of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy - metaphysics, cosmology, ethics, theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind - as presented, mainly, in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* too are subjected to a close analytical study. The connection between the doctrines of the *Sāṅkhya* and those of early Buddhism, the *Avesta* and the Greek thought is also examined in detail. The introductory chapter deals with the necessity of the historical method, the sources of the present study and the early *Sāṅkhya* teachers. Chapter II presents the general background of the *Sāṅkhya* system in the pre-*Vedic*, *Vedic* and post-Vedic periods. Chapter III examines the meaning and significance of the term *Sāṅkhya* as applied to this particular school of philosophy. Some 92 cases of enumerative analysis mainly in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* are examined. Chapter IV deals with the historical development of the concept of dualism; dualism of different entities, animate and inanimate, real and mythical are studied. Chapter V is an examination of the genesis and development of the doctrine of evolution. Two types of concepts, namely those derived from $\sqrt{jan}$, to be born, and those derived from *sam* + $\sqrt{vṛt}$, to evolve, are subject to an analytical study. Chapter VI is concerned with the evolution of the idea of teleology as well as the immanent teleology attributed to *Prakṛti.* Chapter VII traces the historical development of the idea of causality and also engages in an analytical study of the conception of *Satkāryavāda,* theory of the actual existence of the effect. Chapter VIII examines the gradual development of the idea of *Puruṣa* and also the different definitions of it. Chapter IX deals with the various phases of the evolution of the category of *Prakṛti.* Chapter X is concerned with the development of the notion of the *Guṇas;* the origin of the doctrine is traced back to the *Vedic* cosmology. Chapter XI studies the evolution of the concept of *Mahat,* the great germ of the universe from different sources. Chapter XII discusses the origin of the category of *Ahaṅkāra* or the I-consciousness. Chapter XIII is an examination of the historical development of the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Manas* or

mind. Chapter XIV deals with the evolution and the significance of the idea of the *Prāṇas* (the vital airs) or the *Vāyus* (the winds). Chapter XV discusses the gradual emergence of the notion of the *Indriyas* or the organs of sense and action. Chapter XVI is concerned with the development of the idea of the *Tanmātras* or five subtle essences.Chapter XVII traces the evolution of the idea of *Liṅga* and the term *Liṅga* is considered to be of non-Aryan origin. Chapter XVIII examines the origin and significance of the doctrine of the *Bhāvas* or the psychic states. Chapter XIX studies the gradual development of the concept of the *Bhūtas*, the gross elements. Chapter XX deals with some problems of metaphysics which did not come under the above survey (Chapters I - XIX); a descripto-critical analysis of these concepts is attempted. Chapter XXI is a study of the role of the philosophy of mind as a functional trait within the *Sāṅkhya* system : linguistic method, wherever necessary, is employed. Chapter XXII is a critical analysis of the cosmology of the system. Chapter XXIII is an analytical study of the epistemology of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy with a brief historical introduction. The general *Sāṅkhya* method of argument, the *modus tollens* is also examined. Chapter XXIV with an historical introduction deals with ethics or the moral philosophy : special contributions of the *Sāṅkhya* system in this field are examined. Chapter XXV deals with the similarities between the *Sāṅkhya* and Buddhism: some important doctrines are found to be common to both teachings. Chapter XXVI is a study of certain concepts in the *Sāṅkhya* and the *Avesta*: several similarities are established. Chapter XXVII is devoted to a study of some parallels between the *Sāṅkhya* and the Greek thought. A number of important similarities are brought forward. Chapter XXVIII is the concluding chapter. It discusses in detail the manifold contribution of this philosophy to the advancement of Indian culture and civilization.

A Note to the First Edition

I am presenting herewith my work, the *Sāṅkhya Philosophy, A Critical Evaluation of Its Origins and Development,* to the learned world. I did this research as a thesis for my second Ph.D. from the University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka.

I am indebted to my *Guru* Professor O.H.de A. Wijesekera, a great Indologist who guided me throughout this work. I am also grateful to my *ācārya* Professor J. Tilakasiri who took an abiding interest in this subject. I am fortunate to have such noble scholars as my teachers.

I should like to place on record here my deep gratitute to my wife Mrs. A.I.Weerasinghe, B.A. (Cey.), M.Sc. (Philippines) for the constant help she has given me with regard to this piece of research.

I am also grateful to my friend Shri Naresh Gupta for the interest he has envinced in publishing this work. My salutation to the great patron of Indology. Finally I offer my sincere thanks to the members of the staff of the Indian Books Centre, for their services to bring this work through the press.

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19.09.1992

Foreword

The *Sāṅkhya* is one of the oldest schools of Indian Philosophy. It comprises the four main branches of inquiry traditionally required to be included in any given system of thought: cosmology, metaphysics, ethics and epistemology. It has hardly any data derived from the realm of religion. This is an important characteristic of this particular *darśana*. Hence it is a philosophy in the true sense of the term.

This philosophy explains human nature in the light of the *Guṇas* which are mainly physical in nature. The emancipation, according to this philosophy, is to break away from the magnetic power of *Prakṛti* through the psychological detachment from what is near and dear. This attitude on the part of the *Sāṅkhya* system is an important step in the development of Indian psychology.

The *Sāṅkhya,* as a school of philosophy does not seem to have received due attention during the modern period. R.Garbe and A.B. Keith have done important research in this connection. But there was much more to be accomplished.

Professor S.G.M. Weerasinghe with his academic training in Sanskrit (with Vedic), Pali and Philosophy has done thorough and systematic research into this subject. His method is historical, descriptive , comparative and critical, simultaneously. Thus he has rendered a great service to the cause of the *Sāṅkhya* Philosophy.

I am glad to write these few lines to this excellent piece of research which will be very useful to all students of Indian Philosophy.

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Professor Emeritus, Formerly Professor of Sanskrit,
University of Paradeniya, Sri Lanka.

Preface

Philosophical reflections in India have gradually developed from the time of the latter part of the Vedic civilization. This development in course of time has given rise to the six orthodox systems on the one hand and, Jainism, Buddhism and materialism on the other. Once the different schools of Indian philosophy were formed, they have continued to develop through centuries with some additions and elaborations giving rise to some minor sects within each school. One may thus see that Indian philosophy, in the main, is the story of the historical development of the above nine principal schools. Hence it is very important to have a clear idea of the gradual evolution of the different schools of Indian thought in order to have a better understanding and a critical appeciation of their distinct contributions. In fact, it is this idea which has led to the present study: *The Sāṅkhya Philosophy - A Critical Evaluation of its Origins and Development.*

Several sholars have already attempted to trace the history of *Sāṅkhya* thought. Among them, Professor Garbe is well known for his valuable work: *Die Sāṁkhya Philosophie.* In this work Garbe has studied the principal categories of the Sāṅkhya system. While discussing the philosophical significance of these categories, he has also referred to their historical aspect in some places. We may next mention Professor Deussen's brief survey of the origin of the Sāṅkhya system found in his work, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* (pp. 239-255). Professor Oldenberg's monograph *Zur Geschichte der Sāṅkhya-Philosophie* (NGWG, *philologisch-historische Klasse,* 1917, pp. 218-253) is also of considerable importance. Professor Johnston's work, *Early Sāṁkhya* is limited to a few Sāṅkhya concepts although it gives a very good account of the Sāṅkhya doctrines in the *Mahābhārata,* specially in the *Mokṣadharma.* Professor Keith's monograph the *Sāṁkhya System* is also an important study on the history of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. Being a concise work, it has not discussed some *Sāṅkhya* doctrines such as the *Prāṇas* in detail. There are several other essays and monographs on this subject which need not delay us here. A study of all these works has convinced us that

a fresh and a fuller study of the history of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy is an urgent need.

We believe that a study of the historical development of the Sāṅkhya concepts alone is not sufficient. Therefore we have also complemented it with a critical exposition of the general structure of this philosophy (i.e., theory of knowledge etc.,) as it is presented mainly in the classical *Sāṅkhya* of the *Kārikā*. This, too, has been a gap to be filled especially in view of the very brief (and at times unhistorical) treatment it has received in many of the histories of Indian philosophy. We have also compared certain doctrines of the *Sāṅkhya* with those of early Buddhism, the Avesta and the Greek thought. Thus the present study is both an historical and an analytical study of the *Sāṅkhya* school of Indian Philosophy.

I must take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to my Āchārya Professor O.H de. A. Wijesekera, former Head of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Ceylon, Peradeniya, under whose guidance this study was pursued. His constant suggestions and criticisms were very valuable. It indeed was a great pleasure to do this piece of research under his expert guidance. I must also express my gratitude to my teacher Professor J. Tilakasiri, Head of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Ceylon (Peradeniya Campus), for having gone through the entire thesis and offering very valuable suggestinons for improving it. Finally, I must thank Mr. D.K. Heyn, former Senior Clerk of the University of Ceylon, for his neat typing.

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Abbreviations

Ā	*Āraṇyka.*
ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (Poona)
A.G.	Altindische Grammatik
A.G.P.	Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie
A.I.E.	Ancient Indian Education
Ait.	Aitereya
Ait.Up.	Aitareya Upaniṣad
AJP.	American Journal of Philology (Baltimore)
A.N.	Aṅguttara Nikāya
Av.	Avesta
A.V.	Atharvaveda
A.V.S.	The Atharva Veda Saṃhitā
B.C.V.	Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume
B.G.	Bhagavadgītā
Bk.	Book
B.L.	Buddhist Logic
Brāh.	Brāhmaṇa
Bṛhad. Ār.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
Bṛhad (Bṛh.). (Ā) Up.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
BSL.	Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique (Paris)
B.S.O.S.	Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies (University of London).
C.C.B.	The Central Conception of Buddhism
C.E.S.D	A Concise Etymological Sanskrit Dictionary (i.e. Kurzgefasstes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen)
ch./chap.	chapter
Ch.(Chānd.) Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
C.H.G.P.	A Critical History of Greek Philosophy
comy.	commentary
C.P.B.	Central Philosophy of Buddhism
C.R.	The Cosmology of the Rigveda, An Essay
C.S.S.S.	A Critical Study of the Sāṅkhya System
C.S.U.P.	A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy

Der R.V.	Der Rig-Veda
Dic.S.L.	A Dictionary of Sanskrit Language
Dīgha.	Dīgha Nikāya
D.P.	Dhamma Pada
Ed.	Edition/Edited by
Egg.	Eggling
Eng.	English
ERE.	Encylopaedia of Religion and Ethics
E.S.	Early Sāṅkhya
G(auḍa)	Gauḍapāda
G.B.	Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya
G.B.W.T.	Guide Book To Western Thought
G.P.	Greek Philosophy
G.G.A.	Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen
G.T.	Greek Thinkers
H.A.V.	The Hyms of the Artharva Veda
H.C.	Hindu Civilization
H.D.A.	History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas
H.G.P.	A History of Greek Philosophy
H.P.	Hindu Philosophy
H.R.V.	The Hymns of the Rigveda
H.S.L.	A History of Sanskrit Literature
H.S.V.	Hymnes Spéculatifs du Veda
H.W.P.	History of Western Philosophy
H.Y.P.	A Hundred Years of Philosophy
I.C.	L'Inde Classique
I.H.Q. (IHQ.)	Indian Historical Quarterly
I.I.P.	An Introduction to Indian Philosophy
I.P.	Indian Philosophy
Iti.	Itivuttaka
JA.	Journal Asiatique (Paris)
JAOS.	Journal of the American Oriental Society (New Haven)
JASB.	Journal of the Anthropoligical Society of Bombay
JBORS.	Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society (Bankipore)
JOR.	Journal of Oriental Research (Madras)
JRASB.	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal (Calcutta)
Kauṣī. Up.	Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad

Lal.Vist.	Lalita Vistara
L.B.	The Life of Buddha
M.A.	Majjhima Nikāya
M.Bh.	Mahā Bhārata
Meta.	The metaphysics
M.L.S.	The Middle Length Sayings
M.N.	Majjhima Nikāya
M.S.L.	Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique
M.W.	Monier-Williams
N.B.	Nyāya Bindu
ÑGWG	Nachrichten von der könighlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen
O.H.G.P.	Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy
O.I.P.	Outlines of Indian Philosophy
P.C.S.	Penguin Classics Series
P.I.	Philosopies of India (by Zimmer)
P.I.	Philosophical Investigations (by Wittgenstein)
P.M.S.	Philosophy Made Simple
Prin.	Principal
P.S.D.	A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary
P.T.S.	Pali Text Society
P.U.(p).	The Principal Upaniṣads
R.K.	Radhakrishnan
R.P.V.U.	The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and the Upaniṣads
Ṛ.V.	Ṛgveda
Ṣat(a)	Ṣatapatha
Ś.B.	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa
S.B.E.	Sared Books of the East
S.C.P.	The Sāṅkhya Conception of Personality
Sec.	Section
S.K.	Sāṅkhya Kārika
Skt.	Sanskrit
S.N.(Sn.)	Sutta-Nipāta
S.P.	Die Sāṅkhya-Philosophie
S.P.B.	Sāṅkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya
S.P.S.	Sāṅkhya Pravcana Sūtra
S.S.	The Sāṅkhya System
S.T.K.	Sāṅkya Tattva Kaumudi
SUV	Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda

Śvet.Up.	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
Tait.	Taittīriya
Tāṇḍ.Br.	Tāṇḍyamahā Brāhmaṇa
Tr.	Translation/ Translated by
U.C.R.	University of Ceylon Review
U.p.	Upaniṣad
Vāc.	Vācaspatimiśra
V.R.	A Vedic Reader for Students
V.S.	Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā
W.zum, R.V.	Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda
Y.B.	Yoga Bhāṣya
Y.S.	Yoga Sūtra
Y.S.P.	The Yoga-System of Patañjali
Z.A.	The Zend Avesta
Z.D.M.G.	Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft (Leipzig)

I

Introductory

(1) An historical analysis of the origins of Indian pholosophies is a desideratum. We come across many a general exposition on Indian philosophy, but we have only a very few works dealing with the historical development of the different schools of Indian thought. For example, we may refer to the *Vedānta*, the philosophy par excellence of the Hindus. There are many treatises, ancient and modern, dealing with this school. Almost all of them approach the subject from a descriptive point of view. This method is good enough for the *Bhākta*, but it is not sufficient for the student of philosophy. In this age, where the philosophy in the West has reached the stage of analysis,[1] it is important that we should develop a more critical attitude to our systems of philosophy and discover at least the origins of the different schools which are hidden in the mists of antiquity. Coming back to the *Vedānta* we may say that it is quite legitimate for one to raise the question: what is the historical explanation of the origin of the *Kosa* theory in the *Vedānta*? Can't it be traced back to the similar conception in the Ṛgveda, for example, *divyam Kośam* in the R.V. V. 59.3. Again we may raise the question regarding the origin of the concept of *turīya*,[2] a mystic state, of the school. In all probability, this can be traced back to the similar concept found in the Ṛgveda in the form *turīya pada* (R.V.I. 164.45), fourth part or step (Geldner: vierte Viertel), *turīya Āditya* (R.V.VIII.52.7), the fourth *Āditya* (Geldner: *vierte Āditya*), *turīya dhāma* (R.V.IX. 96.19), the fourth form (Geldner: vierte Form) and so on. Similarly *sākṣin*, *jīva* and so forth are to be examined from the point of view of their historical origins. In this connection the *Sāṅkhya* system is in a slightly better position. The works of Garbe, Deussen, Keith and Johnston are of considerable importance for those who attempt to trace the origins of *Sāṅkhya* doctrines.

(2) The *Sāṅkhya*, the oldest of the schools of Indian philosophy, has influenced most of the other philosophical systems of India. The well-known *Sāṅkhya* doctrine, the concept of *Guṇa*, for example, has influenced not only the other schools of Indian philosophy, but even Indian medical science, the Āyurveda and the Belles-Letters[3]. Neverthless the *Sāṅkhya* system has been badly neglected by the orthodox teachers of ancient India. This attitude towards the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy seems to have been carried down through the ages till the recent past. It is surprising to hear from Max Müller. "We have learnt since from Ballantyne (Drift of the Sānkhya, p.1.) that at Benares where he resided, these *Kārikās* were hardly known at all except to those who had seen Professor Wilson's English edition of them.[4] Being termed as the *Pradhāna-malla*, the chief opponent of the *Vedānta* philosophy,[5] the *Sāṅkhya* system did not attract much attention on the part of the orthodox philosophers. For them the *Sāṅkhya* was not to fulfil but to destroy; therefore their aim was not so much to expound it, but to neglect or destroy it. Almost all the early writings on the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy are lost or perhaps destroyed.[6]

(3) We have only one important work surviving the classical *Sāṅkhya* system, the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* with the following commentaries: (1) the *Māṭhara Vṛtti*, the commentary by *Māṭhara*, (11) the *Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya*, the commentary by *Gauḍapāda*, (III) the *Jayamaṅgalā* by a different *Gauḍapāda*, (IV) the *Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudi* or the Moonshine of the Truth of the *Sāṅkhya*, *the commentary by Vāscaspati Miśra*, (V) the *Yuktidīpikā* (Calcutta ed.), (VI) the *Sāṅkhya Candrikā* by *Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha*, (VII) the *Sāṅkhya Kaumudi* by *Rāmakṛshṇa Bhaṭṭācārya* [vide (1) S. Hall, *Sāṅkhya Sāra* Pref. 41, (11) Garbe (*S.P.* p. 61)], and (VIII) the *Sāṅkhyataruvasanta* by Mudumba Narasiṅha Svāmin. Of these commentaries, the one by *Māṭhara* appears to be the oldest. This author, *Māṭhara* was probably a Jain. The commentary of Gauḍapāda is generally supposed to have come after, and even drawn upon, the *Māṭhara Vṛtti*[8]. A comparison of the *Jayamaṅgalā* with the *Sāṅkhya- Tattva-Kaumudi* may lead us to the conclusion that the former was the earlier commentary. This view receives good support from the commentaries on verse 51.[9] The *Yuktidīpikā* is an earlier commentary though its date and authorship are uncertain. The *Sāṅkhya Candrikā*, a treatise on the *Kārikā*[10] is later

than the *Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudi.* The *Sāṅkhya Kaumudi* and the *Sāṅkhataruvasanta* are very recent commentaries.[11]

(4) These commentaries, though useful in some ways, do not lend much support for a proper interpretation of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, a fact clearly seen from the works of Paul Deussen,[12] and V.V. Sovani[13]. Myths and legends, alien to the spirit of the classical *Sāṅkhya* play a significant role in them. As correctly pointed out by K.C. Bhattacharyya: "there is so much that is clothed in a poetic or mystic garb on which commentaries do not help us much but which are suggestive enough to tempt us to construct the system anew[14]. The commentators have, at times, misinterpreted the *Sāṅkhya* concepts either deliberately or through ignorance[15]. We can cite Vijñāna Bhikṣu as a case of the former. Vijñāna Bhikṣu's deliberate misinterpretation of the *Sāṅkhya* doctrines are well known. These false assumptions and errors are critically examined by Garbe in his edition of the *Sāṅkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya*[16]. The absurdity of Bhikṣu's assumptions becomes conspicuous in his well-known contention that the *Sāṅkhya* "atheism," is an unnecessarily extravagant claim (*Prauḍa-vāda*)[17]. The utter baselessness of this claim is implied by Keith when he observes: "the atheism of the *Sāṅkhya* is, in his (Vijñāna Bhikṣu's) view merely a concession to current phraseology".[18] Misinterpretations through ignorance are many and varied. A number of them are brilliantly explained by Deussen in his valuable edition of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* with a German translation.[19]

(5) Indian philosophy was in the making from the time of the tenth *maṇḍala* of the *Ṛgveda*. During this period orthodox speculation appears to have been greatly influenced by different concepts of the early teachers of *Sāṅkhya* school. The course of the development of the *Sāṅkhya* ideas has not yet been fully determined although some pioneer works like, *Die Sāṅkhya Philosophie, The Sāṃkhya System, Early Sāṃkhya* etc., have already appeared. Hence we feel that a fresh attempt on historical lines may reveal some more important points which have not been noted by these scholars. A few writers have furnished us with some important data regarding the history of the schools of *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. From Chinese sources Takakusu has pointed out that there were eighteen *Sāṅkhya* schools.[20] The authority for this statement rests on Paramārtha who lived in

the sixth century A.C. Next the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* on the *Yoga-Sūtra* 11.23 throws some important light on the question of the early schools of the *Sāṅkhya*. Here the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* mentions eight different theories regarding the reason for the union between the two ultimate principles postulated by the *Sāṅkhya*: *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*.[21] The fourth among these theories is that of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*[22]. Vācaspati Miśra, the commentator on the *Yoga-Bhāṣya*, observes that all these theories are taken from different expositions of the *Sāṅkhya* system.[23]

(6) In the *Smṛtis*, the *Mahā Bhārata*, the *Kārikās* etc., we come across the names of twenty-six early teachers who are regarded as the 'founders' of the school: (I) Kapila (II) Āsuri (III) pañcaśikha (IV) Vindhyāvāsa or Vindhyāvāsika or Vindhyāvāsin (V) Vārṣagaṇya (VI) Jaigīṣavya (VII) Voḍu (VIII) Asitadevala or Devala (IX) Sanaka (X) Sanandana (XI) Sanātana (XII) Sanatkumāra (XIII) Bhṛgu (XIV) Śukra (XV) Kāśyapa (XVI) Parāśara (XVII) Gārga or Gārgya (XVIII) Gautama (XIX) Nārada (XX) Ārṣṭiṣeṇa (XXI) Agastya (XXII) Pulastya (XXIII) Hārita (XXIV) Ulūka (XXV) Vālmiki and (XXVI) Suka. Of these only Kapila, Āsuri, Pañcaśikha, Vindhyāvāsa and Vārṣagaṇya are of any importance. To this list we may add the authors of the two *Sāṅkhya* works, the *Saṣṭitanra* and the *Rājavārtika* which remain only in name today.

I. Kapila

The *Sāṅkhya* system is said to have been formulated by Kapila, a semi-mythical sage who stands outside the traditional line of Vedic *ṛṣis* but is regarded as an enlightened one in his own right. It is important to note that the name Kapila is a very old one. It occurs already in the *Ṛgveda* (X.27.10). According to *Sāyaṇa* it refers to the (supposed) founder of the *Sāṅkhya* system. Geldner may, perhaps, be correct in seeing the *Urbild der Ṛṣis* or the prototype of the *ṛṣi* in the name Kapila. In the *Yājñavalkīya Kāṇḍa* of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* Kapila seems to have been alluded to, by the name *Kapya Patamchala*. One cannot but see in this name a reference to Kapila and Patañjali the traditional founders of the two allied systems of the *Sāṅkhya* and the Yoga.[24] Again the name Kapila is found in the Śvet. Up. (V.2) regarding which reference Weber observes as follows:- 'The latter (=the Śvetāśvataras) gave their name to an Upaniṣad composed in metrical form and called at its close the work of a *Śvetāśvatara*: in which the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of the two primeval principles is mixed up with the Yoga doctrine of one Lord Kapila, the originator of the Sāṁkhya system, appears in it raised to divine dignity itself..... (H.I.L. p. 96).[25] From a quotation in the *Baudhāyana* (2.6.30) we learn that an *asura* Kapila originated the institution of the four *āśramas*. There is another Kapila who is credited with a Kapila-*Smṛti* dealing with *śrāddha, vivāha* and *prāyaścitta ceremonies*[26]. In the *Mahā Bhārata* (3:107) too, we come across a Kapila with great miraculous power. Again the *Sāṅkhya sūtras* which cannot be earlier that 1380-1450,[27] in their present form are traditionally ascribed to Kapila the (supposed) founder of the *Sāṅkhya* system. In the *Padma Purāṇa* we find that one Kapila (=Vāsudeva) taught the *Sāṅkhya* doctrines to Brahman, *Bhṛgu* etc:[28] another Kapila was a teacher who opposed all the Vedic tenets.[29] According to the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, Vāsudeva himself was born as Kapila in the womb of Devahūti.[30] These different allusions merely go to show that it is difficult to establish the historicity of Kapila as the founder of the *Sāṅkhya* system. The only fact that emerges from these considerations is that the name Kapila was quite well-known in ancient India although it did not enjoy the same status as those of the orthodox teachers. It is further to be noted that there is a strong tradition which supports the view that Kapila was the founder of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. In this connection we may cite the name Kapilavatthu which is supposed to have been named after the great sage Kapila, the founder of the *Sāṅkhya* system. Beyond this we cannot proceed. Hence the position of Kapila, as the founder of the *Sāṅkhya* system, is to be left as an open question.

II. Āsuri

The name Āsuri already occurs in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, a text with reference to which Macdonell observes as follows: 'Certain allusions are also suggestive of the beginnings of the *Sāṅkhya* doctrines, for mention is several times made of a teacher called Āsuri and according to tradition Āsuri is the name of a leading authority of the *Sāṅkhya* system'.[31] However, the historicity of Āsuri cannot be proved. In the *Mahā Bhārata*, Āsuri is made the teacher of Pañcaśikha (*tatra pañcaśikho nāma Kāpileyo*

mahāmuniḥ...āsureḥ prathamam śiṣyam, Sānti-Parva 218.6.10).[32] There is but one quotation ascribed to him and it occurs in the commentary of Haribhadra on the Ṣaḍdarśana-Samuccaya p. 36:-

vivikte dṛk-pariṇatau
buddhau bhogo'sya kathyate.[33]
pratibimbodayaḥ svaccho
yathā candramaso'mbhasi.

When the ripening of the quarters takes place it is called the enjoyment in the Buddhi. This is the rising of a pure image similar to that of the moon appearing in (a reservior of pure) water.

III & IV. Pañcaśikha and Vārṣagaṇya

Pañcaśikha and *Vārṣagaṇya* represent two important schools of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. *Vācaspati Miśra* refers to *Vārṣagaṇya* in his commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 47: there he attributes the aphorism, *avidyā pañcaparvā*, the ignorance consists of five branches,[34] to *Vārṣagaṇya (pañca-parvā avidyā iti-āha bhagavān vārṣagaṇyaḥ). Vārṣagaṇya* appears to have lived in the fourth century A.C.[35] Pañcaśikha seems to have had another name, namely *Vṛddha Parāśara* as appears from the *Mahā Bhārata* XII. 11875. From the numerous quotations in the *Yoga-Bhāṣya*[36] we may understand that the *Sāṅkhya* aspect of *Patañjali's* doctrines is based on the teachings of Pañcaśikha[37].

V. Vindhyāvāsa

Some scholars such as Keith have identified Vindhyāvāsa with Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*[38]. We have one quotation from Vindhyāvāsa in the *Rājāmārtaṇḍa* of Bhoja, *sattvatavyatvam eva puruṣatavyatvam*[39]. Vallālasena, king of Bengal (12 century) seems to have consulted a work of a *Sāṅkhya* teacher named *Vindhyāvāsin.*[40] According to a Chinese tradition *Vindhyāvasin wrote a Sāṅkhya* work called *Hiraṇyasaptati.*[41] Belvalkar may be right in his conjecture that this *Hiraṇyasaptati* was only a commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā.*[42] Thus the position of Vindhyāvasa remains a matter of uncertainty.

Finally we may refer to the two works, the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* and the *Rājavārtika*. Both these works are lost to us; only some quotations from them are found. According to *Vācaspati Miśra*, the following verse quoted in his *Bhāmatī* on *Vedānta-Sūtra* ii.1.2.3. is taken from the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (cp. Sharma, S.K. p.27):

guṇānām paramam rūpam
na dṛṣṭipatham ṛcchati.
yat tu dṛṣṭipatham prāptaṁ
tan mayeva sutucchakam.

The absolute form of the *Guṇas* does not come within our field of vision. All that comes within our field of vision, (on the other hand) is empty like an illusion.

This same quotation is, again, found in the *Yoga Bhāṣya IV.* 13.[43] In his commentary on the verse 72 of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* Vācaspati Miśra quotes three verses ascribed to the *Rājavārtika* which is supposed to have been written by, or for, Bhoja Rāja, King of Dhāra (1018-1060).[44] These three verses describe the ten principal topics along with another fifty, thus completing the sixty topics (*ṣaṣti-tantra* S.K.72) of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. The ten principal topics mentioned in these three verses are as follows: (1) the existence of *Pradhāna (= Prakṛti)*, (11) its oneness, (111) its objectivity, (IV) its difference from Spirit *(Puruṣa)*, (V) its subservience of Spirit, (VI) the manifoldness of Spirit, (VII) disjunction of Spirit and Nature *(Pradhāna)*, (VIII) conjunction of Spirit and Nature, (IX) continuance of embodiment and activity after the attainment of wisdom and (X) non-activity of Spirit. These are the ten principal topics. The other fifty are the five modes of ignorance, the nine forms of complacency, the twenty-eight forms of infirmity and the eight attainments.[45] Unfortunately they do not lend much help in reconstructing the early history of the *Sāṅkhya* system. In the eleventh century, al Birūni[46] has translated a *Sāṅkhya* text which, according to Takakusu, was nothing but the work of Paramārtha.[47] The opinions of the ancient exponents of the *Sāṅkhya* system are again found now and then in the different commentaries of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. Gauḍapāda's commentary on the *Kārikā* 25, for example, makes an important comment on the two technical terms *sāttvika* (characterised by the *Sattva Guṇa*) and *tāmasika* (characterised by the *Tamas Guṇa*). The ancient teachers, says Gauḍapāda, have named them *vaikārika* and *bhūtādi* respectively. All these evidences undoubtedly point to the fact that there were at least several schools of early *Sāṅkhya* thought. In fact we notice Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself expressing a personal opinion *(me mati)* in the *Kārikā* verse 61.[48] Roughly speaking we may say that there

were three stages in the history of the *Sāṅkhya* thought: they are the *pre-Kārikā* (*Proto-*Sāṅkhya*), the *Kārikā* and the post-*Kārikā* stages.[49]

(7) The main works taken into consideration in this study are as follows: (I) The *Vedas*, (II) the *Brāhmaṇas*, and (III) the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads*. In addition to these we may refer, at times, to the following works containing different *Sāṅkhya* doctrines: (I) the *Mahā-Bhārta* (II) the *Buddhacarita* (III) the *Carakasaṃhitā*, (IV) the *Maṇimēkalai* and the *Nīlakēci* (V) the *Yoga-Sūtra with the Bhāṣya*, (VI) the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* and the other *Sāṅkhya* expositions. Under the *Vedas* we lay emphasis on the *Ṛgveda* and the *Atharvaveda* with special reference to their speculative hymns. Although there is very little philosophical interest in the *Brāhmaṇas* we still find in them some isolated passages which are useful for our study. In spite of the fact that the *Upaniṣads* have been studied by different scholars, yet some interesting data in them deserve further investigation. In this connection we refer, among other things, to the *Maitrī* and the *Praśna Upaniṣads*. But it may not, perhaps, be wrong to take the *Maitrī Up.* as contemporary or even later than the *Kārikā*. The first four chapters of this *Upaniṣad* may be taken to be a comparatively early redaction as opposed to the other three chapters (cp. Ranade, C.S.U.P. p.31).[50] The *Praśna Up.* which is considered to be earlier than the *Kārikā* by some scholars[51] may probably belong to the same period. Thus the date of these *Upaniṣads* being a matter of uncertainty, we may, however, refer to them without laying emphasis on them. In the great Epic we have various expositions of the doctrine. They are either specifically *Sāṅkhya* or based on the *Sāṅkhya* thought. The most important of these expositions are found in the *Mokṣadharma* and Anugītā sections (Mahā Bhārata XII and XIV) and in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The *Rāmāyaṇa*, on the other hand, does not give us any idea regarding the developing of the system except for the fact that it gives a few comments such as, '*Viṣṇu* is the great *Puruṣa* praised by the gods with the *Yoga*, *Sāṅkhya* and *Upaniṣads*' (North Western Recension, V.91, 66). The *Buddhacarita* and the *Carakasaṃhitā* are important. In canto XII of the *Buddhacarita* there is an account of the *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* doctrines according to the Buddhist arguments of the day. In the *adhyāyas* I and V of the *śarīrasthāna* of the *Carakasaṃhitā* there is a fairly complete

account of kind of *Sāṅkhya* which is quite close to that described by Aśvaghoṣa.[52] The *Carakasaṃhitā* accepts only 24 principles, for they include both *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* under the category of the Unmanifest (*avyakta*).[53] There is another old medical work, the *Suśruta* which also has a *Sāṅkhya* section in its *Śarīrasthāna*. But this appears to be much later than the corresponding passage of the *Carakasaṃhitā* and has hardly any value for our survey.[54] The Tamil work *Maṇmēkalai*[55] is undoubtedly an early work, for it treats *Puruṣa* as a single universal soul[56] and is ignorant of the *Tanmātras*. However apart from these two points, the work does not seem to have much bearing on our problem. We may also refer to another Tamil work, the *Nīlakēci* which is later than the *Maṇimēkalai*. This anonymous Jaina poem describing the debates of *Nīlakēci* refers to *Parāśara* the *Sāṅkhya* at Hastināpura. This particular type of *Sāṅkhya*, while recognizing the twenty-five *tattvas*, is monistic like the *Sāṅkhya* found in the *Maṇimēkalai*.

Parāśara's doctrine maintains that *Puruṣa* is without *guṇas*, an enjoyer, not undergoing changes, not subject to the law of *karma*, eternal, all-pervading, all-perceiving and all-enjoying existence.[57] There are two things in this doctrine which are of particular interest to us. Firstly, the doctrine that *Puruṣa* is not bound by *Karma*, an idea which is directly opposed to the *Sāṅkhya* teaching found in the *Mahā Bhārata* XII, 11637 where the action of the *guṇas* is equated with that of *puṇya* and *pāpa* (i.e., *Karma*) (vide Ch. 7). The second is that *Puruṣa* is without *guṇas*, a concept which is incidentally implied in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 60 where Īśvarakṛṣṇa plays pun on the word *guṇa* in(i) *guṇavati* (i.e. *Prakṛti*) and (ii)*aguṇa* (one who is devoid of *guṇa* : *Puruṣa*) causing them to mean (i) the possessor of generosity, i.e. generous or the one possessing the *guṇas* and (ii) the one who is not generaous or *the one devoid of the guṇas*. Thus it appears to us that the kind of *Sāṅkhya* referred to in the *Nīlakēci* is very probably a pre-*Kārikā* type of doctrine. The last two works, the *Yoga-Sūtras* with the *Bhāṣya* and the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* are well known. The former work, the *Yoga-Sūtras*, represent the Yoga variety and is obviously a composite work.[58] It represents in general an earlier form of the doctrine. Thus the eight-fold *Buddhi* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 23[59] is unknown to the *Yoga-Sūtras*, although it is maintained now and then in the commentaries on it. The earlier parts of the *Sūtras* do not accept the

theory that *Prakṛti* becomes active in order to bring about the *puruṣārtha*[60] or the attainment of the goal of the Spirti: this fact may imply that the doctrine in question was probably unknown to them. It is also seen with fair certainty that the *Yoga-Sūtras* form a valuable link between the *Mahā Bhārata* and the *Sāṅkhya Kārika* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.[61]

(8) We may add a word regarding the repetitions, set-phrases (S.K. 24 and 52), and the contradictions (S.K. 10) that have found their way into the frame-work of the *Kārikā*. This phenomenon is mainly due to the *Kārikā's* being a synthesis of both old and new material. The best example in this connection is the problem of the *Bhāvas* or the psychic states. In the *Sāṅkhya Kārrikā* we come across two different sets of *Bhāvas*[62] from which it is clearly seen that Īśvarakṛṣṇa has given the ideas of two different traditions. Hence it is correctly observed by Deussen that in the doctrine of the *Bhāvas* in the *Kārikā* the author (Verfasser) has merely presented two different views in the same school leading to the same goal *(Ziele)*[63]. The reason as to why the commentators of the *Kārikā* at times, have not only failed to grasp the true significance of some concepts laid down in it, but also have offered different views regarding them will support our view mentioned earlier that the *Sāṅkhya* as a philosophy has been neglected or treated with indifference for a long time. An important example is the commentaries on the verse 32 of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, where the functions of the organs (*Karaṇas*) have been attributed to different organs (see table on pp.10).

Name of the Function	Different organs attributed to by different commentators			
	Gauḍapāda	Māṭhara	Vācaspati	Author[64]
Āharaṇa or seizing	*Karmendriya* or motor-organs	*Indriya* or organs	*Karmendriya* or motor-organs	*Karmendriya* or motor-organs
Dhāraṇa or retaining	*Karmendriya* or motor-organs	*Ahaṅkāra* or I-consciousness	Three-fold *Antaḥkaraṇa*	*Prāṇa*
Prakāśakaraṇa or manifestation	*Buddhīndriya* or sensory-organs	*Buddhi* or Intellect	*Buddhīndriya* or sensory-organs	*Buddhīndriya* or sensory-organs

Finally, we would like to mention that we also propose to devote three chapters for a comparative study of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy with Early Buddhism, the Avesta and the Greek thought.

Notes and References

1. "The problems are solved, not by giving new information but by arranging what we have already known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language". -Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 109.
2. Cp. *C.I.P.* p. 72.
3. Cp. Macdonell, *H.S.L.* pp. 398-400.
4. Max Müller, *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* p. 12.
5. Cp. Śaṅkara, *Sārīrika Bhāṣya* 1.4.28.
6. K.C. Bhttacharyya, "Much of the Sāṅkhya literature appears to have been lost and there seems to be no continuity of tradition from ancient times up to the age of commentators. In such systematic works as we have, one seems to have a hazy view of a grand system of speculative metaphysics... here in the Sāṅkhya the construction at many places involves supplying of missing links from one's imagination. It is a risky work but unless one does it one cannot be said to understand Sāṅkhya as a philosophy"-- *Studies in Philosophy, Vol. II*, p. 127.
7. Vide Garbe, *Der Mondschein der Sāṁkhya Wahrheit*, Munich (1892).
8. (i) Introduction to the *Māṭhara Vṛtti*, Chawkhamba Series.
   (ii) *I.H.Q. Vol. III.* p. 421.
   (iii) Belvalkar's article on *Māthara Vṛtti, Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, p. 172.
   (iv) S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, *The Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, p. XXIV.
9. Suryanarayana Sastri, *S.K.* p. XXIV.
10. Vide (a) Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. ii, p. 255.
    (b) Keith, *Sāṁkhya System*, p. 73.
11. Vide (i) Suryanarayana Sastri, *S.K.* p. XXIV, and
    (ii) R. Garbe, S.P. p. 61.
12. Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie. Erster Band, Dritte Abteilung. Die Sāṅkhya- Kārikā des Isvarakrishna übersetzt und erklart*, pp. 413-466 (Leipzig, 1914).
13. Sovani, *A Critical Study of the Sāṅkhya System* (Poona 1935).
14. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy, vol. II*, Preface, p. 127.

15. There are many concepts and doctrines which the commentators did not understand through ignorance; *Prakṛti-laya* (S.K. 45) or the loosing of the bond between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* is a good example, vide Deussen; *A.G.P.* 1, iii; p. 451 and Keith, *S.S.* p. 103. The commentators have rendered the term as 'absorption in nature' which is evidently wrong.
16. Vide introduction to *S.P.B.*, pp. XI-XIV.
17. Cp. *The Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa* by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, p. XVII.
18. Keith, *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣads*, 124.
19. Cp. Foot note 12.
20. *Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient* (1902), p. 58.
21. 'These are alternatives found in the books on this', *Yoga-Bhāṣya* on *Y.S.* 11.23.
22. *puruṣasya darśanārtham*, for the contemplation of *Puruṣa*, that is to say, for the purpose of *Prakṛti* being contemplated by *Puruṣa* (*S.K.* 21).
23. 'These are found in the books' - Vācaspati on *Yoga-Bhāṣya*, 11.23. Cp. also, J.H. Woods, *The Yoga-System of Patañjali*, p. 165.
24. Cp. Weber, *The History of Indian Literature* (London, 1878), p. 137.
25. Cp. Deussen, 'Möglich auch, dass der ganze Kapila auf unserer Stelle beruht'. *Sechzig Upanishads des Veda*, p. 304, f.n.2.
26. Kane, *History of the Dharma Śāstra*, vol. I. pp. 25, 525.
27. Cp. (i) Garbe, *Die Sāṅkhya-Philosophie* (2nd ed. Leipzig, 1917) pp. 83-84 and 95-100.
    (ii) Zimmer, *Philosophies of India*, p. 282.
28. H.D. Sharma, *S.K.* p. 13.
29. Cp. S.K. Belvalkar, *Notes on the Brahma- Sūtra* (ii.1.1) page 4.
30. H.D. Sharma, *S.K.* p. 14.
31. *H.S.L.* p. 217.
32. Sharma, *S.K.* p. 14.
33. Cp. *sarvam prati upabhogam*
    yasmāt puruṣasya sādhayati buddhiḥ, S.K. 37.
34. Cp. (i) *pañça parvām adhīmaḥ*, we meditate on him with five branches. *Śvet.Up.* 1.5. (ii) *Buddha-Carita*, XII. 33. (iii) *Tattva-Samāsa*, 14. (iv) Johnston, *E.S.* p. 8. (v) Keith, *S.S.* p. 77.
35. Cp. (i) Frauwallner, *Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṅkhya Systems, W.Z.K.S.O.* 2 (1958), pp. 84-129. (ii) G. Oberhammer, *The Authorship of the Ṣaṣṭitantram, W.Z.K.S.O.* 4 (1960) pp. 71-91. (iii) *Indo-Iranian Journal*, vol. VI (1962-63) pp. 137-140.

36. Vide Garbe, *'Pañcaśikha und seine Fragments'* in Festgruss an Roth (Stuttgart, 1893) p. 75.
37. Johnšton, *E.S.* p. 9.
38 Keith, *S.S.* p. 84.
39. Cp. H.D. Sharma, *S.K.* p. 17.
40. Kane, *History of the Dharma Sāstra*, vol. I, pp. 341 and 793.
41. *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, p. 175.
42. *B.C.V.* p. 177; Cp. also Sharma, *S.K.* p. 17.
43. Vide J.H. Woods, *The Yoga-System of Patañjali* p. 317.
    Vide *Interpretation of an old Kārikā* by H.R.R. Iyengar in the *P.K. Gode Commemoration Volume*, pp. 169-174.
44. *ibid*, p. xxii.i.
45. (i) *pradhānasthitvam ekatvam*
    arthavattvam athānyathā
    parārthyam ca tathā'naikyaṁ
    viyoge yoga eva ca.
    (ii) *śesa-vṛttir akartṛtvam*
    maulikārthāḥ smṛtā dasa
    viparyayaḥ pañcavidhas
    tathoktā nava tuṣṭayaḥ.
    (iii) *karaṇānām asāmarthyaṁ*
    aṣṭa-viṁśatidhā mataṁ
    iti ṣaṣṭiḥ padārthānām
    aṣṭabhiḥ saha siddhibhiḥ.
46. Vide E.C. Sachau, *Alberuni's India*, Trubner's Oriental Series (1964), New Delhi. Alberuni refers to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy in many places of his work, cp. pp. 30, 48, 62, 64, 75, 81, 83, 89, 92 and 132.
47. Cp. Renou, *L'Inde Classique*, section 1428 (p. 37).
48. Cp. Wilson: "It is clear therefore, that the expression refers to the author; such is his opinion"- *The Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, p. 235. Vide also chap. 23 sec. 18.
49. Cp. Sovani, *A Critical Study of the Sāṅkhya System*, p. I.
50. Vide *A.G.P.* I. 111, p. 12 and 410.
51. Vide Johnston, E.H., *Early Sāṁkhya*, pp. 3, 20, 47, 73 and 74, and Keith, *S.S.* p. II.
52. The idea presented in verse vii. 53 of the *Buddhacarita* is practically the same as that which is found in verse 36 of chapter one of the *śarīrasthāna* of the *Carakasaṁhitā* (Eng. tr.) published by Shree Gulabkunverba Ayurvedic Society, Jamnagar, India 1949.
53. Vide *ibid.*, pp. 363, 367-368.
54. Johnston, *E.S.* pp. 10-11.

55. Translation by Suryanarayana Sastri, *Journal of Indian History* (Madras) viii (1929), pp. 322-24.
56. Even the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* ... in spite of its .... still reads ... like a text concerned with one Puruaṣa. *Nāma-Rūpa and Dharma-Rūpa* by M. Falk, p. 87, f.n. 41.
57. Vide A.L. Basham, *History and Doctrine of the Ājīvikas*, p. 201.
58. Cp. Jhnston, *E.S.* p. 11.
59. adhyavasāyo buddhir-dharmo Jñānam virāga aiśvarayam sāttvikam etad-rūpam - tāmasam asmād viparyastam. The intellect is determination. Virtue, knowledge, non-attainment and the possession of lordly powers constitute its *sāttvika* form. The reverse of these are of its *tāmasa* form.
60. Cp. (i) *S.K.* 21 (ii) Johnston, *E.S.* p. 11.
61. The *M.Bh.* makes both *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* aspects of the one *Brahman* : it accepts the *Sāṅkhya* enumeration of the elements and also adds *Īśvara* as the twenty-sixth principle (*M.Bh.* XII. 309.7 ff. - Chitrashala ed. - cp. also Hopkins, E.W. *The Great Epic of India*, pp. 133 ff.). The *Yoga-Sūtras* accept only the twenty-six principles among which *Īśvara* is nothing more than a special *Puruṣa*. The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* admits only 25 categories wherein there is no place for *Īśvara*.
62. (i) The eight *Bhāvas*, S.K. 43-45.
(ii) The fifty *bhāvas* S.K. 46-51.
63. Vide Deussen, *A.G.P.* I.iii. pp. 454-455.
64. Vide Dessen, *op. cit.*, p. 443 and Sovani, *C.S.S.S*; pp. 36-37.

II

The General Background of the Sāṅkhya System

(1) A cursory glance at the Vedic and the pre-Vedic periods of Indian history may convince us that there was already sufficient conditions[1] for the gradual development of the *Sāṅkhya* thought. The stone image of a Yogin found at the Mohendo-jaro and Harappa excavations is of considerable importance.[2] This reminds us of the well-known *Muni-sūkta* of the *Ṛgveda* (10.136)[3] in which the author has portrayed the image of a *Muni* which is probably a predecessor of the later Yogin.[4] The *Muni* in this context is described as long-haired (*keśī R.V.* 10.136.1), clad in tawny-coloured garments (*piśaṅga vasate, R.V.* 10.136.2), flying in the air (*antarikṣeṇa patati, R.V.* 10.136.4), delirious by the state of being a *Muni* (*maunayena unmaditā, R.V.* 10.136.3), and also displaying all sorts of forms (*viśvā rūpā avacākśat, R.V.* 10.136.4). The picture portrayed here seems to indicate that the author was filled with a feeling of wonder at the sight of the *Muni* performing miracles.[5] It is further mentioned in a different context of the *Ṛgveda* that Indra was a friend of the *Munis* (*munīnām sakhā, R.V.* viii.17.14). This may indicate beyond reasonable doubt that the *Munis* were already gaining a favourable position in the Vedic culture and civilisation. The *Tāṇḍyamahā Brāhmaṇa* refers to a "divine muni" (*deva-muni*).[6] It is interesting to note that the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* already makes obeisance to the *Munis* of Gaṅgā and Yamunā (*namo gaṅgāyamunayor munībhyaḥ*).[7] It is possible that the term *Muni* at the beginning was mainly connected with the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* (as well as with Jainism and Buddhism). In the *Kārikā* too Īśvarakṛṣṇa once refers to Kapila as *Muni*,[8] the Silent One, the silence being due to great wisdom arising from a perfect vision of truth,[9] hence sage.[10] We may also take note of the terms like *Sākya-muni, Muni-Sutta* (*Sutta Nipāta* I.12), etc. It appears that at the beginning the two terms *Muni* and *Ṛṣi* may

have represented two different traditions. Kapila, Buddha and also Mahāvīra seem to have represented the *Muni* tradition whereas the orthodox Hindu thinkers, the *Ṛṣi* tradition. Of these the former may, in all probability, be traced back to the Indus Valley civilization.[11]

(2) We may now refer to two important passages of the *Ṛgveda* which are useful for our study. They are as follows : (i) I was Manu, I was also Sūrya. (Now) I am the Seer Kakṣīvān (holy) singer. I master Kutsa, the son of Arjuna. I am the Kavi Uśana, behold me (*R.V.* IV.26.1).[12] (ii) Being yet in embryo I observed all generations of the devas (IV.27.1).[13] These passages are of great value to the students of the early history of Indian philosophy in that they seem to refer to two important indigenous doctrines that anticipated the systems of Sāṅkhya, Jainism and Buddhism. The former passage may imply what is technically known as the *pubbenivāsānussati ñāna*, the knowledge of remembrance of one's former state of existence which is described as one of the faculties of an *Arhant* (*Dīgha*.III.110,220; *Majjhima*.I.35). The latter seems to convey the idea of a developed consciousness and an unusual ability of observation on the part of Vāmadeva while he was yet in the mother's womb. The view that a developed consciousness can exercise its powers of discrimination etc., even in the embryonic stage can be seen even in the Early Buddhist texts such as the *Dīgha Nikāya* iii, p.103 (vide Wijesekera *Upanishadic* Terms for Sense-Functions, U.C.R. October, 1944, pp.15-16).

(3) The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy has an antipathy towards the priests and the sacrificial gifts. According to it, one of the different forms of bondage is the "bondage by sacrificial gifts".[14] This form of bondage arises when one through misconception gives gifts to priests (*dakṣiṇā*). This is a distinct sign of hostility to priests and sacrifice.[15] The faint beginning of this *Sāṅkhya* attitude was already taking shape since the latter part of the *Ṛgveda*. *Dakṣiṇā* (lit. that which is placed on the right-hand side of the priest), as we know, is an outcome of the *Śraddhā* [*Śrad* + $\sqrt{dh\bar{a}}$ = lit. placing (one's) heart; related to Latin *Credo* (*Cred*-do, I believe)] or faith. It was through *Śraddhā* that they performed sacrifice. In some passages of the *Ṛgveda* we notice a lack of faith. In the tenth *Maṇḍala* of the *Ṛgveda*. an entire hymn (X.151) is addressed to *Śraddhā* or Faith. This short

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but important hymn deserves our attention : therefore we may translate it first :

Śraddhā or Faith (R.V. X.151)

i. Agni is kindled by Faith. Oblation is offered up (*hūyate*) through Faith. We celebrate with praise (*vacasā*) Faith upon the height of happiness (*bhaga*).

ii. O Faith, make this word of mine (*iyam me uditam*) pleasant (*priya*) to the one who gives, to the one who is desirous of giving and (also) to the liberal worshippers.

iii. Even as the gods maintained Faith in connection with the powerful Asuras, so make this word of mine (worthy of faith) among the liberal worshippers.

iv. Guarded by Vāyu, the sacrificing gods, draw near to (*upāsa* < *upa* + $\sqrt{as}$) or honour Faith. Man winneth Faith by the intention or yearnings (*ākūti*, Geldner, *Vorsatz*) of the heart, and (also) wealth (vasu) by Faith.

v. We invoke, Faith in the early morning, we invoke Faith at noonday; we (also) invoke Faith at the setting of the sun. O Faith make one here, have belief (or faith) in us.

We agree with Oldenberg in maintaining that in this hymn (*R.V.* X.151.2 and 3) there is a close connection between *Śraddhā* and *Dakṣiṇā*.[16] It has been aptly pointed out by Deussen that an invocation of this sort would be unintelligible if one does not assume a certain lack of faith as prevalent in the age in which the hymns were composed.[17] *Śraddhā* in this hymn is undoubtedly the faith in gods and the confidence of the sacrificer in the power of priests.[18] This lack of faith had greatly perturbed the minds of the priests. A halt to this tendency was imperatively

essential. Back to the Vedic gods, and back to the priests, this was a must in the eyes of the exponents of the Vedic thought. Hence it is thus observed in the *Śvet.Up.* (ii.7): with Savitar as the inspirer (*prasavena*) one should delight in the ancient prayer (*brahma pūrvyam*). When you take your stand there, (then) your previous work will no more affect you.[19]

(4) Sacrifice which is closely connected with the *dakṣiṇā* (the sacrificial gifts) was a functional trait of the orthodox Brahmanic culture. The exponents of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy have emphatically denounced the efficacy of the Vedic sacrifices and they have looked down upon them as being impure (*a--viśuddha, S.K.*2). Īśvarakṛṣṇa has clearly mentioned that : the revealed (*ānuśravika*) is like the evident one (or sensuous perception = *dṛṣṭa*), and is also linked with impurity, destruction and inequality.[20] On this Gauḍapāda adds : "linked with impurity, destruction and inequality : linked with impurity because of the slaughter of animals" (*paśu-ghātāt*). The practice of denouncing the *Vedic* sacrifices has a long history. Already in the *A.V.* (XX.9.3,49.6) and in the *Black Yajyur Veda* (VI.2.8) we come across a group of (religious) people called *Yatis* (lit. the striving ones) who were independent of the fetters of the Brahmanical hierarchy. In the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* these same *Yatis* are said to have condemned sacrifices: they are further said to have been thrown to the jackals.[21] In the *Tāṇḍyamahā-Brāhmaṇa* the *Yatis* are regarded as enemies of Indra, the central figure of the *Vedic* culture (*Taṇḍ.Br.* Chowkhamba ed.1.p.208). It is important to note that the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* (ii.40) has defined a *Yati* as an ascetic bent on obtaining the Yogic powers.[22]

(5) The concept of *ahiṃsā* or non-violence is seen side by side with that of the institution of sacrifice. *Vedic* rites and ceremonies such as the *Aśvamedha* required the slaughter of a large number of animals (cp.Gauḍapāda on *S.K.*2). The *Sāṅkhyas* were (especially) against these animal sacrifices. The fact that the *Sāṅkhyas* were greatly opposed to the killing of animals is very well-recognized[23]. This dislike towards the slaughter of animals is a very old one. The origin of this tendency can be traced back to the late *Ṛgvedic* period. In the *Xth* Book there is an important verse which condemned not only the votaries of the *Veda* but also those who engaged in the animal slaughter :

na taṃ vidātha yaimā jajāna
anyad yuṣmākam antaram babhūva.
nīhāreṇa pravṛtta jalpyā ca-
asutṛpā uktasāśaś caranti.
(*R.V.* X.82.7)

You will not find him who produced these creatures;
another thing has risen up among you. Enwrapt in
misty cloud (or being self-deluded) and prattling,
the life-stealing priests go hither and thither.

The importance of this passage was alive in the minds of the later writers such as the author of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* who directly alludes to it.[24] This disapproval of the animal sacrifice reminds us of the well-known verse in the *Māṭhara Vṛtti* on the second verse of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* :

vṛkṣān chitvā paśūn hatvā
kṛtvā rudhira kardamam
yajñaiś ced gamyate svargo
narakaḥ kena gamyate.

Having cut down trees and having slain animals and thus
making a pool of blood, if by this sort of sacrifice Heaven
is attained, who, alas, will ever go to Hell.

which is like a commentary on the above given *Ṛgvedic* verse. The (*Vedic*) priests, at times, seem to have been an object of ridicule. The *Maṇḍūka-sūkta* of the *Ṛgveda* (VII.103.1) (which has been interpreted differently) may perhaps contain a subtle satire directed towards the Brahmin priests when it is said: "the frogs having lain for a year like *Brāhmaṇas* practising a vow" (*saṃvatsaraṃ śaśamānā, brāhmaṇā vratacāriṇaḥ*). The comparison of frogs here does not seem to be a well-meant one. The same tendency prevails in the *Chānd.Up.*(1.12.4-5) where there is a satire on priestly ritual (cp. R.K., *P.U.*p.357). Here dogs are described as marching in a procession like the priests and then saying : "Aum let us eat, Aum let us drink (*aum adāma, aum pibāma*) etc.[25]

(6) The atheism of the classical *Sāṅkhya* is obvious. However, they do not venture to oppose the *Vedas* openly. They adopt the more practical process of sapping their foundations.[26] This *Sāṅkhya* atheism too has a history behind it, and its roots are already found in the *Ṛgveda*. The very existence of Indra is

doubted. Thus the hymn (*R.V.*11.12) pointedly refers to the current disbelief in the existence and supremacy of Indra (*utem āhur na-eṣo asti-iti, R.V.* 11.12.5) and endeavours by recounting his great deeds to convince the unbelievers of his majesty and power. There is another instance in the *Ṛgveda* which is, perhaps, of greater interest, as it is not the opinion of a disbeliever but, on the contrary, that of a votary of Indra himself. Thus in the eulogy of the *R.V.* VII.37.7, the poet unconsciously introduces the fact that even Indra is subject to old age and decay; that he is not an eternal (omnipotent) divinity. It is interesting to find that more or less the same trend of thought is found in the *Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya* on the second verse of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*.[27] Terms like *deva-nid* (*R.V.* I.152.2; II.23.8, VI.61.3), maligners of gods or *apavrata* (*R.V.*I.51.9; V.42.9) men of no principles, too indicate the atheism prevailing in the *Vedic* period. Yāska, the author of the *Nirukta* who flourished about 500 B.C. mentions, in his work, that one Kutsa has criticized the *Veda* as meaningless or self-contradictory (*The Nirukta*, 1.XV - XVI). The *Kalpa-Sūtras* too refer now and then to infidels (*nāstikas*) classifying them with sinners and criminals.[28]

(7) In the *Upaniṣads*, particularly in the *Śvet.* one already comes across nearly half a dozen of different philosophical views (*Śvet.Up.*1.2.).[29] The *Svabhāva-vāda* or naturalism of the *Upaniṣads* seems to have been responsible for a particular attitude noticeable in the Epic which tends to do away with the conception of the absolute and to set soul or *Puruṣa* against matter or *Prakṛti* as mutually independent entities (cp.*M.Bh.*XII.314; *B.G.*III.27, IX.10, XIII.19, 20 and 29). This tendency has been clearly described by Hiriyanna: 'the notion of the Absolute as the supreme - or sometimes that of God - is retained, with puruṣa and prakṛti regarded as subordinate to, though distinct from, it ..... Puruṣa and Prakṛti are sharply distinguished ... It is a knowledge of the distinction between them ... that is believed in this new doctrine to qualify for release from saṁsāra.[30] This position need not be taken, as Garbe did, as a full-fledged Sāṅkhya but as *Proto-Sāṅkhya*, which has paved the way for the appearance of the *Sāṅkhya*, the most ancient school of Indian philosophy.

Notes and References

1. Cp.Macdonell,*V.R.*p.207.
2. Vide R.K.Mookerji,*H.C.*Part I pp.20-21.
3. Cp.The *Muni-Sutta* of the *Sutta-Nipāta* (1.12).
4. Keith, *Sāṅkhya System*.p.16.
5. Vide G.C.Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p.258.
6. *Tāṇḍyamahā-Brāhmaṇa* II, p.601.
7. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, I.p.166.
8. *"etat pavitraṁ agryam, munir āsuraye...pradadau"* - S.K.70.
9. Cp : (i) *"maunāt satyam viśiṣyate"* (ii) *"upaśānto 'yam ātmā"* Saṅkara's comy. on the *Brahma Sūtra*,iii.2.17.
10. 'Sage' being derived from Latin *sapere*, to be wise, is close to the concept of *muni* in Sanskrit.
11. Vide Zimmer, *Philosophies of India*, p.217.
12. *aham manur abhavam sūryaś ca-ahaṁ*
kakṣīvām ṛṣir asmi vipraḥ.
aham kutsam ārjuneyam nyrañje
aham kavir uśanā pasyatā mā.
13. *garbhe nu sann anveṣām avedam*
aham devānām janmāni viśvā.
14. *Prākṛtena ca bandhena - tathā vaikārikeṇa ca*
dākṣiṇena tṛtīyena - baddhā nānyena mucyate.
(Gauḍapāda on *S.K.* 44).
15. *Sāṅkhya System*, p.111.
16. *Z.D.M.G.* 50 p.448.
17. *Indian Antiquary* (1900).
18. *Der Rig-Veda*, iii, p.383.
19. *savitrā prasavena, juṣeta brahma pūrvyam*
tatra yonim kṛṇavse, na hite pūrtam akṣipat.
Cp.Deussen, *Durch Savitar, durch seinen Trieb*
Freut des Gebets, des alten, euch
Wenn dort ihr euren stand nehmet
Befleckt euch fruh'res Werk nicht mehr. (Sech.Up.p.295).
20. *dṛṣṭavad ānuśravikaḥ*
*sa hy aviśuddhi-kṣaya-atiśaya- yuktaḥ. S.K.*2.
21. Cp. Max Müller, *Sāṅkhya and Yoga*, p.58.
22. Vide J.S.Woods, *Y.S.P.* p.188.
23. Cp. *S.K.*2 and R.K. *I.P.* vol.11 pp.330 and 285.
24. Cp. *The Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, 11.21.28.
25. Cp. Sharma, *I.P.* p.10.

26. Cp. R.K. *I.P.* Vol II p.302; Sovani *C.S.S.S.* pp.3-4.
27. *bahūnīndra sahasrāṇi*
devānām ca yuge yuge
kālena samatītāni
kālo hi duratikramaḥ.
28. Cp. *Gautama Dharma Sūtra* XV. 15.
29. *kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatir yadṛcchā*
bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintyā
saṃyoga eṣām na tvātma-bhāvād
ātmāpy anīśaḥ sukha-duḥkha-hetoḥ.
Time, inherent nature, necessity, chance, the elements, the womb or *Puruṣa* (person), are they to be considered as the cause? It cannot indeed be a combination to these, because of the existence of the soul. Even the soul is powerless in respect of the cause of pleasure and pain.
30. *O.I.P.* p.106.

III

The Term Sāṅkhya and Its Significance

(1) Kapila, who is traditionally considered as the founder of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, according to the historian R.K. Mookerji, has taught his doctrine at Mathura or Taxila.[1] What is of interest to us here is the origin of the name of Kapila's philosophy: the *Sāṅkhya*. It is also to to be noted that the word *Sāṅkhya* does not occur within the text of the *(Sāṅkhya) Kārikā*, the oldest extent work of the system. In the *Kārikā* the doctrine is just referred to as : "this supreme purifying (knowledge) *(etat pavitram agryam, S.K.*70). The word *Sāṅkhya* appears for the first time in the *Śvet.Up.* (vi. 13) in the following context : *tat kāraṇam Sāṅkhya - Yogādhigamyam* - that cause which is to be apprehended by discrimination (of *Sāṅkhya*) and discipline (Yoga). It is again found in the *Śāntiparva* of the *Mahā Bhārata*.[2]

(2) The term *Sāṅkhya* is formed of *sam* = together +√*khyā* meaning, to reckon, count, sum up, enumerate and calculate. Thus it means in general the enumerative analysis in the form of classification and division. Hence it is pertinently observed by Renou: *"Le nom de Sāṅkhya.....signifie proprement 'ce qui repose sur le nombre', allusion à l'emploi caracteristique que fait cette doctrine de enumerations et d'une hierarchie classificatoire"*[3] ("The name *Sāṅkhya*... .....properly means 'that which rests on number', allusion to the characteristic employment which makes this doctrine one of enumerations and of a classificatory hierarchy").

(3) We must however mention here that the Indologists are divided regarding the meaning of the term *Sāṅkhya*. We may briefly sum up the different views as follows : (i) L.D. Barnet[4], W. Monier Williams,[5] A.B. Keith, [6] H.Zimmer[7], J.Sinha,[8] Ninian Smart,[9] R.C.Zaehner,[10] R.K.Mookerji,[11] and Louis Renou, [12] are generally inclined to believe that the word *Sāṅkhya* means 'enumeration'. (ii) Suryanarayana Sastri [13] is of opinion that the term *Sāṅkhya* has both meanings: 'enumeration' and 'reflection'.

(iii) Deussen[14] and Radhakrishnan [15] take the word to mean 'reflection'. (iv) Macdonell expresses his doubt whether the term *Sāṅkhya* originally meant ' enumeration', from the twenty five principles or 'discriminative doctrine', from the method it pursues.[16] (v)Richard Garbe derives it from *Saṁkhyā* (number) and takes it to mean 'analysis' *(Untersuchung)*, 'examination' *(Prüfung)*, 'discrimination' *(Unterscheidung)* and 'consideration' (Erwägung).[17] (vi) Hermann Oldernberg is inclined to take it to mean 'examination', 'calculation' and 'description by enumeration of constituents[18], (vii) Hermann Jacobi (reviewing the second edition of Garbe's book, i.e.Die *Sāṁkhya-Philosophie)* in the *G.G.A*, CLXXXI (1919), p. 28, holds that *Sāṁkhya* means defining a concept by enumerating its content; earlier reviewing the first edition of Garbe's book, in *G.G.A.* CLVII (1895), p.209, and also in his well-known work, *Der Ursprung des Buddhismus aus dem Sāṅkhya- Yoga* (especially pp.47 - 53) he held that the word refers to investigation of the categories of existence. (viii) Mircea Eliade thinks that the term may mean 'discrimination' and 'discernment'.[19] None of these views are established on a sound principle of *verification* : in other words, sufficient evidence has not been adduced in support of these views. It is not enough to say that something is the case unless it is shown with good evidence [20] as to why it is so. Therefore we propose to go into a detailed study of the problem.

(4) In our study of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* we have found that it has a great predilection for sub-divisions, enumeration and analysis, a fact which we will be discussing towards the latter part of this chapter. A careful study of the first sixty-nine verses of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* shows that they contain some 92 examples of this kind. Hence we may conclude that "enumerative" sense of the word *Sāṅkhya* is more in keeping with the contents of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. It is, in fact, hardly possible to agree with Guṇaratna's view that *Sāṅkhya*, derived its name from a supposed first founder Saṅkha [21] specially in view of the fact that the suggestion has no historical support.

(5) Enumerative analysis as a method is of historical significance. In India "number" played a very important role right from the time of the *Ṛgveda*. We may have a cursory glance, here, at the gradual development of this concept in the early literature. Already in the *Ṛgveda* (X.90) there is an inquiry into

the different parts of the *Puruṣa* and also what they have really become (X.90.11). This analysis of the *Puruṣa* is not without significance for the later thought. Again in the *Atharvaveda* (X.2) we come across an enumeration of the human body (1 to 8) with the idea of searching for a principle hidden in it.[22] This tendency is further continued in the *Brāhmaṇas* and the early *Upaniṣads* where they repeatedly attempt the analysis of the individudal with the idea of ascertaining the religious fate of man. Firstly, there was the desire to discover the most vital component of the individual. Originally this was for the symbolic interpretation of the *Vedic* rites and later for the benefit of those, who had discarded the rites in favour of asceticism or *Yoga*, to enable them to reach the final goal. Secondly, they were interested in the nature of life after death. The idea of transmigration exercised many minds. So they wanted to search for an answer to the question what elements of the individual survived into the next existence. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* provides us with an important passage (X.1.3.4) where the individual is divided into ten parts consisting of five immortal parts and five mortal parts. Johnston's observations on the passage are important : "This division foreshadows the difference of aspect noted above between the material and the mental principles of *Sāṅkhya* on its physical side"[23]. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (1.6) the individual person is analysed into *nāman, rūpa* and *karman*. *Nāmarūpa* is a very old concept. It appears already in the philosophical portion of the *Atharvaveda* (X.2.12; XI.7.1 and XII.8.9) as two words. The concept is again found in the *Ś.B.* (XI.2, 3, 3 and 6) and the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* (ii.2.7.1). In the form of a compound it is found in the *Upaniṣads* such as *Bṛhad. Up. i*.4.7 and 6.3; *Chānd. Up* VI. 3.2-3 and VIII.14.1; *Muṇḍaka Up*.III.2.8 (also separately at 1.1.9) and Praśna Up. VI.5. The scope of the compound in all these passages is made clear by the *Bṛhad. Up.* passage (1.6) which was referred to above, that the individual person is made up of *nāman,-rūpa* and *karman*. It is undoubtedly from inquiries and analyses of this sort that the (early) *Sāṅkhya* derived its special character or being enumerative.

(6) We may now refer to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* with a view to examine its great predilection for enumerative analysis. The *Sāṅkhya* "fondness for sub-divisions"[24] and analysis is clearly

seen in the *(Sāṅkhya) Kārikā*. Below we tabulate all these enumerations and sub-divisions in the ascending order of magnitude:

Two-fold enumerations

i. The Scriptural means *(ānuśravika)* is doubly defective *(S.K.* 1 and 2):
(a) It has no finality *(atyantataḥ - abhāva)* and
(b) It has no certainty *(ekāntataḥ-abhāva)*.

ii. Buddhi is mainly two-fold *(S.K.* 3 and 23):
(a) *Sāttvika Buddhi* and
(b) *Tāmasika Buddhi.*

iii. The double nature of mind *(S.K.* 27):
It is of the nature of both organs,
(a) Cognitive and
(b) Active.

iv. The two types of organs *(indriyas)* (S.K.3 & 26):
(a) The five organs of sense, and
(b) The five organs of action.

v. The two principles of the *Sāṅkhya (S.K.* 3).
(a) *Puruṣa,* and
(b) *Prakṛti.*

vi. The 23 categories beginning with Mahat are divided into two classes *(S.K.*3):
(a) Evolvents *(Prakṛti)* and
(b) Evolutes *(Vikṛti).*

vii. The 23 categories *(S.K.* 7, *Mahad-ādi* = the Great One and the rest) are again said to possess two types of characteristics:
(a) They are (partly) similar to *Prakṛti,* and
(b) They are (partly) dissimilar to *Prakṛti.*

viii. Inference *(S.K.*5).
It is preceded by the knowledge of:
(a) A mark *(liṅga* = the middle term) and
(b) That which bears the mark *(liṅgin*= the major term).

ix. The two types of objects that do not come within the scope of perception *(S.K.6)*:
(a) Those that are beyond senses *(atīndriya)* and
(b) Those that cannot be directly perceived *(parokṣa)*.

x. The material world is two-fold *(S.K.*10-11):
(a) The manifest *(Vyakta)* and
(b) The unmanifest *(Avyakta)*.

xi. Each *Guṇa* is described to possess two characteristics *(S.K. 13)*:
(a) *Sattva* - light and bright,
(b) *Rajas* - exciting and mobile,
(c) *Tamas* - heavy and enveloping.

xii. The creation is two-fold *(S.K.24; cf. S.K..* 52);
(a) The creation of the group of eleven (the set of eleven organs of cognition), and
(b) The creation of the five-fold subtle elements *(tanmātra)*.

xiii. The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (v.52) mentions another two-fold creation viz.
(a) The creation of the *Liṅga* and
(b) The creation of the *Bhāvas* or the psychic states.

xiv. The functions of the three internal organs are two-fold *(S.K.*29) :

(a) The *special* function of each organ. The definition of intellect has been given as " determination is intellect" (*S.K.*23);

determination is also the function of intellect. Similarly, "Ego is self-consciousness" (S.K.24) is the definition of ego; consciousness is also the function of ego. "Mind is determinative" (*S.K.*27) is the definition of mind; therefore the function of mind is only determinativeness.[25]

(b) The *common* functions of the three organs, namely the circulation of the five vital airs (*prāṅas*).

xv. The organs (*karaṇas*) are two-fold (S.K. 33):

(a) The internal *ābhyantara* organs, and

(b) The external (*bāhya*) organs.

xvi. The dual functions of *Buddhi* (*S.K.*37):

(a) The provision of enjoyment for *Puruṣa*, and

(b) The provision of the means of liberation for *Puruṣa*.[26]

xvii. Aśakti or lack of power[27] is of two kinds (*S.K.*49):

(a) The weakness of the ten senses and mind (*indriyavadha*), and

(b) The defects of intellect (*buddhi-vadha*) which prevent the attainment of the nine satisfactions (*tuṣṭis*) and eight perfections (*siddhis*).

xviii. The *tuṣṭis* or satisfactions are two-fold (*S.K.*50):

(a) The four internal satisfactions viz. Nature (*Prakṛti*), means (*upādana*), time (*kāla*) and luck (*bhāgya*), and

(b) The five external satisfactions viz. those due to aversion from the objects of senses.

Three-fold enumerations

i. *Duḥkha* or misery is three-fold (*S.K.*1) :

(a) Misery caused by the *daiva* or the *karma* (*ādhidaivika*)[28]

(b) Misery resulting from men, animals and inanimate objects (*ādhibhautika*), and

(c) Misery caused by intrinsic influences, bodily or mental (*ādhyātmika*).

ii. The *ānuśravika* or that which is derived from the *anuśrava*, the revealed texts, namely the *Veda* has three-fold defects (*S.K.*2).
It is linked with:

(a) impurity (*aviśuddhi*),

(b) destruction (*kṣaya*) and

(c) surpassability (*atiśaya* : Deussen, *Übermass*).

iii. The *Sāṅkhya* method of deliverance is derived from the discriminative knowledge of three entities:

(a) the Evolved (*vyakta*),

(b) the Unevolved (*avyakta*) and

(c) the Knower (*jña*).

iv. *Ahaṅkara* or "I-consciousness" is of three types (*S.K.*25):

(a) *Vaikṛta ahaṅkāra* or the I-consciousness with a preponderance of the *Sattva Guṇa*,

(b) *Bhūtādi ahaṅkāra* or the I- consciousness with a preponderance of the *Tamas Guṇa*, and

(c) *Taijasa ahaṅkāra* or the I-consciousness wherein *Sattva* and *Tamas* are overcome by *Rajas*.

v. There are three types of categories (*tattvas*) that are both evolvents and evolutes (*S.K.* 3):

(a) *Mahat* or the Great One,

(b) *Ahaṅkāra* or the I-consciousness, and

(c) *Tanmātras* or the subtle elements.

vi. *Prakṛti* consists of three constituents (*S.K.* 3 & 13):

(a) *Sattva* or that element of *Prakṛti* which is of the nature of pleasure, and is buoyant or light (*laghu*) and bright or illuminating (*prakāśaka*),

(b) *Rajas* or that element of *Prakṛti* which is of the nature of activity in things, and

(c) *Tamas* or that element of *Prakṛti* which is of the nature of passivity and negativity in things.[29]

vii. The *Pramāṇas* or the independent sources of valid knowledge accepted by the *Sāṅkhyas* are three in number (*S.K.*3) :

(a) *Dṛsta* or perception,

(b) *Anumāna* or inference, and

(c) *Āpta-vacana* or valid testimony.

viii. There are three types of *Anumāna* or inference (*S.K.*5): [30]

(a) *Pūrvavat* or the inference that is based on the observed uniformity of concomittance between two things.

(b) When one infers, after examining a portion of something, that the rest (*śeṣa*) too is of the same nature as that which is examined, the process is called *Seṣavat*.

(c) *Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* or the inference in which, with the support of what is found in the sphere of sensuous objects, one reasons about parallel cases in the sphere of the supersensuous.[31]

ix. The functions of the organs are three in number (*S.K.*32):

(a) Seizing (*āharaṇa*),

(b) Retaining (*dhāraṇa*) and

(c) Manifesting (*prakāśakara*).

x. *Antaḥkaraṇa* or the Internal Organ is made up of three (*trayaḥ* - *S.K.*29) principles (*S.K.* 29-33):

(a) *Mahat* or *Buddhi* - the Great One or the Intellect.

(b) *Ahaṅkāra* or "I-Consciousness" and

(c) *Manas* or the mind.

xi. *Pañca-bhūta* or the five (gross) elements are said to possess three types of characteristics (*S.K.*38). They are the characteristics of being,

(a) tranquil (*śānta*),

(b) terrific (*ghora*) and

(c) delusive (*mūḍha*).

xii. *Viśeṣa* or the specific objects are three-fold (*S.K.* 39):

(a) subtle or fine elements (*śūkṣma*),

(b) those born of father and mother (*mātāpitṛja*), and

(c) the *Prabhūtas* (or the gross elements) which form the mass of inorganic nature.[32]

xiii. *Bhāvas* or the psychic states are of three kinds (*S.K.*43). They are:

(a) *Sā ṇsiddhika-* connate or as Deussen calls it *fertig mitgebracht*,

(b) *Prākṛtika*, natural or as Deussen calls it *angeboren*, and

(c) *Vaikṛtika*, acquired or as Deussen calls it *neu entstanden*.

xiv. *Bandha* or bondage is three-fold (*S.K.*44 and *Gauḍapāda's* commentary on it).

Thus observes *Gauḍapāda* on this question of bondage:

prākṛtena ca bandhena
tathā vaikārikeṇa ca
dākṣiṇena tṛtīyena
baddho nānyena mucyate.

He who is bound by the *prākṛta, vaikṛta* and the *dākṣiṇa* bondages, is not liberated by anything else (except the knowledge).
The three types of bondage can be explained as follows :

(a) The *Prākṛta* bondage. This is the bondage resulting from the belief in any of the evolvents as the highest reality.

(b) The *Vaikṛta* bondage. This results from the belief in any of the evolutes as the highest reality.

(c) The *Dākṣiṇa* bondage or the bondage by sacrificial gifts (vide Keith *S.S.*p.111).
The man in *dākṣiṇaka* bondage centres his faith in deities and sacrifices and thus passes only from death to death. [33]

xv. The curb on attainment is three-fold (*siddheḥtrividha-aṅkuśa, S.K.*, 51 cf. also *S.K.*, 47).

(a) *Viparyaya* or the ignorance (i.e. the erroneous view),

(b) *Aśakti* or lack of power, and

(c) *Tuṣṭi* or satisfaction.

xvi. *Bhautika-sarga* or the creation of beings (Deussen: *die Wesen Schöpfung*) is three-fold (*S.K.*53).

(a) *Daiva* or the divine order,

(b) *Tairyagyona* or the animal world (Deussen: *die Tierwelt), and*

(c) *Mānuṣa* or the human class.

xvii. The universe is divided into three regions (*S.K.*.54):

(a) *Ūrdhva* or the upper region where the *Sattva Guṇa* predominates.

(b) *Madhya* or the middle region where *Rajas* predominates, and

(c) *Mūla* or the lower region with a predominance of the *Tamas Guṇa.*

Four-fold enumerations

i. *Ādhibhautika duḥkha*, the misery resulting from animate and inanimate objects, according to Gauḍapāda, is four-fold (*S.K.*1 and the *G.B.*).
These four-fold miseries are due to:

(a) *Jarāyuja* or the viviparous,

(b) *Aṇḍaja* or the oviparous,

(c) *Svedaja* or those born of sweat, and

(d) *Udbhijja* or those born of soil.

ii. The *Sāṅkhya* categories are classified into four groups (*S.K.*3):

(a) *Mūla-prakṛti* or the Primal Nature (Dessen: *Die Urerzeugerin)* which is not an evolute.

(b) The seven beginning with the Great One (*Mahad ādyaḥ......sapta*) i.e. the Great One or Intellect, Ego and the five subtle elements, which are both evolvents and evolutes.

(c) The group of sixteen (*ṣoḍaśaka*) (the five organs of sense, the five of action, the mind and the five gross elements). The constituents of this group are but evolutes.

(d) *Puruṣa* or the Spirit which is neither an evolute nor an evolvent.

iii. The *Sāttvika* forms of *Buddhi* are four in number (S.K. 23, 44-45):

(a) *Dharma* or virtue.[34]

(b) *Jñāna* or knowledge.

(c) *Vairāgya* or non-attachment.[35]

(d) *Aiśvarya* or divine power.

iv. The *Tāmasika* forms of *Buddhi* are also four in number *S.K.* 23, 44-45):

(a) *Adharma* or vice.

(b) *Ajñāna* or ignorance.

(c) *Avirāyya* or attachment (Keith, S.S. p. 103, desire

(d) *Avirāgya* or lack of divine power.

v. There are four aspects of *dharma (S.K.,* 23 & *G.B.*):

(a) *Dayā* or mercy.

(b) *Dāna* or charity.

(c) *Yamas* or the five restraints.

(d) *Niyamas* or the five obligations.

vi. *Sarga* or the creation is supposed to be four -fold (*S.K.*, 24 & 52).

(a) The creation of the group of eleven, five organs of cognition, five organs of action and the mind (*S.K.* 24).

(b) The creation of the five-fold subtle elements (*S.K.*, 24).

(c) The creation of the *Liṅga* (*S.K.*52).

(d) The creation of the *Bhāvas* or the psychic states (*S.K.*52).

vii. *Catuṣṭaya* or the (group of) four that functions with regard to the visible objects (*S.K.*, 30 & *G.B.*):

(a) *Buddhi* or Intellect,

(b) *Ahaṅkāra* or the I-consciousness,

(c) *Manas* or the mind, and

(d) An organ of sense.

viii. The *Pratyaya-śarga* or the creation of intellect (Deussen: *Buddhischöpfung*) (i.e. the fifty *bhāvas*) is analysed into four groups (*S.K.*46-51):

(a) *Viparyayas* or the erroneous views.

(b) *Aśakti* or lack of power.

(c) *Tuṣṭi* or satisfaction.

(d) *Siddhi* or perfections.

ix. The internal satisfactions are four in number (*S.K.* 50):

(a) *Prakṛti* or Nature.

(b) *Upādāna* or means.

(c) *Kāla* or time, and

(d) *Bhāgya* or luck.

Five-fold enumerations

i. *Ādhidaivika duḥkha* or the misery caused by the *daiva* or the *karma* [36] is five-fold (*S.K.*1. and *G.B.):*

(a) *Śīta* or cold,

(b) *Uṣṇa* or heat,

(c) *Vāta* or storm,

(d) *Varṣā* or rain, and

(e) *Aśani* or thunder.

ii. *Avyakta* or the Unmanifest as the cause does exist (*S.K.* 15) :

(a) It exists because of the finiteness of the specific objects, for the finite (itself) cannot be the cause of the infinite (*bhedānām parimāṇāt*).

(b) It exists because the common characteristics of individual things imply a common source of them (*samanvayāt*) and this common source is the Avyakta.

(c) It exists because the individual things are the effects of a potent cause (*śaktitaḥ pravṛttaḥ*) which is nothing but the *Avyakta.*

(d) The finite world (considered as an effect) is not its own cause :therefore the finite world has a cause (*kāraṇa-kārya-vibhāga*) from which it has evolved (i.e. from the *Avyakta*).

(e) The unity of the universe (*viśvarūpa-avibhāga)* points to a single cause which is to be taken as the *Avyakta.*

iii. *Tanmātras* or the subtle essences are of five kinds (*S.K.* 25):
(a) *Śabda-tanmātra,*
(b) *Sparśa-tanmātra,*
(c) *Rūpa-tanmātra,*
(d) *Rasa-tanmātra,* and
(e) *Gandha-tanmātra.*

iv. The organs of sense are five in number (*S.K.26):*
(a) *Cakṣu* or eye.
(b) *Śrotra* or ear.
(c) *Ghrāṇa* or nose.
(d) *Rasana* or tongue.
(e) *Tvak* or skin.

v. The organs of action are also five (*S.K.* 26):
(a) *Vāc* or speech.
(b) *Pāṇi* or hands.
(c) *Pāda* or feet.
(d) *Pāyu* or anus.
(e) *Upastha* or the organ of procreation.

vi. The gross elements are five in number (*S.K.* 22) :
(a) *Ākāśa* or ether.

(b) *Vāyu* or wind.
(c) *Tejas* or fire.
(d) *Āpaḥ* or water.
(e) *Pṛthivī* or earth.

vii. The mutual activities of the *Guṇas* are five-fold (*S.K.* 12) :
(a) To suppress each other (*anyonya-abhibhava).*
(b) To co-operate with (=to support) each other (*anyonya-āśraya).*
(c) To produce each other (*anyonya-janana).*
(d) To consort each other (*anyonya-mithuna)*[37].
(e) To exist mutually (*anyonya-vṛtti).*

viii. & ix. Both the *Yamas* and the *Niyamas* are five-fold (*S.K.* 23 and *G.B.*): These sub-divisions are discussed by Patañjali in his *Yoga-Sūtra,* ii. 30 and 32.

x. *Prāna* or the vital airs are five in number (*S.K.* 29) :
(a) *Prāṇa.*
(b) *Apāna.*
(c) *Vyāna.*
(d) *Samāna.*
(e) *Udāna.*
(vide Chapter XIV on the *Prāṇas*).

xi. The *Viparyayas* or the erroneous views are five *(pañca-viparyaya)* (*S.K.* 47 and *G.B.*)
(a) *Tamas* or darkness.
(b) *Moha* or confusion.
(c) *Mahāmoha* or deep confusion.
(d) *Tamisra* or gloom, and
(e) *Andhatamisra* or dark gloom.[38]

xii. The external satisfaction (*bāhya-viṣaya uparama-tuṣṭi*) are five in number (*S.K.* 50 and *G.B.*): These consist of the renunciation of the sensations of :

(a) Sound (*śabda*),

(b) Touch (*sparśa*),

(c) Form (*rūpa*),

(d) Taste (*rasa*), and

(e) Smell (*gandha*).[39]

xiii. The animal creation (*tairyag-yona;* Deussen : *die Schöpfung in der Tierwelt*) is five-fold (*S.K.* 53 and *G.B*):

(a) *Paśu* or domestic animals.

(b) *Mṛga* or wild beats.

(c) *Pakṣi* or birds.

(d) *Sarisṛp* or reptiles, and

(e) *Sthāvarāṇi bhūtāni* or immovable objects, such as vegetables and minerals.

xiv. Five reasons are enmerated in support of the *Satkāryavāda*, the *Sāṅkhya* theory of causality (*S.K.* 9). The effect is pre-existent in its cause because of the following reasons :

(a) What is non-existent (*a-sat*) cannot be brought into existence by the operation of a cause (*a-karaṇāt*).

(b) The effect is merely a manifestation of its material cause, for it is invariably connected with its cause (*upādāna-grahanāt*).

(c) Everything cannot be produced by everything (*sarvasambhava-abhāvāt*); that is to say that the effect, before its manifestation, is implicit in its relevant material cause.

(d) Only an efficient cause can produce that for which it is potent (*śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt*); in other words, production is only an actualization of the potential.

(e) The effect is of the same nature as the cause (*kāraṇa-bhāvāt*).

xv. Five reasons are enumerated to prove the existence of *Puruṣa* (*S.K.*17):

(a) All composite things (*saṅghāta*) exist for another (*para*), namely for *Puruṣa*.

(b) There must be the reverse of that which is composed of the three *Guṇas (triguṇādi- viparyayāt)*, and this is nothing but *Puruṣa*.

(c) There must be a presiding power (*adhiṣṭhānāt*) which co-ordinates all our experience, and this is *Puruṣa*.

(d) There must be some one to enjoy the products of *Prakṛti (bhoktṛbhāvāt)*, and this is *Puruṣa*.

(e) Persons striving for liberation (*kaivalya*) imply that there are *Puruṣas* or the Selves with qualities opposed to those of *Prakṛti*.

xvi. *Puruṣa* is considered to possess five characteristics (*S.K. 19*). They are the characteristics of:

(a) witnessing (*sākṣitva*),

(b) isolation (*kaivalya*),

(c) indifference (*mādhyasthya*),

(d) perception (*draṣṭṛtva*), and

(e) inactivity (*akartṛbhāva*).

Six-fold enumerations

i. *Vyakta*, the Manifest and *Pradhāna*, the pre-established principle[40] differ from *Puruṣa* in six points (S.K.11). Thus they are:

(a) composed of the three constituents (*Guṇa*),

(b) non-discriminated,

(c) objective,

(d) general (i.e. common to all Spirits),

(e) non-intelligent, and

(f) productive.

Seven-fold enumerations

i. Evolvents and evolutes are seven in number (*mahad ādyāḥ prakṛti-vikṛayaḥ sapta*) (*S.K.*3 & *G.B.*). They are :

(a) *Mahat*, the Great One.

(b) *Ahaṅkāra*, the I- consciousness, and

(c) the five *tanmātras* or the subtle elements.

ii. There are seven *Bhāvas* (the psychic states) which do not bring about salvation (Deussen : *A.G.P.* 1, iii p. 462, *die Sieben nichterlösenden):*

(a) *Dharma*, Virtue,

(b) *Adharma*, Vice,

(c) *Vairāgya*, Non-attachment,

(d) *Avairāgya*, Attachment,

(e) *Aiśvarya*, Divine power,

(f) *Anaiśvarya*, Lack of divine power, and

(g) *Ajñāna*, Ignorance.
These are called the seven forms *(sapta-rūpa)* through which *Prakṛti* binds herself by herself.

Eight-fold enumerations

i. They enumerate eight causes of non-perception (*S.K.*7):

(a) Excessive distance (*atidūrāt*),

(b) Proximity (*sāmīpyāt*),

(c) Injury to senses (*indriyaghātāt*),

(d) Inattention (*manonavasthānāt*),

(e) Minuteness (*saukṣmyāt*),

(f) Obstruction (*vyavadhānāt*),

(g) Suppression (*abhibhavāt*), and

(h) Mixture with what is similar (*samānābhihārāt*).

ii. *Buddhi* or Intellect has eight forms *rūpa* (*S.K.*23):

(a) *Dharma* or Virtue,

(b) *Adharma* or Vice,

(c) *Jñāna* or Knowledge,

(d) *Ajñāna* or Ignorance,

(e) *Vairāgya* or Non-attachment,

(f) *Avairāgya* or Attachment,

(g) *Aiśvarya* or Divine power, and

(h) *Anaiśvarya* or Lack of divine power.

iii. Divine power (*aiśvarya*) the lordliness (*īśvarabhāva*) is eight-fold (*S.K.* 23 *and G.B.*)
Thus it is said:
anīmā laghimā prāptiḥ
prākāmyam mahimā tathā
iśitvañ ca vaśitvañ ca
tathā kāmāvasāyikā.[41]

(a) *Aṇimā* : This is the state of an atom. That is, a person possessed of this power wanders over the world in an atom-like minute form.

(b) *Laghimā*: A person possessed of this power, becomes as light as the fibre of a lotus stalk: therefore a person possessing this power can stay on the tip of the filaments of flowers.

(c) *Prāptiḥ* : A person possessed of this power gets the desired object, whatever it may be.

(d) *Prākāmya* : A person possessed of this power can do whatever he likes.

(e) *Mahimā*: Possessed of this power a man wanders in large form.

(f) *Iśitva* : A person possessed of this power reigns over the three worlds, on account of his lordliness.

(g) *Vaśitva* : Everything comes in the power of the person possessed of this power.

(h) *Kāmāvasāyika* : A person possessed of this power can stand, sit or wander over anything whenever he desires.[42]

iv. The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* mentions two sets of Bhāvas or the psychic states (cp. *S.K.* 44-45 and 46). According to one enumeration they are eight in number (*S.K.* 44-45). These eight *Bhāvas*, the psychic states, are the same as the eight forms (*rūpa*) of *Buddhi* or Intellect described above (ii).

v. *Siddhis* or Attainments are eight in number (*S.K.* 51):

(a) *Ūha*, reasoning,

(b) *Śabda*, Oral instruction,

(c) *Adhyayana*, study,

(d) *Duḥkha-vighātas trayaḥ*, the three-fold to

(f) suppression of misery,

(g) *Suhṛt-prāptiḥ*, the winning of friends, and

(h) *Dāna* or purification of mind.[43]

In other works these eight attainments (*Siddhis*) are termed as follows :-
Tāra, Sutāra, Tāratāra, Pramoda, Pramudita, Pramodamāna, Ramyaka and *Sadāpramudita* (vide *G.B.* on *S.K.* 51).[44]

vi. *Tamas* or Darkness is of eight kinds (*S.K.* 48 & *G.B.*).
When a man merges into the eight evolvents -

(a) *Pradhāna*, the Pre-established Principle,

(b) *Buddhi*, the Intellect,

(c) *Ahaṅkāra*, the I-consciousness and

(d) the five *Tanmātras* (the subtle to essences), and thinks 'I am liberated',
then this is called darkness.[45]

vii. *Moha* or confusion is of eight kinds (*S.K.* 48 & *G.B.*). Gods like Indra and the rest do not obtain liberation on account of their attachment to eight-fold power (cf. no.iii above): but after the destruction of this power they again migrate.
This is eight-fold delusion.[46]

viii. The divine (*daiva*) order is of eight kinds (*S.K.* 53 and *G.B.*)
They are *Brahma, Prajāpati, Soma, Indra, Gandharva, Yakṣas, Rākṣasas*, and *Piśācas*.

Nine-fold enumerations

i. The Manifest (*vyakta*) differs from the Unmanifest (*avyakta*) in nine points (*S.K.*10):
The manifest is -

(a) caused (*hetumat*),

(b) non-eternal (*anitya*),

(c) non-pervading (*avyāpi*),

(d) active (*sakriya*),

(e) manifold (*aneka*),

(f) existing in its cause (*āśrita*),

(g) mergent (*liṅgam*),

(h) conjunct (*sāvayava*), and

(i) dependent (*paratantra*).
The Unmanifest is just the reverse.

ii. *Tuṣṭis* or the satisfactions are nine in number (*S.K.* 50 & *G.B*).
These are the four internal satisfactions, viz.
(a) *Prakṛti* or Nature,
(b) *Upādāna* or means (Deussen : *Askese - A.G.P.* 1, iii, pp.453- 454),
(c) *Kāla*, or time,
(d) *Bhāgya* or luck,
(vide no ix, under four -fold enumerations) and the five external satisfactions; namely the renunciation of the sensations of (e-i) sound, touch, form, taste and smell (vide no xii, under five-fold enumerations). It is to be mentioned here that the five external satisfactions are differently named by different commentators.[47]

Vācaspati and *Nārāyaṇa*	*Gauḍapāda*	*Māṭhara*	*Jayamaṅgalā*
Pāram	*Pāram*	*Tāram*	—
Supāram	*Sutamaḥ*	*Sutāram*	*Sutāram*
Pārāpāram	*Sunetram*	*Sunetram*	*Supāram*
Anuttamāmbhaḥ	*Anut-tamāmbhasika*	*Sumarīcam*	*Anut-tamāmbham*
Uttamāmbhaḥ	*Nārīkam*	*Uttamāmbhasika*	*Uttamāmbham*

In other works, says, *Gauḍapāda*, they are named as :-
(a) *Ambhaḥ, Salilam, Oghaḥ, Vṛṣṭiḥ, Sutamaḥ, Pāram, Sunetram, Nārīkam, and Anuttamāmbhasikam.*

These are the same as those mentioned by Takakusu and which are thus translated into Chinese.[48]
(a) *Ambhaḥ* Lubricating water.
(b) *Salilam* Moving water.
(c) *Oghaḥ* Running water.

(d) *Vṛṣṭiḥ* Lake water.
(e) *Sútamaḥ* Water (which has) well penetrated.
(f) *Pāram* Water easy to cross.
(g) *Sunetram* Water which gushes well.
(h) *Nārīkam* Transparent water.
(i) *Anuttamāmbhasikam* Excellent and pure water.[49]

Ten-fold enumerations

i. The organs (*indriyas*) are ten in number (*S.K.* 26) They are :
(a) the five sensory organs (vide no iv of the five-fold enumerations),
(b) and the five motor organs (vide no v of the five-fold enumerations).

ii. The objects of the thirteen organs are said to be ten-fold (*daśadhā*) (*S.K.*32) and *G.B.*).
The ten kinds of objects, viz, sound, touch, form, taste, smell, speaking, taking, walking, excretion and pleasure are manifested by the organs of sense, and are seized and retained by the organs of action."[50]

iii. *Mahāmoha* or deep confusion has ten varieties (*S.K.*48). The ten *Mahāmohas* are the devotion of the gods and of men to sensations of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.[51]

Eleven-fold enumerations

i. The group of eleven (*ekādaśaka-gaṇa* (S.K. 24). This is the group of eleven organs :
(a) The five sensory organs,
(b) The five motor organs,

(c) and the mind (*manaḥ*).

Twelve-fold enumerations

i. *Dharma* or virtue has twelve varieties (*S.K.* 23 & *G.B.*.)
   (a) *Dayā* or mercy,
   (b) *Dāna* or charity,
   (c) the five *Yamas* or restraints,
   (d) and the five *Niyamas* or obligations.
   The *Yamas* (restraints) and the *Niyamas* are described in the Treatise of Patañjali. *Ahiṃsā* (or non-injury), *satya* (or truth), *asteya* (or non-stealing), *brahmacarya* (or celibacy) and *aparigraha* (or non-acceptance of gifts) are the *Yamas* (*Yoga Sūtra* 11.30). *Sauca* (or purity), *santoṣa* (or contentment), *tapaḥ* (or austerity) *svādhyāya* (or study of the *Vedas*), *Īśvarapranidhāna* (or meditation on God) are the *Niyamas* (*Yoga Sutra* 11.32). It must, however, be mentioned that the concept of *Yama* and *Niyama* as given by *Gauḍapāda* cannot be in accordance with the spirit of the classical *Sāṅkhya*. The adoration of God or *īśvara* cannot find a place in the atheistic *Sāṅkhya* of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*. It is very probable that Gauḍapāda has given the ordinary enumeration of the *Yoga* system. We agree with S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri in maintaining the view that *Paramārtha's* doctrine of *Yama* and *Niyama* has a greater possibility of being the original doctrine than that of *Gauḍapāda*. *Paramārtha's* enumeration in this connection, as given by Takakusu from the Chinese sources, is as follows : "*Yama* has five subdivisions, (1) not to put oneself in anger, (2) to respect one's spiritual masters, (3) to possess internal and external purity, (4) to be moderate in eating and drinking, (5) not to become addicted to licence. *Niyama*, too, is divided into five: (1) not to kill, (2) not to steal, (3) to speak the truth, (4) to practise continence (*brahmacarya*), (5) not to flatter" (Takakusu) (*The Sāṅkhya Kārikā studied in the light of the Chinese Version. English Translation by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, p. 31*).

Thirteen-fold enumerations

i. The organs are of thirteen kinds (*karaṇam trayodaśa vidham*) (*S.K.*32).
   (a) the five organs of action (cp. f.f.e.no v),
   (b) the five organs of sense (cp.f.f.e.no iv),
   (c) and the three internal organs (cp.t.e.no x).

ii. The thirteen organs are re-enumerated in a different way (*S.K.*33):
   (a) *Bāhya-karaṇa* or the external organs are 10,
   (b) *Antaḥkaraṇa* or the internal organs are 3.

Fourteen-fold enumerations

i. *Sarga* or creation consists of fourteen kinds (*S.K* 53):
   (a) the divine order is of eight kinds,
   (b) the animal creation is five-fold, and
   (c) the human order is of one variety.

Sixteen-fold enumerations

i. The evolutes (*vikāras*) together form a group of sixteen (*soḍaśaka*) (*S.K.* 3 and *G.B.*) :
   (a) The five organs of sense,
   (b) The five organs of action,

(c) Mind, the eleventh organ, and

(d) the five gross elements (cf.f.f.e.no vi).

ii. The sixteen evolutes are re-enumerated in a different way (*S.K.* 22 and *G.B.*) :

(a) Five out of the group of sixteen (*tasmād ṣoḍaśakāt pañca*): namely, the five subtle elements.

(b) The eleven organs.

Seventeen-fold enumerations

i. *Buddhi-vadha* or injuries to the Intellect are seventeen in number (S.K.49).
These are the defects of Intellect which prevent the attainment of the nine *Tuṣṭis* (or satisfactions) and eight *Siddhis* (or attainments) (*G.B.* on *S.K.* 49).[52]

Eighteen-fold enumerations

i. *Tāmisra* or gloom consists of eighteen varieties (*S.K.*. 48 and *G.B*).
They are the jealousy arising in connection with the ten objects of sense, and the eight *Siddhis*[53].

ii. *Andhatāmisra* or dark gloom is eighteen-fold (*S.K.*48 & *G.B.*). This is the fear of losing the above-mentioned eighteen objects (i.e.the ten objects of sense and the eight *Siddhis*).[54]

Twentyfive-fold enumerations

i. The *Sāṅkhya* is a philosophy of twentyfive principles (*S.K.*3). The twentyfive principles (*tattvas*) are analytically enumerated as follows:-

(a)	*Mūla-prakṛti* or the Primal Nature	1
(b)	The seven beginnings with the Great One	7
(c)	The group of sixteen	16
(d)	and *Puruṣa* or the Spirit	1
		25

(vide no ii under four-fold enumerations)

Twenty-eight-fold enumerations

i. *Aśakti* or lack of power is said to possess twenty eight varieties (*S.K.* 47, 49 and *G.B.*on 49). Eleven of these are the weakness of the ten senses and mind and, the remaining seventeen are the defects of Intellect which prevent the attainment of the nine *Tuṣṭis* (or satisfactions) and eight *Siddhis* (or attainments).[55]

Fifty-fold enumerations.

i. According to a different enumeration, *Bhāvas* or the psychic states are fifty in number (*S.K.*46):

(a)	The five *Viparyayas* or erroneous views	5
(b)	The twenty-eight *Aśaktis* or lack of power	28
(c)	The nine *Tuṣṭis* or satisfactions	9
(d)	and the eight *Siddhis* or attainments	8
	(cp. Keith, *S.S.*, pp. 103-104).	50

One-member classes

In its enumerations and analyses of various objects and categories, the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* has shown that there are several classes which consist only of one member.

i. *Mūla-prakṛti* or the Primal Nature (*S.K.*3).
There is but one *Mūla-prakṛti*, or Primal Nature (Deussen, *A.G.P* 1.iii.p.415, *Die Urerzeugerin*). It stands in contrast to the other *prakṛtis* or evolvents, viz. *Buddhi* or Intellect, *Ahaṅkāra* or I-consciousness

and *Tanmātras* or the five subtle elements (*mahad ādyāḥ Prakṛti.....sapta*).[56]

ii. *Mānuṣaka* or the human order (Deussen : *Die Mänschliche Schöpfung*) (*S.K.*53). According to *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* there is but one order or class of human beings.

Infinity of Souls (S.K. 18)

Finally we may refer to the well-known *Sāṅkhya* conception of the infinity of Souls, the *Puruṣa-bahutva* mentioned in the *Sāṅkya Kārikā* verse no 18.

(7) It may be seen from the above analyses that the two-fold and the three-fold enumerations were the most popular among the *Sāṅkhyas*, for there are (some) seventeen instances under each category. The popularity of dichotomy as a method of clarification in the *Sāṅkhya* system may have, primarily, been due to its fundamental doctrine of ontological dualism, the historical development of which we have already discussed in detail in chapter four. Predilection for three-fold enumerations deserves some consideration. Historically it may, perhaps, be a trait which has found its way into this system from the dim past when man could count only with one and three. Thus observes L.Hogben[57] :- *"For my one deer you must give me three of your spearheads"*. The earliest men and women like ourselves lived about twentyfive thousand years ago. They could say all this with their hands, simply by pointing one finger at the deer and three at the spearheads. The primitive way of counting with one finger for one thing and three fingers for three things, was the only kind of arithmetic they knew. For thousands of years such people thought of any quantity greater than three as a heap or pile".

Predilection for three-fold enumeration within the *Sāṅkhya* system, as we notice it today, may have also been sufficiently inspired by an important basic tenent of the school, namely, by the well-known fundamental teaching of this philosophy that *Prakṛti*, the world-ground is tripartite. The occurrence of the

technical term *catuṣṭaya*, the group of four in the *Kārikā* (verse 30) is significant, but the doctrines discussed under this category are comparatively few in number. Five-fold enumeration too has been of favourable analysis among the *Sāṅkhya* thinkers. Some examples of this class such as the five organs of sense, five organs of action, the five *Prāṇas* and the five *Tanmātras* strongly suggest that the origin of this kind of analysis was, very probably, anthropocentric. There is hardly anything very specific about the other kinds of analyses. The *Sāṅkhya* interest in analysis and division of the concepts of the system is no more a problem. Analysis aims at explanation and division is the instrument of definition. The above categories of enumeration may be described as complexes consisting of simples. Complexes can have an account (logos;[58] cp. Plato *The Theaetetus*, 202b) given of them, an analysis into their simple components. But an account of simples such as *Puruṣa* or soul which cannot be further analysed into simpler components may not be possible (cp.6, sec.7). The method of analysis and division as we notice, for example, in Plato was an important tool of the ancient systems of philosophy.[59] The *Sāṅkhya* method of enumeration seems to imply the (familiar Aristotelean and mediaeval) idea that complex enumeration is the unit of knowledge.[60] The *Sāṅkhya*, at times, have re-analysed what they had already analysed (cp.for example, the thirteen-fold enumerations and the sixteen-fold enumerations). This is a fair index of their great enthusiasm for analytical understanding. Starting with an ontological classification of two realities (i.e. *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*) the *Sāṅkhya* system winds it up with an analytical insight into the true nature of man consisting of three judgements of final realization (*S.K.* 64.cp.ch.25, sec.17). Thus we clearly notice from the foregoing study that the *Sāṅkhya* exponents were really interested in the enumerative analyses of the doctrines of the system. Therefore we have to point out that V.V. Sovani is wrong in expressing the opinion that : 'Sāṅkhya standing for the system should not be derived to mean 'number' because enumeration is not a characteristic feature of the Sāṅkhya' (*C.S.S.S.* p.3).

Notes and References

1. *Hindu Civilization* part II, pp. 249 and 266.
2. Cp. V.V. Sovani, *C.S.S.S.* p.3.
3. Renou, *L'Inde Classique*, II. p. 34.
4. *Bhagavad Gītā*, p.15.
5. *Hinduism*, p. 136.
6. *Sāṅkhya System*, pp. 12 & 123.
7. *Philosophies of India*, p.280.
8. *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol.11 p.1.
9. *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*, p. 25.
10. *Hinduism*, p. 89.
11. *Hindu Civilization*, part II, p.249.
12. *L'Inde Classique*, 11, p. 34.
13. *The Sāṅkhyakārikā*, p.IX.
14. *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, Erster Band, Dritte Abteilung*, p.96.
15. *Indian Philosophy*, 11, p.249.
16. *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, pp.396 - 397.
17. *Die Sāṁkhya- Philosophie*, pp. 131-134.
18. *Die Lehre der Upanishaden*, p. 351, n.129.
19. *Yoga, Immortality and Freedom*, p.367.
20. Cp. A.D. Woozley, *Theory of Knowledge*, pp.183-187, and D.W. Hamlyn, *The Theory of Knowledge*, pp.60-64.
21. Guṇaratna's commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, p.22.
22. Cp. Renou, *Hymnes Spéculatifs du Véda*, p.261.
23. Cp. Johnston, *E.S.* p.18.
24. Cp. Keith, *R.P.V.U.* p. 535.
25. *Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya* on *The Kārikā* No.29 and Sharma, S.K. p.43.
26. Suryanarayana Sastri, *S.K.* p.68.
27. Cp. Keith, *S.S.*, p. 104.
28. Vide Chapter XXIV, sec.3.
29. Chatterjee and Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, p.226.
30. Vide *Gauḍapāda's* commentary on *S.K.*, 5.
31. Vide Chapter xxiii, sec. 13.
32. Cp. Keith, *S.S.* pp.101-102.
33. Vide Suryanarayana Sastri, *S.K.*, p.77.
34. Vide (i) Keith, *S.S.*, p.103, (ii) Deussen, *A.G.P.*, I.III., p. 451.
35. Keith, *Op.cit.* 103.
36. Cp. Foot note 28.
37. Vide *L'Inde Classique*, ii.p.35.
38. Vide Keith, *S.S.*, p.104.

39. *ibid.*
40. Vide *L'Inde Classique*, ii, p.38.
41. Vide Deussen, *A.G.P.*, 1. iii, p.453.
42. Vide Sharma, *S.K.*, pp.37 - 38.
43. (i) Keith, *S.S.*, p.104.
& (ii) Chapter 21, section 9 of this thesis.
44. Vide Sharma, *S.K.*, p.45.
45. *Op. cit.*, p.61.
46. *ibid.*
47. Vide Sovani, *C.S.S.S.*, pp. 45 - 46.
48. The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, studied in the light of its Chinese version, by J. Takakusu, rendered from French into English by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras 1933) p.62.
49. Vide Sharma, *S.K.*, Notes p. 40.
50. Vide (i) *Gauḍapāda* on *S.K.* 32; (ii) Sharma, *S.K.* p. 46.
51. Vide Keith, *S.S..*, p. 104.
52. Cp. Keith, *S.S.*, p. 104, and Sharma, *S.K.*, p.62.
53. Cp. Keith, *S.S.*, p.104.
54. *Op.cit.*, p.104.
55. Cp. Keith, *S.S.*, p. 104 and Deussen, *A.G.P..*, 1.iii, p.452.
56. Cp. (i). S.S.S. Sastri, *S.K.*, p.8, (ii) Deussen, *A.G.P.* I. iii, p. 416.
57. *Man Must Measure or The Wonderful World of Mathematics*, p.7.
58. F.M. Cornford, ' English provides no single equivalent for *logos* a word which covers (1) statement, speech; (2) expression, *definition*, description, formula; (3) 'tale' or enumeration; (4) explanation, account, ground'. *Plato's Theory of Knowledge - The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato translated with a running commentary*, p. 142.
59. Vide J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, pp. 219-220.
60. Vide N. Gulley, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 97.

IV

Dualism

(1) The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy is a metaphysic of dualistic realism. It attributes the evolution of the universe to the proximity (*sannidhimātra*) of the two ultimate principles : *Puruṣa* (lit.man) the male principle and *Prakṛti*, the female principle.[1] The *Sāṅkhya* dualism appears to have been based on the relationship between man and woman.[2] The idea of dualism, according to Macdonell, goes back to the dim past of the Indo-European period.[3] We do not know for certain whether the Indo-European idea has historically developed into the Indian concept, but the fact remains that the Indian dualism of *Dyāvā-Pṛthivī*, Heaven and Earth had its prototype already in the Indo-European period. By the time the Aryans entered India there was already an ancient civilization in the Indus Valley with a parallel but independent cult of the worship of *Śiva* and *Śakti* and also of *Liṅga* and *Yoni*.[4] These popular beliefs too remind us at once, of the dualism of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* in the *Sāṅkhya* system. In fact the *liṅga* worshippers are already referred to in the *Ṛgveda* by the term *śiśna-deva* (*R.V.*vii.21.5; x.99.3).[5] The Indus civilization, in all probability, was a non-Aryan matriarchal one where the concept of *Śakti* seems to have played a very significant role (vide ch.9.sec.3).

(2) The goddesses in the *Ṛgveda* are but different manifestations of *Śakti*, in the opinion of Renou.[6] On the other hand, Sāyaṇa maintains that Yama, Mātariśvan etc., are but different forms (*rūpa*) of the one reality (*ekam sat*=Indra), the *mahān ātmā* (*R.V.*1.164, 46) (vide ch.8, sec.5). Further, when it is said in the *Ṛgveda* that 'in every figure he has been the model' (*R.V.*vi.47.18) it is clearly implied that gods are only different forms of one and the same reality : Indra (*mahān ātmā*). So Griffith observes :

'Indra presents himself as Agni, Vishnu or Rudra or any other deity...he is identified with each'.[7] Thus it appears to us that the basis for the dualism of the *Sāṅkhya* was already implicit in the *Ṛgveda*. In fact the concept of dualism is an important feature of the religion of the *Vedas*, especially that of the *Ṛgveda*. In the *Ṛgveda*, we often come across deities addressed in pairs. Thus two divinities together form but one concept.[8] For example, *dyāvāpṛthivī* or Heaven and Earth together present the concept of parenthood. In the *Ṛgveda* we have a number of important dual divinities which we propose to examine below. Apart from these there are, again, some other dual situations in the later literature which are of considerable importance. We will limit our discussion only to those dualisms which are most essential for our purpose.

(3) (i) Dyāvā-Pṛthivī : Heaven and Earth

We have already referred to the dualism of *Dyāvā-Pṛthivī*, the oldest of the dual divinities of the *Ṛgveda*. We may reiterate that the divinities addressed in the dual number as two beings form but one concept. This phenomenon is referred to by J. Wackernagel and he says that the combination (of the dual divinities) as a unit *(die Verbindung als Einheit)* is due to the accent on each member of the compound.[9] The phenomenon may partly be grammatical but it may partly be religious also. It is, most probably, because of the concept underlying this compound of *dyāvāpṛthivī* that it is not analysed by the "theological grammarian", Śākalya,[10] in his analysis of the text of the *Ṛgveda*, which is technically known as the *pada-pāṭha*. The concept underlying this dual compound finds its full expression (in the later literature) in the well-known lines of Kālidāsa :- vāgārthāviva *sampṛktau* ... jagataḥ pitarau vande [I salute the couple of universal parents, Pārvatī and Parameśvara (Supreme Lord) who are *well-united* like word and its meaning]. There is another important point to be noted in connection with the dual divinities of the type of *dyāvāpṛthivī, dyāvābhūmī* etc. It is clearly seen in these compounds that the male member at times is influenced by the female member. Thus it is rightly observed by Keith, 'other names are Dyāvākṣāmā, Dyāvābhūmī or Rodasī, in which the male character of Dyaus...., has yielded to the prevailing femininity of Pṛthivī'.[11] The entire problem has been studied by the

present writer in a doctoral thesis entitled, *Divinités Féminines dans le Ṛgveda.*[12] We believe that in this phenomenon there may be an echo of the pre-historic *Śakti* cult with special importance attached to the mother as opposed to the father.[13] This same phenomenon is implicit in the *Sāṅkhya* dualism of *Puruṣa* (male) and *Prakṛti* (female) where *Prakṛti* is more powerful than her counterpart, *Puruṣa.* In fact the seeming union between the universal parents, the Father Heaven and the Mother Earth, seen far away at the horizon, may have furnished the ground for the concept of apparent union between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya* system.

(ii) Parjanya and Pṛthivī

Parjanya is a god of rain and is especially known as the producer and nourisher of vegetation. He is several times referred to as a father (*R.V.*ix.82.3). By implication his wife is the earth (cp.Macdonell : *V.R.*p.104). *Parjanya* is well known as an impregnator, one who produces fertility in cows, mares and women. It is clearly mentioned in the *Ṛgveda* that he quickens the earth with seed (*parjanyaḥ pṛthivīṃ retasā-avati, R.V.*v.83.4). *Parjanya,* in fact, is once said to be the soul of the world (*ātmā jagataḥ-tasthuṣas ca, R.V.*vii.101.6). Thus the association of *Parjanya* and *Pṛthivī* seems to have been somewhat a proto-type of the *Sāṅkhya* dualism of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti.*

(4) Purūravas and Urvaśī

We come across in the *Ṛgveda* (x.95) a couple, *Purūravas* and *Urvaśī,* which is somewhat similar to that of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* in several respects. This episode which is not complete in the *Ṛgveda* has been developed with great literary skill in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (11.5). It is mentioned in this *Brāhmaṇa* that *Urvaśī* joined with *Purūravas* in an alliance, the permanence of which depended on a condition. It was the condition that *Urvaśī* was not to see *Purūravas* in *déshabillé.* But this condition was broken by a stratagem of the *Gandharvas* and the nymph immediately vanished from the sight of her lover : *Purūravas.*[14] We may make an attempt, here, to study the two characters under discussion and to ascertain their similarity with those of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti.* The two names *Purūravas* and *Urvaśī* seem to have

been coined to convey certain tenets. *Purūravas,* when left by *Urvaśī,* was going hither and thither in search of her with great grief and sorrow. *Purūravas,* the often crying one,[15] is depicted in this episode as a distracted, weak soul, weak both mentally and physically. The character of *Urvaśī,* on the other hand, is very active and is different from that of *Purūravas. Urvaśī,* the great desire, ardour or favour personified[16] reminds us of *Prakṛti* characterized by the great desire (*autsukya,* S.K.58) to function for the release of *Puruṣa* (*Puruṣa-vimokṣārtha,* S.K.58). *Urvaśī* is not only active but also subtle and delicate. Hence says she : 'I am inaccessible like wind (cf.*durāpanā vātan iva-aham asmi;* Geldner: *Schwer bin ich einzuholen wie der Wind - R.V.*x.95.2). The delicate nature of *Urvaśī* reminds us of the same of *Prakṛti* clearly described by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (cp.S.K.61 : *sukumāra,* delicate; Deussen, Zartfühlenderes, *A.G.P.*1.iii,p.461). The active nature of *Prakṛti* is too apparent to be dwelt upon here. We may now refer to the condition imposed upon *Purūravas* regarding the permanence of his alliance with *Urvaśī.* According to this condition *Urvaśī* was not to see *Purūravas* in *déshabillé.* When this condition was broken *Urvaśī* immediately withdrew from the sight of *Purūravas.* This reminds us of the somewhat parallel phenomenon described in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 61, where *Prakṛti* is depicted 'like a bashful maiden seen in *déshabbillé* (cp.Keith, *S.S.*p.105) and is withdrawing for ever from the sight of the *Puruṣa* who has seen her. Finally we may refer to the accidental but interesting similarity existing between the two words *Purūravas* (*Puru- ravas*) and *Puruṣa (Puru-ṣa).* We may also compare the distracted, weak character of *Purūravas* with the inactive nature of *Puruṣa.* Thus it may not be unreasonable to consider the dualism of *Purūravas* and *Urvaśī* as a crude precursor of the *Sāṅkhya* dualism of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti.*

(5) The Aśvins and Vāc

In the hymn x.125 of the *Ṛgveda,* the great power of the goddess *Vāc* is described in detail. The connection between *Aśvins* and the mighty goddess *Vāc* is seen in this hymn (cp.stanza 1). It is mentioned in this hymn that *Vāc* is carrying the *Aśvins* (*R.V.* x.125.1)[17], an instance which depicts the great power (*śakti*) attributed to *Vāc.* This situation reminds us, at once, of the well-known simile of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā,* verse 21, elaborated by

Gauḍapāda, where *Prakṛti* is likened to a strong blind person carrying *Puruṣa*, the cripple who is directing her (i.e. *Prakṛti*) on the correct path to be followed. This dualism of the *Aśvins versus Vāc* reminds us also of the dualism of the *Puruṣa-bahutva*, the plurality of *Puruṣas* versus *Prakrti* of the *Sāṅkhya* system.

(6) (i) Dakṣa and Aditi

We come across another important dualism in the tenth *maṇḍala* of the *Ṛgveda* (x.72.4). It is the dualism of *Dakṣa* and *Aditi*. *Dakṣa* and *Aditi* are male and female principles respectively. This dualism is very close to that of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* although it is not developed in the *Ṛgveda*. In the *Ṛgveda* it is mentioned that the two divinities *Dakṣa* and *Aditi* were born from each other. This view, liable to the criticism of the fallacy of *anyonyāśraya*, the dependence on each other, may simply mean that both these are eternal entities like those of the *Sāṅkhya* system.[18] The significance of *Dakṣa* and *Aditi* and their similarity to *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* respectively will be discussed in some subsequent chapters (vide chap.5,sec.5). In fact the idea that the dualism of *Dakṣa-Aditi* is analogous to that of *Puruṣa-Prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya* system has already been pointed out by Renou.[19] *Dakṣa* represents male efficacy or energy (*vide* chap.5). *Aditi* is an anticipation of *Prakṛti*, the dynamism (cp.*sakriya*, S.K.10) of which is well known (cp.chap.9,sec.3). Therefore we may mention that Griffith is not wrong in comparing *Dakṣa* and *Aditi* with the Greek conceptions of *energeia* and *dynamis* respectively (H.R.V.vol.ii,p.387, f.n.7).

(ii) Puruṣa and Virāj

Puruṣa together with *Virāj* occurs in one of the cosmogonic hymns of the *Ṛgveda* (x.90.5). The two principles *Puruṣa*, the male and *Virāj*, the female, together form an important dualism. It is mentioned that the two principles are born from one another. This may be a way of expressing that they both are eternal entities, that is to say, that they, like the two *Sāṅkhya* principles, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, are beyond time and space. The dualism of *Puruṣa* and *Virāj* was one of the most important proto-types of the *Sāṅkhya* dualism of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*.[20]

(7) (i) The Lame and the Blind

We may now take up the well-known simile of the lame and the blind referred to in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 21 (*paṅgu andhavat*, like the union of a lame man with a blind one). The *Sāṅkhyas* attempt to establish their dualism of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* on the analogy of the lame and the blind. This simile adopted to explain the union between the two *Sāṅkhya* principles is very old. It can be traced back to the *Ṛgveda*. The lame and the blind are already referred to in several passages of the *Ṛgveda* (cp. Indra hymns: II.13.12; 15.7; iv. 19.9; 30.19; Soma hymns: VIII.79,2; x.25.11; Aśvin hymns: 1.112.8; 117-19; x.39.3). In the *R.V.* II.13.12 Indra is praised for having helped the blind and the lame to obtain their glory. Again in the *R.V.*II.15.7, it is mentioned that through Indra the blind could see and the lame could walk about. The same idea is again implied in the *R.V.*iv.19.9. Next in the *R.V.* iv.30.19 it is again mentioned that Indra helped the two personalities, the blind and the lame (to move about). The reminiscience of the same episode is found in some Soma hymns too. Thus it is said in the *R.V.* VII.79.2, that (through Soma) the blind could see and the lame could move about. Again the *R.V.*X. 25.11 speaks of Soma's help to the blind and the lame (to move about). The episode of the blind and the lame also occurs in the *Aśvin* hymns. In the *R.V.*1.117. 17-19 the poet attributes to the *Aśvins* the philanthrophic act of granting the eye-sight to the blind and the power of moving about to the lame. With a great ethical flavour the very idea reappears in the *R.V.* x.39.3 which is also dedicated to the *Aśvins* in their special capacity as the upholders of truth (*Nāsatyas*). These passages seem to contain some reminiscience of an old saga which might have been partly forgotten during the period of the composition of these hymns. Speaking from a philosophical angle, one may point out that there is also some difference between the episode of the blind and the lame in the *Veda* on the one hand, and the same occurring in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* on the other. According to the gist of the story as implied in the *Ṛgveda*, the blind and the lame are supposed to have been helped (to move about) either by Indra (*R.V.* IV.30.19) or by Soma (*R.V.*X. 25.11). In the *Veda* the blind and the lame are helped (to move about) by a third person, Indra or Soma. But

in the *Sāṅkhya* dualism of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* (cp.*S.K.* 21 and also Gauḍapāda) there is no third principle or *tertium quid* to bring about the union between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*.[21]

(ii) Ātman versus Brahman

It appears to us that the opposition between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is not very far from the opposition between *Ātman* and *Brahman* of the *Vedānta*. Such, in fact, is also the opinion of Renou. Thus he says : *'mais au fonde, elle n'est pas trés eloignée de l'opposition ātman/brahman du Vēdanta'*.[22] ('but at bottom, it is not very far removed from the opposition (between) *Ātman/Brahman* of the *Vedānta*'). We may, now, go into this problem in detail. First we may take note of the position of *Ātman versus Brahman* in the late *Brāhmaṇa-Āraṇyaka* period. We know that in the *Upaniṣadic* period these two principles were identified with one another, the faint beginning of which could be seen in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* x.3.5 (cp.Radhakrishnan: 'Ātman is Brahman. The purely subjective is also the purely objective'. *I.P.* ii.p.537). However in the early period they were not treated as identical. Let us now examine the significance of the two terms in the earlier period. The explanation of the term *ātman* is not certain. Originally it may have meant 'breath' and then came to be applied to whatever constitutes the essential part of anything more particularly of man, i.e. his self or soul.[23] Thus *ātman* was considered to be the inner self of man.[24] The word *brahman* is derived from the root $\sqrt{bṛh}$ meaning 'to grow' or 'to burst forth'. In the *Upaniṣads* it bears the significance of the primary cause of the universe - what bursts forth spontaneously in the form of nature.[25] *Brahman* in the *Vedic* vocabulary, as pointed out by H.Zimmer, corresponds exactly to what the Hindusim of the subsequent centuries terms *Śakti*, energy, force, power or potency.[26] Thus *Brahman* is the ultimate source of the outer world.[27] It is important to note here that in course of time the term *Prakṛti* has interchanged with *Brahman, or Śakti* or *Mayā*. Thus observes Renou : *Et l'on verra au course des âges la prakṛti alterner avec le brahman, ou avec la śakti ou encore avec la māyā....*[28] ('And one will see in course of time *prakṛti* alternating with the *brahman*, or with the *śakti* or still with the *Māyā*....'). The following observations regarding the similarity between *Puruṣa/Prakṛti* and *Ātman/Brahman* are relevant : *Purusa* of the

Sāṅkhya system is almost the same as *Ātman* in the early literature. In the *Upaniṣads*, we are told, how *Brahman* appears as (or is transformed into) the world, a phenomenon which is in perfect agreement with the meaning of the root of the term *Brahman*, $\sqrt{bṛh}$, to grow or burst forth. Now this so-called bursting forth reminds us of the disturbance of the equilibrium of the three *Guṇas* (*guṇa-kṣobha*)[29] of *Prakṛti*, the primordial world-ground before it gets evolved into the world. The phenomenon under discussion is said to be *anirvacanīya* or indescribable in the later *Vedānta* treatises. Again it reminds us of the unmanifest *Prakṛti* evolving into the world. The former phenomenon, in the terminology of the later *Vedāntins*, is known as *vivarta* or appearance: the latter is called *pariṇāma* or evolution. The first conception of *vivarta* or appearance is a mystic one whereas the second is a realistic doctrine. In fact H. Zimmer's observation that the term *brahman* corresponds to the concept of *Śakti* in Hinduism gains in importance. The origin of the concept of *Śakti* as mentioned earlier goes back to the dim past of Mohenjodaro Harappa civilization and it has appeared in various forms such as goddesses in the early *Vedic* literature. On the one hand, it appears to be related to *Prakṛti* (cp.chapter 9 on *Prakṛti*) and on the other, it is connected with *Brahman* which at times, is called *Mūla-Prakṛti*, the Primal Nature.[30] *Śakti* in association with *Brahman* is generally known as *Māyā-Śakti* or *Bīja-Śakti*.[31] *Māyā* (or miraculous power) is a doctrine related both to *Brahman* and *Prakṛti*. The *Māyā-Śakti* of *Brahman* is well-known. *Māyā* again is an appellation of *Prakṛti* (cp. *mayām tu prakṛtim viddhi, Śvet.Up.*iv.10; *Māyā-śabdena ca prakṛtir eva-ucyate, S.P.B.* 1.69). *Māyā, Avidyā* (cp. The *Tattvatraya* by Lokācārya, page 48, where *Avidyā* is said to be a synonym of *Prakṛti : prakṛti...avidyā jñāna-virodhitvāt*),[32] *Anirvacanīya, Vivarta, Avyakta, Bīja-Śakti, Mūla-Prakṛti* (cp. *S.K.*3: *mūla-prakṛti avikṛtiḥ*, Primal Nature is not an evolute) and so on are used in the *Vedānta* as very nearly synonymous.[33] All this may point to the fact that the difference between *Puruṣa/Prakṛti* and *Ātman/Brahman* is more apparent than real. Such a view receives support from Renou's observation : *et que l'antinomie entre Sāṅkhya et Vedānta, faible á l'origin, a toujours été plus apparente que réele.*[34] ('and that the antinomy between Sāṅkhya and Vedānta, feeble at the beginning, has always been more apparent than real'). It may thus be seen that

the dualism of *Puruṣa/Prakṛti* and the same of *Ātman/Brahman* in the early *Vedic* literature may have been somewhat parallel developments presenting perhaps the same idea in two different types of terminology.

(8) The Unborns, One Female and Two Males

In the *Śvet.Up.*iv.5 we come across a vivid picture of three unborns (i.e. eternal entities), the one a female (*ajā*) and the other two males (*aja*). The description, full of imagery and several other poetic devices (such as *śleṣa* and *anuprāsa*), presents a prototype of the dualism of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. The verse is as follows :-

ajām ekām lohita-śukla-kṛṣṇām
bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjamānām sarūpāḥ
ajo hi-eko juṣamāno, nuṣete
jahāti-enām bhukta-bhogām ajo'nyaḥ.

> The one Unborn, red, white and black, who produces manifold projeny similar in form (to himself): by her side lies the one Unborn (male) delighting. Another Unborn gives her up, having had his enjoyment.[35]

The relevance of this doctrine to the *Sāṅkhya* thought can be clearly seen in the *Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudi*. Commencing his exposition on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (i.e. *S.T.K.*) in a slightly modified form of this verse[36] Vācaspati pays obeisance to *Prakṛti*, the Mother Nature.[37] Referring to this verse in the *S.T.K.* C.D. Sharma observes: 'We bow to Prakṛti, says Ishvarakṛṣṇa, the red-white-dark, the unborn mother and nurse and receptacle of all generation. Such is the conception of Prakṛti in Sāṅkhya'.[38] We agree with the general opinion of Sharma, but we have to point out that he has erroneously attributed the verse in question to Īśvarakṛṣṇa instead of Vācaspati. In the teaching of the *Śvet.Up.* iv.5 with which we are primarily concerned here, reference is made to three Unborns or eternal entities, entities which are beyond space and time. The term *aja* (and *ajā*) meaning both the unborn and the goat, the poet-philosopher presents his metaphysical doctrine of *ajā* (i.e. the Unborn Female or the she-goat) and *aja* (the two Unborn Males or the two he-goats) in the form of *double entendre* or *śleṣa*. Leaving aside the poetic garb in which the idea is presented we may at once get into the core of the teaching.

The one Unborn (*ajā*, f.) with the three colours, red, white and black referred to in this verse is nothing but the unborn, eternal reality of *Prakṛti* consisting of the three *Guṇas*: *Rajas* (lohita), *Sattva* (śukla) and *Tamas* (kṛṣṇa).[39] The triple-coloured Unborn's begetting (*sṛjamāna*) manifold projeny similar to herself (*sarūpa*) reminds us of *Prakṛti's* giving rise to entities such as *Mahat* and *Ahaṅkara* which are also similar to *Prakṛti* in that they too consist of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* (*S.K.*24). The semantic similarity between the present participal construction of *sṛjamāna* (< √*sṛj*, to emit, produce, beget or create) creating or producing attributed to the Unborn (f.) in the *Śvet.Up* iv.5 and the abstract action noun of *sarga* (< √*sṛj*, to produce or create), creation attributed to the *Prakṛti* in the *Kārikā* (*S.K.* 21, 24, 52, 53, 54 and 66) too is striking. The other two Unborns(m.) appear to represent the plurality of *Puruṣa* (*Puruṣa-bahutva*). Deussen has proposed such an interpretation : *die Beziehung von Bock (aja) und Ziege (ajā) auf Puruṣa und Prakṛti (mit ihren drei Guṇa's Rajas, Sattvam, Tamas) der Sāṅkhya's zu treffend....*[40] ('the relation of goat (*aja*) and she-goat (*ajā*) to *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* (with her three *Guṇas*) of the *Sāṅkhyas* is striking').

Although Deussen draws the parallel with the *Sāṅkhya* he does not discuss the passage in detail explaining as to why the two Unborns (*aja*, males) should be regarded as representing a precursor of the concept of the plurality of *Puruṣa* or *puruṣa-bahutva*. Therefore we may attempt to explain it here. The *Sāṅkhya* system admits a plurality of *Puruṣa* among whom one may overcome one's *avidyā* or ignorance with difficulty and thus free oneself from the bondage of *Prakṛti* whereas others will continue to be under the influence of the same. The first of the two Unborns (male), namely the one delighting (*juṣamāna*) is the one who is ignorant and is thus subject to the influence of *Prakṛti* (cp. *saṁsāro bhavati rājasād rāgāt*, S.K.45). The other Unborn (male) represents the one who has overcome one's *ajñāna* or ignorance by realizing the cause of one's *saṁsāric* existence (cp. *tasya hetur avidyā*, *Y.S.* ii.24) and is thus free for ever from the bondage of *Prakṛti* (cp. *jñānena ca-apavargaḥ*, S.K.44).[41] The use of the term *bhukta-bhoga* too is significant; it means, 'the use of which has been enjoyed'.[42] In the present context it conveys the sense of the Unborn (i.e. *Prakṛti*) the use of which has been enjoyed. Therefore the phrase *bhukta-bhoga* seems to allude

to that particular state of having satisfied desires (i.e. *āpta-kāma*) of the Yogin which is a 'must' for the one striving for liberation. One may not thus fail to notice that the *Śvet.Up.*iv.5, contains in a summary form the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine taught in the *Krikā* verses 65-66:

tena nivṛtta-prasavām
arthavaśāt sapta-rūpa-vinivṛttām
prakṛtim paśyati puruṣaḥ
*prekṣakavad avasthitaḥ svacchaḥ. (S.K.*65)

Thereby does the pure Spirit (*Puruṣa*) remaining like a spectator, perceive *Prakṛti* which has ceased to be productive and, because of the power of discriminative knowledge, has turned back from the seven forms (dispositions).

dṛṣṭā maye'ty upekṣaka eko
dṛṣṭā'ham ity uparamanty anyā.
sati saṃyoge'pi tayoḥ
*prayojanam nā'sti sargasya. (S.K.*66)

One (says) 'she has been seen by me' (and thus becomes) indifferent. The other (says) 'I have been seen' (and thus) desists (from evolution). Although there be conjunction of these two, there is no motive for (further) creation.

It may also be possible to point out some linguistic parallels between the teaching of the *Śvet.Up.*iv.5, and that of the *Kārikā* verses 65-66. We have already seen the semantic similarity between *sṛjamāna* and *sarga*. *Sṛjamāna* (< √*sṛj*, to produce) is also conceptually related to *'prasava'* (<pra + √*sū*, to generate) of the *Kārikā*, verse 65. The similarity between *sarūpa* (*Śvet.Up.*) and *sapta-rūpa* (S.K. 65) is conspicuous. The verb *jahāti* meaning 'gives up' in the *Śvet.Up.*iv.5. is very close to the idea of *uparamati* or relinquishes occurring in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 66.

Finally, we may mention that in the *Purāṇic Sāṅkhya* the conception of *Puruṣa* or Spirit is regarded as the male and *Prakṛti* or Matter as the female principle in the process of creation.[43] One should be convinced by the foregoing discussion that the *Sāṅkhya* dualism is not a sudden outcome of a single speculative mind. It indeed is a culmination of a historical development of a particular concept that was at work for a very long time in ancient India.

Notes and References

1. Cp.Monier Williams: 'This concept is of great antiquity in the Hindu system', *Hinduism*, pp.138 and 17, and also Renou: *L'Inde Classique*, ii.,p.35.
2. Cp. S.B.Das Gupta: Evolution of mother worship in India, in *Great Women in India*, p.67.
3. *H.S.L.* p.104.
4. Cp. R.K.Mookerji, *Hindu Civilization*, part I (Bombay) pp.19-23 and J.Lewis, *The Religions of the World Made Simple*, Fertility Cults, pp.22-23.
5. *ibid.*
6. This is an idea suggested to the author by Prof. Renou when the author was working under him (1958-61) on the problem of the *Divinités Féminines dans le Ṛgveda.*
7. *The Hymns of the Rigveda*, vol.I, p.611, f.n.18.
8. Cp. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol.1, p.76.
9. *Altindische Grammatik*, Band II, i,p.152.
10. Even the other dual compounds after it are not analysed in the *Pada-text* of the *Ṛgveda.*
11. Vide *R.P.V.U.* p.93.
12. Thesis submitted to the University of Paris in 1961 (unpublished).
13. Cp.E.O.James, "......in a predominantly matriarchal and agricultural social structure the Mother-goddess has tended to become supreme, and sometimes has acquired a celestial status though generally still remaining in some measure her original vegetation and fertility functions as a life-producer in a variety of forms and aspect as the universal mother. In this capacity, as in Mesopotamia, the male god has been subordinate to her....." *The Worship of the Sky-God.* pp.169-170.
14. *H.S.L.* p.107; cp. also *A.G.P.*1.iii, p.460.
15. *Laut order oft rufend.* Grassmann *W.zum R.V.*p.834.
16. *die Inbrunst also göttliches Wesen personifiert.* Grassmann, *Op.cit.*, p.266.
17. *Ich trage .... die beiden Aśvin* - Geldner.
18. Cp.Deussen, *A.G.P.* i. iii.pp.480 - 481.
19. Vide Renou, *Hymnes Spéculatifs du Veda*, p.242, 4, and Geldner, *Der Rig-Veda*, iii, p.251, f.n. 42.
20. *ibid.*, Renou, *H.S.V.*p.242, 4.
21. Cp. C.D. Sharma, *Indian Philosophy* (1952) p.229.
22. *L'Inde Classique*, Vol.II. pp.35-36.
23. Hiriyanna, *O.I.P.* pp.54-55.

24. *Op.cit.* p.55.
25. *Op.cit.* p.54.
26. Zimmer, *P.I.* p.77.
27. Cp. Hiriyanna, *O.I.P.* p.55.
28. *L'Inde Classique,* tome II p.36.
29. *guṇa-kṣobhe jāyamāne*
mahān prādur-babhūva ha, S.P.B. 1.64.
30. Cp. C.D.Sharma, *I.P.* p.385.
31. *ibid.*
32. Cp.Radhakrishnan, *I.P.* Vol.II p.260.
33. Cp. C.D.Sharma, *I.P.* p.385.
34. L.C.II, p.34 Section 1421.
35. Deussen :
Die eine Ziege, rot und weisse und schwärlich
Wirft viele Junge, die ihr gleichgestaltet,
Der eine Bock in Liebesbrunst bespringt sie
Der andre Book verlässt sie, die genossen.
(Sechzig Up.des Veda, p.301).
36. *ajām ekām lohita-śukla-kṛṣṇām/bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjamānām namāmaḥ,*
ajā ye tām juṣamānām bhajante/jahāty enām bhukta-bhogām numas tān.
37. This Mother Nature is the *jagan-mātā* of the pre-Vedic, Indus Valley civilization.
38. *I.P.* (1952) p.214.
39. Cp.Deussen, *A.G.P.* 1.iii, p.481; Keith, *S.S.* pp. 12-13; Suryanarayana Sastri, *S.K.* p.31.
40. Cp.Deussen, *Sechzig Up. des Veda,* p.301 and *A.G.P.*I.iii.pp.480-481.
41. Cp.Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Up.* p.733.
42. Cp.Macdonell, *P.S.D. q.v.*
43. Cp.Macdonell, *H.S.L.*p.399 and also Pusalker, *Studies in the Epics and Purāṇas of India,* pp.1-24.

V

Evolution

(1) Evolution is one of the most important concepts of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. The idea of evolution is interrelated to the conception of teleology which we will be discussing in the next chapter. We propose to limit ourselves here only to the doctrine of evolution. In the *Ṛgveda* it is mentioned that *Uṣas,* the goddess of morning twilight is being born again and again (*R.V.* 1.92.10). Elsewhere in the same text, Agni, the Fire-god is supposed to take a new birth daily (*R.V.*ii. 9. 5). The duration of the period of the life-span of the same god being increased, it is mentioned in a different context that he (=Agni) is being born month after month (*māsi māsi*) (*R.V.* x.52.3). The germ of the faint beginning of the concept of the periodic cosmic evolution seems to have been latent in the poetic expressions of this category. It is also important to note here that in the *Ṛgveda,* Agni the Son of Strength (*sahasaḥ sūnuḥ*)[1] is supposed to be entering back into his mother's womb (*R.V.* i.141.5). This *tour de force* of the Son of Strength reminds us of the later concepts of evolution (*pariṇāma*) and involution (*pralaya*) of the *Sāṅkhya* system.

(2) Already in the *Ṛgveda* the idea of cosmic periods is implicit in the word *yuga* (epoch). In the first epoch (*pūrva-yuga;* Geldner : *in der erster Zeitalter*) Aditi is said to have gone to (meet) the gods (*R.V.* X.72. 8-9). The idea of epoch (*yuga*) being developed, they refer, elsewhere, to three epochs. Here it is mentioned that *Oṣadhīḥ,* the goddesses of medicinal herbs, were born as the first, that is to say, three epochs before the (birth of the) gods (*yā oṣadhīḥ pūrvā jātā/devebhyas triyugam pare, R.V.* X.97.1). Referring to the important phenomenon of *sat,* the existent being born from *asat,* the non-existent, they say that it took place in the first epoch of gods (*devānām....prathame yuge;* Geldner, *In erster Zeitalter der Götter, R.V.* X.72.3). There is another important idea which is closely allied both to the conception of evolution (*pariṇāma*) and involution (*pralaya*), and to the doc-

trine of epoch (*yuga*). This is the theory of *kalpa* or cosmic age regarded as equal to the time in between evolution and dissolution. The idea of *kalpa* implies the eternal recurrence of creation and dissolution. It must be mentioned that this concept is not explicit in the *Vedas* and *Brāhmaṇas*. It appears probably for the first time in the *Śvet.Up.* (iii. 2; v.3). Here Rudra as the Highest,[2] is said to have created all the worlds and withdrawn them all at the end of time : further this process is stated to repeat many a time (cp.*Śvet.Up*.v.3). Here Rudra as the Highest being is no other than Śiva, the god of cosmic production and destruction. The theory of *kalpa* is closely connected with the doctrine of *Karman* which in turn, is related to the conception of evolution. This problem will be taken up in the next chapter on 'teleology'.

(3) The doctrine of evolution must be viewed against the back-ground of the typical, and almost universal, Indian concept of the pulsating universe. After an epoch (*yuga*) of quiescence during which nature remains in an undifferentiated state, certain internal forces, which were hitherto in a state of equilibrium (*sāmyāvasthā*),[3] lose this balance and gradually nature is transformed into the world.[4] It is interesting to note here that Jainism which is supposed to be a *tributaire du Sāṅkhya*[5] (lit: a tributary of the river of *Sāṅkhya*) is presenting the same concept of cosmic cycles in a different shape. According to Jainism the cycle of time continually revolves. They mention two periods, the *avasarpiṇi* or the descending period and the *utsarpiṇi* or the ascending period. The present descending period was preceded and will be followed by an 'ascending' period. The term *sarpiṇi* is interesting as it suggests the creeping movement of a serpent (*sarpiṇ*). The prefixes *ut* and *ava* mean 'up' and 'down' respectively. Thus the serpent of time will go on revolving throughout the alternating 'ascending' and 'descending' periods for ever.[6]

(4) It is extremely important to make a special mention of the fact that the idea of evolution is already implied in some cosmogonic hymns of the *Ṛgveda*. Thus it is mentioned :

nābhyā āsīd antarikṣam
śīrṣṇo dyauḥ sam avartata. (R.V.X.90.14)

The air (or atmosphere, Geldner: *Luftraum*) came into being (cp.Macdonell: the air was produced) from (his) navel, from (his) head the sky was evolved (cp.Geldner:*aus dem Haupte ging der Himmel hervor*).

The concept of evolution is again found in the *Hiraṇyagarbha Sūkta* (*R.V.* X.121) where it is said that in the beginning there evolved the *Hiraṇyagarba*, the golden germ (*hiraṇyagarbhaḥ sam avartata-agre, R.V*.X.121.1). In this verse the word *avartata* means 'evolved' and it is derived from the root √*vṛt*, to turn, roll, produce, be, exist, and occur. This root √*vṛt* gives rise to a group of words of philosophical significance : *sam-vṛtti, pra-vṛtti* (cp.*S.K.*57) and *ni-vṛtti* (cp.*S.K.*65) are only some of them to be mentioned here. In the above contexts of *sam* + √*vṛt*, (< *samavartata*) the idea of 'be evolved' is presented.[7] In Early Buddhist literature *sam* + √*vṛt* gives rise to words meaning evolution. For example, the word *saṃvaṭṭa* in the Pali Canon means 'rolling on' or 'forward' (as opposed to *vivaṭṭa* meaning rolling back). Thus the term *saṃvaṭṭa-kappa* means the evolving aeon in the sense of the cycle of development of the universe (the opposite being *vivaṭṭa-kappa*).[8]

Again, there are a number of other hymns where one may see an attempt to convey the idea of evolution by means of words derived from the root √*jan*, to be born, as opposed to the words derived from *saṃ* + √*vṛt* meaning "*be evolved*". We propose to discuss some of them below as they attempt to convey the same idea by means of words derived from the root √*jan, to be born.*

(5) The hymn x.72 of the *Ṛgveda* implies several types of (imaginary) evolution.

(i) We begin with the *Ṛgveda* x.72.3 :
devānām yuge prathame
asataḥ sat ajāyata.
tad āśā anv-ajāyata
tad uttānapadas pari.

In the first epoch of gods, the Existent was born from the Non-Existent. Following that were born the quarters of the heaven. That was (born) from the *Uttānapad*.

There is a peculiar type of evolution implied in this verse. Geldner's observation on this verse sheds some important light on this problem. Thus he says : "3 *c.d. Beide tád könne nur auf das*

sát, die bestehende Welt bezogen werden. Die Welt ward aus Nichts erschaffen, aber es war doch eine Gebärerin da, die das Etwas aus dem Nichts gebar. Diese ist die Uttānapad, ein Beiwort der Aditi order einer anderen urschöpferischen Potez".[9] ("3 c.d. Both *tád* could only have referred to the *sát,* the subsisting world. The world has been created out of nothing, but it was however a birth-giver there, which gave birth to something out of nothing. This is the *Uttānapad,* a title of Aditi or another creative power"). The precise meaning of the word "*uttānapad*" mentioned in the above verse is somewhat doubtful. Geldner gives two alternative explanations of it. According to him either it should be a *'Beiwort'* (=title) of Aditi or a different creative power (*Potenz*). We may also refer to Grassmann's explanation of the same words : *'deren Beine (pad) ausgebreutet sind (zum Gebären). Bezeichnung der Weltmutter* : ('whose legs (*pad*) are spread) (to give birth to). A designation of *Jagan-mātā* or the world-mother (W.zum R.V. pp.250-251). Grassmann's explanation that the word means "someone whose legs are spread out (for the purpose of giving birth to) and his belief that the word is a designation of *Jagan-mātā,* or the Mother Goddess seem to be closer to the truth. This explanation reminds us of the 'stricking oblong sealing found at Harappā representing the Earth or the Mother Goddess with a plant growing from her womb.[10]

(ii) Again the first half of the fourth verse of the same hymn is important to us. Here is implied another type of evolution : *Bhūr jajñe uttānapado/bhuvaḥ āśā ajāyata,* the earth was born from the *Uttānapad* and from the earth were born the quarters of the heaven (R.V. x.72.4). It is important to note here that the Earth, one of the primeval parents, is also supposed to have been born from a cosmogonic principle, *Uttānapad.* In fact it is possible that they have presented here the same concept of Mother Goddess (represented as somewhat an abstract principle under the garb of *Uttānapad*) and are thus getting a step closer to the idea of evolution of the world from the principle of *Prakṛti.* That the world is traced back to a principle instead of a mythical entity is in fact a great advancement in the gradual development of the idea of evolution.

(iii) The latter half of the same verse (*R.V.*X.72.4) presents a peculiar phenomenon. This is an unusual reciprocal birth of two mythical figures which is of great interest to us. It is mentioned

here that : Dakṣa was born from Aditi and from Dakṣa Aditi was born *(aditer dakṣo ajāyata/dakṣād aditiḥ pari,* x.72.4d) (vide chap.4, sec.6).

(iv) The fifth verse of this very same hymn under discussion (*R.V.* x.72.5) makes a modification of the view presented in the previous passage (*R.V.*x.72.4d), namely that Dakṣa and Aditi were born from each other. Here the poet-philosopher paints an entirely different picture of cosmogony. According to this new theory, Aditi was born as the daughter of Dakṣa and the gods were born after Aditi (*R.V.* x.72.5). Thus, according to this account Dakṣa the first principle gave birth to Aditi who in her turn seems to have given birth to the gods. The present account may be a distortion of the previous one (x.72.4d) which from the point of view of history appears to be the older concept. Here the author of the hymn has made Dakṣa, the male energy (cp. Renou : *l'efficacité virile, H.S.V.*p.242 n.4) the ultimate principle or the primordial world-ground, an idea which may, perhaps, be seen in the well known *puruṣa-sūkta* or Hymn of Man (*R.V.*x.90) too (cp.Macdonell, *V.R.*p.195). The types of evolution implicit in the above passages can be represented as follows (fig in p. 73) :-



(v) We now propose to examine the above types of evolution. To begin with one may refer to the type 'A'. Agreeing with Geldner we may say that the first principle *a-sat* or the non-existent mentioned in the *R.V.* x.72.3 is the *Uttānapad*. It is probably a representation of the Mother Goddess. This world-ground, the *a-sat* may be the same as *A-diti*. Such an opinion receives the support of Radhakrishnan who observes : 'In x.72, the world-ground is said to be *asat* or the non-existent with which is identified Aditi, the Infinite. All that exists is *diti* or bounded, while the *a-diti*, the infinite is non-existent. From the infinite cosmic force arises'.[11] This *Aditi* with whom the *A-sat* or the non-existent is identified is but an anticipation of *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya* and Radhakrishnan pertinently says in this connection, 'Aditi literally means unbounded or unlimited. Here we have the anticipation of a universal all-embracing, all-producing nature itself, the immense potentiality or the prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya philosophy'.[12] *Sat* or the existent is the second stage of the present scheme of evolution. It is the manifestation of what was remaining implicit formerly. The negative term *A-sat* reminds us of *Avidyā*, that which is not (within our) knowledge (semantically related to *Avedyā*, that which cannot be known) which at times is used as a synonym of *Prakṛti*) (cp.chapter 4, sec.7,ii). This conception of *Sat*, the existent, as born from *A-sat*, the non-existent bearing a prima facie similarity with Heidegger's philosophy, belongs to the earliest stratum of Indian thought. It is to be reiterated here that *A-sat* in the present context is not *śūnyatā*, *tucchatva* or mere nothing. The non-existent (*asat*) is what does not yet exist (in a concrete form), but what possesses the possibility of a future (concrete) existence.[13] It is an implicit condition, an *avyakta* (or unmanifest) which under favourable circumstances, can give rise to an explicit state. Hence the present concept, *asataḥ sat ajāyata*, the existent was born from the non-existent, is not the same as - *Ex nihilo omne ens qus ens fit* - or Every Being as a Being, comes out of nothing.[14] What we have here is an evolution from the implicit to the explicit and this reminds us at once of the central conception of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy : the *Satkāryavāda*, the theory that the effect is implicit (*sat*) in its cause. This is all what is important to us in this account. The significance of the type 'B' is almost the same as the type 'A'. Here the *Sat* or the existent

is represented by the Earth which, undoubtedly is the most-concrete form of existence (cp.*bhūḥ*). Going a step further the author says here (*R.V.* x.72.4) that the quarters of the heaven were born from the Earth which is the second stage of this scheme of evolution. The type 'C' implies that the two cosmogonic principles *Dakṣa* and *Aditi* are eternal entities (vide ch.4, sec.6). The last one, the type 'D' is not very important to us. This evolutionary scheme attempts to derive the female principle (i.e. Aditi) from the male principle (Dakṣa). The idea that the gods were born from Aditi was a normal tenet of the *Vedic* Society.

(VI) We may now refer to another important cosmogonic hymn of the *Ṛgveda*, namely, x.190. In this hymn of three verses one notices, on the one hand, a sort of evolution and, on the other, a creation by *Vidhātṛ* or the Disposer. This hymn is as follows :-

Tapas (R.V.x.190)

i Cosmic Order (*ṛta*) and Truth (*satya*) were born (*ajāyata*) from the burning (*abhīddhāt*) *Tapas*. Thence was the Night born, (and) thence the ocean and its waves.

ii. From the ocean with its waves was born the year (*saṁvatsara*; literally, 'complete year', Renou, *l'annee*)[15] which ordains (*vidadhat*) the days and nights, lord (*vaśī*; Sāyaṇa, *svāmi*) over all who close the eyes.

iii. *Dhātar* (Disposer) (then) formed in range of priority (*yathāpūrvam*, Renou : *en range de priorite*)[16] Sun and Moon and Heaven and Earth, the atmosphere and light.

The first two verses of this hymn depict a certain idea of evolution. It is immediately followed by an account which tells us that *Dhātar* or the Disposer has formed the diverse phenomena in the universe according to a certain pattern. When we consider the first two verses of this hymn it is really surprising as to how a *Dhātṛ* or Disposer can be introduced into the latter half of the same hymn. All these may, perhaps, reflect a conflict of

concepts in the mind of the poet-philosopher, a conflict between the concept of evolution and that of creation. However the *Dhātṛ* mentioned in this hymn cannot be anything more than a great *Vedic* god such as Indra. At any rate he cannot be an almighty creator. He is but one who arranges cosmic phenomena in order, a being who is somewhat similar to the *Demiourgos* in Plato's *Timeus*.[17] The kind of evolution implied by the first two verses of this penultimate hymn of the *Ṛgveda* can be represented in the following diagram :



The evolution implied here has *Tapas* for its first principle. This *Tapas* is the Cosmic Fervour (Renou : *L'Ardeur cosmique*).[18] It may also be taken as the (element of) cosmic fire. *Ṛta*, the Cosmic Order and *Satya*, the Truth (existence) are related concepts. They can easily be taken as two aspects of the same stage of evolution. It is well known that *Ṛta* is but *Satya*: that is why it is said that the Dawns are *ṛtajātasatyāḥ*, that is to say that they

are punctually true[19] (cp.Geldner : *die rechtzeitig geborenen*). The next stage *Rātri* or the Night may imply the faint idea of time. *Rātri*, also, conveys the idea of the element of darkness which is common to many cosmologies (cp.*R.V.*10.129.3; and also ch.22, sec.5). The ocean with its waves, as the fourth stage, in the present context represents the (gross) element of water and the physical world full of motion. This may imply that the physical world with its different phenomena is, already, evolved. The fifth stage presents three important ideas. Firstly, it is the evolution of the phenomenon of day and night; it is merely a transition from *chaos* (*rātri*, i.e. the element of darkness) to *cosmos* (*aho-rātrāṇi*). Next the poet-philosopher implies that the living beings (*miṣataḥ*) are already evolved. Finally the concept of *saṁvatsara*, the complete year, is presented. By complete year is meant the (entire) time necessary for the birth of a calf (*vatsa* (-ra) = Gk.*fétos*). Hence we agree with Geldner in maintaining that the complete year (*saṁvatsara*) mentioned in this evolutionary process is nothing but the concept of time.[20] The special significance attached to 'time' by the author of this hymn is conspicuous. According to the author of the hymn time is the one who reigns over all living beings (*R.V.*10.190.2).[21] This, in other words, may imply that the whole living world evolves in course of time.

(7) We may now attempt to study the *Puruṣa-sūkta* (*R.V.*10.90) in which already the idea of evolution is referred to. According to this hymn the material out of which the world was made is the body of *Puruṣa* or Man.[22] The world which the human beings inhabit is (itself) considered to have been evolved out of a vast figure of human shape called *Puruṣa* or Man. It is but natural for man (puruṣa) to reflect his image even in his philosophical speculations.[23] Thus we notice here the relationship between the macrocosm and the microcosm. Incidentally we may mention here that according to Jainism, a tributory of the *Sāṅkhya* thought,[24] too the entire cosmos is of a human form.[25] The tendency to regard the universe as a *makranthropos* (vide Deussen, *The philosophy of the Upanishads*, p.106) is a very old one which is found in the *Vedas*, *Brāhmaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads*. This problem has been subjected to a good study by G.P.Gonger.[26] The ideas contained in the *Puruṣa-sūkta* can be classified as follows :

(i) From *Puruṣa, Virāj* was born and from *Virāj, Puruṣa* was born (x.90.5).

(ii) *Puruṣa* is all this, all that has been and all that will be (x.90.2).

(iii) (a) *Puruṣa* was thousand- eyed and thousand-footed (x.90.1).

(b) He covered the earth on all sides and extended beyond it the length of ten fingers (x.90.1).

(c) A fourth of the *Puruṣa* is all beings (x.90.3).

(iv) (a) From his navel was produced the air. The sky *was evolved (sam-avartata)* from his head, from his two feet the earth and from his ear the quarters (x.90.14).

(b) The spring was the melted butter of the oblation of *Puruṣa,* the summer was its fuel and the autumn was its oblation (x.90.6).

(v) (a) From that sacrifice were born the hymns and the chants. The meters were born from it. From it was born the sacrifice formula (x.90.9).

(b) From that arose horses and all (the animals) having two rows of teeth. Cattle were born from that and from that were born goats and sheep (x.90.10).

(vi) From the clotted butter collected from that sacrifice (of *Puruṣa*) were made the beasts of the air, of the forest and those of the village (x.90.8).

(vii) The mouth of *Puruṣa* was the *Brāhman.* His two arms were made the warrior, his two thighs the *Vaiśya* and from his two feet the *Śūdra* was born (x.90.12).

(viii) The moon was born from his mind. The sun was born from his eye. From his mouth Indra and from his breath (*prāṇa*) *Vāyu* was born (x.90.13).

Under section one we notice a dualism of *Puruṣa* and *Virāj* (cp.ch.4.sec.6,ii). According to this it appears that *Puruṣa* (along with *Virāj*) is responsible for the origin of the world.

Section two implies that *Puruṣa* is the world-ground. Here *Puruṣa* is depicted somewhat like the later concept of *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya*. This reminds us of *Dakṣa* (*R.V.*x.72.4d) a cosmogonic principle.

Section (iii) (a) presents a popular description of *Puruṣa*. This description of *Puruṣa* as possessing thousand eyes and thousand feet reminds us of Empedocles' (495 B.C.- 435) theory of evolution.[27]

Section (iii) (b) and (c) are important. These accounts imply that *Puruṣa,* the world-ground is something larger than its products. This reminds us of *Prakṛti* regarding which Radha-krishnan observes as follows : 'Evolution implies a principle which cannot be equated with any one of its stages. It is something larger than its products, though immanent in them'.[28]

In Section (iv) (a) the very word *evolution (sam-avartata:*x.90.14) is employed. Here it is mentioned that the sky, the earth and the quarters were evolved from the head, feet and the ears of *Puruṣa* respectively. The *antarikṣa* (*R.V.*x.90.14), the air,[29] and the seasons (*R.V.*x.90.6) mentioned in this section imply the evolution of (the concepts of) space and time.

Sections (iv) (b) and (vi) refer to the evolution of the animal kingdom.

In section (v) (a) there may be a reference to the origin of the human speech.

Then in section (vii), the poet describes the origin of the Indian social order.

The last section (viii) is of importance to us. It is interesting to note here that the great god Indra, who is generally supposed to have had a miraculous birth (*R.V.*iv.22.4), is also considered to have been born from (the mouth of) *Puruṣa*. The mind (*manas*)

and the breath (*prāṇa*) of *Puruṣa* have given rise to the moon and the wind (*Vāyu*) (x.90.13). The material nature of mind implicit in this passage reminds us of the *Sāṅkhya* principle of *manas* (mind) which evolves from *Prakṛti*, a material entity. The ideas contained in this section (x.90.13) appear to have been developed in the *Aitareya Up.* 1.1 and also in the *Muṇḍaka Up.* 11.1.3-4. Thus says the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* : "From him are born life, mind, all the sense-organs, (also) ether, air, light, water and earth, the supporters of all. Fire is his head. His eyes are the Sun and the Moon, *the regions of space are his ears,*[30] his speech the revealed *Vedas*; air is his life and his heart the world. *Out of his feet the earth was born;*[31] indeed he is the self of all beings". Referring to these passages from the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* (11.1.3-4), which appear to be a development of the ideas contained in the *Puruṣa-sūkta* (x.90.3), Deussen aptly remarks that they already pave the path for the (appearance of the) later conception of *Sāṅkhya* : '*...so dass die Stelle, schon den Übergang zu der spätern Sāṅkhya-Anschauung bildet*'.[32]

(8) The most important hymn with regard to the concept of evolution is the *R.V.*x.129, which may be said to be the climax of speculative thought in the *Ṛgveda.*[33] This cosmogonic poem describes the origin of the world as the evolution of *sat* or the existent from *asat* or the non-existent. According to the author of the poem water came into being first and from it evolved 'mind' (*manas*) by heat. In all probability, it is the starting point of the natural philosophy which, in course of time, developed into the *Sāṅkhya* system.[34] We may now analyse the contents of this hymn as follows : (i) In the beginning there was darkness hidden by darkness. All this was (but) water. (Now) there arose 'That One' through the power of heat (x.129.3). (ii) Then (at that time) there was not death, nor immortality. There was neither night nor day (x.129.2). (iii) Then there evolved (*sam-avartata*) *kāma* or desire. It was the first seed of mind (x.129.4). (iv) There were impregnators, there were powers; there was energy (*svadhā*) below, there was impulse (*prayatiḥ*) above (x.129.5). The type of evolution implied in this hymn (x.129) can be shown as follows :

Asat		
Water (*Salila*)		*Āpaḥ*
Heat (*Tapas*)		*Tejas*
Tad Ekam or the unevolved universe. (Macd: *V.R.* p. 209)	That One breathed windless (x. 129 .2) (Macd., *V.R.* p 208)	*Vāya*
Kāma or desire	Cp. *Ṛgveda* x. 129.4... dass das *Manas* aus dem *Kāma* order dass der *Kāma* aus dem *Manas* entspringt...' A.G.P. 1. iii. p. 58. Paul Deussen.	
Manas or Mind		
Retodhāḥ or the Impregnators	*Prayatiḥ* or Impulse	Male and Female
Mahimānaḥ or Powers	*Svadhā* or Energy	Cosmogonic Principles

The evolutionary process implied in this hymn, clearly mentions that the original stuff from which the world has evolved is *asat* or the non-existent mentioned in the fourth verse of this hymn (x.129.4). Thus it is said :-

sato bandhum asati nir avindan
hṛdi pratīṣyā kavayo manīṣā.

Sages seeking in their hearts with wisdom found out the bond of the existent in the non-existent.[35]

This concept of the existent getting evolved from the non- existent has already been discussed under section 5.v. There is another important phenomenon of this hymn which we should mention here. The evolutionary process implied in this hymn

consists of three stages of evolution : (i) The objective world, water and heat, (ii) The subjective world, *kāma* or desire and *manas* or the mind, (iii) The male and female (cosmogonic) principles (cp.Renou, *H.S.V.*p.254 & Geldner, *R.V.* iii.p.360.

(i) The first stage of this evolution may roughly correspond to the *tanmātra-sarga* or the evolution of the subtle elements described in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, 24: water (*salila*), heat (*tapas*) and *Tad Ekam*, That One (x.129.3) (cp.*tad ekam ānīd*, that one breathed, x.129.2) in this evolution may imply the subsistence of the elements of *āpaḥ* (water), *tejaḥ* (heat) and *vāyu* (wind). *Tad Ekam* or 'That One', as Macdonell observes, is the unevolved universe (cp.*V.R.*,p.209). It reminds us of the *Avyakta* or the Unmanifest of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, verse no 2. All these together represent the objective side of the present evolutionary process.

(ii) Desire (*kāma*) and mind (*manas*) together form the subjective side of this evolutionary scheme. *Kāma* and *manas* can be taken as the second stage of this evolution. *Manas* or the mind, according to this evolution, does not appear to be a pure psychic entity. It is a gradual development of the early material stage of this evolution. Thus its position in the present evolutionary process is not different from that of *manas* in the *Sāṅkhya* which is an evolution from *Prakṛti*.

(iii) In the third stage is found a dualism of two sets of opposite principles, masculine and feminine. One of these is *Retodhāḥ* versus *Mahimānaḥ*. *Retodhāḥ* derived from, *retas*, seed + √*dhā*, to put, means literally those who place the seed. Thus it means the impregnators or the male principles. *Mahimānaḥ* (pl.) (< *mah-i- man*) derived from √*mah*, to be great, conveys the sense of 'powers' (Mayerhofer : *Kraft*) or *śakti* in the sense of female principles. The word *Prayatiḥ* derived from *pra* + √*yat*, to be active may mean impulse, i.e. the male aspect of the cosmogony. Finally *svadhā* formed of *sva*, own + √*dhā*, to put, means energy in the sense of the female aspect of the same cosmogony. Thus one cannot fail to notice that *Retodhāḥ-Mahimānaḥ* and *Prayatiḥ-Svadhā* represent two sets of male-female principles corresponding to the *Sāṅkhya* duality of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*.

(9) The *Ṛgvedic* passages which we have discussed so far point out the fact that the idea of evolution was already known to the poets of the *Ṛgveda*. Again, it is also implicit in the *Ṛgveda* that the evolution, as a process, is not always without hindrance.

This hindrance or the 'unnatural interference' with objects, as Aristotle would call it[36] appears to be implicit in expressions such as *ardha-deva*, demi-god, (Geldner:*Halbgott*) (*R.V.* IV.42.8-9), *Ardha-garbha*, half-children (Geldner:*Halbkinder*) (*R.V.*1.164.36), and *vṛṣaṇ-aśva* (R.V.1.51.13), a being which is half-bull and half-horse (Geldner:*ein Wesen das halb Stier and halb Pferd ist*). The *Sāṅkhya* theory of evolution would explain the above phenomena by means of its doctrine of the *Guṇas*. According to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy the evolution of different phenomena is determined by the general preponderance of one *Guṇa* over the others. This is implicit in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 12, which describes the nature of the different *Guṇas*. Here is mentioned, amongst other characteristics of the *Guṇas*, the fact that they always try to suppress each other (*anyonya-abhibhava*) and thereby to become prominent in different forms of existence. Again it is implied in the *Kārikā* 54 that *Sattva* predominates in gods, *Rajas* in human beings and *Tamas* in animals and in the plant kingdom. According to this *Sāṅkhya* doctrine a god, in general, evolves with a preponderance of the *Sattva Guṇa*. But if in such a situation the *Sattva* is interfered by the *Rajas* the evolution may result in a demi-god (=half-god and half-man) in place of a god. Thus we may notice that evolution follows a definite law which cannot be transgressed (*pariṇāma-krama-niyama*): this means that there are some natural barriers which cannot be removed.[37] Adopting the terminology of Kierkegaard one may describe this position as a "rational gap"[38] in nature that cannot be overstepped. This sort of interference may explain the other two phenomena too. The idea of the incomplete teleology is also seen in Aristotle. Thus Ross points out : 'This (Aristotle's) teleology is not complete. He has to admit the existence of many imperfections in the structure of animals...They are ascribed to defect in the material, not in the sense that there is anything vicious in matter as such or in any particular matter, but in the sense that nature often has to work with matter which, however good for other purposes, is not good for the purpose in hand...When nature has succeeded in making some individuals perfect, why (we may ask) does it not succeed in making the others perfect? *Owing to the variability of matter, says Aristotle*'.[39]

(10) In the *Atharvaveda* we come across a repetition of certain *Ṛgvedic* material such as the *Puruṣa-sūkta*. Except in these

instances the concept of evolution is not clearly developed in the hymns of the *Atharvaveda*. It is vaguely referred to in some passages as the *A.V.*IV.1.1 [the womb (*yoni*) of the existent and the non-existent[40]], *A.V.*xi.8.6 (Both penance... and action were within the great sea, penance was born from action: that did they worship as chief[41]), *A.V.*xix.51.1 [From time came into being the waters; from time (came) the *brahman*, fervour, the quarters...[42]].

(11) In the *Brāhmaṇas*, we do not come across any important development of the concept of evolution as their main purpose is to describe the sacrificial performances in detail. However, we notice, here and there, a trace of the ideas of *pariṇāma* or evolution. Thus observes Renou 'The prevailing system of ideas in the *Brāhmaṇas* is that of substance and forces, and is largely inherited from the hymns....Cosmic powers, elements of the personality, factors of life, spiritual capacities, acts profane and religious values etc., stand in various relations to each other: now one is an integral part of another, enters into it or emerges from it, is its cause or effect and now the two come together to create a new essence and sometimes there is a trace of the idea of evolution (*pariṇāma*).[43] We may, for example, refer to a few selected passages which are representative of the position of the concept of evolution found in the *Brāhmaṇas*. The following passages from the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* may imply the concept of evolution (*pariṇāma*) and also the same of involution (*pralaya*). A.(i) Out of fire the sun is born... From the sun the moon is born....From the moon the rain is born...From rain lighting is born (*Ait.Brāhmaṇa* V.5.28)[44]. (ii) The rain when fallen is absorbed by the moon...The moon at the time of the new moon is absorbed by the sun...The sun, when setting is absorbed by Agni...The fire (Agni) when extinguishing is absorbed by *Vāyu* (*Ait.Brāhmaṇa*, V.5.28).[45]B. For lightning (produces) rain and rain gives food. Thus he makes lightning and enters it (*Ait.Brāhmaṇa*, ii,5.41). The two examples given under 'A' is of greater interest to us and hence they deserve discussion. We may symbolize them as follows : (i)$F \rightarrow S \rightarrow M \rightarrow R \rightarrow L$. (ii) $V \rightarrow A \rightarrow S \rightarrow M \rightarrow R$.[46] In these two series of symbolic expressions we have some important links, namely (a) $S \rightarrow M \rightarrow R$ in the first and (b) $S \rightarrow M \rightarrow R$ in the second. Keeping to the accepted convention of the symbolic logic one may replace S,M and R by p,q

and r. Thus the two expressions would appear as follows :- (a) $p \rightarrow q \rightarrow r$ and (b) $p \rightarrow q \rightarrow r$. One would read them as: p gives rise to q and q gives rise to r and (b) r is absorbed by q and q is absorbed by p. The principle involved here is just the same as that involved in saying : (a) *Prakṛti* (p) gives rise to *Mahat* (q) and *Mahat* (q) gives rise to *Ahaṅkāra* (r) and (b) *Ahaṅkāra* (r) is absorbed by *Mahat* (q) and *Mahat* (q) is absorbed by *Prakṛti* (p). Thus it may not be wrong to conclude that the idea reflected in the above passages of the *Ait. Brāhmaṇa* has presupposed the *Sāṅkhya* conception of evolution and involution.

(12) An important stage in the development of the concept of evolution is found in some *Upaniṣadic* passages which we propose to discuss in the following pages. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* vii.24.2, we have a significant concept involving the idea of evolution. Thus it is said : *anyo'hi anyasmin pratiṣthitaḥ*, one thing is established in another (*Chānd.Up.*vii.24.2). Here we come across the doctrine of *paratantra* (the theory that one thing depends on another) which reminds us of the position of the different stages of evolution taught in the *Sāṅkhya* system (as well as the *paṭiccasamuppāda*, the dependent origination of early Buddhism).[47] The importance of this passage from the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* is further enhanced in that it is immediately followed by a passage (*Ch.Up.* vii.25.1) where the word *ahaṅkāra*[48] *(+ādeśa)* occurs. (*Ahaṅkāra*, according to the *S.K.* is the second stage of evolution and it depends on *Mahat* or *Buddhi* for its existence). Now this doctrine of *paratantra* is explicitly referred to in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. In describing the nature of the *Vyakta* or the Manifest the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* observes as follows :-

> *hetumad - anityaṁ avyāpi*
> *sakriyam-anekam-āśritam liṅgam*
> *sāvayavam paratantram*
> *vyaktam....* (S.K.10).

The translations of this verse, as given by H.D.Sharma and S.S.Suryanarayana Sastri, do not bring out the meaning of *paratantra* precisely and clearly. The former translates *paratantram* as 'subordinate'[49] and the latter as 'heteronomous'[50]. Deussen translates it as *abhängig*[51] or dependent and this is the exact meaning of *paratantra* in the present context. Thus we may translate

the verse as follows :- 'The manifest is caused, non-eternal, non-pervading, active, manifold, existing in its cause (*āśritam*),[52] mergent (Deussen : *Merkmal*), conjunct and dependent (*paratantra*)...'. Under the Manifest (*Vyakta*), we have *Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, Manas, Indriyas*, the *Tanmātras* and the *Bhūtas*. All these differ from the Unmanifest (*Avyakta*) in the above-mentioned nine points out of which, we at the moment, are concerned only with the *paratantra*. Regarding this nature (i.e. *paratantra-tā*) of the Manifest Gauḍapāda observes as follows : 'Again it is dependent, i.e. it is not independent. As *Buddhi* is depending on *Pradhāna* or *Prakṛti, Ahaṅkāra* is depending on *Buddhi*, the five subtle elements and the eleven organs are depending on *Ahaṅkāra*; and the five gross elements are depending on the five subtle elements...'. Similar is Deussen's explanation: *Sie sind paratantra, abhängig nämlich jedes Glied der Entwicklung von den vorhergehenden und in letztne Grunde alle von der Prakṛti welche allein von nichts anderem abhängt.*[53] ('They are *paratantra*, depending, namely each link of the evolution on the foregoing and in the last ground all on the *Prakṛti* which alone depends on nothing else.') Thus we see that the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of *paratantra* is already presupposed by the above mentioned passage of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (vii.24.2).

(13) In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 1.3.10-13 (=ii.3.7-11)[54] we have a gradation of certain mental faculties which, in all probability, was the immediate precursor of the evolutionary process as given in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. It is as follows :

Puruṣa (Ātmā)
↑
Avyakta
↑
Mahān Ātmā
↑
Buddhi (*Jñānātmā* i.3.13)[55] (*Sattvam*, 11.3.7)[56]
↑
Manas
↑
Arthāḥ or the objects (of the senses) and the *Indriyas*.[57]

This gradation of mental faculties is of great interest for the students of the history of the two allied systems; the *Sāṅkhya* and the *Yoga*. The scheme implies that *Ātman* is everything. But there appears to be an unconscious contradiction running through the discussion which again draws a sharp contrast between soul and matter. This, as correctly pointed out by Macdonell, is the contradiction between the later *Vedānta* and the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* systems of Indian philosophy.[58]

(14) This gradation of mental faculties can be compared with a scheme mentioned in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 1.1.8-9. It is said: "By *Tapas* expands *Brahman*. From that food (*anna*) is developed (*abhijāyate* : Deussen : *entwickelt*).[59] From food, life (*prāṇa*), (thence) mind (*manas*), (thence) the reals (*satyam*, the five elements); (thence) the worlds; (thence the rituals) in the rituals (*karmasu*), immortality (1.1.8). He who is all-knowing and all-wise, whose *Tapas* (austerity) consists of knowledge, from him are born this *Brahmā* (*Hiraṇya-garbha*), name-shape and food (*anna*)". Thus we have the following scheme :

Yaḥ Sarvajñaḥ, Sarva-vid (he who is all-knowing and all-wise (Brahman)
↓
Annam (food)
↓
Prāṇa (life) (*Hiraṇyagarbha*)
↓
Manas (Mind)
↓
Satyam (the five elements), *lokāḥ* (the worlds) and *karmāni* (rituals)[60]

The above two schemes are essentially the same. The only difference we notice between them is that the former mixes up *Mahān-ātmā* and *Buddhi* to create the *Prāṇa*. Such is the opinion of Deussen too.[61]

(15) There is another relevant passage in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* (ii.1.3.) which does not appear to be so important as the one we have mentioned above. There it is said :

etasmāj-jāyate prāṇo
manaḥ sarvendriyāṇi ca
khaṁ vāyur jyotir āpaḥ
pṛthivī viśvasya dhāriṇī.

From him are born life (*prāṇa*), mind, all the sense-organs, (also) ether, air, light, water, and earth, the supporter of all.

What is suggested here is an emanation proceeding from 'him' who is explained by Śaṅkara as *Īśvara* or Lord. Deussen has correctly pointed out that this 'person' (he=*etaḥ*) is *Puruṣa-akṣara* or the Imperishable Person'. The table (Deussen, *Genealogie*) can be given as follows :

Puruṣa-Akṣara
↓
Prāṇa
↓
Manas
↓
Sense-organs and Elements (ether, air, light and earth)[62]

(16) The different kinds of concepts which we have discussed so far have formed the back-ground for the *Sāṅkhya* idea of evolution. The *Sāṅkhyas* have adopted some of these ideas and welded them into a fairly coherent theory of cosmic evolution which proceeds in two ways :-

(i) The *bhautika-sarga* (*S.K.*24 and 53), the evolution of beings (Deussen, *Die Wesen Schöpfung*).[63] According to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 64, the evolution of beings (*bhautika-sarga*) includes not only the divine beings, the human beings, and the animals, but also the plant kingdom (*sthāvarāṇi bhūtāni* - Gauḍapāda). This is the evolution of the organic aspect of the world.

(ii) The *tanmātra-sarga* or the evolution of the five subtle elements (cp.*S.K.*24) and consequently the same of the gross elements (*mahā-bhūta*). This is the evolution of the inorganic side of the world.

Before winding up the present chapter, we have to add a word regarding the terminology adopted to name the two ways of evolution mentioned above. This terminology is not in full agreement with that employed by S.C.Chatterjee and D.M.Datta. We begin with their view : 'the whole course of evolution from

Prakṛti to the gross physical elements is distinguished into two stages, namely, the psychical (*pratyaya-sarga* or *buddhi-sarga*) and the physical (*tanmātra-sarga* or *bhautika-sarga*). The first includes the development of *prakṛti* as *buddhi, ahaṅkāra* and the eleven sense-motor organs. The second is constituted by the evolution of the five subtle physical essences (*tanmātra*), the gross elements (*mahābhūta*) and their products'.[64] The *bhautika-sarga* as understood by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, does not appear to be equal to the *tanmātra-sarga* though they are considered to be similar in the above passage. Our view is made clear by the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 24 where it is said thus :

abhimāno' haṅkāraḥ
tasmād dvidhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ
ekādaśakaś ca gaṇaḥ
tanmātraḥ pañcakaś caiva.

Ahaṅkāra (Keith : Individuation,[65] Deussen : *der Ichmacher, das Prinzip der Individuation*)[66] is self-consciousness. Therefore creation proceeds in two ways, as the eleven-fold aggregate and as the five-fold subtle elements.

The two ways of evolution (*sarga*) is clearly mentioned here. They are : (i) the evolution of the eleven-fold aggregate and (ii) the evolution of the five-fold subtle elements (*tanmātra-sarga*) (and consequently the evolution of the five gross elements). There is no problem regarding the *tanmātra-sarga* as it is clearly mentioned in the above verse. Then what is this evolution of the eleven-fold aggregate? The evolution of the eleven-fold aggregate (as we saw in ch.3) is the evolution of the five sensory organs, the five motor organs and the mind. This, indeed, is the evolution of the living being.[67] Thus it is seen that the eleven-fold aggregate is nothing but the *bhautika-sarga* or the creation (evolution) of the living beings mentioned in the *Kārikā* 53 :

aṣṭa-vikalpo daivas
tairyagyonaś ca pañcadhā bhavati.
mānuṣakaś cai'kavidhaḥ
samāsato bhautikas sargaḥ.

The divine (order) is considered (or judged) to be of (i.e. divided into) eight (kinds); the animal creation (evolution,

tairyag-yona), next, becomes five-fold; mankind is (indeed) of one variety. Such, in brief, is the *bhautika-sarga* or the creation (evolution) of the living beings.[68]

This *bhautika-sarga* as we saw before consists of gods, men, animals, and plants. Of this, according to Suryanarayana Sastri, 'The varieties are cattle, wild beasts, birds, reptiles and immovable objects, such as vegetables and minerals'.[69] Thus it is clear that the *bhautika-sarga* is not the same as the *tanmātra-sarga* but the very opposite of it. The word *bhautika* is derived from *bhūta* meaning animate and inanimate things and also the elements (cf. (a) *kālo ghasati bhūtāni*, time consumes the beings, (b) *pañca-bhūta*, the five elements). But the word as used here, i.e. *bhautika-sarga*, means the creation (evolution) of beings in the sense of gods, men etc., and not the creation of the subtle elements (*tanmātra-sarga*). Hence we disagree with the view of Chatterjee and Datta and propose to translate *bhautika-sarga* as the creation (evolution) of beings (cp. Deussen, *die Wesen Schöpfung, A.G.P.* 1.iii,p.457). According to this interpretation, *bhautika-sarga*, is the opposite of the *tanmātra-sarga*.[70]

Notes and References

1. Macdonell, *V.R.* p.2.
2. *'eko hi rudro na dvitīyāya...' Śvet.Up.*iii.2.
3. Cp.Chatterjee and Datta, *I.I.P.* p.264.
4. Cp.Ninian-Smart: *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy* (London), p.77.
5. Renou, *L'Inde Classique*, II.p.34.
6. Cp. H. Zimmer, *P.I.*,pp.224-225.
7. Cp. Macdonell, *V.R.*, p.249.
8. Vide P.T.S. *Pali-English Dictionary*, part viii, p.115.
9. *Der Rig-Veda* III, pp.250-251.
10. R.K.Mookerji, *Hindu Civilization*, part 1, p.20.
11. Radhakrishnan, *I.P.* Vol.I., p.99.
12. R.K., *I.P.*Vol.I,p.82.
13. Cp.Griffith, *The Hymns of the Atharva-Veda*, Vol.I., p.17 f.n.1.
14. Vide Heidegger, *Existence and Being*, p.96, and Edo Pivcevié, *Husserl* and *Phenomenology*, p.109.
15. *H.S.V.*, p.137.
16. *ibid.*

17. Vide A.E.Taylor, *Plato the Man and his Work*, pp.437-461.
18. *H.S.V.* p.137.
19. Macdonell, *V.R.*p.97.
20. *Der Rig-Veda*, III, p.404, f.n.1.
21. Cp. Ovid, *tempus edax rerum* (time, the consumer of things), M., XV.234.
22. Macdonell, *V.R.* p.195.
23. (a) This is also seen in the anthropomorphism of the *Ṛgvedic* gods. This anthropomorphic element is not absent even in the field of science. Thus says Stebbing :-
    'Plank has pointed out that this ideal is attainable only by the elimination of the anthropomorphic element from science'.
    A Modern Introduction to Logic, p.405.
    (b) Even the concept of *Puruṣa* in the *Sāṅkhya* system may be under the same influence.
24. Renou, *I.C.* 11. p.34.
25. Zimmer, *P.I.* p.241.
26. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal - Letters*-Calcutta, 29 (1933).
27. "Originally countless tribes of mortal creatures were scattered abroad endowed with all manner of forms, a wonder to behold ..." Russell, *H.W.P.* p.72.Cp.also Kṛṣṇa's *viśvarūpa* in the *Bhagavadgītā*.
28. *I.P.*, II p.259.
29. Macdonell, *V.R.* p.202.
30. *diśaḥ śrotre*
31. *padbhyām pṛthivī*. Compare these lines (i.e.30 and 31) with *padbhyām bhūmir, diśaḥ śrotrāt* (R.V.X.90.19.C).
32. *A.G.P.* 1.iii.p.39.
33. Cp.*The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, p.15.
34. *V.R.*, p.207.
35. *Im Herzen forschend machten die Weisen*
    durch Nachdenken das Band (d.h.die Inhärenz
    des Seins im Nichtsein, den engen Zusammenhang
    beider) des Seins in Nichtsein ausfindig.
    (Geldner).
36. Cp. (i) R.H.Popkin, *Philosophy Made Simple*, p.83.
    (ii) Ross, *Aristotle*, p.80.
    (iii) *Meteorologica* 341 a1 ff.
37. Das Gupta, *Indian Philosophy*, vol.i, p.256.
38. W.S.Sahakiam, *Philosophy*, pp.66 and 85.
39. Ross, *Aristotle*, pp.126-127.
40. Cp. *Atharva Veda Samhita*, tr. by Whitney Vol.I, p.143.

41. Cp.*A.V.S.* by Whitney, Vol.II, p.647.
42. *Cp.A.V.S.* by Whitney, Vol.II, p.989.
43. *Vedic India*, p.86.
44. Cp.Haug, *The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, pp.534-535.
45. Cp. *Op.cit.*. pp.533-534.
46. *Vide Schipper and Schuh, A First Course in Modern Logic*, pp.75-78.
47. Cp.Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p.487.
48. (a) Garbe, *Der Ahaṅkāra, bekanntlich einer der Hauptbegriffe der Sāṅkhya-Philosophie, ist in der Chāndogya Upanishad, VII.25.1 genannet. Die Sāṃkhya - Philosophie*, p.17.(b) Keith, 'The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* in vii, 25.1 has the word *Ahaṅkāra*, but uses it merely as a synonym for the self, *Ātman....*" *S.S.* p.22. This is a difficult point to decide. Probably Garbe's may be the correct interpretation.
49. H.D.Sharma, *S.K.* p.14.
50. S.S.S. Sastri, *S.K.* p.26.
51. *A.G.P.*, 1,iii, p.424.
52. Sovani, *C.S.S.S.*, p.23.
53. *A.G.P.* Vol.1, iii, p.424.
54. Cp.(a) Garbe, *S.P.*, p.247; (b) Keith, *S.S.*, p.97.
55. Cp.Radhakrishnan, *jñānātman* is the *buddhi* of 1.3.ii. *The Principal Up.* p.628.
56. *Sattva*, essence (intelligence), *Op.cit.*p.643.
57. Cp.Deussen, *Sechzig Up.des Veda*, p.265.
58. Cp.Macdonell, *H.S.L.* p.235.
59. Cp.*Sechzig Up.des Veda*, p.547.
60. Cp.ibid., p.546.
61. Deussen, *Vergleichen wir diese Stufenfolge mit der oben S.265 und Kāṭhaka zusammengestellten, so zeigt sich, dass sie in wesentlichen dieselbe ist, nur das sie, durch Verschmelzung von mahān ātmā und buddhiḥ zu prāṇa, der Sāṅkhyalehre noch um einen Schritt näher gekommen ist. Sechzing Up.des Veda* p.546. Cp.Deussen, ibid., p.551 f.n.1.
62. *ibid.*
63 *A.G.P.* 1.iii. p.457.
64. *I.I.P.* p.277.
65. Vide *R.P.V.U.* p.534.
66. *A.G.P.* 1.iii, pp.435-436.
67. Vide (i) *S.P.B.* III.46, '...*bhāutiko bhūtānāṁ vyṣti-prāṇināṁ ... sarga ity arthaḥ*'. (ii) *The Sāṁkhya-krama-dīpikā* (Ballantyne's Lecture No.72) and (iii) R. Garba, *Die Sāṁkhya-Philosophie*, pp.138-139.
68. *Der Götterwesen Schöpfung hat acht Arten;*
Funf Arten sind der Schöpfung in der Tierwelt.
Von einer Art nur ist der Menschen Schöpfung,
Das ist der Wesen Schöpfung in der Kurze. A.G.P. *1.iii, p.457.*
69. *The Sāṅkhya Kārikā* p.88.
70. Vide R.Garbe, *Die Sāṁkhya Philosophie*, pp.242-243; *'Die organische Welt (bhūta-sarga, bhautika-sarga, dhātu-saṃsarga) wird gewöhnlich in drei Hauptteile zerlegt, in das Reich der Götter, Menschen und Tiere (unter Einschliessung der Pflanzenwelt).....'*

VI

Teleology

(1) That a concept of teleology is implied in the *Sāṅkhya* system is well-known. The word 'teleology' derived from the two Greek words *teleos*, end, purpose and *logos* discourse, means the interpretation in terms of purpose. Hence from the point of view of philosophy it means the doctrine that all objects in the universe serve some purpose, and are not merely the products of chance combinations of atoms working in a haphazard way. Teleology and evolution represent two important aspects of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. The two concepts, as we have mentioned earlier, are interrelated with one another. Teleology, immanent in the *cosmos*, is the *raison d'être* of evolution; therefore evolution is purposive; it is for the liberation of the souls (*puruṣas*). In short, every material entity in this world exists to serve a particular purpose of the *Puruṣa (saṅghāta-parārthatvāt, SK.* 17). As a concept of philosophy, teleology has two aspects : (a) external teleology and (b) immanent teleology.[1] The technical details of these concepts need not delay us here. We may briefly mention that the *Sāṅkhya's*, just as Aristotle's, is an immanent teleology.[2] The end of each evolution is internal to the very evolution. According to the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine all objects of the world show a creative process of evolution. Even the inorganic things cannot be completely explained on mechanical terms. This concept denying the idea that the universe is simply mechanical, presents the view that the force working in the universe is not fundamentally blind and mechanical, but is intelligent and purposive. The *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of teleology is implied in several verses of the *Kārikā* (cp. verses 17, 57 and 58). The scope of *Sāṅkhya* teleogogy, however, need not be exaggerated beyond its limit. This teleology does not imply that there will ever be a perfect, harmonious world. We often come across in this world men, animal and plants which are not fully developed (or evolved). The

acorn that is eaten by a squirrel,[3] an animal born without an organ, the existence of dwarfs are some examples in this connection. The phenomenon is extended to all other realms of beings (*bhauṭika-sarga*) including even that of gods regarding which we have already seen a good example in the term, *ardha-deva*, a demi-god (*R.V.* iv.42.8.9), meaning a being who is not fully developed (evolved) into a god (vide chap.5, section 9). This 'unnatural interference,[4] is to be connected with the law of *karma* (which is accepted by the six orthodox schools and, Jainism and Buddhism).[5]

(2) The faint beginning of the *Sāṅkhya* idea of teleology may be traced back to the Indo-Iranian ethico-cosmic notions, the *asha* and the *ṛta*[6] associated with Ahura Mazda and Varuṇa respectively.[7] The primary sense of the word *ṛta* is movement or adaptation while Wüst suggests an agricultural origin (the furrow) to it. The corresponding *asha* of the *Avesta* has a sense more like 'health'.[8] The conception of *ṛta* in the *Ṛgveda* is very important.[9] The word literally means the ordered course of things.[10] It stands for law in general and the immanence of justice.[11] Originally the conception or *ṛta* may have been suggested by the regularity of the movements of sun and moon, the alternation of day and night and cyclic succession of seasons. In the *Ṛgveda* it is generally connected with *Varuṇa*, the great guardian of the cosmic order. 'By the law of Varuṇa, they say, that 'heaven and earth are held apart'[12]. It implies the order of the world. We see in the conception of *ṛta* a development from the physical to the divine. The concept of *ṛta* which orginally meant the established route of the world has gradually become the path of morality to be followed by man and the law of righteousness observed even by the gods. In the *Ṛgveda* the goddess Uṣas is supposed to be following the path of *ṛta* (*R.V.* v. 80.4).[13] Varuṇa who at first was the maintainer of the physical order of the universe has soon become the custodian of the moral order (*ṛtasya gopā* : Geldner, *der Hüter des Gesetzes*) (*R.V.* x.8.5) and the punisher of sin. The recognition of the conception of *ṛta* has caused a change in the nature of the *Vedic* gods. The world was no more regarded as a chaos of blind forces: it was regarded as the working of a harmonious purpose.[14]

(3) A development of the conception of *ṛta*, the moral order is seen in the idea of *vrata* in the *Ṛgveda (R.V.* iii, 59.2 and 3;

v.83.5; viii.48.9 etc.). *Vrata*, derived from the root √*vṛ*, to choose, means will, ordinance or law.[15] It is the 'ordinance' of the great gods like Mitra (cp.*R.V.* iii.59.2-10 etc.) and Varuṇa (cp.*R.V.* i.25.1; viii.41.7 etc.). Everything happens in accordance with this law (or ordinance) of the gods. The conception of *vrata* finds its full expression in a verse addressed to the benevolent god Parjanya:

> *yasya vrate pṛthivī nannamīti*
> *yasya vrate śaphavaj jarbhurīti*
> *yasya vrate oṣadhīr viśvarūpāḥ*
> *sa naḥ parjanya, mahi śarma yacha.* (R.V.v. 83.5)

> In whose ordinance the earth bends (herself) low; by whose ordinance, all those possessing hoofs leap about, in whose ordinance plants are omniform, as such O Parjanya, bestow mighty shelter on us.[16]

This notion of 'ordinance' conveyed by *vrata* is also related to the conceptions of *dharman* (R.V.i.160.1; x.90.16) and *dhāman* (R.V. vii.61.4; 63.3) of the *Ṛgveda*.[17] *The word dharman* derived from the root √*dhṛ*, to hold, literally means, that which holds or establishes. Hence it means ordinance or law.[18] *Dhāman*, similarly, is derived from √*dhā* to put or establish and it too means ordinance.[19]

(4) The doctrine of transmigration is not yet fully developed in the *Veda*. Agreeing with Deussen, we may, nervertheless, maintain that it is not difficult to trace its gradual development from the earlier times:[20] the idea seems to be vaguely implicit in several late hymns of the *Ṛgveda* such as *R.V.*x.14-18. A series of rewards and punishments corresponding to the good and the bad deeds of the present life appear in the *Brāhmaṇas*. We may, for example, refer to the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, iii.11 where by way of illustrating the significance of the *Nāciketa-fire*, the story is told of Naciketas who on visiting the House of Death was granted the fulfilment of three great wishes by the god of the dead (*Yama*).[21] But when we come to the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* a detailed account of the theory of transmigration is found. The ascetic who meditates on 'faith as austerity' (*sraddhā-tapaḥ*), is said here, to enter after his death, the *devayāna*, the path of the

gods leading to the final absorption in *Brahman* (*Chānd.Up.* v.10.1-2): the house-holder who has performed sacrifice and good works (*iṣṭapūrta*), on the other hand, goes by the *pitṛyāna* the 'path of the Fathers' to the moon after passing a series of intermediate stations; one returns from there to earth when the consequences of one's actions are exhausted. He is said to be born here as rice and barley (*vrīhī-yava*) herbs and trees (*oṣadhī vanaspatayaḥ*) or as sesamum plants and beans (*tila-māṣā iti jāyante*)[22] (v.10.3-6). The wicked are again said to be born as outcasts (*caṇdāla*), dogs (*śva-yoni*), or swine (*sūkara-yoni*) (v.10.7). In addition, mention is also made of a 'third state' (*tṛtīyam sthānam*) which appears to be a forerunner of the later concept of hell (v.10.8)[23]. The *locus classicus* of the concept of transmigration is found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* where the manner in which a man dies and is born again is discussed in detail (cp.iv.3.35; and iv.4). In the *Kaṭha Up.* the idea of transmigration is clearly implied. Thus it is said :

> *saśyam iva martyaḥ pacyate*
> *saśyam iva jāyate punaḥ.* (i. 1. 6)

> A moral ripens like corn and like corn is born again.

This teaching seems to imply that the idea of the process of regular and automatic transmigration has been formed on the analogy of the growth and ripening of a plant.[24] The *Upaniṣads* also refer to the destiny of the evil soul. The problem is discussed in a number of *Upaniṣads* such as the *Bṛhad.Up* (iv.4.11), the *Kaṭha Up.* (1.1.3) and the *Īśā Up.*. (3) According to these *Upaniṣads* the wicked soul is destined to go to a joyless (*ananda*) (*Bṛhad. Up.* iv.4.11), demoniac (*asurya*) (*Īsā Up.*3). region (*loka*) enveloped in blinding darkness (*andhena tamasā-vṛta*).

(5) During the period of 'transition to system' we come across the development of two ideas allied to that of *ṛta*; the ideas of *dharma* and *karma*. The word *dharma* is very important in the history of Indian thought. But it is not quite easy to give an adequate definition of it embodying the different aspects of the connotation of the term. This term which is also found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 44 (cp. also 23, 43, and 67), literally means, 'what holds together' and signifies that it is the basis of all order,

whether social, moral or otherwise. Thus, in its ethical aspect, *dharma* is allied to *ṛta*. In fact the concept of *dharma* virtually replaced that of *ṛta* in the historical period. Sometimes it is used as a purely moral concept standing for right or virtuous conduct which leads to some form of good result (cp. *dharmam cara*, practise virtue, *Taittirīya Up.*, i.11.1), but its more usual meaning as we shall see below, is religious merit (*puṇya*) which, operating in some unseen way secures good to a person in the future either here or else where.[25] The conception of *ṛta* in the *Ṛgveda*, in all probability, was the germ of the law of *karma*, the doctrine that the events in the world are determined by their antecedents. The *Upaniṣads* clearly conceive such a moral law. Thus it is said, jor example, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.. puṇyo vai puṇyena karmaṇā ... pāpaḥ papeṇa* - verily one becomes good by good action, bad by bad action (iii.2.15). The gist of the doctrine is: as we sow, so we reap. In these circumstances(i.e. *dharma* and *karma*) the concept of *saṁsāra*, the cycle of births takes shape. This idea which plays a very important role in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (cp. verses 40, 44 and 45) is established, as we have already seen, in the *Upaniṣads* such as the *Chānd. Up* (v.10.3-6), the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.)* (iii.2.13 and iv.3.35), the Kaṭha Up. (I.1.6) etc. In the *Bṛhad Up.* (iv.4.6) it is implied that desire (*kāma*) is the root of *saṁsāra*,[26] (cp. *S.K.* 45. *saṃsāro bhavati rajasād rāgāt*, *samsāra* results from passionate attachment). *Karma* (like the *ṛta*,) is an unconscious principle governing the whole universe.[27] The cosmic position of *ṛta* may have been responsible for the evolution of the idea of *karma* in the form of a doctrine of regular automatic reaction to one's own actions. *Karma* thus brings out the rational nature of the whole world. The Greek 'fate', the Stoic 'reason' (*logos*)[28] and the Chinese *Tao* are different names for the primary necessity of this law. The notion *iṣṭā-pūrta* (*R.V.* x. 14.8,[29] *Chānd. Up.* v.10.3,etc.) represents another aspect of the concept of *karma*. *Iṣṭa* derived from √*yaj*, to offer, means the sacrifice offered to the gods and *pūrta*, from √*pṛ*., to fill, conveys the meaning of 'good works' in the sense of the gifts to the priests. The view that the two words together formed but one concept is strengthened by the fact that the term is not analysed in the *Pada-text* of the *Ṛgveda*.[30] This term which comes within the field of the dual (*dvandva*) compounds with a neuter singular ending is referred to by Wackernagel whose observations too imply that the term in question represents only one concept (*iṣṭā-pūrtam, Geopfertes und Geschenktes ist aus... betontem Ntr.sg.verbunden. Altindische Grammatik, Band* II.i.p.160). Thus the term *iṣṭāpūrta* in its developed semantic frame-work seems to have conveyed the general concept of 'merit' (cp. *Chānd.Up.* v.10.3) securing bliss for the person performing them. Thus we notice the close relationship of the conception of *iṣṭā-pūrta* with the belief in *karma*..

(6) Having thus traced the development of the general concept of teleology, we may now examine the same concept as implied in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. In the *Kārikā* there are nine verses (21, 31, 36, 42, 56, 57, 58, 60 and 63) which imply the doctrine of teleology. In fact the very process of evolution is teleological. 'The Union between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is to enable *Puruṣa* to see *Prakṛti* (as distinct from himself) and also to help *Puruṣa* to release himself from the (apparent) influence of *Prakṛti*' (cp. Deussen: *Um dem Purusa zum Schauen der Prakṛiti und weiterhin (tathā) zur Loslösung von ihr su verhelfen, A.G.P.*,1.iii.p.434) (S.K.21).[31] 'The motive for the action of organs is the goal of *Puruṣa*' (*S.K.*. 21). 'The three *Guṇas* which mutually differ and yet always co-operate work like (the oil, wick, and flame of) a lamp and illuminate the entire purpose of *Puruṣa* (*S.K.*36). 'The Unmanifest (*Avyakta=Prakṛti*) functions for the release of *Puruṣa*' (*S.K.* 58). 'The subtle body too works for the sake of *Puruṣa's* end' (*S.K.* 42). 'Just as non-intelligent milk functions (or flows through the udder of the cow) for the nourishment of the calf, so does *Pradhāna (Prakṛti)* function for the liberation of *Puruṣa*' (*S.K.* 57). *Prakṛti* binds herself by herself through seven froms; the same *Prakṛti* through one form, releases herself for the purpose of *Puruṣa*' (*S.K.* 63) 'The generous Nature (*Prakṛti*) endowed with the *Guṇas* without any benefit to herself, works through various means for the realization of the purpose of the Spirit (*Puruṣa*) which is devoid of the *Guṇas* and which confers no benefit in return' (*S.K.* 60). 'This (entire) evolution brought about by *Prakṛti* from (the first evolute) the *Mahat* up to the last evolutes, the gross elements, is, therefore, for the purpose of liberating each individual *Puruṣa*' (*S.K.* 56). This is the meaning of the *Sāṅkhya* teleology. The conception of teleology immanent in *Prakṛti*, the Nature of the *Sāṅkhya* system, is not unlike the notion of the function of *ṛta* within the cosmos, as conceived

by the Vedic thinkers. Therfore we may reiterate our opinion that the latter, in all probability, has formed the basis for the former.

(7) (a) Finally, we take up the position of *Prakṛti* as an ultimate reality with an immanent teleology. We may begin with the description of *Prakṛti,* the uncaused cause of the universe, as given by the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*.. In the *Kārikā,* this uncaused cause is mentioned seventeen times (S.K. 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 16, 21, 22, 42, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 68.) under three names as follows :-

(a) *Pradhāna,* the pre-established principle (*S.K* 11, 21, 57, 68).
(b) *Avyakta,* the Unmanifest (S.K. 2, 10, 14, 16, 58).
(c) *Prakṛti* (*S.K.* 3, 22, 42, 56, 59, 61, 62, 63).

The following *kārikās* refer to aspects of the nature of *Prakṛti.* 'Other than that (the revealed) is better, - proceeding from the right cognition of the Manifest, the Unmanifest (*Prakṛti*)' (*S.K.*2). 'The Primal Nature (*Mūla-prakṛti*) is not an evolute' (*S.K.*3). 'The Manifest is caused, non-eternal, non-pervading, *active,* manifold, existing in the cause, mergent, conjunct and dependent; the Unmanifest is just the reverse' (*S.K.*10). 'The Manifest is composed of the three *Guṇas,* non-discriminated, objective, general, *non-intelligent* and productive: so also is *Pradhāna*' (*S.K.*11). 'The Unmanifest is also proved by the effect being of the same nature as its cause' (*S.K.*16) *'The Unmanifest* exists as the cause of the diverse... ' (*S.K.16*). 'To enable *Puruṣa* to see *Prakṛti* (as different from himself)' (*S.K.*21). 'From *Prakṛti* proceeds the Great One (*mahān*)' (*S.K.*22). 'And with the aid of the might of *Prakṛti*' (*S.K.* 42). 'This (entire) evolution brought about by *Prakṛti,* from *Mahat* down to the gross elements, is for the purpose of liberating each individual *Puruṣa*' (*S.K.*56). *'Pradhāna* functions for the liberation of *Puruṣa*' (*S.K.* 57). 'The Unmanifest functions for the release of *Puruṣa*' (*S.K.* 58). 'As a dancer desists from dancing after showing herself to the audience, so *Prakṛti* desists after showing itself to *Puruṣa*' (*S.K.* 59). *'Nothing in my opinion is more delicate* (Deussen: *Zartfülhenderes, sukumāratara*) than *Prakṛti* who because (of the realization) 'I have been seen, never again comes into the view of *Puruṣa*' (*S.K.* 61). 'It is *Prakṛti* abiding in manifold forms, that migrates or is bound or liberated' (*S.K.* 62). *'Prakṛti* binds herself by herself through seven forms, the same *Prakṛti,* through one form, releases herself for the purpose of *Puruṣa*' (*S.K.* 63). *'Pradhāna,* her object accomplished, ceases to be active' (*S.K.*63). This is all that is said about *Prakṛti,* the uncaused cause of the universe. In fact we do not find in these statements any attempt to give a clear definition of *Prakṛti.* The above statements made about *Prakṛti* in different contexts are meant more to explain the different tenets of the *Sāṇkhya* system than to give a definition of *Prakṛti.* The position, in fact, is similar to that of *Puruṣa,* the other principle of the *Sāṇkhya* dualism (vide chapter eight, on *Puruṣa*). It is not very difficult to understand the reason as to why the *Sāṇkhya Kārikā* does not attempt to give a comprehensive definition of *Prakṛti* (or *Puruṣa*). The *Sāṇkhyas* consider the phenomenal universe as a dynamic order, an eternal process of unfolding without beginning or end. All that constitutes the world has evolved out of an uncaused cause which is postulated for the purpose of evading the fallacy of infinite regress which is not consistent with their rational philosophy. *Prakṛti* is an ultimate reality, it is an absolute. The ultimate realities are beyond time, beyond space and beyond thought. They are without difference, without attribute and without form, for it is the human mind roaming within the sphere of space and time that forms the notions of 'difference', 'form' and so on. In other words, intellect which operates within the phenomenal world of space and time cannot grasp the ultimate principles adequately. Language which is a human product necessarily confined to the realm of *deśa* (space), *kāla* (time) and *nimitta* (causality) cannot do full justice to a principle which is beyond that realm.[32] It is, for ever, removed from empirical knowledge which concerns itself only with the phenomenal world. Īsvarakṛṣna must have been well aware of this fact and hence (perhaps) he did not attempt a real definition of *Prakṛti.*[33]

(b) We may now examine Īsvarkṛṣṇa'ṣ views (i.e. description)[34] of *Prakṛti* collected above and also Śaṁkara's criticism of the immanent teleology of the same principle. In fact, it is true that Īśvarakṛaṇa, the author of the *Sāṇkhya Kārikā* (the only work of the classical *Sāṅkhya system*) has made some contradictions here and there by attempting to say something or the other of *Prakṛti* in a brief and negative way. For example, we may refer

only to one such instance: 'The Manifest is caused, non-eternal, non-pervading, *active*.... The Unmanifest is just the reverse' (*S.K.* 10). What we have here is but a brief negative description of *Prakṛti*. An error has crept into it, probably because of the brief negative method adopted here. Now according to this description the Manifest possesses several characteristics which are denied of the Unmanifest. However, the characteristic of being active of the Manifest cannot be denied of the Unmanifest as the Unmanifest too is active, (*hetumat anityam avyāpi, sakriyam anekam āśritam liṅgam / sāvayavam paratantram, vyaktam viparītam avyaktam, S.K.* 10). The error, in all probability, was due to the aphoristic style adopted by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. What is surprising is that these unconscious errors are not often noticed even by the commentators such as Gauḍapāda.[35] Whatever it is, we have to emphasize that *Prakṛti* cannot be adequately described through the medium of human speech. *Prakṛti* is a sort of *mystery*. The conception of Aditi which we will attempt to show as an earlier stage of the idea of *Prakṛti* (vide chap.9.3a) is already considered to be a mystic entity in the *Kaṭha Up.* ii.I.7, where she is described as living in a 'secret place' (*guhā*). Again we may refer to *Kārikā* verse 69, where the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine itself is described as a 'secret', 'esoteric' or a 'mystic' knowledge (*guhya-jñāna*). The *Sāṅkhya* doctrine primarily deals with the play and the display of *Prakṛti*. Thus it is seen that *Prakṛti* is depicted as something mystic. So it is not purely material. It is something more than that. In spite of the diverse phenomena to which *Prakṛti* gives rise, its substance is not at all diminished. In other words, the source of becoming is not exhausted by the many and varied things produced. Indeed, a material entity cannot function without getting some of its latent energy exhausted. Thus it is rightly observed by Radhakrishnan that it is difficult to regard *Prakṛti* as purely material in nature.[36] Whatever we say of *Prakṛti* is but inadequate; it is beyond human speech. Thus it is amply clear that the nature and working of *Prakṛti* is beyond the grasp of human intellect. This position of *Prakṛti* is similar to that of *Brahman*[37] both in the *Upaniṣads* and the *Vedānta*. Therefore it is Īśvarakṛṣṇa who is responsible for the contradictory characteristics attributed to *Prakṛti* in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. In fact, it is difficult to understand *Prakṛti*: it is *avedyā* (or *a-vidyā*).[38] Therefore Śaṅkara's criticism of the immanent teleology of *Prakṛti* (*Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya* ii, 2.6)[39] is not safe for a *Vedāntin* to make, in as much as his own *Brahman* or Absolute is equally unknowable, at least from the empirical stand-point.[40]

Notes and References

1. J. Sinha, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p.199.
2. Vide C.D. Sharma, *Indian Philosophy*, p.244 and M. Hiriyanna, *O.I.P.*, p.143.
3. R.H. Popkin, *P.M.S.* p.83.
4. Vide, chapter 5, Evolution, section 9.
5. Chatterjee and Datta *I.I.P.* p.15.
6. 'This word which is pre-Indian in origin...' Hiriyanna, *O.I.P.*, p.33.
7. Renou, *Vedic India*, p.56.
8. *ibid.*, p.73.
9. In ancient China this was known as *Tao*.
10. Hiriyanna, O.I.P., p.33.
11. Radhakrishnan, *I.P.* Vol. 1 p.78.
12. Cp. Macdonell, *H.S.L.* p.74.
13. 'She travels perfectly the path of order' - Griffith.
14. Radhakrishnan, *I.P.* vol.I, p.80.
15. Cp. Macdonell, *V.R.* p.250.
16. Cp. Geldner, *Bei dessen Walten die Erde sich neigt, bei dessen Walten alles, was Hufe hat, hüpft, bei dessen Walten die bunten Pflanzen (spriessen), du Parjanya, gewähre uns deinen grossen Schutz.*
17. Renou, *Vedic India*, p.73.
18. (a) Grassman, *Gesetz, W.z.R.V.*, p.659.
    (b) Macdonell, *V.R.*p.236.
19. (a) Grassmann, *Gesetz, Satzung, W.z.R.V.*, p.677.
20. The Philosophy of the Upanishads (translated into English by A.S. Geden), pp.313 ff.
21. This story became the basis of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*.
22. This reminds us of the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of evolution according to which one may be born (i.e. evolved) not only as a god or an animal but also as a herb, plant, tree or creeper.
23. Cp. Deussen, *A.G.P.* 1.iii.p.608 and *Sechzig Up. des Veda*, p.144.
24. A.L. Basham, *H.D.A.* p.225.
25. Hiriyanna, *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, p.37.
26. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p.273.

27. cp. *sukhasya duḥkhasya na kopi dātā* paro dadātīti kubuddhir eṣā.
28. Vide P.Huby, *Greek Ethics*, p.69.
29. Vide Keith, *R.P.V.U.* pp.250, 478.
30. Cp.chapter IV, section 3 (i).
31. *puruṣasya darśanārtham - kaivalyārtham tathā pradhānasya*, *S.K.*21.
32. Vide Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p.150 with f.n.4.
33. Th. Bernard, *Hindu Philosophy* (New York 1947) p.68.
34. 'Description is a partial statement of the connotation of the term'. A.A. Luce. *Logic*, p.30.
35. Vide Gauḍapāda's commentary on *S.K.* verse no.10.
36. *I.P.* Vol.II. p.274.
37. (a) Cp. *Puruṣa-Prakṛti* with *Ātman-Brahman*, chapter 4, Dualism, section 7, ii.
(b) Even the *Vedāntic* description of *Brahman* as existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*), according to Śaṅkara, is not an adequate definition. It clearly means that Brahman is not non-existence, not unconsciousness and not of the nature of pain, R.K. *I.P.* Vol.II.pp.537 and 539.
38. Cp. the *Tattvatraya* by Lokacārya. p.48.
39. *abhyupagame-api-artha-abhāvāt*, even if there be the admission (of the spontaneous activity of *Pradhāna* or *Prakṛti*, still it cannot be the cause or the world-ground) on account of the absence of a purpose in it. Vide Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sūtra*, pp.370.
40. Cp. *naiva vācā na manasā-prāptuṃ śakyo na cakṣuṣā/astīti bruvato'nyatra- kathaṁ tad upalabhyate.* (*Kaṭha Up.* 11.3.12) - Not by speech, not by mind, not by sight can he be apprehended. How can he be comprehended by any other means other than the words 'he is' (*asti-iti*).

VII

Causality : The Satkāryavāda

(1) The *Sāṅkhya* theory of causality is known as the *Satkāryavāda* (cp. *S.K.*9) : [1] it maintains that the effect is pre-existent in, or identical with, the cause.[2] Accordingly, the *Sāṅkhyas* stress the relational aspect of causation. Hence the effect is simply the effect 'of' a cause: conversely the cause must bear upon its effect: this means that the *Satkāryavāda* is an Entailment theory, [3] holding that the cause necessarily brings about its effect which is contained in it. Unless the two phenomena are related one would not be the cause of the other. An identity or a continuity is to be traced between the cause and effect.[4] Without this minimum identity between cause and effect, the two concepts would fall asunder. Then there would be no cause at all or (as Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself implies) everything would be the cause of everything (*sarva-sambhava, S.K.*9). The problem of causality plays a very important role in every school of Indian philosophy, except in the *Cārvāka* materialism (cp. *I.I.P.* p.61).[5] The Buddhists, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* and the *Vedāntins* have put forward their own theories of the relationship between cause and effect. What actually is the connection between cause and effect? Is it mere succession or is it production. Hume, Mill and others in the West say that it is succession. The opinion of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* is similar to it. This view is technically termed the *asat-kārya-vāda*, [6] the theory that the effect is not pre-existent in the cause. Now according to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory of causal relation, the effect is entirely a new entity. Therefore this view is also known as *ārambha-vāda*, the theory of the beginning of the effect anew (vide *I.I.P.* p.259). However, there are other schools which hold the view that the cause has some power to produce the effect. The cause thus transforms itself into the effect. So the cause is a centre of productive activity. Similar is the concept of the *Sāṅkhya* system which advocates the

pariṇāmavāda, the doctrine that the effect is but a transformation of the cause. According to this theory, the effect pre-exists potentially in its cause. The *Vedānta* which is known as a *satkāraṇa-vāda*, theory of the actual existence of the cause, does not take the effect to be as real as the cause. According to this school of philosophy the effect is but an apparent transformation of the cause *(vivarta)* : hence their theory is also known as the *vivarta-vāda*[7] or the doctrine of *phenomenal* development (vide C.D.Sharma, *I.P.* p.358.). The *Satkāryavāda*, the central conception of the Sāṅkhya philosophy[8] is related to the theory of evolution advocated by it. Under the name of *Satkāryavāda* the *Sāṅkhyas* have given a new interpretation to the problem of change. Becoming or change, for the *Sāṅkhyas*, is self-becoming: it is a self-manifestation of the same original stuff in different forms. One and the same thing is at once the stuff that changes and the efficient cause of its change. Thus matter *(Prakṛti)* is a dynamic, energy-stuff. Therefore the *Sāṅkhyas* maintain that, that which changes and that into which it is changed are identical *(satkāryavāda)*.[9] Thus we see that, *ex nihilo nihil fit (na-asataḥ sat-jāyate)* is the general stand-point of the *Sāṅkhya* theory of causality.[10]

(2) It is important to note that the term *hetu* or cause *(S.K.*10) is also found once in the *Ṛgveda*. In x.34.2 the poet refers to the gambler's wife being away from her home. It is mentioned that: 'because of a die too high by one, I have driven away a devoted wife *(akṣasya-aham ekaparasya hetor, anuvratām apa jāyām arodham)*. Here we notice a sort of causal relation between 'a die too high by one' and 'the gambler's wife being driven away from home.' The former is the *raison d'être* of the latter. Hence one may take the former as the cause and the latter as its effect. The *hetu* or 'cause' implied in this context may be described as an instance of the *kāraṇa-hetu* (the *raison d'être*), later famous among the logicians of India.[11]

(3) The faint beginning of the peculiar *Sāṅkhya* theory of causal relation can be traced back to the *Ṛgvedic* period. The idea could have originated in the hymns addressed to Agni and Indra. The *Ṛgvedic* poets have often dwelt on the different births of Agni. It is implied that Agni exists in the form of a foetus *(garbha)* in wood (two fire sticks).[12] Thus says the *Ṛgveda*:

> *uttānāyām ajanayant suṣūtam*
> *bhuvad agniḥ purupeśāsu garbhaḥ*. (ii.10.3).

> On wood supine they got the well-formed infant. Agni was a germ in various fashioned plants.

In this connection Griffith aptly remarks : 'On wood supine: the lower piece of wood in which fire is produced; *a germ*: latent in plants, with reference to the luminosity of plants.[13] Again it is said that Agni is a germ (foetus, *garbha*) or unborn baby of the earth and also of the plants and trees (R.V. vii. 4.5). The plants and trees support him, a baby unborn, and the earth (bears) him, the all-sustainer (*R.V.* vii.4.5). In a different passage of the *Ṛgveda* iii.29.11, it is mentioned that Agni is *(already)* formed in his mother as *Mātariśvan*, the one that grows up (lit. swells up) in (the womb of) his mother. Thus it is said :

> 'As germ celestial he is called *Tanūnapāt*:
> And *Narāśaṃsa* born diffused in various shape,
> Formed in his mother he is *Mātariśvan*.
> ....'[14] *(R.V.* iii. 29.11).

Here Agni, as 'germ celestial' contains a reference to lightning bursting from clouds in the form of an effect from a cause (i.e. clouds). All the above passages imply that Agni, as a germ, or in a latent form, already exists in wood, plants, the earth and the sky. Here we may find an early adumbration of the concept that the effect pre-exists in its cause. Another important stage in the development of the concept under discussion seems to be implicit in some passages of the *Puruṣa-Sūkta (R.V.*x.90). Thus it is said in it: (a) His arms were made the warrior (*bāhū rājanyaḥ kṛtaḥ*) : his thighs the *Vaiśya* (R.V.x.90.12). (b) From his breath *(prāṇa) Vāyu* was born *(R.V* x.90.13). (c) From his head the sky was evolved , from his two feet the earth, from his ear the quarters *(R.V.* x.90.14). The idea important to us in the passage 'a' is the causal relation between the arms of *Puruṣa* and the warrior. It is implicit here that the arms of *Puruṣa* were potentially the warrior. In the passage 'b' we may see again that the breath

represents an implicit state of which *Vāyu* may be taken as the explicit from. While referring to the concept of evolution, the passage 'c' says that the sky was evolved from the head of the cosmic Man: *Puruṣa*. This implies that the head of the cosmic *Puruṣa* was potentially the upper region of the *Vedic* cosmology: the sky. We may see a further development of the conception under discussion in some later cosmogonic hymns of the *Ṛgveda*. In chapter five under evolution we noticed certain phenomena getting evolved from certain other phenomena. For example, the conception of the evolution of the existent *(sat)* from the non-existent *(asat)* was quite familiar to the later period of the *Vedic* thought. The idea is found in few passages of the *Ṛgveda* such as x.72.2.3., x.129.4, etc. Now the non-existent *(asat)* mentioned in x.129 is not a *śaśaviṣāṇa* or a mere nothing. It is what does not yet exist, but still possesses the possibility of future emergence into existence.[15] *Asat* in this context implies an implicit condition, an *Avyakta* (or unmanifest), which under favourable conditions, can give rise to an explicit state (cp. chap.5, sec. 5). Thus it is rightly observed by Griffith with reference to *R.V.* x.129.1: 'Non-existent: *asat;* that does not yet actually exist, but which has in itself the latent potentiality of existence.[16] We may notice an important aspect of the development of the concept of causality in some other passages of the *Ṛgveda*. The verses in question refer to a particular principle by the name of 'the One' *(ekam)* (*R.V.* x.82.5-6).

We may notice that 'the One' which these passages mention is nothing but a primordial substance out of which the universe was supposed to have developed. Such is the opinion of Wallis, Griffith and Geldner. Geldner pertinently observes that 'the One' is the original matter which evolves itself as the world (*'Das Eine ist das Urding, das sich selbst zur Welt gebiert;...Der R.V.* ii, p.265, f.n.60). It is further interesting to note that the term *ekam* 'the One' is again used synonymously with the universe (*R.V.* iii.54.8; x.48.7).[17] Thus the relationship between 'the One' (i.e. the unevolved universe, cp. Macdonell, *V.R.* p.208) and the universe is to be explained with the principle that cause and effect are identical (cp.Wallis, *C.R.* p.58). Hence we may safely conclude that in the above passages is seen a presupposition of the *Sāṅkhya* conception of causality, the *Satkāryavāda*. The *Atharvaveda* does not provide much data for the development of

the concept under discussion (cp.ch.5, sec.10.) It has only causually referred to the concept of the existent and the non-existent (A.V.iv.1.1.).

(4) Here and there in the *Brāhmaṇas* we come across many entities standing in causal relation to each other. Now one enters into another or emerges from it. The former is the cause or the effect of the latter (cp. Renou : *Vedic India*, p.86). In the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* V.5.28, we have a good example where the notion of causal relation is clearly seen. We do not propose to give it here as we have already discussed it in detail elsewhere (chap. 5, section II). The causal relation implied here is very close to the idea of *satkāryavāda*, the theory of the actual existence of the effect (vide Macdonell, *P.S.D.*p. 330) of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy.

(5) Another important landmark in the development of the conception of the *Satkāryavāda* of the *Kārikā* may be seen in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (vi.12) where we come across the illustration of the *Nyagrodha* tree.[18] According to this teaching the existence of the great *Nyagrodha* tree is traced back to the 'essence' contained in the extremely fine seed of the *Nyagrodha* fruit. Thus the *Nyagrodha* tree does not arise out of nothing or non-existence *(a-sat);* nor does it arise out of a cause which is entirely different from itself: it is simply a manifestation of the essence implicitly contained in the seed. It, in fact, is a manifestation of what was already existing in an implicit state. In Aristotelean terminology it is but the transition from potential being to actual being .[19] Or to use Hegel's words, [20] it is a passage from the implicit to the explicit. Thus it is said in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (vi. 12.1.2.):

1. 'Bring hither a fruit of that *Nyagrodha* tree.' 'Here it is, Venerable Sir', 'Break it.' 'It is broken, Venerable Sir'. 'What do you see there?' 'These extremely fine seeds, Venerable Sir.' 'Of these please break one'. 'It is broken, Venerable Sir.' 'What do you see there?' 'Nothing at all Venerable Sir.'

2. Then he said to him, 'My dear' that subtle essence which you do not perceive, verily, my dear, from that very essence this great *Nyagrodha* tree exists. Believe me, my dear.'

The main point of this teaching is the concept of the emergence of the discriminate out of the indiscriminate. Deussen"s remarks too support the same view: *'Hervorgehen der unterschiede aus dem Unterschiedslosen. Wie aus dem scheinbar gleichartigen Inhalte des Samenkornes der grosse Nyagrodhabaum hervorgeht, so entspringt der ganze mannigfaltigkeit der Welt aus dem Uterschiedslosen Seienden' (Scehzig Upanishad's des Veda* p.159). Deussen's observations can be summed up as follows:- 'Emergence of the discriminate out of the indiscriminate. Just as the great *Nyagrodha* tree emerges out of the homogeneous contents of the grains of seeds (i.e. the very fine seeds), so emerges the entire multiplicity of the world from the indiscriminate being.' This *Upaniṣadic* teaching (with a *Vedāntic* colouring) may be taken as an important stage in the development of the concept of *Satkāryavāda* found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

(6) We may point out here that the *Sāṅkhya* theory of causality, the *Satkāryavāda* as explained at the beginning of this chapter has *two* meanings: (a) the theory that the effect *(kārya)* is pre-existent *(sat)* in its cause. (b) (i) the theory that the effect is identical with its cause. (ii) the theory of the (eternal existing) reality of the effect, i.e. the *Vyakta* or the *Manifest*[21] (iii) the cause is the substance of effect, substance that is only as it of itself becomes the effect.[22] According to Īśvarakṛṣṇa the world is a *parināma* or transformation of *Prakṛti*, which is the uncaused cause of the universe (cp. *S.K.* 9, 15,16, 22 etc). According to the teaching of the *Kārikā* everything is the effect of a producing cause, for, from nothing nothing comes. On the other hand, if less is contained in the cause *(upādāna-kāraṇa)* than in its effect, then the excess would have to be produced by nothing. Hence, it logically follows that the cause *(kāraṇa)* must possess more reality than or, at least, as much reality as its effect *(kārya)*. Another important point to be noted as mentioned earlier (ch.6) is that the substance of *Prakṛti*, the world-ground is in no way diminished, in spite of the innumerable things to which it gives rise. Thus, it is quite clear that *Prakṛti*, the source and cause of becoming is not exhausted by the things produced. Keeping the two nuances of meaning attributed to the concept of *satkāryavāda* in view, we may now examine the general stand-point of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* with regard to its theory of causality. Does the term *sat-kārya*, [23] the effect is existent, mentioned in the *Sāṅkhya*

Kārikā verse 9, really advocate a theory of a cause *(kāraṇa)* and effect *(kārya)* ? Or else does it maintain that the effect *(vyakta*, the Manifest) is identical with its cause *(avyakta*, the Unmanifest), the effect as an eternal reality *(sat, S.K.*9) or a potentiality *(Śakti, S.K.* 15) latent in the cause?[24] A critical study of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* reveals that both these ideas are implicit in it. Empirical experience plays an important role even in the formulation of philosophical concepts. Thus the relation between *Prakṛti* and its evolutes *(vyakta)* is similar to that of metaphysics and physics. The connection between metaphysics and physical appearance is often understood on the analogy of our experience of causality. So it is with the *Sāṅkhya* too. Almost everywhere in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, *Prakṛti* or the *Avyakta* appears as the cause or *Kāraṇa* (cp. *S.K.*9. 15.16.e.g. *kāraṇam asti avyaktam*, the Avyakta exists as the cause, S.K. 16)[25] while the *Vyakta* or the Manifest appears as its effect.[26] According to this teaching *Prakṛti* is not the *causa efficiens (nimitta-kāraṇa)* (which in some other respect is mentioned in the *S.K.* verse 42), but is the *causa materialis (upādāna-kāraṇa)*. In this respect the relation between *Prakṛti* and its appearance (the Manifest) is similar to that of the texture and the thread, if we are to use the picture portrayed in the verse 16 of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. We may say that the relation is similar to that between steam or ice and water (cp. *pariṇāmataḥ salila-vat*, S.K.16).[27] There is another implication in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. According to this *Prakṛti* is not the cause of the world. It is neither *nimitta-kāraṇa*, nor *upādāna-kāraṇa*, but to express in one word, is the potentiality that will actualize in every appearance. That is the reason why it is called *śakti* or the potentiality in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 15 and *Śakta*, the potent one in verse 9 of the same text.[28]

(7) Thus according to the *Satkāryavāda* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* we notice that there are two implications of the relationship between *Prakṛti (Avyakta)* and its evolutes *(Vyakta)* (a) the relationship of cause and effect and (b) the relationship of identity of cause and effect. The first of these implications is metaphysical, the second is physical or realistic, the faint beginning of which is seen in the above-mentioned *Puruṣa-sūkta* passages (vide section 4) such as 'from his breath *(prāṇa) Vāyu* was born (R.V.x. 90.13) etc. It is of great significance that these implicit ideas have gradually paved the way for the emergence of the

Sāṅkhya conception of causality, the *Satkāryavāda*, which, in fact, is the specific contribution of the *Sāṅkhya*.

Notes and References

1. For a detailed discussion of the *Sāṅkhya* concept of material cause, see *Die Stellung des Sāṁkhya zum Problem der materiallen Kausaliät* in *Der Samavāya Im Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-System* pp.54-63.
2. Vide Richard Garbe, *Die Sāṁkhya-Philosophie*, p.232.
3. Vide A.C.Ewing, *The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy*, pp.162-169.
4. This is the opposite of the 'causal connection' put forward by David Hume, the great 18th century Scottish thinker whose opinions changed the course of Western philosophy, cp. A.A. Basson, *David Hume*, pp.65-65.
5. For a criticism of the *(Sāṅkhya)* theory of causality, see the *Mādhyamika Kārikā*, chap. 20, verses 19-20.
6. Vide Garbe, *S.P.*p.232, f.n.2.
7. Cp. Chatterjee and Datta, *I.I.P.*, p.380 and Macdonell, *P.S.D.q.v.*
8. Cp. (a) Murti, *C.P.B.*, p.61.
   (b) Radhakrishnan, *I.P.* Vol.II, p.256.
   (c) Theos Bernard, *Hindu Philosophy*, p.72.
9. Cp. Murti, *C.P.B.*, p.61.
10. Cp.Radhakrishnan, *I.P.*, vol.II., p.259.
11. Vide *L'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu*, chap. 11, pp.245 & 299 ff.
12. Cp. Macdonell, *H.S.L.*, p.94.
13. Griffith, *ibid.*, p.344.
14. Griffith, *ibid.*, p. 344.
15. Griffth, *H.A.V.*, vol. I,p.129, f.n.1.
16. *H.R.V.*, Vol.II, p.575, f.n.1.
17. Vide Griffith, *H.R.V.* vol.I, p.377, f.n. 8 and vol. ii, p. 450, f.n.7.
18. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Up.* p.462.
19. Radhakrishnan, *I.P.*, Vol.II.p.257.
20. Vide W.T.Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel*, p.25; and Radhakrishnan, *I.P.*, Vol.II. p. 257.
21. (i) Deussen, *'die Lehre von der (von jehr bestehenden) Realität der Wirkung, d.h. des Ayaktam'*, *A.G.P.*, 1.iii.p.478.
    (ii) Garbe : *Lehre von der ewigen Realität der Produkte'*.......*S.P.* p.232.

22. Cp. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol.I,p.167.
23. Deussen, *'Die Wirkung (kārya) ist seiend (sat), auch behor sie in die Erscheinung trat'*- *A.G.P.* 1.iii, p.423.
24. *ibid.*,.p.477.
25. Deussen, 'Drum muss als Ursach' das Avyaktam gelten', *ibid.*, 430.
26. Cp. *S.K.* 8, 9, 14, 15 and 16.
    mahad-ādi tac ca kāryam
    *prakṛti-sarūpam virūpam ca. S.K.*8.
27. Cp. Deussen, *A.G.P.* 1, iii, p.476.
28. *ibid.*

VIII

Puruṣa and Prakṛti : (1) Puruṣa

(1) Puruṣa is the male principle postulated by the *Sāṅkhya* dualism. *Puruṣa*, literally meaning Male or Man, is the Spirit, the source of consciousness. It is the animating principle of nature, the principle which breathes life into matter. *Puruṣa*, by logical implication, is postulated to account for the subjective aspect of nature. It is eternal and indestructible : it is without activity, uncaused and changeless. *Puruṣa*, the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*)[1] of the universe imparts the appearance of consciousness to the manifestations of *Prakṛti*.

(2) Now what is the precise nature of *Puruṣa* in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*? In this text *Puruṣa* is mentioned eight times as follows : 'The Spirit (*Puruṣa*) is neither evolvent nor evolute' (*S.K.*3). 'Spirit exists' (17). 'The association of the two (*Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*) is for the (dual) purpose of Primal Nature (*Pradhāna*) being contemplated by the Spirit and the release of the *Spirit* (from the threefold misery)'(21). 'The intellect (*Buddhi*) brings about the enjoyment of the Spirit in respect of all (things)'(37). 'Of certainty, not any (Spirit) is bound or liberated nor does any migrate' (62). 'The Spirit seated composed like a spectator perceives the nature (*Prakṛti*) which has ceased to be productive and consequently, which has now reverted from seven forms' (65). 'The plurality of spirits is established' (18). 'The release of each spirit' (56), and, the liberation of Spirit' (57). From all these we see that the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* does not attempt to give an adequate picture of *Puruṣa*. The real nature of *Puruṣa*, the Spirit or soul is not made quite clear. Thus Johnston says : '...*Sāṅkhya* at no stage gives a really intelligible account of soul...' etc.[2] The reason as to why the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* has not attempted to give a clear definition of *Puruṣa* (the Soul or Spirit) is not surprising: undoubtedly the author might have been aware of the impossibility of giving an exact picture of an ultimate principle such

as *Puruṣa* (vide chapter six, section 7). In fact the inability to know the real nature of the soul, the knower, is often referred to in the *Upaniṣads*.[3]

(3) We have already mentioned in the fourth chapter on dualism that the Vedic *Dyaus Pitar* (Heavenly Father) and the *Śiva-Liṅga* idea of Indus Valley civilization may have formed the basis of the concept of *Puruṣa* of the *Sāṅkhya* system. As Macdonell says : 'the personification of the sky as a god never went beyond a rudimentary stage in the *Ṛgveda*, being almost entirely limited to *the idea of paternity. Dyaus* is generally coupled with *Pṛthivī* or Earth, the pair being celebrated ... as universal parents' (*H.S.L.* p.73). Further we notice that the word *dyaus* in the dual compounds such as *dyāvāpṛthivī* is subject to the influence of the feminine member (vide chap.4, section 3). Thus Renou observes that : '*dyaus* itself is often feminine, at least as a common noun.[4] These features of the *Vedic Dyaus* at once remind us of the *inactive Puruṣa* placed against the powerful *Prakṛti*, the universal mother, in the *Sāṅkhya* system. The position of *Dyaus* under the influence of *Pṛthivī*, *Kṣāmā* or *Bhūmi* is not unparallel to that of *Puruṣa* being carried by *Prakṛti* (vide *G.B.* on the *S.K.* verse 21). Again, it appears, as if greater importance is attached to *Prakṛti* in certain verses of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. We may, for example, refer to *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* v.60 where *Prakṛti* is depicted to be of greater importance than *Puruṣa* (vide chapter 20, metaphysics, section 9).

(4) The origin of the term *Puruṣa* is shrouded in mystery. Philosophers, as we will be seeing below, have given various etymological explanations of it. These are but fanciful etymologies constructed by the philosophers to account for the origin of the term. Therefore we may now make an attempt to understand the true significance of the term *Puruṣa*. In the *Ṛgveda* we come across a word *pūru* (*R.V.*VI,46.8 etc.) which Grassmann explains as follows : '*pūru,m,(I). Mensch, im Sing, collectiv: die Menschen, das Volk (als die das land füllenden, von pur; vgl. populus) (2) Bezeichnung eines Volkstammes, auch hier im Sing.collectiv.* ('pūru, m,(I). Human being (=man) in Sing, Collective:the human beings (=men), the people (as those that fill up the land, from *pur;* cp.*populus*) (2). Designation of a tribe of men, also here in sing. collective'). (*Wörterbuch zum Rig Veda, p.844*). Thus, according to Grassmann's interpretation *pūru*, a collective,

singular term, appears to mean a 'tribe of men who fill up the land' (*eines Volkstammes; das Volk als die das Land füllenden*). According to Monier Williams, the word *pūru* is derived from *puru* and they both are related to *pūruṣa* and *puruṣa*, *pūru* and *puru*, according to the same authority, mean a man.[5] Agreeing with the views of Grassmann and Monier Williams we may now proceed to point out that just as *Manuṣa* (*R.V.*1.117.21 etc) is related to *Manu*,[6] so are *Puruṣa* (and *Pūruṣa*) related to *puru* (and *pūru*):[7] a man. Thus it appears that the word *puruṣa* has been adopted as a technical term by the *Sāṅkhyas* to mean 'a man', an individual, a soul or spirit. This may indirectly imply the 'anthropocentric' attitude of the *Sāṅkhya* thinker who in this respect is similar to Socrates of ancient Greece who devoted his individual interest to the problems which arise from man's mental nature.[8]

(5) We may examine here the concept of *Puruṣa* in the well known *Puruṣa-sūkta*. This comsmic *Puruṣa* as he appears in the *Ṛgveda* (x.90) does not show any explicit similarity with the *Puruṣa* of the *Sāṅkhya* system. There are two important points to be noted in this connection : (a) The *Puruṣa* of the *Ṛgveda* is but one whereas the conception of *Puruṣa* in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* denotes a plurality of souls (*puruṣa-bahutva*, *S.K.*17). (b) In the *Ṛgveda* we have a cosmic *Puruṣa*, that is to say a *Puruṣa* of a macrocosmic status. The nature of the *Puruṣa* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* is not well defined (vide section 2), but it appears to be of a microcosmic status. It has, however, been argued by Johnston that the conception of *Puruṣa* of the *Sāṅkhya* at one stage also implied only a single universal *Puruṣa* or soul.[9] Similar to this is the opinion of Oldenberg that the *Puruṣa* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, in spite of the assertion that it means a plurality of souls, appears very much like one *Puruṣa*.[10] We may further mention here that Māṭhara[11] and Gauḍapāda too are inclined to the idea of a single *Puruṣa*, as seen in their commentaries on the eleventh and forty-fourth verses of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*.[12] These opinions of different authorities, ancient and modern, imply the necessity of going deeper into the problem of the historical relation between the concept of *Puruṣa* in the *Ṛgveda* (x.90) and in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. Now what is this *Puruṣa*, the man from whom all this diversity (i.e. the phenomenal world) is supposed to have come into being. This original principle (*R.V.*x.90), the only reality which is responsible for the apparent

diversity of the world is already implied in the *Ṛgveda* 1.164.46:

> *indram mitram varuṇam agnim āhur*
> *atho divyaḥ sa suparṇo garutmān.*
> *ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*
> *agnim yamam mātariśvānam āhuḥ.*

> They call him Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, Agni, and he is the heavenly, noble-winged Garutman. What is (only) one, sages speak of, in different ways (i.e. names). They call it Agni, Yama, and Mātariśvan.

This verse refers to two important phenomena: the multiplicity of words and the unity of the world. The reality mentioned to be but one (*ekam sat*) in this verse, according to *Sāyaṇa*, is the *mahān ātmā* or the great soul. Taking all these into consideration we may conclude that this *Puruṣa* in the *Ṛgveda* (x.90), in all probability, is the *ātman* or soul appearing under a macrocosmic anthropomorphic garb. In support of our view we may refer to the statement '....it is not unreasonable to interpret the concept of the primeval male (man) as occurring in the famous *Puruṣa-sūkta* as the macrocosmic anthropomorphic representation of the soul or the *ātman*.[13] Thus it is not incorrect to take the *Vedic Puruṣa* (x.90) as a proto-type of the *Puruṣa* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* which is nothing but the *ātman* made many. As Keith says : 'it is not possible to ignore the obvious fact that *puruṣa* of the *Sāṅkhya* is merely the *ātman* made many.[14] This opinion also receives the support of several other authorities such as Max Müller,[15] Deussen,[16] Griffith,[17] and Macdonell.[18]

(6) We may draw another conclusion from the foregoing facts. The above discussion reveals that the conception of *sat* (*R.V.*1.164.46 etc.), the *ātman* as Sāyaṇa explains it, represents an earlier stage of the conception of *Puruṣa*.[19] On the other hand, the *a-sat* or the non-existent (cp.chapter 5, sections 5, v and 8) is identified with Aditi, the infinite (*R.V.*x.72),[20] which represents an anticipation of a univeral all-embracing, all-producing nature itself, the immense potentiality or the *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy.[21] Thus it appears that the *sat* and the *asat* (*avyakta, avedyā or avidyā*; vide chapter 5, section 5.v.), of the *Ṛgveda* (cp.*R.V.*,x.72.3; x.129.4) represent an early stage of the

development of the concepts of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti.* Radhakrishnan observes pertinently : "...we get being and non-being, the I and the not-I, the active[22] *Puruṣa* and the *passive*[23] *prakṛti*, the formative principle and the chaotic matter.[24] The most interesting thing we may notice in this discussion is the view presented in the *R.V.*x.72.2 that the existent (*sat*) in an earlier stage of gods was born from the non-existent (*asat*). This, when expressed in the terminology of the *Sāṅkhya* would read like *Puruṣa* in an earlier stage of gods was born from *Prakṛti.*

(7) Coming back to the topic of discussion, we may refer to an important instance of the development of the concept of *Puruṣa* already in the *Ṛgveda* itself. This important passage speaks of the *Puruṣa* (or the Soul) of plants (*oṣadhīnām puruṣa*, x.51.8, the Soul of plants - Griffith). But this context does not appear to have been rightly understood by the commentators. Durgā believes that it is the *puroḍāśa* cake.[25] Sāyaṇa too seems to be in favour of this interpretation. According to Hillebrandt this *puruṣa* of plants is Soma.[26] Geldner's position is different. He wonders whether this *puruṣa* (male or man) of plants (*oṣadhīnām puruṣa*) could perhaps be the tree (=wood) itself. Thus he observes : *Der Mann (puruṣa) der Pflanzen vielleicht der Baum*=Holz? (*Der Rig-Veda*,III.p.213,f.n.8c) None of these authorities seem to have got at the true significance of *Puruṣa* in this context. Here we may see, in all probability, the beginning of a very old Indian belief common to both the *Sāṅkhya* and Jainism. *Oṣadhīnām puruṣa* is the soul of plants, that is the belief that there are souls in plants. Our view of the above *Vedic* passage (x.51.8) is in agreement with that of Grassmann who explains this *Puruṣa* as follows : *'...der Geist, die Lebenskraft der Pflanzen'* ('...the Spirit, the life-force of plants') (*Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda*, p.833). This *Ṛgvedic* passage reminds us of Empedocles (B.C.495-435) of ancient Greece, who declared that 'plants are primary organisms and are having souls like animals'.[27]

(8) The *ātman* in the shape of a *puruṣa* (male or man) is explicitly mentioned in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 14.4.2.1 where it is thus said : *ātmā-eva idam agre āsīt puruṣa-vidhaḥ*, verily at the beginning was the *ātman* in the sahpe of a *puruṣa* (male or man). This appears to be an elaboration of the central conception of the *Puruṣa-Sūkta*, Hymn of male or man (*R.V.*x.90) (vide section

5 of this chapter) which is again found in the same elaborated form at the beginning of the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* (1.1).

(9) (i) A satisfactory explanation of the term *Puruṣa* seems to have been a great desideratum. Hence an 'etymological' explanation of the term has been put forward in the *Bṛhad Āraṇayaka Upaniṣad* (1.4.1) where it is mentioned that *Puruṣa* is so named, 'because before all this, he burnt all evils' (*sa yat pūrvo' smāt sarvasmāt sarvān pāpmana auṣat, tasmāt puruṣaḥ*).

(ii) The term *Puruṣa* in its closest form to the conception of *Puruṣa* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* is found in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (3.10-13 = 6.7-11) (vide chap.5, sec.13). As Johnston has remarked, of the terms named, *puruṣa*, the one which finally survived into classical *Sāṅkhya*, is also the word used in the earliest text, the *Kaṭha Up.*[28] Following the tradition started in the *Bṛhad.Āraṇ.Up.* (1.4.1) certain passages of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* attempt to describe the nature of *Puruṣa*. It is mentioned here that *Puruṣa* is of the size of the thumb (*aṅguṣṭha-mātraḥ Puruṣaḥ* 11.I.12-13). This attempt to give an idea of the nature of *Puruṣa* appears to have been continued in the *Praśna Up.* (v.5) where another 'etymological' explanation of the term *puruṣa* is alluded to. Thus it is said : *sa etasmāj jīvaghanāt parāt-param puriśayam puruṣam īkṣate* (Praśna Up.v.5). He (the meditator) sees the *Puruṣa that dwells in the citadel (of body)*, who is higher than the highest complex of life (Deussen: *dann shaut er ihn, der höcher ist als dieser hochste Komplex des Lebens (d.h. als die individuelle Seele), den in der Burg (des Leibes) wohnenden Geist). Sechzig Up.des Veda*, p.570).

(iii) *Puruṣa* (the soul) is again referred to in the *Śvet.Up.* where the belief that *Puruṣa* is of the size of the thumb is repeated (*Śvet.Up.*iii,13). The most important thing mentioned in this text is the concept that *Puruṣa* or Soul is an enjoyer. Thus it is said : *ātmā ... bhoktṛbhāvāt*,[29] the soul being an enjoyer (*Śvet.Up.*1.8). This agrees *verbatim* with the following line of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā: puruṣo (sti) bhoktṛ-bhāvāt (S.K.17), Puruṣa* (must) exist as an enjoyer,[30] where Īśvarakṛṣṇa postulates the existence of *Puruṣa* on the ground that there must be an intelligent principle to enjoy (i.e. experience) the worldly products of *Prakṛti.*

(10) In the *Bhagavad Gītā*, the term *Puruṣa* is used in the sense of individual soul. But we come across the term in this sense only from chapter xiii onwards.[31] Thus it is said at the beginning

of Chapter xiii:

prakṛtim puruṣam caiva
kṣetram kṣetrajñam eva ca
etad veditum icchāmi
jñānam jñeyam ca keśava. (B.G.xiii.1)

Prakṛti and *Puruṣa*, the field and the knower of the field, the knowledge and the object of knowledge, these I would like to know, O Keśava.

The foregoing discussion shows that the concept of *Puruṣa* has passed through several stages of development before it was admitted by the *Sāṅkhyas* to represent the animating principle of their philosophy. The term *Puruṣa*, as a name of one of the two ultimate categories of the *Sāṅkhyas* may faintly imply their great concern for man (*puruṣārtha*,S.K.69).

Notes and References

1. 'It (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) is the power which helps the material cause to produce the effect' - *I.P.* by C.P.Sharma, p.286.
2. Johnston, *E.S.*, p.41.
3. *vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt*, by what, pray, should one know the knower? (Deussen, *Wie sollte er doch den Erkenner erkennen?*) *Bṛhad Up.* (2.4.14).
4. *Vedic India*, p.67, section 133.
5. *A Dictionary of Sanskrit Language, p.637.*
6. Griffith, *'Manus*; another form of the word *Manu*, man, the great forefather of man', *H.R.V.*, Vol.I,p.100,f.n.5.
7. Cp. Burrow, *The Sanskrit Language*, p.152.
8. Zeller, *O.H.G.P.* p.99.
9. *E.S.*p.11 and also p.87.
10. Cp. Radhikrishnan, *I.P.*Vol.II, p.322.
11. Cp. *'ahetumān-nityo vyāpī niśkriya eko'nāśrito'liṅgo niravayavaḥ svatantra iti'*; commentary on S.K.verse 11.
12. Cp. V.V.Sovani, *C.S.S.S.*pp.24-25.
13. Wijesekera, *Siddhabhārati or the Rosary of Indology*, Dr. Siddheshvar Varma Presentation Volume, pp.2-3.
14. Cp. *R.P.V.U.* II, p.535, f.n.6.

15. "...and we can hardly doubt that we have, in the name of *puruṣa, a recollection of the Vedic puruṣa* ... (Sāṃkhya and Yoga, p.38).
16. *'Purusha, mann, Person, Geist (S.Mann). Namentlich 1 der kosmische Purusha, aus dem die Welt geschaffen woden...Der Purusha in Menschen (zellgross etc)...(mehr und mehr das Subject des Erkennens in sinne dr Sāṅkhyalehra) (Sechzig Up.des Veda p.914).*
17. 'Purusha:embodied spirit or man personified and regarded as the soul and the original source of the universe' (*The Hymns of the Rig Veda*, Vol.11 p.517 f.n.1).
18. In the *Brāhmaṇas puruṣa* is the same as the creator Prajāpati and in the *Upaniṣads* he is *identified with the universe.* Still later, in the dualistic *Sāṅkhya* philosophy *puruṣa* becomes the name of 'soul' as opposed to 'matter' (*H.S.L.*p.134).
19. 'They applied to the central principle the neuter term *Sat*...'They were convinced that there was something real of which Agni, Indra, Varuṇa, etc., were only the forms or names'. Radhakrishnan, *I.P.* Vol.1, p.94.
20. 'In x.72 the world-ground is said to be the *asat* or the non-existent with which is identified Aditi, the infinite.' *ibid.*, p.99.
21. 'Aditi literally means unbounded or unlimited'...here we have the anticipation of...the *prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy', *ibid.*, p.82.

22,23. Author wonders whether there is an unconscious interchange of adjectives here.

24. *I.P.* Vol.I, p.102.
25. *The Nirukta*, 8.22.
26. Vide Geldner, *Der Rig-Veda* iii,p.213 f.n.8c.
27. Windelband, *Ancient Philosophy*, p.75.
28. *E.S.* p.52.
29. Cp. *ajo eko juṣamāno' nuśete.* (*Śvet.Up.* iv.5).
30. Deussen, *'Muss sein der Puruṣa auch als Geniesser'*, *A.G.P.*, i, iii.p.431.
31. Cp. Johnston, *E.S.*p.53.

IX

Puruṣa and Prakṛti : (II) Prakṛti

(1) We have already seen that *Prakṛti* the female principle postulated by the *Sāṅkhya* dualism is also known by two other names: *Pradhāna*, the pre-established principle[1] and *Avyakta*, the Unmanifest.[2] Of these the term *Prakṛti*[3] occurrs nine times, *Avyakta* five times, and *Pradhāna* four times in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (vide chapter 6 section 7). Thus we notice that *Prakṛti* is the commonest and the most important of the three terms.

The word *Prakṛti* formed of *pra*, before or first and √*kṛ*, to make or produce, means that which existed before anything was produced, the primary source of all things: the original substance from which all things have evolved and into which all things will eventually return. *Prakṛti*, as an ultimate reality, is established purely on logical grounds. *Na-asataḥ sat-jāyāte*, no being comes out of non-being, that is to say, something cannot come out of nothing, is the central conception of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. This view, as we saw in the seventh chapter, is technically called the *Satkāryavāda*, the theory that the effect is pre- existent in or identical with the cause (cp. chapter 7, section 6). Upon this principle the material universe is supposed to have evolved from a first cause. To avoid the *regressus ad infinitum*, *Prakṛti* is postulated to be the uncaused cause. It is extremely important to keep in mind the fact that *Prakṛti* is merely a logical assumption for the sake of analysis (cp.*S.K.* 15 and 16).

(2) The word *Prakṛti (pra* + √*kṛ*, to do) does not occur in its nominal form in the *Ṛgveda*. But this may not mean that it was not in existence during this period. There are several expressions in the *Ṛgveda* which may lend support to our view. Some of them are, briefly as follows: *pra-kṛṇve*, lit. I draw away (Sāyaṇa, *prakṛṣṭam kṛṇomi*, R.V.I.138.2) *pra-akṛta*, lit. has shown (Sayaṇa, *prakarṣeṇa karoti*, *R.V.* I.124.5), and *pra-cakre*, lit. has done, made or performed (Sāyaṇa, *prakarṣeṇa kṛtavān* R.V.8.4.5).

One may do well to compare these phrases with the etymology of *Prakṛti* offered by Māṭhara: *prakaraṇāt prakṛtiḥ* (commentary on *S.K.*3). The relation between the above expressions and the explanation of *Prakṛti* as given by Māṭhara is obvious. The etymology of *Prakṛti* given by the Devībhāgavata - *prakṛṣṭavācakaḥ 'pras' ca, 'kṛtiś ca sṛṣṭi-vācakaḥ/ sṛṣṭau prakṛṣṭā yā devī, prakṛtiḥ sā prakīrtitā* (9.I.5.) - too is in general agreement with Māṭhara. We may now study the above *Vedic* examples with reference to their contexts. In the *R.V.* I.138.2, it is said: *pra hi tvā pūṣan ... stomebhiḥ kṛṇve* - thee, then, Pūṣan, I *urge* (Geldner, *treibe* = drive) with songs of praise. Next in the *R.V.*I.124.5, it is mentioned: *pūrve ardhe rajaso aptyasya/gavām janitrī-akṛta pra ketam* - there in the east half of the watery region the mother of the cows *has manifest* (Griffith, shown, Geldner, *aufgesteckt*) her ensign. Lastly in the *R.V.*8.4.5. it is said: *pra cakre sahasā maho/babhañja manyum ojasā* - with (mightier) strength he *has conquerd* (Geldner, *hat behandelt*) strength, with energy he has crushed (their) wrath. Just as *pra-jabhāra* (*pra* + √*bhṛ*, to bear) (cp. also *pari-jabhre*, *R.V.*i.61.8) implies the existence of *pra-bhṛti* (< *pra* + √*bhṛ*), so does *pra-cakre* imply the existence of *Prakṛti*. While *pra-jabhāra* (*R.V.*2.30.3) plies the possibility of the existence of *prabhṛti*, the latter, indeed, is found in the *Ṛgveda* (2.24.1). But while *pra-cakre* (*R.V.*8.4.5.) implies the possibility of the existence of the word *Prakṛti*, the latter, however, does not occur within the *Ṛgveda*. But the analogy of *prajabhāra-prabhṛti* will logically lead us to conclude that the word **Prakṛti* must have existed side by side with *pra-cakre* (in a non-technical sense) although it has not found a place in the collection of hymns of the *Ṛgveda* as we have today. Viewed from the angle of language one may also arrive at the same conclusion by maintaining that *pra- cakr*(e) is a linguistic development of *pra-kṛ*(ti). Geldner's remark on *pra-cakre*: *5 a, pra-kṛ in der angenommen Bedeutung* such *A.V. 12.2.5* (5 a, pra- kṛ in the adopted meaning also at *A.V.*12.2.5.) too seems to lend indirect support to our view, for he too appears to think that *pra-cakre* implies the existence of *pra-kṛ* which is intimately related to *Prakṛti*)

The words *Avyakta* (unmanifest) and *Vyakta* (manifest) are not found in the *Ṛgveda* even in a related form. But the closest to the ideas conveyed by them are found in *asat*[4] and *sat* of the *Ṛgveda* (*R.V.* 10.129.1,4, and 10.72.3) respectively (vide chap. 5

secs. 5,8 and chap.7, sec.3). The idea of *Vyakta* is conveyed by *āvir* + √*kṛ* (< *āvir-kṛnute)* found in the fifth maṇḍala of the *Ṛgveda* where it is thus said, *rathī iva kaśayāśvām abhikṣipann/ āvir dūtān kṛṇute varṣiām aha* - Like a charioteer lashing his horses with a whip, he makes *manifest* his messengers of rain (*R.V.* 5.83.3). The *āvir* + √*kṛ* not only conveys the etymological sense of *Vyakta,* but also reminds us of *āvir* + √*bhū* (meaning to manifest) (the opposite being *tiro* + √*bhū*) which is often found in the later philosophical literature. The third term *Pradhāna* is also not found in the *Ṛgveda* . The concept under lying this term too is not discernible in this text. One of the important notions attached to the concept of *Prakṛti* in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* is that it is a *śakti* or potentiality (S.K.15 and 9)[5] (cp.also *triguṇātmasvarūpā yā/sarva-śakti-samanvitā*. The *Devībhāgavata,* 9.1.7).

(3) The worship of the mother-goddess (i.e *pṛthivī mātā*) of the *Ṛgveda* people (*R.V.*I.89.4) and the influence of the pre-Vedic Śakti cult may have formed the background of the *Sāṅkhya* conception *Prakṛti* (cp.chap.4,secs 1-3). The influence of the latter may be seen in many Vedic goddesses such as *Śacī* (R.V.8.37.1) etc. The name *Śacī* derived from √*śak,* to be able, means 'energy personified'.[6] Again *Ūrjānī (R.V.* I.119.2) (cp.*ūrk, ūrjā,* f. nourishment, *power, strength,* Gk.'*orgé,* impulse, affection, anger) (vide Mayrhofer, *C.E.SD.q.v.)* derived from √*vṛj*, to twist (vide Whitney, *The Roots* p.163) is strength personified (cp.Geldrer, *R.V.* iv,p.128). The concept underlying the goddesses in the *Ṛgveda* is extremely important for a proper study of the *Sāṅkhya* idea of *Prakṛti*. Ernest Wood has pointed out that in India the goddess principle came to be called Shakti, the power.[7] The present writer has shown that among the divinities of the *Ṛgveda,* the goddesses are in majority. In the *Ṛgveda* they have referred to some sixty-seven(67) goddesses. On the other hand the number of the gods mentioned in the *Ṛgveda* is something like forty seven (47). It is true that the majority of the hymns are addressed to the gods; but the fact that the number of the goddesses in the *Ṛgveda* is far greater than that of the gods is not without significance. Undoubtedly we may notice here an echo of the pre-Vedic *Śakti* cult of the Indus Valley civilization. In a solitary stanza of the *Ṛgveda* reference is made to 'goddesses with unclipped wings' (*R.V.* 1,22,11), an idea which may

indirectly suggest that the power (i.e.*śakti*) of the goddess is not limited.[8]

Almost all the goddesses of the *Ṛgveda* are called mothers. Thus Aditi (*R.V.* iv.55.3: *Sāyaṇa: deva mātā*), Araṇyānī (*R.V.*x. 146.6: *Sāyaṇa: mṛgāṇām mātaram, janayitrīm), Āpaḥ* or Waters (R.V.1.23.16: *ambayaḥ,* dear mothers), Indrāṇī (R.V.x.86.7: *amba,* dear mother), Iḍā (*R.V.*v.41.19: *yūthasya mātā,* the mother of the herd), Uṣas (*R.V.* 1.113.19: *devānām mātā,* mother of the gods), Uṣāsānaktā (*R.V.*1.142.7: *ṛtasya mātā,* mothers of the cosmic order), Oṣadhī or the Plants (*R.V.* x.97.2: *amba*), Dyaus (*R.V.* iii.55.12: mātā), Pṛthivī (*R.V.* 1.89.4: *mātā pṛthivī*), Pṛśni (*R.V.*11.34.2. etc.), Bṛhaddivā (*R.V.*X.64.10; *Sāyaṇa: devamātā;* Geldner: *die Mutter Bṛhaddivā*), Rasā (*R.V.*V.41.15; *mahī mātā rasā;* the great mother Rasā), Vipāś (*R.V.* 111.33.3 *mātṛtame;* thou who are the most motherly), Sarasvatī (R.V. 11.41.16; *ambitame;* thou who art the most motherly) etc. are mothers *par excellence.* Maternity is a special characteristic of most of the goddesses of the *Ṛgveda.*

The great powers or importance attributed to some of the godesses are well-known. We may first refer to the *Ṛgvedic* river-goddesses, whose significance has already been excellently examined in the *Kunhan Rājā Commemoration Volume,* wherein it has been shown that they are some manifestations of the pre-*Vedic Śakti* cult.[9] The river-goddesses were very powerful, especially in their capacity as givers of water: the great significance of water (i.e. *Āpah* or the goddesses of waters, *R.V.* 1.23.16 etc.) in a dry land like the north-west India can be clearly seen in the *Nighaṇṭu*[10] where one comes across a hundred synonyms of water depicting the various aspects of the utility of the goddess of waters *(cp.L.Sarup, The Nighaṇṭu and Nirukta, Udakanāmāni,* pp.4-5). In this capacity they are aptly represented as the potent mothers, the bestowers of *aqua vitae* to the mankind. We may also refer to *Nirṛti,* the goddess of 'disorder' who is considered to have power over Indra himself (*R.V.* vii.37.7), the most powerful god of the *Vedic* pantheon. Elsewhere it is mentioned that Uṣas is the mistress of the world (*R.V.* vii.75.4). Further it is indicated that Pṛśni is above all the other divinities of the *Ṛgveda* (*R.V.*vii.94.2). All these facts point out the great powers attributed to some goddesses in particular, and also emphasize the general belief among the *Vedic* people that the goddesses

were very powerful. We may now refer to two other goddesses, Dhiṣaṇā and Uṣas. Dhiṣaṇā with the three feminine powers (cp. Geldner: Dhiṣaṇā plu, *drei weiblische Potenzen,* V,69.2, *Der Rig-Veda* Vol.iv.p.51), reminds us of *Prakṛti* with three constituents of it, the *Guṇas.* Uṣas, the mistress of the world (*R.V.* vii.75.4) connected with the three colours, black (*R.V.*iv.52.6), red (*R.V.*v.80.1) and white (*ruṣa*) (R.V.1.62.8) and compared to a danseuse, again reminds us of *Prakṛti* in a similar role referred to in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse fifty nine (59).[11] With these preliminary remarks on the concept underlying the goddesses of the *Ṛgveda* we may now analyse the character of two goddesses of the *Ṛgveda.* Aditi and Virāj:

(a) Aditi

The word *A-diti* formed of *'a'+ 'diti'* derived from $\sqrt{d\bar{a}}$ to bind, means 'unbinding'. Therefore Aditi is the Boundless[12]. Agreeing with Grassmann we may say that she is the Boundless in space, time and might.[13] Thus, Aditi among the goddesses of the *Ṛgveda,* stands closest to the conception of *Prakṛti.* Elsewhere Aditi appears under a pantheistic garb. Thus it is said: 'Aditi is the heaven, Aditi is the atmosphere (*antarikṣa*), *Aditi* is mother, she is also father and son, Aditi is all-gods, the five (tribes of) men, Aditi is all that has been born, and shall be born' (*R.V.*1.89.10). Aditi, as depicted in this verse (with a pantheistic colouring) is nothing but an anticipation of the immense potentiality of the *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya* system.[14] Aditi is known for her unrivalled bounty or gifts (*aneha dātram,* R.V. 1. 185.3). Aditi's gifts (*dātram*) mentioned here are the blessings of infinite Nature.[15] This generous nature of Aditi, the *Weltmutte*[16] reminds us of the same generous nature of *Prakṛti*[17] *of the Sāṅkhya* system. Finally we may remind ourselves of the similarity between *Aditi-Dakṣa* and *Prakṛti - Puruṣa* which we have already shown in chapter four under section 6,i.

(b) Virāj

The word *Virāj* derived from *vi* + $\sqrt{r\bar{a}j}$, to shine, and thus to rule, means 'far-ruling'. Thus we see that it is a very dynamic concept like the *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya* system. Apart from its luminous character, *Virāj,* as the name indicates, is a

dominatress,[18] a characteristic which reminds us of the same function of *Prakṛti* over *Puruṣa* so long as the latter does not obtain liberation. Agreeing with Renou, we propose to describe *Virāj* as a sort of *Śakti*[19]. *Virāj,* in fact, is the female principle with which primal *Puruṣa* produces the concrete universe. Such is the opinion of Radhakrishnan too.[20] We have already pointed out that *Virāj-Puruṣa* was a prototype of the *Prakṛti-Puruṣa of the Sāṅkhya* system (vide chapter four, section 6, ii).

(4) We may now examine some important philosophical concepts of the *Ṛgveda* which have a bearing on the *Sāṅkhya* origins. The hymn 1.164 of the *R.V.* seems to be very important for the students of the history of the *Sāṅkhya* thought. It contains several verses which deserve our attention. We propose to take them one by one and examine them here.

(a) Viśvarūpyām Gām or the Cow Wearing all Shapes or Forms

The *Ṛgveda* verse 1.164.9 makes a reference to a *viśvarūpyām-gām* or a cow possessing all forms (*rūpa*) of which it is thus said: The mother was yoked to the boon cow's carpole; the infant rested in the dark rows of cloud. Then the calf lowed, and looked upon the mother, the cow who wears all shapes in three directions (*R.V.* 1.164.9). This cow possessing all *rūpas* or forms appears to be the earth. This, in fact, is also the opinion of *Sāyaṇa.* He explains it as the earth in possession of various forms on account of the variegated vegetation like cereals etc. (*viśvarūpyām śasyādibhir nānārūpavatīm bhūmim*). Incidentally, the interpretation proposed is curiously paralleled by a passage in a modern (scientific) fiction where it is said: 'It seems that in ploughing, planting and harvesting he (i.e.man) had only one idea to cover the earth lovingly with a fine coat, made of *many different pieces of* cloth, some rough and some smooth, some shining and some dull, of strange and contrasting colours, some dark and some grey, but all of them pretty' (vide A.Lamorisse, *Trip in a Balloon,* p.7). Griffith too believes that the cow mentioned above is the earth and says; 'earth undertook the functions of the cow who supplies milk for sacrifices'[21] The goddess of Earth, the mother *par excellence* of the *Ṛgveda,*[22] as we saw earlier, is a precursor of the conception of *Prakṛti* (cp.chap.4, sec.3,i). Here, the goddess Earth qualified by the important

epithet *viśvarūpyām* gets a step still closer to the concept of *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya*. In fact the very term *'viśva-rūpya, the epithet of the cow (i.e. the earth)* is used in its strengthened form as *vaiśvarūpya* (lit. the manifestation of which makes up the universe)[23] meaning the 'universal cause' in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (verse no.15) in connection with *Prakṛti* with a view to showing that the universe as a whole implies a single cause: the *Prakṛti*. T.R.V. Murti remarks pertinently that in the *Sāṅkhya* 6 only the universal cause (*vaiśva-rūpya*) is self-sufficient'[24] and Sharma makes the comment: 'The unity of the universe points to a single cause and this cause is *Prakṛti*'.[25] Further we may mention that the *rūpas*, forms or shapes of this cow, the earth, remind us of the similar traits of *Prakṛti* (cp. *rūpa-sapta* or the seven forms of *Prakṛti, S.K.* verse 63) of the *Sāṅkhya* system. The three 'directions' mentioned in the verse may contain an allusion to the three regions assigned to the three constituents (*Guṇas*) of *Prakṛti* in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, verse 54 (vide ch. 10, see.2.). Thus we may safely conclude that this *viśvarūpyām gām*, the cow wearing all forms is a fairly plausible precursor of the primordial world-ground of the *Sāṅkhya* system, *Prakṛti*.

(b) Anasthā, the Boneless

There is another verse in the same hymn (*R.V.* 1.164.4) (which is also found in the *Atharvaveda* 9.9.4) in which is presented a riddle as follows:

> *ko dadarśa prathamam jāyamānam*
> *asthanvantam yad anasthā bibharti.*

> Who has seen him who is being born as the first,
> seen how the boneless one carries the bonny?[26]

The word *anasthā* formed of *an*, 'not', '-less' or 'devoid of' and *asthan* (used as the weakest base of *asthi*[27]), bone, meaning the Boneless, seems to be a poetic expresseion, probably, of pre-classical medical origin. Linguistically the term *anasthā*, the Boneless is of the same order of synonyms such as *Aditi*, the Unbound and *Asambhūuti*, the Non-become. The term *anasthā*, expressing the negative conception of the Boneless seems to be

a prototype of *Prakṛti*,(the Mother Nature) representing the pre-historic conception of *Śakti* or the Mother Goddess. *Sāyaṇa* also explains *anasthā* as the concept of *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy (*anasthā asthirahitā sāṅkhya-prasidhā Prakṛti*). Griffith too is in agreement with this view. He translates the line: 'How the boneless one supports the boney' and adds 'or in more conventional and less literal words, how the unsubstantial one (feminine) supports that (masculine) which is endowed with substance' .... 'The boneless or unsubstantial is *Prakṛti*'[28]. Geldner also holds the same opinion.[29] The picture portrayed in this verse, namely the bony (masculine)being carried by the feminine one, the boneless (*Prakṛti*) reminds of the well-known simile of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 21, elaborated by Gauḍapāda, where *Puruṣa* is compared to a cripple being carried by *Prakṛti*, the blind (cp.ch.4,sec.5 and 7, i). Furthermore, *anasthā* may be a term of pre-classical medical origin. We have maintained elsewhere (ch.28,sec.3) that the concept of *Puruṣa, Prakṛti* and *sannidhi-mātra* of the *Sāṅkhya* on the individual or human side (as opposed to the cosmic aspect) may represent father, mother and their union. This is important for the understanding of the *anasthā* representing the pre-historic concept of the Great Mother. It may not be difficult for one to trace the origin of the concept of *anasthā* to an earlier stage of the following teaching of the Indian medical science;

> *loma-lohita-māṃsāni/jāyante mātur asya yat,*
> *pituḥ snāyvasthi-majjānas/tataḥ ṣāṭ kauśikam vapuḥ.*[30]

> Of him (i.e. foetus) hair, blood and flesh are born from the (celles of) mother; tendons, bones and marrow from the father. Thus the (human) body is of six sheaths.

According to this doctrine *bones are not born from* the maternal cells, but from the cells of the father. Perhaps this idea may have influenced the poet- philosopher to introduce the concept in question in a metaphorical expression such as *anasthā*, the Boneless. We may point out that *asthi* also meaning the 'kernel

of a fruit',[31] the term *anasthā* again conveys the sense of 'the one without substance' (kernel). In philosophy substance in general means that which has its whole being in itself, whose reality does not flow into it from anything else, etc.[32] Such, indeed, is the *Ātman, Puruṣa* or Soul, for it is supposed to be an independent, enduring entity, as against the ever- fleeting, the ever-changing phenomena of *Prakṛti* or matter. Therefore, from this point of view too, the concept under discussion may deserve the name *anasthā*, the unsubstantial one.

(5) An aspect of the development of the concept of *Prakṛti* is again found in the *Vājasaneyī Saṃhitā* XL,12, of the *Yajurveda*. Here it appears under the garb of *Asambhūti*. The term *Asambhūti* (< a + sam + √*bhū* , to become) literally means that which has not yet (fully) become (i.e. manifest). The philosophical import of the concept of *Asambhūti* is that it is something *'non-become'* (*a-sambhūti* = *-p*) with the potentiality to *'become'* (*sam* + √*bhū*) something (= p) under favourable conditions. That is to say that *Asambhūti* is the non-existent which may manifest itself in course of time as *Sambhūti* the existent. One would thus say that '-p' (A-sambhūti) is a sufficient condition for 'p' (*Sambhūti*): -p→ p. Thus we may say that *Asambhūti*, the non-existent, as an earlier stage implies the possibility of *Sambhūti*, the existent, as a later development of the same. It is also to be pointed out that semantically the conception of *Asambhūti* is similar to that of *Avyakta*, the Unmanifest of the *Kārikā* (vide sec. 2 of this chapter). Hence the relation between *Asambhūti* and *Sambhūti* is not different from that which exists between *Avyakta*, the Unmanifest and *Vyakta*, the Manifest of the *Sāṅkhya* system. Thus it is said in the *Vājasaneyī Samhitā*: 'Into blinding gloom enter those who worship or believe in *Asambhūti* and into a greater darkness, as it were, those who delight in *Sambhūti* (*V.S.*XL.12).[33] In agreement with Renou, one could say that this *Asambhūti* is a prelude to the conception of *Prakṛti*.[34] Commenting on this verse, Śaṅkara says that the worship of *Asambhūti* (*Prakṛti*) is but blindness (or ignorance) and those who do so, will fall into the corresponding darkness.[35] The Idea of *Asambhūti* is again found in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* XIV[36] and also in the *Īśā Upaniṣad* (12-14). In verse 12 of the latter, the same *Yajurvedic* doctrine is reproduced.[37] Commenting on

Asambhūti in the *Īśā* Up. *Śaṅkara* reiterates his view that it represents *Prakṛti* (*asambhūteḥ avyākṛtāt, Śaṅkara* on *Īśā Up.* verse 13) and the same opinion is held by Dvivedagaṅga, another commentator on the same text.[38] The meaning of the term *Asambhūti*[39] as occurring in the *Īsā Up.* (12-13) is clearer than the same found in the *V.S.* XL.12. We may, also, explain the teaching, that those who worship *Asambhūti* fall into blinding darkness. This doctrine, at once, reminds us of the *Sāṅkhya* concept of the *prākṛtika-bandha*. Now what is this bondage (*bandha*) ? In his commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 44, Gauḍapāda refers to three types of bondage, the *prākṛtika*, the *vaikṛtika* and the *dākṣiṇaka*: but he explains neither the *prākṛtika* bondage nor the others. We may still get an idea of this bondage from *Vācaspati* who observes that: 'of those who worship or believe in (*upāsate*) *Prakṛti* with the misconception of identifying *Ātmā* with it etc., there results the *prākṛtika* bondage' (*tatra prakṛtāu-ātmajñānād ye prakṛtim upāsate, teṣāṁ prākṛtiko bandhaḥ - Vācaspati* on *S.K.* 44) : Vācaspati further says that: 'those who believe in *Avyakta* (*Prakṛti*) fall into bondage for a full hundred thousand of years (*pūrṇam śatasahasraṃ hi, tiṣṭanti avyakta cintakāḥ*, ibid,) Thus it is fairly certain that the doctrine of *Asambhūti* (as occurring in the *Īśā Up.* 12-13) is historically related to the conception of *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya*. Radhakrishnan has pertinently referred to *Asambhūti* (*Īśā Up.* 12) *as the unmanifest or the undifferentiated Prakṛti*[40]

(6) It is interesting to note that the adjective *Prākṛta* (related to *Prakṛti*) is found in two contexts of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* as follows :-

I. *api ha vā 'etarhi, devebhyo' śvamedham ālabhante: tad āhuḥ prākṛto' śvamedha' iti-itara' id-nūṇam sa tad vāeṣa, eva-aśvamedho yac-candramāḥ* (SB. II.2.5.I).

And, verily, even on this occassion, they perform an *Aśvamedha* sacrifice to the gods: of this (New and full-moon sacrifice) they say, 'it is the *original (normal or natural) Aśvamedha'* ; and that (real *Aśvamedha*) indeed, is just the other (modified one); for, indeed, the *Aśvamedha* is the same as the moon.

II. *yajño vā anaḥ. yajño hi vā'anas, tasmād anasa eva yajūṁsi manti, na kauṣṭasya, na kumbhyai bhastrāyai ha sma ṛṣayo gṛhṇanti; tad ṛṣīn prati bhastrāyai yajūṁsi-āsuḥ; tāni-etarhi prākṛtāni; yajñād yajñām nirmimā'iti tasmād anasa eva gṛhṇīyāt.* (Ś.B. 1.I.2.7).

The cart further is (one of the means of) the sacrifice; for the cart is indeed (one of the means of) sacrifice. Therefore the (following) *Yajus* texts refer to the cart and not to a store-room, nor to an earthen pot. It is true that the seers once took (the rice) from a leathern bag, and hence, in the case of the seers, *Yajus* texts applied to a leathern bag. Here, however, they are taken in their *natural application*. Because he thinks, 'from (or, by means of) the sacrifice I will perform the sacrifice', let him, therefore, take (rice) from the cart.

Keith[41] followed by Renou[42] thinks that the adjective *prākṛta* in the above passages of the *Śata. Brāhmaṇa* reveals the existence of the conception of *Prakṛti* 'ground form' later famous in the *Sāṅkhya* system of philosophy. But the two references mentioned above do not seem to have a bearing on the philosophical term *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya*. It would, perhaps, be better to take the adjective *prākṛta* in the above contexts as merely conveying its etymological idea 'orginal' in the sense of being 'underived'. This may probably imply that the idea of *Prakṛti* was in the propocess of getting gradually established.

(7) The conception of *mūla-prakṛti*, the Primal Nature (Deussen : *Die Urerzeugerin*) which we will be discussing below (vide sec.10) seems to be implied in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* II.1.6 under the garb of 'waters' : *yaḥ adbhyaḥ pūrvam ajāyata*, he who was born of old from the primeval waters (Deussen: *Urwasser*). Radhakrishnan has aptly explained the concept of 'waters' here as referring to the idea of *Mūla-Prakṛti* or the Primal Nature.[43] Again in the immediately following verse of this same *Upaniṣad*, ii.1.7 the author appears to refer to *Prakṛti* by the name of Aditi. It is thus said:

yā prāṇena sambhavati-
aditir devatāmayī,
guhām praviśya tiṣṭantī,
yā bhūtebhir vyajāyata.

She who comes into being with life, Aditi, the soul of the gods, who stands, having entered the 'secret place' (of the heart), who was born with the beings.

Aditi (a-diti=not bound) the Boundless in this context, according to Śaṅkara, means the mother of gods (*sarva-devatā-mayī sarva-devātmikā).* As Radhakrishnan remarks, the term *aditi* is used here in the sense of mother- nature (cp. *R.V.*, 1.89.10), *Prakṛti*, the source of the objectivity.[44]

(8) Next we notice a different type of development of the concept of *Prakṛti* in the *Śvet.Up.*I.4. It is implied here that *Prakṛti* is plural in number (vide *R.K., The Princip.Up* pp.711- 12.). The *Upaniṣadic* passage in question refers to a group of eight (*aṣṭaka*) *Prakṛtis* and also a series of sixteen (*ṣoḍaśa) Vikāras* or transformations. This teaching called the 'vikāra theory' by Johnston[45] is of great importance. The eight *Prakṛtis* or the primary constituents are *Prakṛti, Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra* and the five elements. The series of sixteen called *Vikāras* or the secondary constituents consist of mind, the ten organs and the five objects of the senses.[46] It is interesting to note here that the idea of *Prakṛti* is considered as being plural in order to form a group of eight primary constituents (i.e. *Prakṛtis*)[47]

This division into two groups of eight and sixteen is taught in a number of epic passages and the group of eight is several times mentioned in the *M.Bh.*XII.7570; 11596; 11552.[48] It is also found in two other texts: the *Buddhacarita* (cp.XII, 17) and the *Carakasaṁhitā, śarīrasthāna).* The practice of using the word *Prakṛti* in the plural is continued even in the later texts such as the *Tattvasamāsa* (1 and 2), the *Garbha Upaniṣad*, 4, and the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (vii. 7,2).[49]

(9) We may, now, take up the problem of the two synonyms of *Prakṛti*, namely *Pradhāna* and *Avyakta*. The origin of the term *Pradhāna* (the primary one, cp. Wackernagel: *Hauptsache, A.G.II.i.p.3)* is not quite certain. It may have meant either the

chief of the eight *prakṛtis*,[50] or merely 'the pre-established principle.[51] *Pradhāna* is used regularly in the two *Upaniṣads*, the *Śvet. Up.I.10.* and the *Maitrī Up.* which specifically teach Yoga. It is the regular term used in the *Yoga Sūras* of Patañjali. However, the occurrrence of this term in the Epic is not common; it is only found in a few passages such as XII,9105, 9115, 11635,11794, 13035,13537, and XIV, 522. 529, 579, 953, 1399.[52] In chapter five we saw that the term *Avyakta* is found in the *Kaṭha Up. (I.3.II;11.3.7).* The term *Avyakta* occurs also in the *Maitrī Up.* vi.10 and it is again found in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (vii,24; xii,1,3;xiii.5).

(10) The above concept of *Prakṛti* (plural) (vide, sec.8) seems to have been alive in the mind of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, for he has once used the term *mūla-prakṛti* in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (verse no.3), to designate *Prakṛti* in contrast to the other *Prakṛtis* mentioned above, viz, *Buddhi (Mahat), Ahaṁkāra* and the five (subtle) elements. It is surprising to note that the historical significance of this term as found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* has not been noticed by some editors and translators of this text. They have rendered *mūla-prakṛti* (*S.K.3*) as well as *Prakṛti* as Primal Nature (cp. Suryanarayana Sastri: The *S.K.* p.7 and p.46). Referring to the *mūla-prakṛti* Īśvarakṛṣṇa observes as follows.

mūla-prakṛtir avikṛtir
mahadādyaḥ prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ sapta
ṣoḍaśkas tu vikāro
na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ.(3).

> *Mūla-prakṛti* is not an evolute: Mahad etc. the seven, are (both) evolvents and evolutes: the group of sixteen is evolute: (only) the Spirit (*Puruṣa*) is neither an evolute nor an evolvent.

Here the term *sapta* confirms the view that the *Kārikā* regarded the *Prakṛtis* as eight.[53] We may compare with them the *Prakṛtis* and the *Vikāras* (i.e. the *Vikṛtis*)[54] of the *Śvet. Up. 1.4.* mentioned above, as follows:

No	Names of the Categories.	Categories mentioned in the *Śvetāśvatara Up.*	Categories mentioned in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā.*
i.	The Primal Nature (i.e. *mūla-prakṛti*).	—	*mūla-prakṛti.*
ii.	The *Prakṛtis* (pl.).	The group of eight *Prakṛtis (aṣṭaka)* i.e. 1. *Prakṛti,* 2. *Buddhi (Mahat),* 3. *Ahaṅkāra,* and 4-8. The five elements.	
iii.	The *Prakṛti-Vikṛtis.*		The group of seven *(sapta)* *Prakṛti-Vikṛtis* i.e. 1. *Buddhi (Mahat),* 2. *Ahaṅkāra* 3-7. The five *Tanmātras* (i.e. subtle essenses)
iv.	The *Vikāras* (=*Vikṛtis*).	The group of sixteen (*ṣodaśa*):i.e. 1. Mind 2-11 Ten organs, and 12-16. The five objects of the senses.	The group of sixteen (*ṣodaṣaka*) *i.e.* 1. Mind 2-11. The ten organs 12-16. The five gross elements *(mahā-bhūta)*

The *Prakṛti* of the *Śvet.Up* is equivalent to the *Mūla-prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. The two *Prakṛtis* of *Buddhi* and *Ahaṅkāra* of the *Śvet.Up* are the same as those found under the *Prakṛti-Vikṛtis* of the *Kārikā*. The five elements of the *Śvet.Up* seem to be equivalent to the five *Tanmātras* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's system. Regarding the Mind and the ten organs there is no difference in the two systems. Finally the five objects of the senses in the *Śvet.Up* seem to be equivalent to the gross elements (*mahābūta*) in the *Kārikā* of Īsvarakṛṣṇa. This comparison may not fail to convince one that Īśvarakṛṣṇa's is a developed form of a type of Sāṅkhya akin to the same found in the *Śvet.Up*.

(11) Another important aspect of the concept of *Prakṛti* is its consideration as *Māyā*. In the *Svet.Up*. iv.10, *Prakṛti* is called *Māyā* (*māyām tu prakṛtim viddhi*, know then that *Prakṛti* is *Māyā*). Agreeing with Johnston we may say that the conception of *Prakṛti* equated with *Māyā* in this context denominates the *Avyakta* or the Unmanifest. This tradition of interpreting *Prakṛti* is continued in the *Sāṅkhya Pravacana Bhāsya*, 1.69. We have already seen that *Prakṛti* in an earlier stage of its development was known as *asat*, the non-existent (vide, ch.7,sec.3). This *asat* the non-existent as we saw before is not mere nothing but a latent potentiality or an *Avyakta* which would manifest itself as *sat* (cp. *asataḥ sat ajāyata*, *R.V.* x.72.3) in the appropriate circumstances. Hence *asat* is a latent existence of the *sat* the manifest existence. That which limits is *Māyā*;[55] the term *Māyā* (semantically related to *mātṛ* and *nir-māṇa*) is derived from √*mā*, to make, in the sense of creating or measuring. Thus *Māyā* means either that which creates temporal reality, reality for this empirical sphere of measurable forms appearing *sub specie aeternitatis* (*cp. Lokacāraya:* Māyā is the cause of the varied creation: *Tattvatraya*, p.48) or that which exists as the Unmanifest (= *Avyakta*). Although Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not equate *Prakṛti* (= the *Avyakta*) with *Māyā*, we may nevertheless, notice that the idea is implicit in his *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. In fact *Prakṛti* in the state of *Avyakta* (or the Unmanifest) characterized as 'not manifold' (*na- aneka*, *S.K.* 10) in opposition to *Vyakta* (or the Manifest) described as 'manifold' (*aneka*, *S.K.*10) implies that it is a sort of mystery or *Māyā*. We, thus, notice that *Māyā*, as synonym of *Prakṛti*, has a history behind it which may, ultimately, be traced back to the concept of *asat* in the *Ṛgveda*. It appears that Īśvarakṛṣṇa has carefully avoided

the term *Māya* (which occurs also in the *Vedānta*) as a synonym of *Prakṛti*. But his description of *Prakṛti* (the female principle of the *Sāṅkhya* dualism) appears to suggest the idea of *Māyā*. Thus it is said that the non-perception of *Prakṛti*, is due to its subtlety and not to its non- existence (*S.K.*8). Again he employs two verses to establish the existence of *Prakṛti* with emphatic ascertain: 'the Unmanifest, verily, exists' (*avyaktam kāraṇam asti*, *S.K.* 15 & 16). Elsewhere he compares *Prakṛti* to a *danseuse* disappearing from the audience, an idea implying the illusive nature of *Prakṛti*. We may also mention here that the very idea that *Prakṛti* binds *Puruṣa* is also *māyā* or illusion, as indicated by Zimmer who states: 'Here, rather, is a kind of optical effect - a psychological illusion, which makes it appear that the life-monad is in bondage, caught in the unceasing activities of various aspects of matter (the *guṇas*) where actually it is free.[56]

(12) In the earlier part of the *Mokṣadharma* of the *Mahā Bhārata* the use of the term *Prakṛti* as a synonym of the Unmanifest (*avyakta*) does not appear to be known (*E.S.*p.27). In the case of the *Anugītā* the term occurs only once at *XIV, 522*, but it does not appear to have any technical significance (*E.S.pp.27-28*). The next important occurrence of the term *Prakṛti* is found in the *Bhagavadgītā* VII, 4 and 5. There it is said:

bhūmir apo'nalo vāyuḥ
khaṃ mono buddhir eva ca
ahaṃkāra itī' yam me
bhinnā prakṛtir aṣṭadhā. (VII,4).

Earth, water, fire, air, ether, *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaṅkāra* - this is the eightfold division of my nature.

aparo'yam itas tv anyām
prakṛtiṁ viddhi me parām
jīvabhūtaṁ mahābāho
yaye 'daṁ dhāryate jagat. (VII.5).

This is my lower nature. Know my other and higher nature which is endowed with life (*jīvabhūta*), by which the world is upheld, O Mighty-armed (Arjuna).

Here Kṛṣṇa refers to his twofold *Prakṛtis*, viz (a) his eightfold *Aparā Prakṛti* consisting of *Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, Manas* and the great elements and (b) his *Parā Prakṛti* which is said to be *jīvabhūta*. This peculier term *jīvabhūta* may either mean 'become alive' or 'forming the life of' (with genitive). But these meanings do not fit in the context. Therefore we may translate it as 'endowed with life' (cp. Monier Williams, *q.v.*).Now the above division somewhat peculiar from a historical point of view is apt to mislead one, for it has failed to observe the parallels in the rest of the Epic. *Aparā Prakṛti* is not the same as the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Prakṛti* which is excluded from the list by definition. Therefore we have to understand the verse vii, 4, as giving a particular version of the conception of eight *Prakṛtis* which adds *Manas* to the group and omits *Avyakta (=Prakṛti)* from it. This doctrine does not appear to be attested elsewhere. The important thing to be noted, here, is that in the systems which accept the existence of eight *Prakṛtis*, it is very essential to use a qualifying term to distinguish *Avyakta*, if it is called *Prakṛti*. Thus the *Mahā bhārata*, XII, 11396, refers to the doctrine of the eight *Prakṛtis*: again in the same text, XII, 11394, the *Avyakta* is called the *Parā Prakṛti*. The same practice is found in *Nārāyaṇīya* where verse 13041 refers to the eight *Prakṛtis* and verse 13142 to the *Parā Prakṛti* meaning as the context indicates the *Avyakta*. Thus we notice that Kṛṣṇa's *Parā Prakṛti* is nothing but the *Avyakta*. On the other hand it must be pointed out that in XIII,19ff., XIV,5 and XV,7, *Prakṛti* without a distinguishing adjective stands for the *Avyakta* and the doctrine of an eightfold *Prakṛti* is not admitted (cp.*E.S*, p.28). The reason as to why *Prakṛti* is once called *Mūla-Prakṛti* in a single passage of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (verse 3) is no more a problem. It is undoubtedly the same *Parā Prakṛti* which has been once called *Mūla-Prakṛti* by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In the same passage of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* we come across not only the *Mūla-Prakṛti* but also the *Prakṛti-Vikṛtis*, viz *mūla-prakṛtir avikṛtir ... prakṛti-vikṛtayah sapta* (*S.K.*3). Here in *prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ* (= evolvents and evolutes) we have to understand *Mahat (=Buddhi)*, *Ahaṁkāra* and the five subtle elements. The two systems can be compared with a view to ascertain the similarities as well as the dissimilarities:

	The Bhagavad Gītā Chapter VII, Verses 4 & 5		*The Sāṅkhya Kārikā Verse No. 3*
1	*Parā-Prakṛti*	1	*Mūla-Prakṛti*
	The Eight-fold *Aparā Prakṛti*		The Seven-fold *Prakṛti-Vikṛtayaḥ*
1	*(Mahān) Buddhi*	1	*Mahat (Buddhi)*
2	*Ahaṅkāra*	2	*Ahaṅkāra*
3-7	The five great elements	3-7	The five subtle elements
8	*Manas*	8	—

From this chart we can see that the concept of *Parā-Prakṛti* (*B.G.*, vii.5) has given rise to the notion of *Mūla-Prakṛti*. As to the *(Mahat) Buddhi* and *Ahaṅkāra* there is no difference. In place of the five great elements of the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* has introduced the five subtle elements (*tanmātras*). Finally in contrast to the system represented in the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* does not recognise *Manas* as a kind of *Prakṛti*. Incidentally we may mention here that in a late *Upaniṣad*, namely in the *Rāma-Uttara-Tāpanīya Up.*, 3, Sītā, the wife of Rāma, is identified with *Mūla-prakṛti*[57], no doubt an illusion to the mother goddess aspect of *Prakṛti*, for Sītā herself is a goddess of fertility (cp. *R.V.*4.57.6 and 7, Sītā = furrow).[58]

Notes and References

1. Vide Renou, *L'Inde Classique*, II. section 1431.
2. Deussen, *das Unoffenbare, Unentfaltete, A.G.P.*, I. iii, p. 424.
3. Deussen, *Urnatur, ibid.*, p. 477.
4. Vide Griffith, *H.R.V.*, vol.ii, p. 575, f.n.I.
5. Vide Deussen, *A.G.P.*, I, iii, p. 477.
6. Cp. Zimmer, *P.I.*, pp. 62 and 77-78.
7. *Yoga*, p. 142.
8. See my thesis : *Divinités Féminines dans Ie Ṛgveda*, thesis submitted to the University of Paris in 1961 (unpublished).

9. O.H. de A. Wijesekera. *Ṛgvedic river-goddesses and an Indus Valley* Seal, Dr. Kunhan Rājā Presentation Volume, 1946, Pt. 1, pp. 10-18.
10. See *Divinités Féminines dans le Ṛgveda*, pp. 81-88.
11. *raṅgasya darśayitvā, nivartate nartkī yathā nṛtyāt ...tathā ... prakṛtiḥ*, as a danseuse desists from dancing having exhibited herself to the audience, so does *Prakṛti*. S.K. 59.
12. Cp. *Hiriyanna*, O.I.P.p 41.
13. Cp. Grassmann, *unbeschränkt in Raum, Zeit, Macht order Fülle, W. zum R.V., q.v.*
14. Cp. Radhakrishan, *I.P.*, Vol. i, p. 82.
15. Griffith, *H.R.V.* Vol. 1, p. 248, f.n.3.
16. Grassmann, *W.z.R.V.* p. 251.
17. Cp. *Upakāriṇī prakṛtiḥ : generous* (Deussen, *hilfreich) Nature, SK.* 60.
18. Cp. Renou, *H.S.V.* p. 248, note 4.
19. *Ibid.*,
20. Radhakrishnan and Moore : *A Source Book of Indian Philosophy* (London, 1957, p. 19, f.n.1).
21. *H.R.V. vol. I, p. 221, f.n.9.*
22. Yāska (The *Nirukta*, 10.4:ed. by Roth), Pischel *(Vedische Studien*, 11.86) and Hardy *(Vedische-Brāhmaṇische Periode, Aditi)* identify Aditi, with the goddess of Earth.
23. (i) *viśvam jagat, tasya rūpaṁ vyaktiḥ. viśvarūpasya bhāvo vaiśvarūpyam, Gauḍapāda.* (ii) Deussen, *'deren Summe das Universum (vaiśvarūpam) ausmacht'*, *A.G.P.* 1. iii. p. 430.
24. *C.P.B.*, p. 61.
25. *I.P. p. 212.*
26. *'Wer hat den zuerst Geborenen gesehen, da die Knochenlose den knochigen trägt-'* Geldner.
27. Cp. Macdonell, *P.S.D.* p. 35.
28. *H.R.V.* Vol. I, p. 220, f.n.4.
29. *Der Rig-Veda*, vol.i, p. 228.
30. The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* edited by S. Sastri and published by Paṇḍurang Jāwaji (Bombay, 1940) p. 40.
31. Vide Mayrhofer, *C.E.S.D.q.v.*
32. Vide Stace, C.H.G.P. pp. 186-87.
33. Renou, *Ils entrent dans l'aveugles ténèbres,*
ceux qui croient dans le non-devenir;
et dans plus de ténèbres encore
ceux qui se plaisent dans le devenir. H.S.V.,p.225
34. *H.S.V.*, p.274.
35. Griffith, *The Hymns of the White Yajur Veda* (*Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā*) XL (*Īśāvāsya*) verse no. 12 and notes on it.

36. Cp. Monier-Williams, *A Dictionary of Sanskrit Language*, p.119.
37. *Andhaṁ tamaḥ praviśanti, ye-asambhūtim upāsate.*
tato bhūya iva te tamo,ya u sambhūtyām ratāḥ. (12).
Into blinding darkness enter those who believe in (or worship) *Asambhūti* and into still greater darkness, as it were, those who delight in *Sambhūti* Cp. also Deussen,
In blinde Finsternis eingeht,
Wer ein Werden zu Nichts geglaubt,
In blindere whol noch jener,
Der ein Werden zu Etwas glaubt. (Sechzig Up.des Veda, p. 527).
38. Vide (i) R. Garbe, *S.P.* pp. 19-20 (ii) Deussen, *Sechzing Up.des Veda*, p.527. (iii) Keith, *S.S.*p.22.
39. *'Die Nichtswerdung'* - Deussen, *Sechzig Up.des Veda*, p.527.
40. *The Prin.Up.* p.575.
41. *R.P.V.U.* ii,p.483.
42. *L'Inde Classique*, tome II, p.34.
43. Vide, *The Princip.Up* p.633.
44. Vide *ibid.*
45. Vide *E.S.* p.25, also *J.R.A.S.* (1930) p.865 and Theos Bernard, *H.P.*, p.204, under *Vikāra*.
46. Cp. Radhakrishnan, *The Prin.Up.* p.712.
47. Cp. Max Müller: *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*, p.75 and Johston, *E.S.* p.25.
48. Cp. *E.S.*, pp. 25-26.
49. Cp. Radhakrishnan, *The Prin.Up.* 712.
50. Cp. Johnston, *E.S.*, p.26.
51. Cp. Renou, *L'Inde Classique*, tome II, p.38, *le principe préétabli.'*
52. Cp. *E.S.*p.26.
53. *Cp. Gauḍapāda, Mūlaprakṛtiḥ pradhānam. prakṛti-vikṛti-saptakasya mūlabhūtatvāt* and *Māṭhara, mūlam saptānām prakṛti-vikṛtīnām ādir ity arthaḥ.*
54. *Vikāro vikṛtiḥ, G.B*, on *S.K.* 3.
55. Cp. Radhakrishnan, *I.P.*, Vol.II, p.260.
56. Cp. Zimmer, *P.I.* and Radhakrishanan, I.P.
57. Cp. Deussen, *Sechzig Up.des Veda*, p.821.
58. Cp.Jakobie, *Schon im Rig-Veda (IV.57.6,7) wird die personifierte Ackerfurche unter dem Namen Sītā göttlich verehrt...... Dass Sītā des Rāmāyaṇa identlich mit dieser vedischen Sītā ist, kann nicht bezweifelt werden.....'Das Rāmāyaṇa*, pp. 130-131.

X

Puruṣa and Prakṛti : (III) The Constituents of Prakṛti : The Guṇas

(1) *Prakṛti*, the ultimate causal nexus of the world of non-self consists of three constituents (or strands) which are technically termed the *Guṇas*. The *Guṇas* are very important for the *Sāṅkhya* system. They are postulated (in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*) to account for the diversified objects of experience. The *Sāṅkhya* has a tendency to push the analysis of existence up to its minutest, last elements. The *Guṇas* are a sort of atomic or infra-atomic energies of which the empirical things are composed. What we call *Guṇa* in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy is only a particular manifestation of a subtle entity.[1] The word *Guṇa* goes back to an Indo-European origin. It is derived from ※ , *gṛ-nó*, I.E. base ※ , *gere*, to twist, wind.[2] On the other hand, seeking the origin of the term *Guṇa* within the field of Sanskrit language itself, Deussen traces it back to the word *gaṇa* meaning 'troop' or 'band'.[3]

(2) In the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy reference is made to three *Guṇas: Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas*. Īśvarakṛṣṇa describes them as follows :

> *sattvam laghu prakāśakam*
> *iṣṭam upaṣṭambhakam calam ca rajaḥ.*
> *guru varaṇaka eva tamaḥ,*
> *pradīpavac cā'rthato vṛttiḥ. (S.K.* 13).

Sattva is considered to be buoyant and illuminating, *Rajas* exciting and mobile, and *Tamas* is only heavy and enveloping. Like a lamp their function is to gain an end.

According to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* v.22, *Prakṛti* evolves in two different ways, the one with a predominance of the translucent

intelligence-stuff (*Sattva*), the other with a predominance of dead matter (*Tamas*) resulting in sense-objects in their subtle (*tanmātra*) and gross (*mahābhūta*) forms (cp.Stcherbatsky C.C.B.p.12). As we shall see at the end of this chapter we are unable to agree with Keith's view that the origin of the conception of *Guṇa* seems to be in the main psychologic.[4] Przylusky's view that the conception of *Guṇa* is of Iranian origin[5] is also not acceptable. It appears to us that the origin of the idea of *Guṇa* can be found in India itself. The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* describes the universe with the three *Guṇas* prevailing in its different quarters as follows : 'Above (*ūrdhva*), there is predominance of *Sattva*, below (*mūla*), the creation abounds in *Tamas*, in the middle (*madhye*), *Rajas* predominates (*S.K.*54)[6]. This description may help one to have an idea of the *Sāṅkhya* cosmology, a subject which we will discuss in detail in chapter 22. The above teaching of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* indicates that the entire creation is three-fold and that the three *Guṇas* are predominanting in their special regions. The division of the world into three regions, viz, the upper region or heaven (=*ūrdhva*), the middle region, the *antarikṣa* or atmosphere (*madhya*), and the lower region or the earth (*mūla*) is of *Ṛgvedic* origin. The term *Sattva* in its technical sense is not found in the *Ṛgveda*. But a related form of *Sattva*, namely *satvan* meaning 'brave'', 'valiant' or 'strong' is found in a number of places such as the *R.V.* vi.29. 6;X. 155.1 etc. It is interesting to note that *satvan* is often found near the word *satya* or truth (for example, cp. *R.V.* vi.22.1 and vii. 16.8) (cp.also Grassmann: *W.z. R.V.* p.1455), a word closely related to *Sattva* both from the point of view of morphology and semantics. Thus it appears that the path was already being faintly paved for the later appearance of the conception of *Sattva*. We have seen that *Sattva* is described to be light (*laghu*) and bright (*prākaśaka*), and is also said to be predominating in the upper region of the universe (*S.K.*54). Lumious heavenly deities like *Dyaus, Sūrya*, etc., are found in the upper region. This could easily have led Īśvarakṛṣṇa (and his predecessors) to attribute the predominance of the *Sattva Guṇa* to this region of the world.

Next is *Rajas*. The word *rajas* derived from *√raj, rañj*, to colour, to redden (cp. *A.V.* I.23.1)[7], to be excited (cp. Macdonell, *PS.D. q.v.*) and to be passionate (cp. *A.V.* XV.8.1),[8] conveys the sense of 'dimness' and, the region of clouds distinguishing itself

from *div* or *svar*, the region of light (cp. Macdonell, *ibid.*, q.v.). The original meaning of the word *rajas* may have been associated with the fine grains of dust floating in the atmosphere (*marīci*) while glittering in the beams of the sun.[9] It is seen in the *Ṛgveda*, V.59.3, that *Rajas* obstructs the 'eye' or the rays of the sun and Geldner clearly translates the word *rajas* here, as *Dunkel* or 'dark'. Thus *Rajas* is seen to be a cause of darkness too. When the dust of the earth gets the rain, so the particles of dust floating in the atmosphere, too, is permeated with moisture, consequently the word *rajas* receives the epithet 'watery' (*aptya*[10] *R.V.* I.124.5). Thus *Rajas* in philosophy conveys the sense of the quality inflaming or obscuring the mind of an individual. The dust implied by *Rajas* may undoubtedly be the particles of dust continuously stirred up by wind especially in Northern India where there is no rain sometimes for ten months. The dry soil of the land is continuously whirling into the air. The dust thus dims the serenity of the sky and comes down over trees, plants, animals, the human beings and so on. Thus *Rajas* dims the outlook on everything, the in-animate as well as the animate world. The *Ṛgveda* clearly depicts the *antarikṣa* not only as the region where one comes across swift gods such as *Vāyu* (=Vāta) and even *Maruts* but also as a region filled with ruddy dust. Thus it is said :

divispṛg yāti aruṇāni kṛṇvann
uto eti pṛthivyā reṇum asyan. (R.V. X, 168, 1).

Touching the sky he goes producing ruddy hues: and he also goes along the earth scattering dust.[11]

The intellect of the sage is characterized by the far visibility of the autumnal sky (*vi-śārada*), shining through and untainted whereas the intellect of the fool is filled with *Rajas*, the ruddy dust of passion.[12] Thus we believe that the origin of the conception of the *Rajas Guṇa* is connected with *rajas*, the particles of dust. It is interesting to note that the mid-region (*madhya, S.K.* 54) of the world which is supposed to have a predominance of *Rajas* by Īśvarakṛṣṇa is not only called *antarikṣa* (cp. R.V. i. 35.7 etc.,) but also *rajas* in the *Ṛgveda*: *vi-dyām eṣi rajas pṛthu*, you go through the sky, the wide space (R.V. 1.50.7). Thus it is seen that in attributing the *Rajas Guṇa* to the atmosphere, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has simply followed the Vedic cosmolgy. Finally we may take up the *Tamas Guṇa*. The word *tamas* (cp.Latin; *tene-brae*; French: *ténè-bres*) in the sense of darkness is found in many verses of the *Ṛgveda* (e.g. IV.50.4; 51.1.2,3; VII.62,1; 71,5. etc.). But it is not yet found in its technical sense as the *Tamas Guṇa*. *Tamas* derived from √*tam*, to become breathless, faint, to be exhausted or distressed and to become rigid (cp. Macdonell, *P.S.D. q.v.*) meaning literally darkness or gloom, morally obscurity, spiritually blindness, connotes the unconsciousness prevailing in the lowest stage of creation (*mūla-sarga*) which consists of animal, vegetable an mineral kingdoms. This particular *Guṇa* is the basis of all lack of feeling, and inertia. The solidity of the inert matter, the strife in the plant kingdom for light and air, the greed of animals in their search for food are some of the primary manifestations of this universal principle. It is, in fact, the power of *Tamas* that *holds* the frame of the universe together counter-balancing the dynamism of the principle of *Rajas*.[13] The characteristics of *Tamas*, a *Guṇa* attributed to the lower region (*mūla*) by Īśvarakṛṣṇa are generally found in the *pṛthivī* of the *Vedic* cosmology. In fact the very word *pṛthivī* derived from √*prath*, to spread, meaning the 'extended one' may imply its special nature of being unwavering. It is mentioned in the *Ṛgveda* that *pṛthivī* is rigidly fixed (*dṛlha*) (*R.V.*V.84,3). Again it is said in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* that the earth consists of all that is dark (*yat kṛṣṇam, tad annasya, Chānd.Up.* vi,4.3). Thus we may notice that the region where the *Tamas Guṇa* predominates is corresponding to the lowest plane of the *Vedic* cosmology. Summing up we may safely conclude that the conception of the *Guṇas* with their special abodes has its root in the three-fold division of the *Vedic* cosmology.[14] We, now, propose to have a cursory glance at the passages of the post-*Ṛgvedic* literature where the *Guṇas* are implied implicitly or explicitly.

(3) The first reference to the three *Guṇas* seems to be found in the *Atharvaveda* where it is said as follows:

puṇḍarīkam navadvāram
tribhir guṇebhir āvṛtam
tasmin yad yakṣam ātmanvat
tad vai brahmavido viduḥ. (A.V.X.8.43).

> The lotus flower of nine doors (is) covered with three strands (=*guṇas*). What soul-possessing monster there is in it, that verily the knowers of the Brahman know.

The three strads (*tri-guṇa*) mentioned in this riddle verse may refer to the three *Guṇas* under discussion. Such a view is also held by Oltramare,[15] Muir, Griffith and Renou. Renou points out that here there is a possible allusion to the three qualities, substances of the *Sāṅkhya*.[16] Griffith citing Moore comments on the stanza, 'enclosed with triple bands and bonds or which the three qualities enclose'. It is possible that there may be here a first reference to the *Guṇas* (Fundamental Qualities) afterwards so celebrated in Indian philosophical speculation'.[17] There is another verse in the *Atharvaveda* with a possible reference to the idea of the *Guṇas*:

tasmin hiraṇmaye kośe
traya 're tri-pratiṣṭhite.
tasmin yad yakṣam ātmanvat
tad vai brahmavido viduḥ. (A.V X.2,32).

> In that golden vessel, the three-spoked with three supports - what soul-possessing monster there is in it, that verily the knowers of Brahman know.

This verse, just like the previous one (A.V.X.8,43) is a riddle verse. The three spokes (*traya're*) referred to here may probably imply the same conception: the three *Guṇas* (cp. Renou, *H.S.V*: p. 261). The golden vessel (*hiraṇmayakośa*) mentioned here appears to be the same as the *puṇḍarīka* covered with the three *Guṇas* mentioned in the previous verse (A.V.X.8.43).[18]

(4) The next important stage in the development of the conception of the three *Guṇas* is reflected in the *Upaniṣads:*

(a) In the *Chāndogya Up.* VI.4. 1-4 we notice the explicit beginning of the conception of the three *Guṇas* of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. The doctrine of the 'three forms' (*trīṇi rūpāṇi*) taught here may have been adopted by the *Sāṅkhyas* to develop their theory of the three *Guṇas* :

1. Whatever red (*rohita*) form fire has, it is the form of heat; whatever (is) white (*śukla*), (it is the form) of water; whatever (is) dark (*kṛṣṇa*), (it is the form) of earth. Thus vanishes the quality of fire from fire: the modification (*vikāra*) being only a name arising from speech while the truth is that it is only the three forms.
2. Whatever red form the sun has, it is the form of heat....
3. Whatever red form the moon has, it is the form of heat...
4. Whatever red form the lightning has, it is the form of heat...

Deussen is also of the opinion that the doctrine of the three forms has directly influenced the conception of the *Guṇas* of the *Sāṅkhya* system.[19] Radhakrishnan too says that the three colours are taken over by the *Sāṅkhya* system to correspond to the three *Guṇas*: *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas.*[20]

(b) This doctrine of the three colours is further developed in the *Śvet.Up.* IV.5 (vide chap.4,sec.8). Thus it is said: 'the one Unborn (or she-goat), red, white and black, producing manifold progeny similar in form to herself'. Thus this conception of the Unborn, red, white and black,[21] along with the previous teaching of the *Chānd.Up.* VI.4, could have led to the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of *Prakṛti* with its three constituents, *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas.* Such is also the opinion of Deussen.[22]

The phenomena of the *Guṇas* seem to have been implied in the *Śvet.Up* 1.4, under the guise of the epithet of *trvṛta*, the three tyres of the *Brahmacakra* (cp.*E.S.*p.31), the wheel of *Brahman* (vide ch.18, sec.3). This verse is also a riddle verse and probably it represents a continuation of the same type of riddle verses as seen above (*A.V.*x.2.32;8.43). Agreeing with Radhakrishnan we maintain

the opinion that the 'three tyres' (*trvṛtam*) mentioned in this verse may have a reference to the three *Guṇas*: *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas*.[23] The word *guṇa* occurs in several places of the *Śvet.Up*. But in none of these places does the word imply the conception of the *Guṇas* under discussion (çp.*E.S*.p.31). For example, the phrase *sarvendriya-guṇa-ābhāsam, Śvet.Up*. iii.7, simply means, reflecting the qualities of all senses: here the word *guṇa* has hardly anything to do with the term *guṇa* of the *Sāṅkhya* system.

(5) The gradation of mental faculties mentioned in the *Kaṭha Up*. I.3.10-13 which we have already referred to in chap.5,sec.13, re-appears in a slightly modified form at the *Kaṭha Up*. I.1.3.7-11. The term *Buddhi* mentioned in 1.3.10-13 is here replaced by *Sattva* (vide *Kaṭha Up. ii.3.7)*. This gradation is as follows:

Puruṣa	*(Ātmā)*
↑	
Avyakta	
↑	
Mahān Ātmā	
↑	
Sattvam	*(Jñāna ātmā)*
↑	
Manas	
↑	
Indriyas	

According to Deussen the *Sattva* in the latter context is the same as the *Buddhi* in the former (*Kaṭha Up*. 1.3.10-13). Deussen translates this word as *Wesenheit* (= the state of being) and *Güte* (=goodness) and refers to four contexts, *Kaṭha Up*. 6.7 (=11.3.7); *Śvet. Up*.iii.12; *Maitrī Up*. iv.3 and vi.38 where the word *Sattva* is found in this sense (*Sechzig Up.des Veda*,p.917).

However, he does not explain as to how the word *Sattva* can stand for *Buddhi*. Radhakrishnan's comment is more instructive: '*sattva*: essence. Intelligence constitutes the essence of mind' (*The Prin.Up. p. 643*). Śaṅkara explains *Sattva* at the *Śvet.Up*. iii.12, as *Antaḥkaraṇa* or the Internal Organ.[24] Now this *Antaḥkaraṇa* or the Internal Organ is explained by C.D.Sharma as follows: '*Buddhi, ahaṅkāra* and *manas* represent the three psychological aspects of knowing, willing and feeling or cognition, conation

and affection respectively. *Sāṅkhya* calls them material and derive them from *Prakṛti*. They shine through the light of the *Puruṣa* and are apparently conscious. All the three are called the internal organs or *antaḥkaraṇa*'.[25] These comments, however, do not solve the problem fully. We know that *Buddhi* is known for it is illuminating activity (*saiva ca viśinaṣṭi punaḥ, pradhāna-puruṣāntaram sūkṣmam, S.K*.37). It evolves from *Prakṛti* with a preponderance of the element of *Sattva*. As Chatterjee and Datta remark: '*Buddhi* arises out of the *preponderance of the element of sattva in prakṛti*. It is the natural function of *Buddhi* to manifest itself and other things. In its *pure (sāttvika)* condition, therefore, it has such attributes as virtue (*dharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), detachment (*vairāgya*) and excellence (*aiśvarya*)'.[26] It thus appears to us that the employment of the term *Sattva* in place of *Buddhi* in the *Kaṭha Up*. 11.3.7, may, in all probability, be due to a presupposition of the preponderance of the *Sattva Guṇa* in the principle of *Buddhi*.[27]

(6) Another aspect of the development of the conception of *Guṇa* is found in the *Maitrī Up*. which is generally assigned to a later date. Certain doctrines of this *Upaniṣad* seem to be very closely related to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (vide chap.17).

(a) The sixth *adhyāya* of this *Upaniṣad* (VI.10) mentions the *Guṇas* explicitly:

> *'prākṛtam annam triguṇa-bheda-pariṇamatvān mahadādyam viśeṣāntam liṅgam....*

All that begins with *Mahat* (= the intellect) and ends with the specific (=the gross elements), being a *transformation* of the distinction of the food (supplied by) of *Prakṛti* (=Nature) with its three *Guṇas*, is the *Liṅga* (= sign).[28]

(b) Even the important technical term of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, 27: '*guṇa-pariṇāma* (- *viśeṣa*)', has its prototype

already in this *Upaniṣad* (see above), in the form of *'tri-guṇa-bheda-pariṇamatvāt* (*Maitrī Up.* VI.10).

(c) The *Maitrī Up.* which clearly mentions the three *Guṇas* is like a connecting link between the earlier *Vedic* thought and the classical *Sāṅkhya* system. Thus Macdonell says: 'The remainder of this *Upaniṣad* is supplementary.... We have here a cosmogonic myth, like those of the *Brāhmaṇas*, in which the three qualities of matter, *Tamas, Rajas, Sattva*, are connected with *Rudra, Brahmā* and *Viṣṇu*, and which is in other respects very remarkable as a connecting link between the philosophy of the *Ṛgveda* and the later *Sāṅkhya* system' (*H.S.L.* pp.233 - 234).

(d) These observations made by Macdonell remind us at once of the concept of *sthiti-utpatti-pralaya*, the existence, origin and dissolution mentioned by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* v.69.

(7) There are many references to the *Guṇas* in the *Mahābhārata* but very often, they are ambiguous. A study of these occurrences shows that they can, broadly, be classified into three main classes. (i) There are couple of instances, namely at XII. 6923 and 8822 where *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas* are described as the three *jīvaguṇas*. (ii) The second class comprises of two groups: (a) at XII. 7081,10500 and XIV. 1564, the three *Guṇas* are called the three *Bhāvas* or the states of being; (b) sometimes an account is given of the three *Bhāvas*, the *Sāttvika-bhāva*, the *Rājasa-bhāva* and the *Tāmasa-bhāva* and these instances occur at XII.7701, 7831, 7959 and 11258.

(iii) The third class appears to be the largest among the three classes. Here the three factors of the *Avyakta* are called *Guṇas*, as in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. The most certain examples of this class can be seen at XII. 7850, 11289, 11327, 11635, 11761 and 12886 and XIV. 990 and 1058 (cp. *E.S.*, p. 32). In the *Bhagavadgītā* there are two *Sāṅkhya* sections, namely, canto VII and XIII. The older of these, namely, canto VII is important, for though not describing the *Guṇas* as a class, it still refers in verse 12 to the conception of the three *Bhāvas*: the *Sāttvika, Rājasa* and *Tāmasa Bhāvas*.

Thus it is said:

ye cai'va sāttvikā bhāvā
rājasās tāmasāś ca ye
matta eve 'ti tān viddhi
na tv ahaṃ teṣu te mayi. (VII.12).

And whatever states of being there may be, be they *Sāttvika* (harmonious), *Rājasa* (passionate), *Tāmasa* (slothful) - know thou that they are all from me alone. I am not in them, they are in me.

The same canto mentions in verse 13 the *guṇamaya-bhāva* or the modes of *Guṇa*:

tribhir guṇamayair bhāvair
ebhiḥ sarvam idaṃ jagat
mohitaṃ nā'bhijānāti
māṃ ebhyaḥ param avyayam. (VII.13).

Bewildered by these three fold modes of the *Guṇas* (nature) this whole world does not recognize me who am beyond them and imperishable.

On the other hand, in canto XIII and later, the term *Guṇa* alone is used. It appears from these data that *Bhāvas*, probably, were the original name for the group of the three *Guṇas* (cp. *E.S.*p.31). It is interesting to note that in some Epic passages the *Guṇas* are sub-divided into a number of qualities to be found in the individual. For example we may refer to xii. 7727 ff, 8992 ff, and 11621 ff. This moral concept of the *Guṇas* is an important development. In this moral aspect, the action of the *Guṇas* is fundamental to the fate of the individual. Thus the variety of existence to which the individual will transmigrate in his future births is determined by the proportion in which the three *Guṇas* are present in him. This view is found in a number of passages of the Mahābhārata. They are xii, 7419, 7710 with 7723, 11157

ff, 11256 and 11637 and xiv. 882-4. The passage number xii, 11637 is one of the most vivid examples and it equates the action of the *Guṇas* with that of *puṇya* and *pāpa* (vide *E.S.*,p.34). This function of the *Guṇas* is ignored in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*: there it is carried out by *dharma* and *adharma*, two of the eight aspects of *Buddhi*.[29] This is an important stage of the development of the theory of the *Guṇas*. In fact, it involves considerable modification in the theory of salvation of the classical *Sāṅkhya*. According to the *Sāṅkhya* system as represented by the *Kārikā*, salvation is to be attained by passing beyond the range of all the three *Guṇas*. This doctrine already appears in the *Gītā*, xiv. 19-20 and the *Mahābhārata* xii, 11643 and 12603-12610. However, there are a number of passages in the Epic which seem to advocate a different doctrine. According to this doctrine which Johnston considers to be the original view (vide *E.S.*p.35), rebirth is due to the accumulation of *Rajas* and *Tamas*. The same doctrine says that salvation is to be attined not only by the extinction of these two *Guṇas* but also by the increase of *Sattva*. Thus it appears, according to this theory, that the three *Guṇas* were not inseparable from each other. This doctrine is clearly enunciated in some passages of the Epic such as xii.7736 - 37, 9104 - 5, 12288 and 12913.

(8) This same view is mentioned in the well-known medical treatise, the *Carakasaṃhitā* :

rajastamobhyāṁ yuktasya
saṁyogo'yam anantavān
tābhyāṁ nirākṛtābhyāṁ tu
sattvavṛddhyā nivartate.[30]

> Of him who consists of *Rajas* and *Tamas* this phenomenon (rebirth) will be infinite. (The functioning of) the two (*guṇas*) being interrupted this phenomenon is stopped, through the increase of the constituent of *Sattva*.

The view presented in the *Carakasaṁhitā* may, in all probability, have been taken over from the *Mahābhārata*. According to this view of the *guṇas*, the person obtaining salvation will not only

get rid of *Rajas* and *Tamas*, but also will have an increase of the *Sattva Guṇa*. There is an apparent difficulty in this teaching. So long as there are *Rajas, Tamas* and *Sattva* simultaneously one may increase *Sattva* as opposed to the other two *Guṇas*. But when *Rajas* and *Tamas* are removed (*nirākṛta*) can there be, morally, any more necessity of increasing the already existing *Sattva Guṇa* in the individual? If this was a genuine *Sāṅkhya* view it may mean that all those who are devoid of *Rajas* and *Tamas* are, no doubt, of a very high spiritual level, but still they will not attain emancipation immediately as a matter of fact, for they yet have to fulfil the next task of increasing the *Sattva Guṇa* already existing in them, probably, to a certain minimum limit. This theory which we may term as the 'quantitative theory of the *Guṇas*' has not found a place in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, for liberation will eventually have to go above the influence of all the three *Guṇas* (cp.*dharmādīnām akāraṇa, S.K.*67).

(9) In this connection we may also refer to *Aśvaghoṣa's Buddhacarita* (vii.53). Here it is mentioned that a preponderance of *Rajas* with *Sattva* compels one to desire for *svarga* or heaven. Next it is said that (a preponderance of) the *Sattva Guṇa* battles with *Rajas* and makes one wish to attain emancipation:

yajñais tapobhir niyamaiś ca tais taiḥ
svargaṃ yiyāsanti hi rāgavantaḥ
rāgeṇa sārdhaṃ ripuṇeva yuddhvā
mokṣaṃ parīpsanti tu sattvavantaḥ.[31]

> Those who posses a (preponderance) of *Rāga* (=*Rajas*), indeed, desire to go to *Svarga* (Paradise) by means of various sacrifices, austerities and restrictions: but those who have *Sattva* battle with the *Rāga* (=Rajas) as with an enemy and desire to attain *mokṣa* or liberation.

The doctrine presented by Aśvaghoṣa is more logical than the one found in the *Carakasṁhitā* and the *Mahābhārata*. He implies that a preponderance of *Rāga* (=Rajas) is the root cause of desire (cp. *yiyāsanti*) for material gain (cp. *svarga*). Aśvaghoṣa also points out an important characteristic of the *Sattva*, namely its nature to fight against the *Rajas* which is but an enemy (*ripu*)

of the the spiritual advancement of mankind. He further implies that those who possess a preponderance of *Sattva* will battle with *Rajas* and remove it for the purpose of attaining *mokṣa* or emanipation. Aśvaghoṣa (perhaps rightly) leaves out the necessity of an increase of the *Sattva Guṇa* in order to attain liberation. This view presented in the *Buddhacarita* seems to be a very consistent theory and it is quite close to the same found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. We may also point out that the connection of the Buddhist idea of *Rāga* with the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Rajas* is significant for the etymology of the latter (i.e.*Rajas*).

(10) From the foregoing discussion we may draw the following conclusions: (i) The origin of the conception of the *Guṇas* in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* is to be traced back to the idea of the three planes of the *Vedic* cosmology. However Īśvarakṛṣṇa has modified certain views of the *Guṇas* that were prevailing upto his time. (a) The moral view of the *Guṇas*, that is, the equation of the action of the *Guṇas* with that of *puṇya* and *pāpa*, is left out of the conception of the *Guṇas* in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. (b) Again the mutual interaction and the inseparability of the *Guṇas* found in the *Kārikā* (v.12),[32] seems to be a contribution of Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself. (ii) Ancient India was famous for its number mysticism and number 'three' played a very important role there: this is another reason responsible for the three types of the *Guṇas*. (iii) The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* does not attempt to adduce strong proof (as has been done in the case of *Puruṣa, Prakṛti* and the theory of *Satkārya*) to support the existence of the Guṇas. This may imply that the doctrine of the *Guṇas* was already in vogue in the time of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. (iv) The origin of the conception of the *Guṇas* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* appears to us to be in the main material and not psychological as Keith has supposed.[33].

Notes and References

1. Cp. Stcherbatsky, *B.L.*, part I, p.19.
2. Cp. Theos Bernard, H.P. p.168.
3. *'Das wort guṇa dürfte im letzten Grunde zuruckgehen auf gaṇa die Sacher, davon gaṇa yati, zahlen, davon guṇayati, multiplizieren, davon Ausdrucke wie dviguṇa, triguṇa, zweifach, dreifach, davon endlich guṇa dessen ursprungliche Bedeutung somit sein*

dürfte der Faktor beim Multiplizieren, und in dieser Bedeutung ist auch das wort im Sāṅkhyasystem zu fassen (A.G.P. I.III.,p.480).
4. *S.S.*, p.91.
5. Vide (a) *La Theorie des Guṇas, B.S.O.S.* VI,1 (1930), 25-35; and (b) *Vedic India* by Renou, p.93.
6. *Ūrdhvam sattva-viśālaḥ*
tamo viśālaś ca mūlataḥ sargaḥ.
madhye rajo-viśālas
brahmādi-stamba-paryantaḥ.
7. Cp. 'So, *Rajanī*, re-colour thou these ashy spots, this leprosy', (*A.V.*I.23.I).'.....the word (i.e. *Rajanī*) is probably used here on account of its derivation from *rañj*, to colour', Griffith.
8. Cp. 'He was filled with passion: from him sprang the *Rājanya*, (*A.V.* XV.8.1). 'The word *rājanyaḥ*, which comes from the root √*rāj*, to rule, is here fancifully connected with the root √*raj* (*so 'rajyata*, he was filled with passion), Griffith.
9. Vide Wallis, *C.R.*p.113.
10. Geldner leaves this word untranslated. Grassmann deriving the word from *ap* translates it as *wasserig* or watery.
11. Cp. Macdonell, *V.R.* p.217.
12. Vide Zimmer, *P.I.*pp. 296-297.
13. *P.I* p.297.
14. Cp. (a) Senart, Journale Asiatique, 1915, Juillet- Aout 151 ff. (b) La Vallee Poussin, L'Inde jusqu' au 300 a.JC.p.270. (c) Oldenberg, *Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus*, pp. 214-215.
15. *L' Histoire des Idées Théosophiques*, Vol. II p.41, f.n.43.
16. Cp. *H.S.V.* p. 265.
17. Cp. *H.S.V.*, vol. 11,p.41, f.n.43.
18. Cp. M. Falk, *Nāma-Rūpa and Dharma-Rūpa*, p.84.
19. Cp. *A.G.P.* 1.iii,p.480.
20. Cp. (a) *The Prin.Up.*p.452; (b) Keith, *S.S.*p.13.
21. Cp. Radhakrishnan, *The Prin.Up.* p.732.
22. Cp. *The Prin.Up.*p.711.
23. Cp. *The Prin.Up.*p.711.
24. Cp. *Sechzig Up. des Veda*,p.298, f.n.7.
25. *I.P.* (1952) p.222.
26. *I.I.P.*,p.273.
27. *The Sāṅkhya Kārikā* lays special emphasis on the two aspects of *Buddhi*; the *Sāttvika Buddhi* and the *Rājasika Buddhi.*, cp. S.K. 23 and 25.
28. *'Die aus der Urnatur stammende Nahrung also wird, durch die Umwandlung in die Verschiedenheiten der drei Guṇa's zu dem*

vom Mahad bis zu den Viśesha's (den die Unterschiede in sich enthaltenden groben Elementen) reichenden Liṅgam'. Sechzig Up.des Veda, p.337.

29. *dharmeṇa gamanam ūrdhvam gamanaṁ adhastād bhavati - adharmeṇa*, S.K. 44.

30. Vide (a) *The Carakasṁhitā (Śarīrasthāna)* ed. by J.Vidyasagara (Calcutta, 1877), p. 329; (b) *The Carakasaṁhitā* Eng. tr. (Jamnagar, India, 1949), p.365, sec.36.

31. *The Buddhacarita*, ed. by E.H.Johnston (Calcutta, 1935-36).

32. They (i.e. the *Guṇas) mutually suppress, support, produce , consort and exist* - *S.K.*12.

33. '....... the origin of the conception seems to be in the main psychologic.......' *Sāṅkhya System*, p.91.

XI

Mahat or Buddhi: The Great One or the Intellect

(1) *Mahat* is the third principle postulated by the *Sāṅkhya* system. Etymologically the word *mahat* goes back to the Indo-European period and its morphology is related to Avestan *mazant* meaning 'great.' It conveys the sense of 'great, extensive, big, important and venerable.' As a technical term in the *Sāṅkhya* systems it stands for the first evolute of the Chief Principle or the Pre-Established One *(Pradhāna)*, which is *Prakṛti*. At the beginning of a cosmic epoch, when *Prakṛti* departs from its original state of perfect equilibrium *(sāmyāvāsthā)* and assumes the characteristics conditioned by its teleological instincts in the process of *guṇa-kṣobha* (S.P.B. 1.64), there evolves from it an energetic mass called *Mahat*, the Great One. The term *Mahat* reminds us of *Mahī*, the Great One, the goddess *Mahī* in the *Ṛgveda* i. 13.9. v.5.8, etc. This idea of a great being, may be said to reach its culmination in the third principle of the *Sāṅkhya : Mahat*, the Great One, the great germ of this universe, the embodied form of being great. Thus considered in its cosmic aspect, it is the great germ of this vast world of objects and is accordinly called *Mahat* or the Great One. In its psychological aspect, on the other hand, as present in individual beings, it is called *Buddhi or the Intellect.*[1] Even in its psychological aspect this principle may deserve the name *Mahat* as it performs a 'great function' of embracing everything cognizable (cp. *B.L.I.* p. 223). Through a simple juxta-position of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti (sannidhi-mātra)* Mahat is evolved. It is both an evolute and evolvent. In so far as it is evolved from the apparent union between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* it is an evolute: but as *Mahat* gives rise to *Ahaṅkāra*, it is also an evolvent (cp. *S.K.3)*. Ascertainment *(adhyavasāya, S.K..* 23) is the special function of *Buddhi. Mahat* or *Buddhi* is the first action that arises in the ideal universe. It is

the first appearance of the moving universe (*jagat*). It pervades all space and all manifestations. This is the stage at which the previously undifferentiated energy determines upon a definite and a well-defined line of evolution.

(2) (a) Now what is this great germ of the universe (*mahat*), the intellect (buddhi) or the first motion arising in the ideal universe? The faint beginning of this conception of the great germ of the universe is already found in the *Hiraṇyagarbha-sūkta* of the *Ṛgveda* (x. 121.) Below we give the translation of this hymn (verses 1-9):

(1) In the beginning there evolved (*sam-avartata*) *Hiraṇyagarbha*. From his birth he was the only lord (*eka-pati*) of beings.[2] He supported this earth and heaven, who is the god that we should adore with oblations?

(2) He who gives life (*ātmā*) and vigour (*bala*), he whose ordinances (*pra-śiṣam*) the All-Gods acknowledge, whose shade is immorality and death.......?

(3) He who by his *greatness* (*mahi-tva*) has, verily, become the sole ruler of (all) the moving universe (*jagat*), that breaths and slumbers, who reigns over these two-footed and four-footed ....?

(4) His, through his *greatness* (*mahi-tva*) are these snow-covered (mountains); they (all) call ocean with the *Rasā* his (possessions); his are these quarters (of heaven = *pradiśaḥ*) (which form) his arms,.....?

(5) He by whom the mightly Heaven and Earth are fixed, by whom are supported the sun and the firmament, in the mid-air he has measured the space (*rajasḥ*)......?

(6) To him, supported by his help, the two battle arrays looked while trembling in their spirit (*manasā*), when over them the risen sun is shining....?

(7) When the mighty waters (*bṛhatīāpaḥ*) came containing the universal germ (*viśvam garbham*) producing Agni, then there evolved (*sam-avartata*) *the one spirit* (*ekaḥ-asuḥ*) *of gods....?*

(b) This hymn is extremely important to us on account of several reasons. The first is the *concept of evolution* found in it (*R.V.* x. 121.1 and also 7). It is clearly mentioned that in the beginning there evolved *Hiraṇyagarbha* (*hiraṇyagarbhaḥ sam-avartata-agre,* x. 121.1). Agreeing with Wallis we may say that the *Hiraṇyagarbha,* literally the 'gold-germ', source of golden light is the Sun-god as the great power of the universe from which all other existences are derived.[3] In fact it is interesting to note that *Hirayagarbha* has already received the epithet *mahat* by implication in the *Ṛgveda*. It is mentioned in the *Ṛgveda,* iv. 50.4, that *Bṛhaspati* was born from the *great light* (*bṛhaspatiḥ jāyamāno jyotiṣaḥ, Bṛhaspati* being born from the great light) by which we many understand the sun. Macdonell pertinently comments on this as follows : *'Mahás:* abl. of *máh* agreeing with *jyotiṣaḥ* (cp. 201 A 1). The Sun is probably meant, cp. II. 35.10c[4]. We may also refer to the *R.V.* ii. 35. 10c where the author mentions the *Hiraṇyaya-yoni,* the golden womb, that is to say, the sun or the great light (*maho jyotiṣa*) mentioned above (R.V. iv. 50.4). This *Hiraṇyaya-yoni,* in all probability, is the *Hiraṇyagarbha* which we interpreted above as the Sun-god. Macdonell's comment in this case is also instructive. He says that *'hiraṇyaya-yoni* may [5] = *hiraṇyagrbha* (x.121.1) at the creation, when Agni was produced from the waters (x. 121.7).' Thus we may see that: *mahaḥ-jyotiṣ* (=the sun) =*hiraṇyaya-yoni* (= the sun) = *hiraṇyagarbha*. We may further refer to the *mah-i-tva* (*=mah-a-tva*), the state of bieng great of *Hiraṇyagarbha* mentioned in the third and fourth verses of this hymn (*cp.i. yaḥ. mahitvā jagato eka-id rājā babhūva,* ii. *yasya ime himavanto mahitvā*). Hence we may conclude that the *Hiraṇyagarbha* of the *Ṛgveda* X. 121 is nothing but the *mahas-jyotiṣ* the great light mentioned in the same text in IV. 50.4. Thus, by implication, in the *Ṛgveda, Hiraṇyagarbha* has already received the epithet *mahat* (great) which later became the name of the third principle *Buddhi* postulated by the *Sāṅkhya* thinkers.

(c) According to the myth implied in this hymn (*R.V.X.* 121. 7), *Hiraṇyagarbha,* the universal germ (viśva-garbha) has evolved

(cp. *R.V.X.*.121.1) from the primeval waters or *Urwasser (āpo ha yat-bṛhati viśvam āyan, garbham dadhānā*,X. 121.7).-The idea becomes clearer when we compare it with the *Kaṭha Up*. II. 1.6, where it is said : *yaḥ adbhyaḥ pūrvam ajāyata*, he (=*Hiraṇyagarbha)* was born of old from waters, where the waters according to Radhakrishnan refer to the *mūla - prakṛti*. The waters mentioned here are the primeval waters as the original stuff or matter *(das Wasser als Urstoff*[6] out of which the world was evolved.[7]

(d) It is again mentioned in this hymn that *Hiraṇyagarbha* has measured the 'space' *(rajas)* or mid-air. Further the hymn (X.121.6) refers to the shining sun. We may, thus, see that *Hiraṇyagarbha* is nothing but the sun appearing in the horizon where Heaven and Earth (cp. X.121, 5) (or waters according to the myth implied in the *R.V.X.* 121.7) seem to be in contact *(Sannidhi)* with one another (cp. *sa dadhāra pṛthivīm dyām utemām*, he supported this earth and heaven, *R.V.X.*121.1). This apparent union between the Heavenly Father and Mother Earth (the proto-type of the *sannidhi-mātra* of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti)* has, in all probability, given rise to the (conception of the) evolution of *Hiraṇyagarbha (hiraṇyagarbhaḥ sam-avartata- agre*, x.121.1). Griffith has aptly mentioned : the sun is the first born of Heaven and Earth, and this birth is the type of all subsequent generations.[8]

(e) Again it is important to note that this very hymn refers to *viśva-garbha (R.V.* x.121.7), or that which has *all* as (its) germ or seed (Geldner : *Das All als Keim empfangend)*. Here viśva-garbha implies the (great) germ of the *viśva* or the universe. It is significant that the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (v.15) refers to the category of *vaiśva-rūpya* (lit. the manifestation of which makes up the universe), the *universal cause* as synonymous with *Prakṛti* wence *Mahat* (the germ of the *vaiśvarūpa*[9] [=*viśvarūpa*][10] or the universe) is said to evolve. In the same hymn we come across the greatness *(mahitva*, x.121.3 & 4) attributed to *Hiraṇyagarbha*, the sole ruler *(eka-rāja)* (R.V.x.121.3). This word is the abstract-noun with suffix-*tva* from the same root √*mah* from which *mahat* is also derived. In this hymn describing the *Hiraṇyagarbha* we may also notice some other interesting facts. We come across in this hymn, the word, *prāṇataḥ* (x.121.3A) connected with *prāṇa* which, according to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 29, is supposed to exist in association with *Mahat (= Buddhi), Ahṅkāra* and *Manas*. It is

again mentioned that *Hiraṇyagarbha* is the *ekaḥ-asuḥ* or the 'one spirit' of the gods (x. 121.7). The concept of *asu* is again related to the idea of *prāṇa*. This hymn also speaks of *Hiraṇyagarbha* as the sole ruler of the moving universe or *jagat* (x.121.3), which reminds us of the unique position of *Mahat* with regard to the universe which evolves from it.

(3) There is another passage in the *Ṛgveda* (v.11.6) which also may be useful for our study. Here we come across Agni, the terrestial representation of the Sun, as being born from the friction of the two 'fire-sticks' (often said to be the father and the mother of Agni) (cp. Macdonell, *H.S.L.* p.94). In fact, elsewhere in the *Ṛgveda* (iii.1.7; 2.2;x.5.3), it is implied that Heaven and Earth are the parents of Agni. According to the author of the verse *R.V.*|11.6) Agni is being born as *Mahat sahasaḥ* or a great might (cp.Geldner: als gross Macht geboren). This instance reminds us not only *Hiraṇyagarbha* the *mahas jyotis*, but also of the *Mahat* of the *Sāṅkhya* system (cp. *guṇakṣobhe jāyamane, mahān prādur babhūva ha*, S.P.B..1.64).

Thus, in summing up, we may reiterate our view that the concept of *Hiraṇyagarbha* is probably the oldest prototype of the *Sāṅkhya* principle of *Mahat*.

(4) Another aspect of the development of the conception of *Mahat* may be seen in the *Skambha of the Atharvaveda* (x.7.8). The word *Skambha* derived from √*skambh*, *skabh*, to prop, is semantically related to *stambha* (√*stambha*, stabh, to prop meaning a 'prop', 'support' or a 'pillar.' Thus the term conveys the sense of the 'cosmic pillar' or the *axis mundi*. According to the doctrine in question *Skambha* is the *Grund* that supports the world: therefore it is at once the cosmic axis and the ontological foundation. The symbol of *skambha* is undoubtedly a very old one, for it is found among the hunters and shepherds of central and northern Asia.[11] The observation made by Maryla Falk in connection with *Skambha* is intructive. Thus she says: 'In the Yoga doctrine of the *Mokṣadharma*, the intermediate position is assigned to the 25th principle called *budhyamāna* : he is the *mahān ātmā* (the ancient *skambha)*[12]. The *mahān ātma* mentioned above, as we shall see later in connection with the *Kāṭha Upaniṣad* (1.30.10-13; ii. 3.7-11), is a precursor or a prototype of the *Mahat* of the *Sāṅkhya* system. The term *Skambha* is already found in the *Ṛgveda* in the sense of *Sūrya* the sun (IV.13.5)[13]. Thus it is said : 'By what

self-power (*sva-dhā*) moves he: who has seen (it). He guards the firmament a close-set pillar. The pillar referred to, here, is *sūrya*, the Sun.'[14] These considerations help in studying the phenomenon (or phenomena) underlying the conception of *Skambha* developed in two hymns of the *Atharva-veda*, x.7 and x.80. Both these hymns are mystic in character. This makes it difficult to determine the precise nature of *Skambha*. In fact, *Skambha* (A.V.x.7)·seems to be an admixture of several concepts. The image of *Puruṣa* is also present in the same verse (cp. *A.V.X.7.* 18 - 20, 43 etc.), a fact clearly pointed out by Renou : *Mais à l'inster du Géant Skambha est representé comme un homme*[15] (But in imitation of the Giant (i.e. Puruṣa) Skambha is depicted like a man) (cp. also sect. 9 below : *puruṣam mahāntam=Mahat, Śvet. Up.*iii.19). But in general the sun seems to have been implied in many verses of these hymns [cp.Renou : *Il y a place pour quelques images solaires*, there are places for some solar images, *H.S.V.*, p. 262]. The connection between *Skambha* and *Hiraṇyagarbha* is also seen (cp.*A.V.X.7.*28). It is again important to note that *Skambha* is qualified by the epithet *mahat (A.V.X.7.2)* which later became a name of the third principle of the *Sāṅkhya* system : 'From what member of him flames Agni ? From what member doth the moon measure out, measuring the member of *great (mahat) Skambha?' (A.V. 10.7.2.).* The existence of different phenomena in *Skambha* is implied in a number of verses of these hymns (cp. *A.V.*10.7.14.3 etc.). It is interesting to note that one of these phenomena is the *great one (mahī)* (*A.V.*10.7.14). What is meant by the 'great one' in this connection is doubtful.[16] However this much is certain that *Mahat* mentioned above (*A.V.* 10.7.2.) and *mahī* in the present context (*A.V.* 10.7.14) are both connected with the concept of *Skambha* and the *Ṛgvedic Mahī (q.v.).*

(5) An advanced step in the development of the concept of *Mahat* may be seen in the *Bṛhad. Up 5.4* where reference is made to *mahad yakṣam prathamajam*. The etymology of the word *yakṣa* as occuring here is not very clear. But it is significant that *Śaṅkara* in his commentary on the *Kena Up* 3.2. (=15) identifies *yakṣa* with *mahad bhūtam*[17] which appears synonymous with *yakṣa* in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* (3.II.I.I).[18] We may briefly mention that the term *yakṣa* has undergone a gradual semantic development somewhat like 'sudden flash of light, mystery, magic

and magic power' in the earlier parts of the *Ṛgveda*.[19] Therefore, agreeing with Deussen and Radhakrishnan, we propose to translate the phrase *mahad yakṣam prathamajaṃ* as the great wondrous being, the first born.[20] In fact this great wondrous being, the first born (i.e.evolved) seems to be nothing but the great *Hiraṇyagarbha* (R.V.10.121.3 and 4) that evolved (i.e. born) in the beginning of the aeon (*sam avartata agre, R.V.* 10.121.I)[21] and which we have already interpreted as a prototype of the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Mahat*. The same concept may have been meant by the designation of *mahān aja ātmā*, the great unborn self, occurring in two other contexts of the same Up.C. *Bṛhad.Up.* 4.4.20 and 22). This *mahān aja ātmā*, the great unborn self, seems to represent an earlier stage of the *mahān ātmā* of the *Kaṭha Up.* 1.3.10, a prototype of the *Mahat* of the *Sāṅkhya* system[22] which we shall discuss below. The word *aja* in this phrase deserves explanation. The adjective *aja* here qualifies *mahān ātmā*. Even if we take *mahān ātmā* in its literal sense as the 'great soul ,' the adjective *aja* employed here to qualify *ātmā* is justified, for *ātman* in Indian thought is considered to be unborn (cp. *ajo nityam śāśvato 'yam purāṇaḥ, B.G.* ii. 20). But we know that *mahān ātmā* is an idiomatic expression corresponding to the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Mahat* and thus it rightly deserves the adjective of *aja*, the unborn, for in the *Sāṅkhya, Mahat* is regarded as *not born* but as evolved from *Prakṛti*, the primordial world-ground. Therefore the adjective *aja* or 'unborn' here is metaphysical as opposed to that of (*prathama-)'ja'*, the (first) born (*Bṛh. Up.*5.4) which, indeed, is metaphorical.

(6) In the *Śikṣāvalli of the Taittirāya Up.* 1.5.1 we come across the term *Mahaḥ* which seems to have a bearing on our problem under discussion. The word is interpreted by Deussen as power or might (*Macht*), fullness or abundance (*Fülle*) and prosperity (*Gedeihen*).[23] It is thus said in the *Taittirīya Up.* : *Bhūḥ, Bhuvaḥ, Suvaḥ*, verily these are the three utterances of them; verily, that one, the fourth, *mahaḥ* did the son of *Mahācamasa* make known. That is *Brahman*, that is the self, its limbs (are) the other gods (1.5.I). That the author was interested in emphasizing the idea of being great (*mahaḥ*) is clearly implied by the phrase, *'mahaḥ*, did the son of *Mahācamasa* make known' where *mahaḥ* is repeated. *Bhūḥ* (lit,earth) is this world. *Bhunvaḥ* is the atmosphere and *Suvaḥ* (i.e. the bright space) is heaven. *Mahaḥ* is the sun,

for it is said that by the sun do all worlds become great.[24] *Mahaḥ* the sun, the *maho jyotiṣaḥ (R.V.* 4.50.4) is the *Hiraṇyagarbha* (i.e. the *apara-brahman* of the *Vedāntins)* whom we have interpreted above as a prototype of the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Mahat.*

(7) Another aspect of the development of the third principle of the *Sāṅkhya* system is seen in the *Kaṭha Upanised.* The word *Mahat* has found an important place here. There are several passages in this *Upaniṣad* which deserves our close attention.

(a) In the *Kaṭha Up.* I.I.29 (cp.1.2.6) *Naciketas* refers to the *mahān sāmparāyaḥ* from which there is no return. It is further said at 1.2.6, that this *mahān sāmparāyaḥ* is not realized by the fool and consequently he becomes a prey to the repeated death. *Sāmparāya,* meaning literally *going-beyond,* is, in the idiom of the *Upaniṣads,* the 'after-life:' that is the life after the death of an individual who had not realized *Brahman.* So *mahān sāmparāyaḥ,* the great going-beyond is the condition after the death of a person who had realized *Brahman* while living. Such a person verily becomes *Brahman* and thus there will be no after-life *(sāmparāyaḥ)* for him in the sense of being subjected to the repeated births and deaths. Hence after the death of such a person there will be no *sāmparāya* but a *mahān sāmparāya,* for his is, so to say, a great going-beyond whence there is no return to the cycle of births deaths. The fools who do not realize *Brahman* will ever be subjected to the repeated births and deaths. In the idiom of the *Upaniṣads,, Brahman* is also known as the *mahad-bhaya* or the great fear *(Śaṅkara).* One may thus notice that there is a connection between the *mahān sāmparāya* and the *mahad-bhaya* mentioned in the same text *(Kaṭha Up.* 11.3.2). The *mahān sāmparāya* from which there is no return *(Kaṭha Up.* 1.1.29) is a result of realizing the *mahad-bhaya* or *Brahman* (Kaṭha Up. 11.3.2). Thus we may see that the word *mahat* was gradually getting a place in the philosophical vacabulary of the period. Our view also receives support from another term, *mahad-yakṣa* the great wondrous being, a synonym of *Brahman* occuring in the *Bṛhad. Up.*V.4.

(b) Again in the *Kaṭha Up.* 1.1.16 we come across the term *mahātmā [mahā (mahat) + ātmā],* the great soul, as an appellation of *Yama.* Now this Yama as mentioned in the *Kaṭha Up.* 1.1.7 is *Vaivasvata,* a son of *Vivasvat,* the Sun (cp. Deussen '*....in Yama's (Vaivasvata's....',Sechzig Up. des Veda,* p. 267). In fact, it is already

implied in the *Saraṇyū* legend of the *Ṛgveda*[25] that Yama is a son of *Vivasvat* and *Saraṇyū*: hence he is aptly named *Vaivasvata* the son of *Vivasvat* (=sun). We have already seen that in the *Ṛgveda* the sun is mythically conceived as *Hiraṇyagarbha,* the great germ of the universe, a prototype of the concept of *Mahat,* the Great One of the *Sāṅkhya* System. Therefore when Yama the son of *Vivasvat (= the sun= Hiraṇyagarbha=* a prototype of *Mahat*) is called *mahātmā* (※ *mahat-ātmā?)* the great soul, there may, perhaps, be a reminiscience of the fact of his being the son of the great germ of the universe, the *Hiraṇyagarbha,* a prototype of the *mahat* of the *Sāṅkhya* system. In short, there may be, in all probability, an anticipation, here, of the *Mahān Ātmā* the Great Self mentioned later in this same Up. (1.3.10).

(c) Furthermore, we may refer to the *mahān ātmā* mentioned in the *Kaṭha Up.* 1.3.10. This, undoubtedly, is one of the most important stages of the development of the concept of *Mahat.* We have already referred to the gradation of mental faculties mentioned in the *Kaṭha Up.* (1.3.10-13) (vide chap.5) and we may repeat it here to facilitate our study of the concept under discussion :

Puruṣa (Ātmā)
↑
Avyakta
↑
Mahān ātmā
↑
Biddhi (= jñānātmā) (= Sattvam, 11.3.7)
↑
Manas
↑
Arthāḥ or the objects (of the senses) and the *Indriyas.*

Puruṣa in this gradation is the Spirit or Soul. *Avyakta* is *Prakṛti* and Śaṇkara explains it as *Māya* or *Avidyā.* By the influence of the light of *Puruṣa,* all form and all content *(nāma-rūpa)* emerge into manifestation from out of *Avyakta,* the Unmanifest (i.e. *Prakṛti),* the universal mother. According to this doctrine *Puruṣa*

is beyond *(para) Avyakta*. But in the classical *Sāṅkhya, Avyakta* and *Puruṣa* are co-ordinate principles, and as such neither is above the other. The third principle *mahān ātmā* represents a prototype of the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Mahat*. Śaṅkara expalins *mahān ātmā* as the great soul of the universe which is said to be the first born of *Avyakta*, the Unmanifest. This great soul of the universe as rightly pointed out by Radhakrishnan is nothing but *Hiraṇyagarbha* already mentioned in the *Ṛgveda* (cp. *R.V.* 10.129:2 and also 10.121). Our view that the concept of *mahān ātmā* is nothing but a precursor of the *Mahat* of the *Sāṅkhya* system also receives the support of Deussen.[26] We have, still, got to explain the peculiarity of the name *mahān ātmā*, the great soul as opposed to *puruṣa*, the soul. As we have pointed out earlier this gradation implies that *Ātman* is everything with an apparent unconscious contradiction in it drawing again a contrast between soul and matter. This is the contradiction between the later *Vedānta* and the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* systems of philosophy (vide ch. 5,sec. 13). *Ātman (=Brahman)* is the normal term for Soul in the *Vedānta* whereas *Puruṣa* in general replaces the same concept in the *Sāṅkhya*. When *Avyakta* is applied to the principle of *Avidyā* or *Māyā*, Śaṅkara (i.e. the *Vedānta)* calls it a power *(śakti)* of the supreme lord *(parameśvara)*, the cause of the whole world which dissolves for an individual only by realisation of *Brahman* (i.e. *Ātman).*[27] In the *Sāṅkhya Avyakta* is the source of the material aspect of the universe. The third principle of the present gradation, namely, *mahān ātmā* is normally represented by *Hiraṇyagarbha* in the *Vedānta* whereas in the *Sāṅkhya* it is represented by *Mahat* (vide sec.2 above). This *mahān ātmā* reappears as *mahad brahma*, the seed *(garbha)* of all beings, in the *Bhagavadgītā* (ch.14.3 &4),[28] and Śaṅkara rightly explains it as *Hiraṇyagarbha*. In fact it is this same concept of *mahad brahma* that we come across in the *Tipiṭaka* as *mahā-brahma (Dīgha*.I. 235 sq.; 244 sq.; iii. 30; It.15), (the great *Brahma* > *Brahma*, the chief of gods) often represented as the creator of the universe *(vasavattī, issaro, kattā, nimmātā).*[29] The fourth principle, the *Buddhi* is mainly a *Sāṅkhya term* although it is also found in the writings of *Śaṅkara* where it is spoken of as possessing the defect of the duality of 'I' and 'thou.'[30] In the *Vedānta* it is perhaps *virāṭ* (so called because of its manifold brilliance), a designation of intellect conditioned by the aggregate[31], the third aspect of *Brahman*[32]

that answers to the *Buddhi* of the *Sāṅkhya*. While *Hiraṇyagarbha* is the universal principle of life, the corresponding collective principle of form is *virāt*[33]. When *Puruṣa*, the highest principle of the present gradation is itself *Ātman*, how can one justify *mahān ātmā* as the name of the third principle in the same scheme? It appears to us that *mahān ātmā* in this context should be interpreted as *Ātman*, the great *(mahān)* seed or womb *(garbha)* of the universe (i.e. *Hiraṇyagarbha)*. Thus it corresponds to the *Mahat* of the *Sāṅkhya* system. Here, it is also important to note the occurence of *Mahān (ātmā)* and *Buddhi* as two different terms of two different grades; but they ultimately become the synonyms of the third principle of the classical *Sāṅkhya* system [34] which still reflects them as two aspects of the same category *(S.K.* 22 & 23).

(8) Next in the *Praśna Upaniṣad* (V.5) we come across the idea of *jīvaghana*. The term *jīvaghana* formed of *jīva*, the living things and *ghana* (< √*han*, to collect. cp. the term *nighaṇṭu)* a collection, means, literally, the conglomerate of the living things. Thus this term (which belongs to the same order of technical terms such as *vijñānaghana, Bṛh. Up.* 11.4.12)[35] conveys the sense of the totality of the living things. In the early period when the schools of philosophy were not rigidly formalized the term may have meant the sum-total of all living things, gods, men, animals, plants, creepers and so on (cp.*S.K.*53). Semantically *jīvaghana* appears to be the same as *viśva-garbha* (x.121.7) which we interpreted as *Hiraṇya-garbha* (see above). Therefore we agree with Śaṅkara and interpret *Jīvaghana* here as *Hiraṇyagarbha* (the self of all beings) which is but an earlier name of Buddhi (cp. *E.S.47* and Radhakrishnan, *P.Up.*665).

(9) In the *Śvet.Up.* (iii.19) we come across the term *mahān puruṣa* which also represents an aspect of the development of *Mahat* of the *Sāṅkhya*. Thus it is said in the *Śvet. Up.* (iii. 19) :

> *a-pāṇī-pādo javanogṛhītā*
> *paśyaty acakṣuḥ sa śṛnoty akarṇaḥ.*
> *sa vetti vedyaṁ na ca tasyāsti vettā*
> *tam āhur agryam puruṣam mahāntam.*

> Without hand or foot, (yet) grasping and swift, he sees without eye, he hears without ear. He knows all that is to be known : of him there is none who knows. They call him the primeval *puruṣa*, the great one (Deussen : *der Erstlings-Puruṣa*, der Grosse).

This verse presents the *mahān puruṣa* under a poetic garb. According to this verse the *mahān puruṣa* is grasping and swift, seeing and hearing, although he is devoid of hands, feet, eyes and ears respectively. He knows all that is to be known, but none can know him. This description rich in imagery clearly implies that the concept presented under the *mahan puruṣa* is nothing but the *mhān ātmā* of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (1.3.10-13) which we interpreted above as a precursor of the *Mahat* of the *Sāṅkhya* system. The term *puruṣa* in *mahān puruṣa* (=mahān *ātmā*) deserves an explanation. Here the word *puruṣa* should not be confused with the concept of *Puruṣa*, one of the two ultimate principles of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, for some of the activities attributed to it, e.g. being swift, cannot be performed by the *Puruṣa* of the *Sāṅkhya*. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that *atmān* and *puruṣa* are synonyms in the philosophical literature of ancient India. What has happened here is, probably, an unconscious interchange of the two synonyms on the part of the poet-philosopher and thus the emergence of the new term *mahān puruṣa* in place of *mahān ātmā*. Therefore we agree with Deussen and interpret this *mahān puruṣa* as the same as *mahat (buddhi)* of the *Sāṅkhya* system.[36] Indeed, the subject of knowing alone is grasping, running and hearing : the organs (of sense and action) are not at all the subject[37]. *Vettṛ* or knower alone knows *(vetti)* and none can know him. Logically the knower can never be known.

(10) The explicit mention of the *Mahat* of the *Sāṅkhya* system is found in a late work, the *Maitrī Up.* (vi. 10). Here the word *mahat* occurs as follows :- *mahad ādi aviśeṣa-antaṁ* (cp. Deussen: *Sechzig Up. des Veda* p. 337, f.n.2 and *A.G.P.* I.iii., p. 435). *Mahat* in this context is the same as the *Mahat-Buddhi* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 40. It is implied in the *Maitrī Up.* (vi. 10) that *Mahat* is one of the eighteen categories that go to make up the *Liṅga*, an idea clearly seen in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 40. Most probably, this doctrine occurring in the later stratum of the *Maitrī Up.* may have been influenced by the classical *Sāṅkhya*.

Notes and References

1. Chatterjee and Datta, *I.I.P.*, pp.272-273.
2. Cp. Renou, *'dès sa naissance il fut I'unique maître de la création'. H.S.V.* p. 119.
3. Cp. (a) Wallis, *C.R.*p. 50 (b) Griffith, *H.R.V.* Vol.II, p. 566, f.n. 1.
4. *V.R. p. 87.*
5. equal to or the same as. Macdonell uses the sign'=' probably to preserve space. Vide *V.R.* p. 75.
6. Cp. Geldner, *Der Rig-Veda*, III. p. 348, 7a.
7. Cp. The *Chāndogya Up.* iii. 19.2.
8. *H.A.V.* Vol.1, p. 129, f.n.1.
9. Vide *C.P.B.*,p. 61 and *A.G.P.*, 1.iii.p.430.
10. Vide Macdonell, *P.S.D.*, p. 301.
11. Cp. H. Eliade, *Le Chamanisme et les techniques archaiques de I'extase*, pp. 235 ff.
12. Vide *Nāma-Rūpa and Dharma-Rūpa* p. 96.
13. Cp. Griffith. *H.R.V.*, vol, I, p. 409, f.n. 5 and *H.A.V.* vol.II.p. 26,f.n.2.
14. Cp. Griffith, *H.R.V.*, Vol. I, p. 409,f.n.5.
15. *H.S.V.*, p.261.
16. Cp. Whitney, *A.V.S.*, vol. ii,p.591.
17. *kimidam yakṣam pūjyam mahad bhūtam iti*, Śaṅkara.
18. *viśvam yakṣam viśvam bhūtam subhūtam.*
19. Vide Wijesekera, *The Philosophical Import of Vedic Yakṣa and Pali Yakkha, U.C.R.* vol. i.no. two p. 31.
20. Cp. Radhakrishnan, 'that wonderful being, the first born', *The Principal Up.*. p. 292, and Deussen, *jenes grosse Wunderung als erstgeborenes, Sechzig Up. des Veda*, p. 490.
21. Cp. Keith, *R.P.V.U.*, p. 436.
22. Vide Deussen, *A.G.P.* I. iii, p. 489.
23. *Sechzig Up. des Veda*, p. 218.
24. Vide Radhakrishnan, *The Principal* Up. p. 532.
25. This legend has been studied by the author in an unpublished doctoral thesis : *Divinités Féminines dans le Ṛgveda.*
26. Vide *A.G.P* I.iii, p. 489 and p. 436. Also see F. Weller, *Versuch Einer Kritik der Kaṭhopaniṣad* p. 50.
27. Vide E.Wood, *Vedānta Dictionary*, pp. 20-21.

28. *ibid.*, p. 61.
29. Vide *P.T.S.* Dictionary, *q.v.*.
30. E.Wood, *Op. cit.* 36.
31. Vide Macdonell, *P.S.D.* p. 287.
32. Vide E. Wood, *Op. cit.* p. 206.
33. *ibid.*, p. 82.
34. Cp. Deussen, *A.G.P.* I, iii. p. 436.
35. Vide B.C. Law, *Concepts of Buddhism* p. 88.
36. *Dieser...kosmische Intellect, die Weltseele wird...Śvet. Up. 3.19 als mahān purushaḥ bezeichnet.. (A.G.P. I.iii, p. 489).*
37. *Vide Sechzig Up. des Veda*, p. 299, f.n.5.

XII

Ahaṅkāra: The I-Consciousness

(1) *Ahaṅkāra* is the principle of individuality.[1] It is the fourth principle postulated by the *Sāṅkhya* system. Impelled by the force of *pariṇāma* or evolution, *Prakṛti* passes from the state of *Mahat* to that of *Ahaṅkāra*. The term *ahaṅkāra* is formed by the personal pronoun *ahaṁ* (=I) and *kāra* derived from √*kṛ* to do, make or perform. The *kāra* can give the sense of '-making' (*not* maker) and the abstract sense of '-ness' can be derived from it as in the case of *andha-kāra*, dark-ness etc. Thus the term *Ahaṅkāra*, in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, means *'I-ness:'* consequently it is used to mean the individuating principle. It is responsible for the limitations, divisions and variety. It is the state of consciousness in which the 'I' or the illuminating aspect forms the dualistic state of the yet unmanifest universe. One may further describe *Ahaṅkāra* as the uniform apperceptive mass as yet without any definite personal experience but with an obscure feeling of being an *Ahaṁ* or 'I'.*Ahaṅkāra* is both evolute and evolvent. It is an evolute in so far as it is evolved from *Mahat* and again it is an evolvent because it produces new modes of being such as the *indriyas*, the organs and the *tanmātras*, the subtle elements (*mahadādyaḥ prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ sapta, S.K.3*).[2]

(2) There is an expression in the *Ṛgveda* which deserves our attention: this is *ahaṁ-pūrva* occurring in the 1.181.3 of the *Ṛgveda*, a verse addressed to the *Aśvins*:

ā vāṁ ratho' vanir na pravatvān
sṛpra-vandhuraḥ suvitāya gamyāḥ
vṛṣṇaḥ sthātārā manaso javīyān
ahaṁ-pūrvo yajato dhiṣṇyā yaḥ.

May your car hurrying like a storm, the wide-seated, come to a good course: the strong car as quick as

thought and wills to be the first, the one worthy of respect, which you, for whom we long, have mounted.

The term *aham-pūrva* which literally means, 'I am the first' (cp. Grassmann : *eigentlish ich erster, selbsterster)* is very important especially in view of the fact that it refers to a condition wherein 'Ego' or 'I' is considered as the first. According to *Sāyaṇa* the term *aham-pūrva* in this context means *ahaṅkāra-pūrva (ahampūrvaḥ ahaṅkārapūrvo manasvī vā atyudāraḥ)*. In the *Sāṅkhya* system too, 'I'-ness' is the first evolute of the great germ of this univese : the *Mahat*. If Sāyaṇa's interpretation is correct the *aham* in the *R.V.* 1.181.3 is equal to *ahaṅkāra* in which case we may conclude that the background was already being formed in the *Ṛgveda* for the faint beginning of the idea of *ahaṅkāra* which ultimately became a name of the fourth principle of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy.

(3) (a) An important development of the concept of *aham* or 'I' is seen in the *Bṛhad. Up.*V.5.4. Here we come across 'I' as a secret name of the *Puruṣa (tasya-upaniṣad aham)*. According to the teaching involved here *(Bṛhad. Up. V.5) Brahman* is *satyam* (=true, V.5.1). He is the *Puruṣa* in the sun (cosmic *Brahman)* and also in the (right) eye (psychic *Brahman)*[3] His *upaniṣad* (i.e. secret name), in his macrocosmic aspect is *ahar* (day), in his microcosmic aspect is *aham*.[4] In this doctrine is seen an attempt to connect *ahar* and *aham*[5] and it may represent an early stage of the development of 'linguistic philosophy' of ancient India.

(b) The first important development of the concept of *ahaṅkāra*, the 'I'-ness' is seen in this same text where it is said as follows :-

> *ātmaivedam agra āsīt puruṣavidhaḥ,*
> *so' nuvīkṣya nānyad ātmano 'paśyat, so 'ham*
> *asmīty agre vyāharat; tato'ham nāmābhvat*
> *(Bṛhad. Up. 1.4/1).*
>
> In the beginning this (world) was only the self, in the shape of a person. Looking around he saw nothing else than himself. He first said, 'I am.' Therefore arose the name of 'I.'

It is probably in this *Upaniṣadic* passage that we come across the first seed of the concept of *Ahaṅkāra*. At the beginning the

word *ahaṅkāra* denoted only the *'I-sound'*[6] *(cp.omkāra*=sound om); next the 'I-consciouness' of the creater of the world. This cosmic sense of the word is also found in the *Chāndogya Up. vii.* 25.1, where it is thus said :

> "That (=*bhūma*, infinite, Deussen : *unbeschränktheit* or *Grösse)*[7] indeed is below. It is above. It is behind. It is in front. It is to the South. It is to the North. It is indeed all this (world). Now next, the instruction in regard to the self-sense *(atha-athaḥ-ahaṁkāra-adeśa eva)*. I, indeed, am below (*aham eva-adhastāt)*, I am above, I am behind, I am in front, I am to the South, I am to the North; I, indeed, am all this (world)."

In this passage with a pantheistic colouring *aham* (=I) is depicted as the all-inclusive I.

(4) The term *ahaṅkāra* accurs in three *Upaniṣads*, the *Praśna Up.* (iv.7), the Śvet. Up. (v.8) and the *Maitrī* Up. (ii. 15; iii.2; vi.5.28) *with two distinct meanings : (a) In the Śvet. Up* (v.8) the term *ahaṅkāra* occurs side by side with *saṅkalpa* (=thought):

> *aṅguṣṭha-mātro ravitulya-rūpas*
> *saṅkalpāhaṅkāra-samanvito yaḥ.*
>
> He is of the measure of a thumb, of appearance like the sun, endowed with thought and self-sense.

Here *ahaṅkāra* occuring next to *saṅkalpa* is presented *as a psychic function* (cp. Deussen : *als psychiche funktion; Sechzig Up. des Veda,* p. 883): (b) In the *Praśna Up.* (iv. 7; *manaś ca mantavyam ca, buddhiś ca bodhavyam ca, aham-kāraś cāham-kartavyam ca* - the mind and what can be perceived, the intellect and what can be conceived, the self-sense and what can be connected with the self) and the *Maitrī. Up* (ii,5; iii. 2; vi.5 and 28; *buddhir manaḥ ahaṅkāraḥ* vi.5: intellect, mind and self-sense; Deussen *Buddhi Manâs, Ahaṅkāra*, Sechzig Up. des Veda, p.333 -) *ahaṅkāra* occurs as a psychic organ near *buddhi and manas (cp. Deussen : als psychisches Organ neben buddhi und manas, Sechzig Up. des Veda, p.883).*

(5) The term *ahaṅkāra* as found in the *Matrī Up.* iii.2 and vi.5, deserves our attention; of these the former passage is of special

importance :

> *Atha yo ha khalu vā va śarīra ity uktam sa bhūtātmety uktam, athāmṛto' syātmā bindur iva puṣkarā iti. sa vā eṣ'obhibūtaḥ prākṛtair guṇair iti. atho' bhibhūtatvāt sammūḍhatvam prayātaḥ, sammūḍhatvād ātmastham prabhum bhagavantaṁ kārayitāraṁ nāpaśyad guṇaughair uhyamānaḥ kaluṣīkṛtas cāsthiraś cañcalo lupyamānaḥ saspṛho vyagraś cābhimānitvam prayātā iti.*
> (*Maitrī Up*. iii. 2)

Now he, indeed, who is said to be in the body is called the elemental self *(bhūtātma)*. Now its immortal self is like a drop of water on the lotus leaf. This (elemental self) verily, is affected by nature's *(prākṛteḥ)* qualities (*guṇaḥ*). Now because of being affected, he gets to bewilderment (he becomes confused); because of bewilderment he sees not the blessed Lord who dwells in himself, the causer of action. Borne along and defiled by the stream of qualities *(guṇa)*, unstable, wavering, bewildered, full of desire, distracted, he gets to the state of *abhimāna*, the self-estimation.

The *abhimāna* in the above passage (*Maitrī Up*. iii.2) can be compared with the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* doctrine :

abhimāno' haṁkāraḥ (S.K. 24)

I-consciousness is self-estimation.

Self-estimation is the ego, of the form of 'I think', I exist'[8], 'I know', 'I have to perform this duty' etc. It precedes determination and is the ground on which determination is based. In the other passage of the *Maitrī Up*. (vi.5) *Ahaṅkāra* is mentioned along with *Buddhi* and *Manas*. In this context, *Ahaṅkāra* seems to be closer to the same concept found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 22, probably due to the influence of the classical *Sāṅkhya* on the teachings of the *Maitri Upaniṣad*.

Notes and References

1. Cp. Keith, *Ahaṅkāra* the principle of individuality which expresses itself in conscious will....' *R.P.V.U.* p. 437, f.n. 1.
2. Cp. *prakṛter mahāṃs tato'haṅkāras tasmād gaṇaś ca ṣoḍaśakaḥ* . *S.K.*22.
3. Cp. Deussen, *Sechzig Up. des Veda*, p. 491.
4. Cp. M. Falk, *The Nāma-Rūpa and Dharma-Rūpa*, p.31.
5. Cp. Deussen, *Sechzig Up. des Veda*, p.491.
6. Cp. Deussen, *A.G.P.I* iii, p.56.
7. Cp. *Sechzig Up. des Veda*, p. 185.
8. Cp. *Cogito ergo sum*- Descartes. Vide R. Falckenberg, *History of Modern Philosophy (1962) pp. 90-91.*

XIII

Manas: The Mind

(1) The word *manas* is very old and it goes back to the Indo-European period. It occurs in classical Greek as *menos.*[1] *Manas* is the fifth principle of the *Sāṅkhya* system. It is the central organ of the senses or *koinon aistheterion.*[2] The *Ahaṅkāra* which transforms itself qualitatively according to the preponderance of the one or the other *Guṇa* in question gives rise to *Manas* when *Sattva,* the modality of luminosity and comprehension is predominating over *Rajas* and *Tamas.* The *Manas* acts as a centre of union between perceptive and motor activity.[3] The base and receptacle of all impressions[4] it co-ordinates biological and psychic activities. So the *Manas* partakes of the nature of the organs of both knowledge and action *(S.K.* 27). The guidance of *Manas* is absolutely essential for the functioning of the organs of action. Without the direction of *Manas,* none of the organs can function in relation to their objects.[5] Though *Manas* is very subtle, it is (supposed to be) made up of parts,[6] consequently it can come in contact with the different senses at the same time. It is mentioned in the *Kārikā* that mind is in the nature of forming the *Saṅkalpa (Saṅkalpaka,* S.K 27) and we may render the term *Saṅkalpa* here as, resolve of the mind, will, definite intention or determination.[7]

(2) The gradual development of the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Manas* is interesting. The term *Manas* occurs in different parts of the *Ṛgveda* with several different shades of meaning. We may classify them into a few groups from the semantic point of view. (a) We notice in many verses of the *Ṛgveda* that *Manas,* the inner organ is considered as a seat of various mental activities. Thus, for example, it is implied that Indra's mind is a seat of terror *(indrasya ghoram manasam,* the terrific mind of Indra, *R.V.*vii. 20.6).[8] (b) *Manas* is again considered as thought or will. This can be seen in a number of verses of the *Ṛgveda* (cp. *R.V* 1. 77.

2; 102. 3; 157.6; 158.2; 164. 27 etc). For example, we may refer to the *Ṛgveda,* viii. 5.2 :

> *nṛvad dasrā mano-yujā*
> *rathena pṛthupājasā*
> *sacathe aśvinā-uṣasam.*

> 'Like Heroes on your will-yoked car far-shining wonder-workers ! ye
> Attend, O Aśvins, on the Dawn'[9].

The Aśvins, the (royal) physicians are famous for their quick activities. They yoke their car in no time to hasten to those who are in need of help : hence it is often implied that theirs is a will-yoked *(mano-yuj)* car. (c) The quickness with which *Manas* functions is implied in many expressions of the *Ṛgveda.* We may refer, for example to a few such passages such as, *mano-java,* the quickness of mind (R.V.x. 71, 7), *mano-ju,* quick as mind *(R.V.* I. 119, I.etc) and so on. (d) The cosmic sense of *Manas* too is found in the *Ṛgveda,* already from an early period.[10] In the *Ṛgveda,* x. 129.4 we come across *Mānas* as getting evolved from *asat* through water, heat etc. *Manas* in this case is related to *Kāma,* the cosmic aspect of desire or will. Here it is implied that *Manas* came into being from *Kāma* or *Kāma* from *Manas* (vide ch. 5. sec. 9). Similarly in the *Puruṣa-sūkta,* the *Ṛgveda,* x.90, we see that it is the *Manas* or mind of the cosmic *Puruṣa* that gave rise to the Moon *(candramā manaso jātaḥ,* the moon was born from his mind, x.90. 13). This connection between the mind *(manas)* of *Puruṣa* and the moon may faintly suggest a sort of material status accorded, at least by some, to the entity of *Manas.* (One may remind oneself here of *Manas* in the *Sāṅkhya* system which evolves from *Prakṛti* considered to be a material entity). *Manas* (cosmic mind) is that state when the ideal universe becomes the object, emerging into the view and forming a clearly defined picture. *Ahaṅkāra* (i.e.Individuating Principle) was concerned with the 'I', *Manas* (cosmic mind) is concerned with the 'this' aspect of the universal relationship, 'I am this'.[11]

(3) In the *Atharvaveda* there is very little data directly connected with our problem. The *A.V.* XV. 14.I, is perhaps the most

important for our purpose. Here mind is regarded as *annāda* or a food-eater. *Manas* (or mind) in its special capacity as *annāda* or food-eater represents 'will' or 'resolution' which in this particular context is an attribute of the impetus storm-gods, the Maruts.[12] Now, 'to make mind (their) food-eater' (*A.V.* XV. 14.I)[13] may mean, 'let mind function as the subject, and resolve its purpose'. Thus we may notice here the 'will-aspect' of the mind, the faint beginning of which is already found in the *Ṛgveda* (see above).

(4) *Manas* as a concept has not received sufficient attention in the *Brāhmaṇa* literature. Yet in their ritual expositionss, an occasional reference to *Manas* can be found, especially in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. *Manas* in this *Brāhmaṇa* is said to be the moon (This one above, the mind, *Śata.Brāh.* viii. 1.2.7). This is a development of the cosmic aspect of mind already implied in the *Ṛgveda* x.90.13 (see above).

(5) In two *Upaniṣads*, namely the *Bṛhad.Up.* iv. I.6 and the *Chānd. Up.* vii. 3.1, the problem of the nature of *Manas* is taken up. It is said in the former that, 'by the mind one takes to a woman' (*manasā......striyam abhihāryate*, iv. I.6). In the latter it is stated that, 'if one has mind to perform sacred works, then one performs them' (*sa yadā manasā manasyati.......karmāṇi kurvīyeti, atha kurute*, vii. 3.I). We may notice that *Manas* in these passages is considered as the organ of wish or the consious will (Deussen, *das Organ der Wünsche, der bewusste Wille*).[14] The discussion of the status of *Manas* in the *Chānd. Up* vii. 3.1, is followed by a description of *saṅkalpa* or will (*Chānd. Up.* vii.4). It is said as follows: *Saṅkalpa* or will, indeed, is greater than mind. For when one wills (*saṅkalpa-yate*), then one reflects (*manasyati*), one utters speech and then one utters it in name.' This position of *Manas* and *Saṅkalpa* occurring next to one another in one of the oldest *Upaniṣads* seems to the of great historical significance. It is so specially in view of the fact that *Saṅkalpaka* or being of the nature of creating *Saṅkalpas*, has been considered to be a characteristic of *Manas* in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, (*atra manaḥ......saṅkalpakam*, here the mind is determinative, *S.K.* 27). We may observe here that *Manas* (mind) and *Saṅkalpa* (will) occuring as two entities in the *Chānd. Up.* (vii.3.I and vii. 4.I) have ultimately fused into one concept in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (verse 27) where *Saṅkalpa* has received the status of an attribute of

Manas. During the period of the *Kaṭha* and the *Śvet. Ups.* the concept of *Manas* is further developed. In the *Kaṭha Up* it is said that *Manas* is the reins (*pragraha*, I.3.3.) by which the intellect controls the senses (organs of action) (vide *R.K.*, *P.U.*p. 624). In the *Śvet. Up.* reference is made to the concept of *pañca-buddyādi-mūla* or the original source of the five senses (organs of sense) (*Śvet.Up.* i.5), namely the *Manas* (vide Deussen, *Sechzing Up.des Veda* p. 906). Thus it is seen that during the period of the *Kaṭha* and the *Śvet. Ups. Manas* has been considered as the central organ of the organs of sense (*buddhi-indriyas*) and the organs of action (*karmendriya*).[15] The idea that *Manas* is the central organ of the sensory functioning (*buddhi-indiriyāni*) is also explicit in two late *Upaniṣads*, the *Kauṣītakī Up.* (iii.7) and the *Maitrī Up* (vi.30).[16] In these texts *Manas* is depicted as the power that perceives, the understanding behind which however there exists the subject of perception, in the form of *prajñā*, *puruṣa* etc.[17] The cosmic sense of *Manas* which we already saw in connection with the *R.V.* x. 90. 13 and x. 129. 4 is repeatedly seen in several Upaniṣadic passages such as *Bṛhad.Up.* 1.3. 16; 11.5.7; iii.I.6; 2.13 and *Ait. Up.* i.I.4. In the *Kaṭha Up.* i 3. 10-13. (=ii.3.7-11) we notice, probably, the immediately preceding stage of the conception of *Manas* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. Here *Manas*, as we saw already, is represented as the fifth of a gradation of mental faculties (vide ch. II., sec. 7).

Notes and References

1. Vide Macdonell, *V.R.*. p. 243.
2. Cp. Max Müller, *I.P.* vol. iii, p. 37.
3. *Aniruddha ad Sāṅkhya Sūtra*, ii. 40.
4. *ibid.*, ii. 42.
5. Cp. *Ohne diese Verbindung mit dem innern Sinn können weder die Wahrnehmungssinne noch die Thetsinne funktioniren*. Garbe, *S.P.* p. 252.
6. Cp. Chatterjee and Datta, *I.I.P.* p. 275.
7. Vide Macdonell, *P.S.D.* *q.v.*
8. Vide Grassmann, *Wörterbuch zum Ṛig-Veda*, p. 994.
9. Griffith's translation.
10. Cp. Deussen, *'Neben dieser psychischen steht sohon in alter Zeit die kosmische Bedeutung des Manas.'* *A.G.P.* 1, iii p. 58.

11. *H.P.* p. 78.
12. Griffith: *H.A.V.* vol. ii, p. 195, f.n.1.
13. Cp. (a) Whitney, *A.V.S.* vol. II, p. 88.
    (b) Deussen, *'Nur der Puruṣa ist Subjekt (annāda), Sechzig Up. des Veda*, p. 337.
14. Vide *Sechzig Up. des Veda*, p. 906.
15. Cp. Deussen, *Sechzig Up. des Veda*, pp. 276, 292 and 906.
16. *Op.cit.*, p. 351.
17. *Op.cit.*, p. 906, *'das Vermögen der Wahrnehmung, der Verstand'*.

XIV

The Prāṇas: The Five Airs or the Vital Winds

(1) The *Prāṇas* (pl.) are mentioned only once in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* briefly in connection with *Antaḥkaraṇa*, the Internal Organ:

> *svālakṣaṇyam vṛttis*
> *traysaya sai 'ṣā bhavaty asāmānyā.*
> *sāmānya-karaṇa-vṛttiḥ*
> *prāṇādyā vāyavaḥ pañca.* (*S.K.* 29).

> The function of the three internal organs is the unique nature (Deussen: *Wesensbeschaffenheit*, *A.G.P.* I.iii.p.441) of each and that is not common (to the three). The common function of the (three) organs is (the circulation of) the five winds (= vital airs), namely *Prāṇa* and the rest.

The five *Prāṇas*, are *Prāṇa*, *Apāna*, *Samāna*, *Udāna* and *Vyāna*. The concept of the *Prāṇas* seems to have originated in connection with the breath on the one hand[1] and the wind (*prāṇad vāyur ajāyata*, R.V.10.90.13) on the other. In the *Sāṇkhya Kārikā* the *Prāṇas* are still called the *Vāyus* or winds (*S.K.*29). Originally the idea (of the *Prāṇas*) may have meant any and every kind of vital (*prāṇaic*) activity.[2] The *Prāṇas* in the *Kārikā* may be taken as the organic forces which animate the body. They do not merely mean *āśvāsa* (breathing in) and *praśvāsa* (breathing out): they seem to be the vital airs or processes which make the action of the *indriyas* (cp.*karaṇa-vṛtti*, S.K. 29) possible. The vital airs (i.e. the *Prāṇas*) will function only so long as the breathing goes on and in the later texts[3] they (i.e. the *Prāṇas*) are recognized as mortal faculties

in man. Thus the *Prāṇas* depend on the breath wheres the breath need not depend on the *Prānas* (or the vital airs). The general idea of the *Vāyus* (=winds) or the *Prāṇas* has also survived in the *Pali Tipiṭaka* under the name of the *Vātas* with a considerable semantic change in many contexts.[4] However the idea of sense-function seems to be still implicit in such contexts as at *unmāda vāta (Petavattu Aṭṭhakathā,* 94) which may mean, the distorted sense-functions or the senses the function of which is not in proper order.

(2) Geldner is of opinion that the idea of *Prāṇa* and *Apāna* is implicit in the {*Ṛgveda* 1.164.38,[5] but this opinion is not at all certain.[6] It is, probably, the sun that is meant here as taken by Griffith.[7] The same opinion is held by W.Kirfel in his, *Die Kosmographie der Inder* (pp.25-26). In the *Atharvaveda* we may see the employment of the term *Prāṇāḥ* (pl.) to denote the idea of 'vital functions'. We come across in this text, perhaps for the first time, an explicit reference to the concept of *Prāṇa* and *Apāna*. Thus it is said: *prāṇāpānau mṛtyor mā pātam, svāhā,* O breath-and-expiration, protect me from death, hail! (*A.V.* 2.16.1).[8] The commentary on this passage defines the two *Prāṇas* as follows: *prāg ūrdhvamukho' niti ceṣṭata iti prāṇaḥ; apānity avāṅmukhaś ceṣṭata ity apānaḥ ...'* According to the commentary, therefore, *Prāṇa* means 'breathing up' i.e. *in* and *Apāna* breathing down', i.e. *out.* One may surmise with Keith (*Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, p.553) that the origin of the various notions regarding the *Prāṇas* may be traced in part to *A.V.* 10.8.9, where the head is compared to a drinking bowl with seven seers in the apertures. The seven, here, refers to the two eyes, two ears, two nostrils and the mouth[9]. It is probably the same idea that is implied in the concept of the *sapta-prāṇa* found in the same text (*A.V.* 2.12.7). Elsewhere in the same text reference is made to nine *Prāṇas* (*nava-prāṇa, A.V.*5.28.1). The concept of the nine *Prāṇas* may be a development of the above idea of the *sapta-prāṇa*. The *nava-prāṇa* seems to be the *nava-sota (Sutta-Nipāta,* 197) or the *nava-dvāra* (*Vimāna-vatthu Aṭṭhakathā,* 76) (P.T.S.eds.), the nine openings of the body, two eyes, two ears, two nostrils, mouth, anus and urethra (cp. *P.T.S. Pali Dic.* q.v.). The *Black Yajurveda* (i.1.6h)[10] mentions three *Prāṇas,* namely *Prāṇa, Apāna and Vyāna.*[11]

(3) In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* the number of the *Prāṇas,* at times, are said to be five,[12] seven[13] and even a hundred and

one.[14] The sense intended by these large numbers is not the vital airs but the vital forces. An attempt to give a sacrificial significance to the concept of the five *Prāṇas* can be seen in this text. Thus it is said: 'those (bricks) which lay down in front are the holders of the *Prāṇa;* those behind are eye-holders, the holders of the *Apāna;* those on the right side are the mind-holders, the holders of the *Vyāna:* those on the left side are the ear-holders, the holders of the *Udāna;* and those in the middle are the speech-holders, the holders of the Samāna' (*Śata. Brāh.* viii.1.3.6). What is important to notice in this doctrine is the attempt to connect the *Prāṇas* with three sense-organs, *manas* (mind), *śrotra* (ear), *cakṣu* (eye) and, one motor organ, *vāc* (speech). The full expression of this doctrine is found in the *Chānd.Up* (V.19-24) to which we shall refer below. It appears that the classical doctrine of the five *Prāṇas* has not yet fully established and this may be the reason why in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (i.1) reference is again made to the two *Prāṇas; Prāṇa* and *Apna*[15]

(4) The fact that the *Prāṇas* are differently stated in the *Upaniṣads* may imply that there was not yet a unanimity among the philosophers of the period regarding the specific number of the *Prāṇas.* We come across a group of three Prāṇas, namely *Prāṇa, Apāna* and *Vyāna* in the *Bṛhad,Up* (v.14.3) and the *Taittirīya Up.* (ii.2). A Group of four *Prāṇas,* viz. *Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna* and *Udāna,* is next found in the *Bṛhad.Up.* (iii.4.I). Finally one comes across the *Pañca-prāṇa* or the well-known five vital airs in the *Chānd.Up* (iii.13.1-6), the *Bṛhad.Up.* (i.5.3; iii.9.26), the *Taittirīya Up.* (i.7) and also in the *Maitrī Up.* (ii.6; vi.3.5.9.35; vii.1-5) which may belong to a later date. In the *Chānd.Up.* (V.19-24), the five *Prāṇas* are subjected to a long discussion in which they are related to several organs of which three are the sense-faculties. The scheme is as follows:

i.	*Prāṇa*	*Caksus*	*Āditya*	*Dyaus*
ii.	*Vyāna*	*Śrotra*	*Candramas*	*Diśas*
iii.	*Apāna*	*Vāk*	*Agni*	*Pṛthivī*
iv.	*Samāna*	*Manas*	*Parjanya*	*Vidyut*
v.	*Udāna*	*Tvak*	*Vāyu*	*Ākāśa*

This teaching may undoubtedly be a development of the idea already found in the Śata.Brāh. (viii.1.3.6). In this scheme the five *Prāṇas* correspond to the five organs of sight, hearing, speech, thought and touch. The connection (*bandhutā*) with the universe is indicated by five regents of sun, moon, fire, rain and wind.[16] The third question of the *Praśna Up.* (which is assigned to a later date by some scholars) and the answer given to it are important. It is thus said in this text : 'The *Apāna* is in the organs of excretion and generation, the *Prāṇa* as such is in the eye and ear as also in the mouth and nose. In the middle is the *Samāna*. It is this *Samāna* that equalizes whatever is offered as food (iii.5). 'Within these (i.e. the arteries) move the *Viyāna* (iii. 6).' 'Now rising upward through one of these (i.e. the arteries) the *Udāna* leads, in consequence of good (work) to the good world, in consequence of evil to the evil world, in consequence of both to the world of men' (iii.7). Here in the *Praśna Up.* one may notice, probably, for the first time, an attempt to describe the different *Prāṇas* and the functions of some of them. It may be pointed out here that in the *Muṇḍaka Up.* (i.I.8-9) *Prāṇa* (sing.) appears as the third step of a particular evolutionary scheme (vide ch.5,sec.14):but this does not seem to have a bearing on the *Sāṇkhya* conception of the *Prāṇas* (pl.).

(5) We may now sum up the central conception underlying the *Sāṇkhya* doctrine of the *Prāṇas*. In many contexts of the *Upaniṣads* we notice that the terms *devāḥ, devatāḥ, prāṇāḥ (pl.)* and *indriyāni* are used to imply the idea of sense-functions.[17] That the term *prāṇāḥ (pl.)* (like its synonyms) has developed the notion of sense-function can be seen in many contexts of the *Upaniṣads.*[18] This idea can be noticed even in the middle *Upaniṣadic* period as at *Kauṣī. Up.* I.6. where *Atman* as actual (*sat*) is distinguished from the sense-powers and the vital functions. Thus it is said that whatever is other than the sense-functions (*devāḥ*) and vital airs (*prāṇāḥ*) - that is the actual (*sat*). While refering to the person about to die, the *Bṛhad.Up.* I.5.17, differentiates the *Prāṇas,* the mortal faculties from the divine immortal faculties (*daivāḥ prāṇāḥ amṛtāḥ*) which together constitute the individual. In a later passage[19] Prajāpati is said to have created the active functions (*karmāṇi)* of speech, seeing, hearing etc.: here they are called the *prāṇāḥ* because when Death (*mṛtyu*) took possession of them they became so many forms of the central

life-principle (*madhyamaḥ prāṇāḥ).* In the discussion of the rivalry of the bodily functions in th *Chānd.Up* (5.I.1-15), it is mentioned that *vāc, cakṣu, śrotra,* and *manas* are called the *prāṇāḥ* (breaths). The same idea is again seen at the *Bṛhad.Up.* 6.I.1-6. We have already seen that in different texts the *Prāṇas* are differently enumerated. In the *Bṛhad.Up*.3.9.4, the *Prāṇas* are said to be ten. This particular enumeration of the *Prāṇas* as ten (which are called the ten Rudras) is important for the *Sāṅkhya* theory of sense-functions in that they may, probably, refer to the five motor functions (*karmendriya*) and the five cognitive functions (*buddhīndriya*) as *Śaṅkara* himself explains[20]. The general idea of sense-functions is found for the *Prāṇas* in several other *Upaniṣads* belonging to the middle period.[21] In a later text, namely in the *Kauṣī. Up* 2.15, we notice that the term *prāṇāḥ* is applied to a number of categories which include the sense-functions as well, showing a marked development of its earlier sense. The isolated use of the term *karmāṇi* for active functions[22] at the *Bṛhad.Up*.I.5.21 too is important. Here it is said as follows: 'Prajāpati created the active functions (*karmāṇi,* lit.activities) and when created they strove with one another: 'I am going to speak' the voice began, 'I am going to see' said the eye. 'I am going to hear' said the ear. So spake the other functions, each according to his activity (*karma*). It is not difficult to notice the importance of the term *karmāṇi* in this context for the origin of the later *Sāṅkhya* conception of *karmendriya* which, however, has been limited only to the motor functions. Our opinion that the concept of the *Prāṇas* imply the idea of sense-function[23] is implicit in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā,* for it refers to the *Prāṇas* as the *karaṇa-vṛtti,* the functions of the (sense-)organs - the function of *Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra* and *Manas.* The fact that the *Prāṇas* are considered to represent the function of *Manas* (i.e. a sense-organ) too, *inter alia,* may suggest that the *Sāṅkhyas* have restricted the application of the concept of the *Prāṇas* as sense-functions only to the internal (sense-)organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) as opposed to the external (sense-)organs (*bāhya-karaṇa, S.K.*33) of their system.

Notes and References

1. Johnston, *E.S.*p. 18.
2. Vide Wijesekra, *Upanishadic Terms for Sense-Functions, U.C.R* vol. II, Nos.1 and 2 (October 1944) pp.14-24.
3. For example at *Bṛhad. Ā..Up.* 1.5.19.
4. Vide *P.T.S Dictionary, q.v.*
5. '38.*Der Lebenshauch als Einhauch (apāna) und Aushauch (prāṇa)... Der Rig-Veda* vol.i.,p.234, f.n.38.
6. *apāṅ prāṅ-eti svadhayaā gṛbhito, (a)martyo martyena sayoniḥ/tā śaśvantā visūcinā viyantā, nyanyaṁ cikyur na ni cikyur anyam.* Grasped by one's own strength he goes backward and forward. The immortal is of the same origin as of the mortal. Ceaseless they move in opposite directions. They mark the one and fail to mark the other.
7. Vide *H.R.V,* Vol.i.p.225, f.n.38.
8. Cp. Whitney: 'The first extension of the notion of *prāṇa,* breath, lit.forth-breathing, is by addition of *apāna,* which also is lit. breathing away, and so, when distinguished from the generalized *prāṇa,* seems to mean expiration. *A.V.S.,* vol.1,p.60.
9. Cp. Wijesekera, *U.T.S.F:U.C.R.* Vol. II, Nos.1 and 2, p.20.
10. Vide Keith's Translation.
11. Cp. Keith: 'It is certain that *prāṇa* means expiration.....apāna accordingly means inspiration.' This interpretation is almost the opposite of that which is given by Whitney. Whitney's seems to be the correct interpretation. In this case Keith seems to have followed Deussen who along with several other German scholars translated *Prāṇa* and *Apāna* as expiration and inspiration respectively : (a) Deussen - *'Prāṇa = Aushauch, Apāna=Einhauch* (A.G.P. 1, 888, p. 442). (b) Geldner .....*Einhauch (apāna) und Aushauch (prāṇa) ' (Der Rig-Veda,* vol. 1, p. 234, f. n. 38), and (c) Zimmer - *'Prāṇa*....the exhaling air.....*apāna* the inhaling air' (P.I. p. 318). Radhakrishnan seems to be in general agreement with Whitney's opinion when he translates *Prāṇa* as. 'breathing in' and *Apāna* as 'breathing out' (*The Brahma Sūtra,* p. 427). It is difficult to distinguish between *Prāṇa* and *Apāna* strictly on etymological grounds specially in view of the fact that the etymological meanings of the two words are very much similar to one another. Thus it is rightly observed by Whitney: '....*prāṇa* breath lit. forth-breaking.....*apāna*....also is lit. breathing away. *(The Atharva Veda Samhita,* vol. i, p. 60).

12. Ś. B. vii, I. 3.6; Eggling's tr. part iv. p. 15.
13. *Op.cit.,* part iii, pp. 349, 402.
14. S.B. X. 2.6. 15; Eggling's tr. iv, p. 326.
15. Vide Deussen, *Sechzig Up., des Veda,* p. 10.
16. Vide Renou, *Vedic India,* p. 87.
17. Wijesekera : *U.T.S.F., U.C.R.* vol. II, Nos. 1 and 2, p 14.
18. See *Bṛhad. Up.* I. 5.3; 3.I.10; 3.4.I; 4.2.24; 5. 14. 3; 6.4. 12; *Ch.Up.* 3.13. 1-6; 5. 19-23; *Tait. Up.* I. 5. 3.
19. *Bṛhad Up.* I. 5. 21 (G. II, early).
20. *'karmabuddhīndriyāni prāṇāḥ......'*on *Bṛhad. Up.* 3.9. 4.
21. *Bṛhad. Up.* 2, 1. 17; 2. 1. 20; 4. 3.38; *Ch.Up.* 6.5.3 (G.III, middle); *Kauṣ., Up.* 3.2. (G.III, late).
22. Cp. *Śaṅkara : 'karmāṇi karaṇāni vāgādīni karmārthāni hi tāniti karmāṇītyucyante;'*
    cp. Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,* p. 90: ' active functions.'
23. Cp. Max Müller, *Indian Philosophy,* Vol. iii. *Sāṁkhya and Yoga* (1952). p. 53.

XV

The Indriyas: The Organs of Sense and Action

(1) By *indriyas* are meant the organs : the organs of sense and the organs of action. The term *indriya* is probably derived from the name *Indra,* the etymology of which is much disputed. *Indriya* as a word is at least of *Vedic* origin. Sometimes it denotes, 'that which belongs to, or agreeable to Indra' (cp. *mahimānam indriyam* - the greatness of Indra, *R.V.*viii.3.13;X.113.1-3). But in the *Ṛgveda* i.107.1, the term (*indriya*) also appears to denote, 'that which is similar to *Indra'*. Elsewhere in the *Ṛgveda* , *indriya.* denotes, the *might of Indra (arcanto arkam janayanta indriyam;* singing their song and generating the might of Indra: Geldner: *Preisgesang singend und die indrische Kraft weckend, R.V.* 1.85.2). It is not impossible that this sense of 'might' or 'power' came to mean 'faculty' and hence (sense) organ.[1] When *Sattva* is predominating over *Rajas* and *Tamas* in the principle of *Ahaṅkāra,* then there evolve the organs of sense. On the other hand, when the equilibrium in *Ahaṅkāra* is dominated by the *Rajas Guṇa* (the motor-energy that makes all physical experience possible), the result is the evolution of the organs of action. The general view of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* is that the *indriyas* are ten in number: five organs of sense (*buddhi-indriya*) and five organs of action (*karmendriya*). The organs of sense are eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin. Speech, hands, feet, anus and the organ of procreation are called organs of action (S.K.26)[2]

(2) The great power of *Vāc* or Speech was recognized at a very early period in the Indian civilization. Thus in the tenth *Maṇḍala* of the *Ṛgveda* (x.125) we come across *Vāc,* the personified speech under the guise of a goddess to whom limitless powers have been attributed. The goddess *Vāc,* according to this hymn (X.125.1), travels with the mighty gods such as Indra, Agni, Mitra, Varuṇa, the Aśvins, the Ādityas, and Pūṣan

(x.125.1. and 2). It is said that *Vāc* is a queen (x.125.3), an idea which is again found in the *Atharvaveda* (iv.1.2). The mighty power of the goddess of speech is summed up as follows:-

> *aham eva svayam idaṁ vadāmi*
> *juṣṭam devebhir uta mānuṣebhiḥ*
> *yaṁ kāmaye taṁ tam ugram kṛṇomi*
> *taṁ brāhmaṇam tam ṛṣim taṁ sumedham.*
> (*R.V.*x.125.5)

> I, verily, myself announce this that is accepted by gods and men (alike). Whomsoever I like, I make him strong, make him a *Brāhmaṇa,* a *ṛṣi (=seer)* and a sage.

One may notice, here, an attempt to attribute powers to *Vāc,* an organ action. In a verse of the same hymn (R.V.x.125.4) three other organs of sense seem to have been recognized:

> *mayā so annam atti yo vipaśyati*
> *yaḥ prāṇiti ya īm śṛṇoty uktam.*

> He eats the food through me, who discerns (Renou: *celui qui discerne*), who breathes, (and) who hears that which is spoken.

Here, in addition to the organ of speech, eye or mind (< discerns = *vipaśyati*), ear (< *śṛṇoti* = hears) and nose (< *prāṇiti* = breath) too seem to have been implied. Passing on to the *Atharvaveda,* we come across in a passage in the philosophical portion of this text a more explicit reference to the same three faculties. Thus it is said:

> And life-time, and form, and name, and fame, and breath, and expiration, and sight and hearing[3] (*A.V.* xii.5.9).

Here sight , hearing and breath and expiration refer to the three organs of sense, eye, ear and nose respectively.

(3) In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* there is an important passage where it is said:

And, indeed these five forms (bodily parts) of him are mortal-the hair on the mouth, the skin, the flesh, the bone, and the marrow; and these are immortal - the mind, the voice, the vital air, the eye, and the ear - (*Śat. Brāh*.x.1.3.4)[4]. What is important here is the concept of five mortal parts and the five immortal parts. The five immortal parts here may remind us of the five organs of sense of the *Sāṅkhya* system. Thus it is aptly observed by Johnston: 'The group of the five immortal parts will repay more prolonged consideration. It recurs in the early texts in many different forms, the commonest of which consists of *manas, vāc, cakṣus, stotra,* and *prāṇa*'[5] The distinction between the mortal and the immortal is important. The idea reappears in the *Bṛhad.Up*1.5.17.18 and 19. In the *Bṛhad.Up.* 1.5.19 it is said that 'out of the sky and out of the sun the *divine mind* (*daivam manas*) enters him, i.e. the father about to depart from this world when he has made over to his son his *mortal faculties (prāṇāḥ)* along with the other two *divine immortal faculties* (*daivāḥ prāṇā amṛtā*) (*Bṛh.* Up.1.5.17) namely speech (*Vāc*) and breath (*Prāṇa*). That the term *daiva* is applied to an organ of sense, the *manas* is significant. The above distinction between the divine-immortal and the human-mortal is important. Herein we may see the reason as to why at *Bṛhad.Up* 4.3.14 the mind or soul in the dream state is called *deva*, a usage which reappears at the *Praśna Up.* 4.1., where it is asked 'which is the god (*deva*)that sees dreams? and it is answered in 4.2. and 5 as 'that is the *Manas*, the highest god' (*para deva,4.1*). The idea that develops from these passaes is that the mind possesses a super-human aspect indicated by the epithets, *deva* and *daiva*. In the *Upaniṣads* with a tendency to regard *Manas* as one of the sense-functions (cp. *Bṛhad.Up.* i.3.18;ii.4 11; iv.5.12; *Praśna Up* ii.3; *Kauṣī.Up. i.7;* cp.also *Sāṅkhya Kārikā,* 27) the term *deva* is extended by analogy to apply to other senses (cognitive and conative) in the human body (cp.*Bṛhad.Up* i.3.12-18; *Īśā Up. 4*). Thus we notice in the above contexts that it is the idea of sense-functions that is meant by term *deva* or *devatā*[6]

(4) In the *Upaniṣads* we come across more explicit references to the *indriyas*. The *Bṛhad.Up* (i.3) refers to *Vāc, Prāṇa* (=*Ghrāṇa*), *Cakṣu, Śrotra* and *Manas*. In this context the term *Prāṇa is used for Ghrāṇa* or nose, the organ of smelling.[7] Again at ii.4.14 of the *Bṛhad.Up.* the same set of *indriyas* are implied by the verbal forms as follows: *Ghrāṇa* (<jighrati), *Cakṣu* (<*paśyati*), *Śrotra* (<*śṛṇoti*), *Vāc* (<*vadati*) and *Manas* (<*manute*). One may take this stage to be a little more developed than the former in that the function of the *indriyas* under discussion are indicated here by verbal forms as opposed to the former where the same set of *Indriyas* are mentioned in the form of nouns (except in i.3.2). Another reason which may support our view is the fact that in place of *Prāṇa* (used for *Ghrāṇa*, the organ of smelling, i.e. nose) in the former passage, we have in the latter the verbal form *jighrati* (=**ghrāṇa*) probably implying that the term *Ghrāṇa* was in the process of getting formed. In the *Chānd.Up.* (i.2) the *Ghrāṇa* is implied by the term *nāsikya-prāṇa*, the breath in the nose. Elsewhere in the same text (*Chānd.Up* ii.II.1 and iii.18) we come across the same set of *indriyas* and this tradition is continued in the *Kena* (i.I) and the *Kauṣītakī (ii.14) Upaniṣads*. This discussion may lead us to a few conclusions. It is seen that the word *Prāṇa* has been employed to convey the sense of the organ of smelling, i.e. nose. But at least, some *Upaniṣadic* thinkers may have not been satisfied with the term *Prāṇa* or breath (to convey the sense of the organ of smelling): this may perhaps, be the reason why the author of the *Chānd.Up* (i.2.2) has used the term *nāsikya-prāṅa* consisting of an additional adjective *nāsikya*, "nasal' or'in the nose' meaning that it is not mere *Prāṇa* but the '*Prāṇa* or breath in the nose'. This may again imply that there was already a faint beginning of a tendency to confuse *āśvāsa*, the inward breath and *praśvāsa*, the outward breath with the concept of the *Prāṇas* (pl.).[8] The technical term of the organ of smelling, namely, *Ghrāṇa*, later famous in the philosophical literature of India has not yet been fully established. The *Upaniṣadic* data which we have examined above indicate that the three sensory organs, *Śrotra*, the ear, *Cakṣu*, the eye, and *Ghrāṇa*, the nose had been already recognized during this period. Among the motor orgars only *Vāc* or speech is mentioned. *Indriyas* or the senses as a stage in the gradation of mental faculties (apparently in their cosmic sense as a stage of evolution) is found in the *Kaṭha Up.* I.3.10-13. This gradation in the descending order of importance, *Puruṣa, Avyakata, Mahān Ātmā, Buddhi, Manas, Arthās* (i.e.the objects of the senses) and the *Indriyas*, has *Manas* as its

fifth stage (cp.Ch.5,sec 13). The concept of the *indriyas* in the most developed form is found in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* which may be of a late origin. Thus it is said: *'iti buddhīndriyāṇi yānimāny etāny asya raśmayaḥ: karmendriyaṇy asya hayā'*, these reins of his are the organs of perception, his horses are the organs of action (*Maitrī Up.* ii.6). If the *Maitri Up.* can be accepted as being prior to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*,[9] one may say that the teaching of the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* has exercised some influence on Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the formulation of his conception of the *Indriyas* in the *Kārikā*. But, on the other hand, it may also be possible that the *Maitrī Up.* has been influenced by the classical *Sāṅkhya* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Notes and References

1. Cp. Garbe, *S.P.* p.257.
2. Garbe compares the functions of *Buddhi, Ahaṅkara, Manas* and *Indriyas* with the function of the nervous system, *ibid.*, p.235.
3. Cp. Whitney, *A.V.S.* Vol.II,p.702.
4. Cp. Egglings, *S.B.*(S.B.E.) part iv. p.290.
5. Cp. *E.S.*, p.18.
6. Cp.Wijesekera: *Upanishadic Terms for Sense Functions*, U.C.R. vol.II, Nos. 1 and 2 (October, 1944) pp.14-24.
7. Cp. Radhakrishnan: *The Principal Up.* p.156.
8. This tendency has reached its culmination in the *Bhagavadgītā*, where reference is made to the *Prāṇa* and the *Apāna* moving within the nostrils *(nāsābhyantaracāriṇau prāṇāpānau*, B.G.v.27). Our view is further strenghthened by the term *prāṇāyama* (B.G.iv.29), the breath control which may not be different from the *anāpānāsati*, the concentration by in-breathing and out-breathing of Early Buddhism (Cp.*Majjhima Nikāya*, P.T.S.ed, 1.425 etc.)
9. Cp.Deussen, *A.G.P.I* iii,p.12 & Macdonell, *H.S.L.*, pp.233-234.

XVI

The Tanmātras : The Subtle Elements

(1) When *Tamas* predominates over *Sattva* and *Rajas* in the *Ahaṅkāra*, then there evolve the five generic seeds of the physical world which are technically called the *Tanmātras*. The term *Tanmātra* formed by the pronoun *tad*, that, and *mātra*, essence (√*mā*, to measure) means 'merely that' or the subtle essences, viz. the essence of sound (*śabda*), touch (*sparśa*), form (*rūpa*), flavour *(rasa)* and odour (*gandha*). They are the subtlest forms of matter without magnitude and supersensible.[1] The *Tanmātras* are, again, called *sūkṣma* (*bhūta*) (cp. *S.K.*,39) or the fine elements: thus, as observed above, they are an aspect of the *Bhūtas*, or the gross elements, which we will be discussing in a subsequent chapter (chap.19). The *Tanmātras* are included among the eighteen principles (i.e. *Mahat-Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, Manas*, the ten organs and the five subtle elements) that go to make up the *Liṅga-śarīra* or the subtle body. But the gross elements are not included in it. In this sense the *Tanmātras* are supposed to be permanent (*niyata, S.K. 39)* whereas the other (gross) elements are not so *(mātāpitṛjāḥ nivartante*, the elements born of parents are perishable, *S.K.*39).

(2) In the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* Īśvarakṛṣṇa has employed three words to denote the subtle elements: *tanmātra* the elemental essences, *sūkṣma* the fine elements and *aviśeṣa* the non-specific. The word *tanmātra* occurs in three verses of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (24,25 & 38), *sūkṣma* in two verses (39 & 40) and *aviśeṣa* in one (38) (cp. *yāni pañca-tanmātrāṇi...etāni aviśeṣa ucchyante, Gauḍapāda).* Out of these three synonyms, the first two are the more important from a historical point of view. *Tanmātra*, as a technical term, does not appear to be very old. Its first occurrence is found in the *Maitrī Up.* iii.2. It is, again, found in two other later *Upaniṣads* belonging to the *Atharvavedic* tradition: the *Prāṇāgnihotra Up.* (iv) and the *Mahā Up.* (i).

(3) The concept of the *Tanmātras* is very much younger than that of the *Mahābhūtas* or the gross elements. Nevertheless, it is already implied in the *Chāndogya Up. vi.3-4,* the *Taittirīya Up.*ii.1. and the *Praśna Up.* iv.8. A consideration of all these contexts will show that they represent two stages of development of the idea of the *Tanmātras*. When we consider these two along with the *Saṅkhya Kārikā,* 38, we may see that there have altogether been three distinct stages of the evolution of the concept of the *Tanmātras.*[2]

In the *Chāndogya Up.* we come across the elements of fire (*tejas*), water (*apas*) and earth (*anna*) (vi.2.3-4), the only (gross) elements known to this *Upaniṣad*. The same doctrine of the three (gross) elements is continued in the *Chānd.Up.*vi.3 and 4[3]. These three elements (*Chānd.Up.*vi.3) are not pure elements.[4] Each element is a mixture in that it contains parts of the other two elements and this process is technically termed as *trivṛt-karaṇa.*[5] In this doctrine reminding us of Anaxagoras affirming that there is a portion of everything in everything,[6] we may notice the origin of the *Sāṅkhya* conception of the *tanmātras*, the subtle essences giving rise to the gross elements (cp.R.K; *I.P.*Vol.I.p.201).

The *Praśna Up.*4.8, differentiates *pṛthivī, āpas, tejas, vāyu* and *ākāśa* from *pṛthivī-mātra, āpo-mātra, tejo-mātra, vāyu-mātra* and *ākāśa-mātra*. What is implied by the latter is the concept of the *tanmātras* which is specifically mentioned for the first time in the *Maitrī Up.*, 3.2. In the *Maitrī Up.* 6.10, is found the following passage: '(*liṅgam*) *mahadādyam viśeṣāntam*'. Deussen proposes to drop the 'm' of the second word of the line and to read it as: '*mahad- ādy- aviśeṣa-antam*'.[7] If Deussen's reading is accepted the *aviśeṣa* in the above passage refers to the *tanmātra* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā.* [8]

In the *Taittirīya Up.* ii.1, it is said that from 'the *ātman* the *ākāśa* arose; from the *ākāśa* the *vāyu*; from the *vāyu* the *agni*, from the *agni* the *āpas;* and from the *āpas* the *pṛthivī*'. This theory (unknown to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*) implies that every element possesses the quality of the element from which it is arisen. In this theory with its elements giving rise to other elements we see an earlier stage of the concept of the *tanmātras*. The elements giving rise to the other elements are the prototypes of the later *tanmātras*. This theory seems to have been utilized by *Gauḍapāda*

and Vācaspatimiśra[9] to explain the passage from the *tanmātras* (the subtle elements) to the *bhūtas* (the gross elements).

(4) Īśvarakṛṣṇa's doctrine of the *Tanmātraṣ* is found in the *Kārikā*, verse 38:

> *tanmātrāṇy aviśeṣāḥ*
> *tebhyo bhūtāni pañca pañcabhyaḥ.*
> *ete smṛtā viśeṣāḥ*
> *śāntā ghorāś ca mūḍhāś ca.*

> The subtle essences are non-specific; from those five (proceed) the five gross elements; these are known as specific, (and are) tranquil, terrific and delusive.

The 'specific' (*viśeṣa*) are the gross elements and the non-specific (*aviśeṣa*) are the subtle elements. According to the *Kārikā* 34, both these are the objects of the organs of cognition: (*buddhīndriyāni teṣām, pañca viśeṣāviśeṣaviṣayāni*, of these the five organs of cognition have objects, specific and non-specific). Deussen thinks that the *Kārikā* doctrine of the *Tanmātras* may diminish the validity of Gauḍapāda's opinion, that the non-specific (or subtle elements) are only the objects of cognition of gods (*etāni aviśeṣā ucyante, devānām* etc., ... *viṣayā*) (*cp. A.G.P.* 1,iii.p.447). But the opinion of Deussen may not be quite correct. What Īśvarakṛṣṇa intended was, perhaps, that in general the organs of cognition apprehend both the gross and the subtle elements. This may not, however, happen in the case of all, for the senses only of gods (as mentioned by *Gauḍapāda*) and the Yogins can perceive the subtle elements.[10] The *Sāṅkhya* conception of the *Tanmātras* implies the recognition that the gross material entities can be reduced into atomic or infra-atomic essences. Thus, by the tern *Tanmātra*, the *Sāṅkhya* exponents could have meant the subtle primary elements conceived as the inner counterparts of the experience of the five organs of sense. If so, this discovery on the part of the *Sāṅkhyas* at such an early period of human history is, indeed, very creditable.

Notes and References

1. Vide Keith, *S.S.*, p. 101.
2. Cp. Deussen, *A.G.P.* 1. iii. pp. 446-447.
3. Cp. Deussen, *Sechzig Up. des Veda*, p. 155.
4. Vide Radhakrishnan, *The Prin. Up.* p. 450 and 452.
5. Cp. *Chānd. Up.* vi. 3.3-4.
6. Cp. Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, p. 96.
7. Cp. Deussen, *Sechzig Up. des Veda.* p. 337.
8. *'tanmātrāṇi-aviśeṣāh'*, *S.K.*, 38.
9. Cp. Deussen, *A.G.P.* 1. iii. p. 446.
10. Cp. Suryanarayana Sastri, *The Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, p. 64.

XVII

The Liṅga : The Subtle Body

(1) The *Liṅga* is a special concept of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy (cp. *S.K.*40,41 and 42). It is also known (in the later literature) as *Liṅga-śarīra. Liṅga* is the subtle body which is (conventionally) considered as the invisible vehicle of the soul (*Puruṣa*). The *Liṅga* is described in the *Sāṅkhya kārikā* as follows : 'The subtle body (*liṅga*) arisen primevally, unimpeded, permanent, composed of intellect and the rest down to the subtle elements, incapable of enjoyment, migrates and is endowed with dispositions (*S.K.*40)[1]. Just as a picture does not exist without a substrate or a shadow without a post and the like, so the *Liṅga* does not subsist supportless without what are specific (i.e. the subtle body) (S.K.41).[2]

(2) The concept of *Liṅga* deserves our attention not only from a philosophical point of view, but also from a linguistic angle. The word *liṅga* is semantically related to *lāṅgala*, plough and *laguḍa*, rod; it is derived from an Austro-asiatic root, √*lak* and it means both *spade* and *male generative organ.*[3] All the three words convey the sense of 'being creative' and thus they are 'functional' in value. *Lāṅgala* performs the function of ploughing and is, thus, instrumental in producing or creating a good crop. *Laguḍa* or rod which is but a synonym of *daṇḍa* is a means of punishment and is thus responsible for reforming an individual in the sense of producing some new traits in his character. So is *liṅga* both in the sense of 'spade' (—> tilling —> good crop) and male generative organ (—> procreation —> progeny). Thus we see that the concept of *liṅga* has gradually emerged from a particular cultural pattern of a primitive ethnic group. It is significant that the term *liṅga* which plays so important a part throughout the history of the Hindu thought is but a word of non-Aryan origin. The *liṅga* cult was an institution in Indian civilization right from prehistoric, times. The worship of *liṅga*, the generative organ of *Śiva-Paśupati* of the Iindus Valley civilization

played an important role even in the later period. This deity (*Śiva-Paśupati*) considered to be a great Yogin is generally supposed to appear in the *Ṛgveda* under the guise of Rudra who even bears the epithet of *Śiva* (cp. *R.V.*x.92.9 and also V.R. p.56). Important terms such as *tryambaka* (a name of Rudra, *R.V.* vii,59.12), *śiśna-deva* (*R.V.*VII.21.5 and x.99.3)too may imply that the pre-*Vedic Śiva-Paśupati* cult was found in the *Ṛgvedic* period in some form or other. We may further refer to the *Muni-sūkta* (*R.V.*x.136) which appears to depict not only the picture of a yogin but also that of the later god Śiva.[4] With these preliminary remarks we may raise the question whether the pre-historic *liṅga* cult of India could have exercised any influence on the formation of the concept of the *Liṅga* (*śarīra*) of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy ?

(3) The term *liṅga* does not occur in the *Vedas* or the *Brāhmaṇas*. But we have to note that an important characteristic attributed to the *Liṅga*, the psychic apparatus, in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, is already found in the *Ṛgveda* . In the *Kārikā* 40, it is stated that the *Liṅga* is *pūrva-utpanna*, that is to say, that it is arisen (originated or formed) primevally. Refering to this *Gauḍapāda* observes that 'when the universe is yet uncreated, then at the first creation of Nature (*Pradhāna*) the subtle body is arisen' (*yadā lokā anutpannāḥ ...tadā sūkṣma śarīram utpannam*). The concept of 'primeval orgin' was already familiar to the *Ṛgveda* . It appears under different forms such as, *pūrva-ja*, arisen or born primevally (Grassmann: *in der Vorzeit geboren, uralt*) (*R.V.* vii.53.2. and x.14.15), *pūrva-jā* (*R.V.* viii.6.41), *pūrva-jāvarī* (*R.V.* x. 65.8), *pūrva-jāta*. (*R.V.*x.97.1). All these instances show beyond doubt that the concept of being born primevally was well-established already during the period of the *Ṛgveda*. In these instances, the two universal parents (*dyāvāpṛthivī*) (cp. 'the two parents born before all others' *R.V* vii.53.2), a *Ṛṣi* (Indra thou art a *ṛṣi* born of old - *R.V.*viii.6.41), the plant-goddesses (*oṣadhīḥ* - *R.V.*x.97.1) etc., are considered to have been born primevally. It is important to note that in two of the five instances cited above (*R.V.* vii.53.2 and x.65.8) the concept under discussion is applied to Heaven and Earth (*dyāvāpṛthivī*), a prototype of the *Sāṅkhya* dualism of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* (vide chap.4.sec.3.1). In the *R.V.*x. 97.1, the idea is attributed to the *oṣadhīḥ* (the mothers - *R.V.*x.97. 2 and 4), a class of goddesses

considered to be a prototype of *Prakṛti* (vide chap.9, sec.3.):

Yā oṣadhīḥ pūrvā-jātā
Devebhyas triyugam purā. (*R.V.*x.97.1)[5]

The plants that were born primevally, three ages earlier than the gods.

This very same idea of being born primevally (*pūrvā-jātā*) mentioned in the *Ṛgveda* x.97.1, is again found in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* vii.2.4.26 (cp.Egg.tr.of the *Śata.Brāh.* S.B.E.Vol XLI, p.339 and Griffith: *The Hymns of the Rigveda*, Vol.11,p.533 f.n.1).

(4) (a) The term *liṅga* for the first time is found in the *Upaniṣads*. Its earliest occurrence is seen in the *Kaṭha Up.* in the form of *a-liṅga*. Here we may perhaps see the faint beginning of the concept of *Liṅga* of the *Sāṅkhya* system.

avyaktāt tu paraḥ puruṣo
vyāpako' liṅga eva ca. (*11.3.8*).

Beyond the unmanifest is the person (*puruṣa*), all pervading and without any mark.

Agreeing with Deussen we may say that *a-Liṅga* in this verse may refer to the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *liṅga*.[6] Here, *a-liṅga* means without any mark and thus it implies a state of being without any empirical attributes (*sarva-saṁsāra-dharma-varjitaḥ*)[7]. Hence *liṅga* is a distinctive mark or sign. Radhakrishnan, thus, appears to be correct in interpreting the *liṅga* in the present context as *liṅga-śarīra*.[8] If this interpretation is accepted it means that *Puruṣa* needs no *subtle body* as it is not subject to death or rebirth.[9]

(b) An aspect of the development of the concept of *Liṅga-śarīra* can be seen in Pippalāda's doctrine of the *Puruṣa* or person with sixteen parts (*ṣoḍaśa kalā*) found in the *Praśna Up*. It is said in this text that: '*Puruṣa* created life (*prāṇa*); from life, faith (*śraddhām*), ether (*kham*), air, light, water, earth, sense-organ (*indriya*), mind (*manas*) and food; from food, vital vigour (*vīryam*), austerity (*tapaḥ*), hymns, works (*karma*), worlds and in the

worlds name (*nāma*) (VI.4). It is interesting to note in this scheme that *Prāṇa* or life comes first, then *Śraddhā* or faith and finally the material elements. *Śaṅkara* understands *Prāṇa*, here as the *Hiraṇyagarbha* (*hiraṇyagarbhākhyam sarva-prāṇi-kāraṇādhāram, antar-atmānam, Praśna Up* vi.4). *Nāma* which comes at the end of the scheme suggests individuation. In this doctrine of the 'Person with sixteen parts', Pippalāda seems to pave the way for the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* doctrine of the *liṅga* (Cp. Ranade, *C.S.U.P.*, p.49 and R.K., *P.U.*p.667).

(c) The earliest occurrence of the word *liṅga* in the *Upaniṣads* is found in the *Śvet.Up.*vi.9. But it is not quite certain whether it represents an early stage of the development of the concept under discussion. However, it is significant that we have the occurrence of the word *Pradhāna*, an important technical term of the *Sāṅkhyas*, in the immediately next verse (*Śvet.Up* VI.10).Cp.

> *na tasya kaścit patir asti loke*
> *na ceśitā naiva ca tasya liṅgam.* (*Śvet.Up.*VI,9)

> Of him there is no master in the world, nor ruler; nor is there any mark of him.

> *yas tantunābha iva tantubhiḥ pradhānajaiḥ*
> *svabhāvataḥ deva ekaḥ svam āvṛṇot...* (*Śvet.Up.* VI.10)

> The one god, according to his own nature, covers himself like a spider with threads produced from *pradhāna* (unmanifested matter).

According to Deussen *Liṅga* in the above context may be the same as the *Sāṅkhya* concept. Therefore after translating the word *liṅga* as *Kennzeichen* (=mark) he gives an alternative translation of it as *feinen Leib*[10] by which he means the *Liṅga* of the *Sāṅkhya* system.

(d) The most certain reference to the concept of *Liṅga* is found in two passages of the *Maitrī Up.* (VI.10 and 19). In the former passage (VI.10) it is found as follows: *mahadādya* (ṁ) *viśeṣāntam*

liṅgam. As pointed out earlier in chap. xvi, Deussen proposes a small change in the above line, namely to remove the *anusvāra* and to add 'a' to *viśeṣāntam* and thus to read it as: *mahadādi - aviśeṣāntam liṅgam.*[11] If this reading is accepted the phrase will be similar to the same found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, 40: *mahadādi sūkṣma paryantam ...liṅgam*. In fact Hume has interpreted the idea here (*Maitrī Up.*VI.10) as the subtle body which includes the categories from intellect up to the separate elements. There is another important passage in the same Up.vi.19: *Liṅgam nirāśrayam* which is just the same as: *nirāśrayam liṅgam* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, 41. Thus we see that the concept of *liṅga* in the *Kārikā* is clearly related to the idea conveyed in the above two passages of the *Maitrī Up.* Deussen too holds a similar view[12]:

(5) In the *Maitrī Up.* vi. 10 we come across an important doctrine, the concept of *Bhūtātman*, the elemental self. It appears to us that this *Bhūtātman*, the elemental self is essentially the same as the *liṅga* of the *Kārikā*.[13] Thus it is described in the *Maitrī Up.*:

> *'asti khalvanyo'paro bhūtātmākhyo yo'yam sitāsitaiḥ karmaphalair abhibhūyamānaḥ sad-asad-yonim āpadyatā ity avāñcyordhvā vā gatir dvand-vair abhibhūyamānaḥ paribhramatīty asyopavyākhyānam, pañca-tanmātrā bhūta-śab-denocyante, atha pañca-mahā-bhūtāni bhūta-śabde-no-cyante'tha teṣāṁ yat samudayam, tat śaīram ity uktam, atha yo ha khalu vā va śarira ity uktam sa bhūtātmety uktam....'* (*Maitrī Up.III.2*).

> There is, indeed, another, different, called the *Bhūtātman*, he who, affected by the bright or the dark fruits of action, enters a good or an evil womb so that his course is downward or upward and he wanders about affected by the pairs (of opposits). And this is its explanation. The five *Tanmātras* are called by the name *Bhūta (element)*. Likewise the five *Mahābhūtas* (gross elements) are called by the name *Bhūta*. Now the combination of these is called the body (*śarīra*).

Now he, indeed, who is said to be in the body is called the *Bhūtātman*.

If we compare this teaching with the conception of *Liṅga* in the *Kārikā*, 40 (see above) we see that the two doctrines are practically the same. Just as the *Bhūtātman*, the *Liṅga* the subtle body being the vehicle of *dharma* (merit) and *adharma* (demerit) (cp.S.K.44) ,which are the basis of transmigration, accompanies the soul on its wanderings from one gross body to another whether the latter be that of a deity, a human being, an animal or a plant.

(6) There is another passage in the same text (*Maitrī Up.*) which deserves our attention:

> *puruṣaś cetā pradhānāntaḥsthaḥ. sa eva bhoktā prākṛtam annam bhuṅkta iti. tasyāyam bhūtātmā hy annaṁ, asya kartā pradhānaḥ..... prākṛtam annam triguṇa-bheda-pariṇamatvān mahadādyaṁ viśeṣāntaṁ liṅgam'.* (*Maitrī Up.* 6.10)

> The conscious *Puruṣa* abides in the *Pradhāna*. He alone is the enjoyer, for he enjoys (feeds on) the food (*annam*) derived from *Prakṛti*. Of him this *Bhutātman* is indeed, the food (i.e. this *bhūtātman* serves him as his food) *(for)* his creator *(kartā)* is *Pradhāna*... The food derived from *Prakṛti* consisting of all that beginning with *Mahat* and ending with *Viśeṣa*, being a transformation of the distinction (of nature) with its *guṇas*, is the *Liṅga*.

Here *Puruṣa* is the subject (*annāda* = *bhoktṛ*); all others are derived from *Prakṛti* and belong to the objective aspect of experience (*anna*).[14] Thus we see that the food derived from *Prakṛti*=*Bhūtātman*=all that begins with *Mahat* and ends with *Viśeṣa*=*Liṅga*. We reserve our comments on the concept of the *Bhūtātman* for the end of this study.

(7) A related idea of the *Bhūtātman-Liṅga* concept can be seen in the *Mahābhārata*. The *Retaḥ-śarīra*, the seed-body (Deussen, *der Samenleib*) mentioned in the *Mahābhārata* (xiv,217) is essentially the same as the *Bhūtātman* mentioned above. Here it is mentioned that the body is the bearer of the *Retaḥśarīra* (cp.Deussen, *A.G.P.* 1.iii,p.64). Elsewhere in the Great Epic (xii.2249) this *Retaḥ-śarīra* is depicted in the same way in which the *Liṅga* in the classical *Sāṅkhya* system (of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*) is described. Here the *Retaḥ-śarira*, just as the *Liṅga* in the classical *Sāṅkhya*, is said to accompany the soul in all its wanderings or the transmigrations (cp. Deussen, *A.G.P.* 1,iii,p,64). It is further mentioned in the same context (xii.22449) that *Puruṣa* who is free from the *liṅga* (*a-liṅga*) is (also) entered into it (i.e.the *Liṅga*). Elsewhere in the Great Epic (v.4615) it is said that Puruṣa coupled with the *Liṅga* wanders for ever (cp.Deussen, *A.G.P.*1.III,p.64).

(8) In conclusion we may say that the similarity between the *Bhūtātman*, the *Retaḥ-śarīra* and the *Liṅga*(*śarīra*) can hardly be missed. They bear similarity to each other not only by the descriptions of their names but also by the activities ascribed to them. If the concept of the *Bhūtātman* reflected in the *Maitrī Up.* is older (*not* the text) than the idea of *Liṅga* in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* then it is certainly a prototype of the latter. But this is only a conjecture. On the other hand, it is not impossible that the classical *Sāṅkhya* (of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*) may have influenced the concept of the *Bhūtātman* in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad*. All that we can say at present is that the conception of *Retaḥ-śarīra* of the *Mahābhārata* (mentioned above) may, in all probability, have been a precursor of the doctrine of *Liṅga* in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*.

Notes and References

1. *pūrvotpannam aśaktam niyatam*
mahadādi sūkṣma paryantam
saṃsarati nirupabhogam
bhāvair adhivāsitam liṅgam. (*S.K.* 40).
2. *citram yathā 'śrayam ṛte*
sthāṇvādibhyo vinā yathā chāyā
tadvad vinā viśeṣair
na tiṣṭhati nirāśrayam liṅgam. (*S.K.* 41).
3. Vide Przyluski, De quelques nomes anaryens en indo-aryen. *M.S.L.* XXII (1921), pp. 205-10.

Emprunts anaryens en indo-aryen, Bulletin de la Société de Linquistique (Paris) XXIV (1924), pp. 118-123.

4. Cp. Geldner, *Der Rig-Veda*, iii, p. 369; Hauer, *Die Anfänge der Yogapraxis im alten Indian*, p. 170; Arbman, *Rudra*, p. 298.
5. The poet, according to the *Anukramaṇikā*, is *Bhiṣaj* by which we may understand a medical man of the *Atharvanic* tradition.
6. Çp. *Sechzig Up. des Veda*, p. 286, f. n. 1.
7. *Śaṅkara* on the *Kaṭha Up.* 11.3.8.
8. Cp.*The Principal Upanisads*, p. 644.
9. Cp. *na jāyate mriyate vā kadācin*
   nā'yam bhūtvā 'bhavitā vā na bhūyaḥ.
   (The B.G. Chapter 2, *Sāṅkhya Theory and Yoga Practice*). He is never born, nor does he die ever, nor having (once) come to be will he again cease to be. *B.G.* ii. 20.
10. *Kein Fürst ist über ihm in allen Welten*
    Und kein Gebieter, kein Kennzeichen trägt er.
    I. Order : keinen feinen Leib (Liṅgam), weil er der Herr des feine Leibes (des 'Herrn der Sinne') ist. Vgl. aliṅga Kaṭha 6.8.
    Sechzig Up. des Veda, p. 308.
11. Cp. *Sechzig Up. des Veda*, p. 337, f. n. 2.
12. *"Das liṅgam nirāśrayam ist, 'der von der Aussenwelt abgewandte psychische Organismus'; diese Erklärung ergibt sich aus Sāṅkhyakārikā 41... Schon öfter begegneten wir, wie hier wieder, wörtlichen Übereinstimmungen mit der Sāṅkhyakārikā". (Sechzig Up. des Veda, p. 344, f. n. 1).*
13. Cp. Deussen, *'Das Liṅgam, der feine Leib, der in wesentlichen dasselbe ist, was bisher Bhūtātman genannt wurde.....', Sechzig Up. des Veda*, pp. 337, f.n. 2.
14. Cp. Deussen, *Sechzig Up. des Veda*, pp. 337, f. n. 1.

XVIII

The Bhāvas: The Psychic States

(1) The connection between the *Liṅga* and the *Bhāvas* is evident. The one cannot be separated from the other. The former is the substratum in which subsist the latter.[1] The relationship between the *Liṅga* and the *Bhāvas* is somewhat parallel to that which exists between the *Antaḥkaraṇa* and the *Prāṇas*. Both the *Bhāvas* and the *Prāṇas* are not included among the twenty-five principles of the *Sāṅkhya* system: they are, so to say, a sort of by-products. Just as the *Prāṇas* exist in association with the *Antaḥkaraṇa*, so subsist the *Bhāvas* in the *Liṅga*. Now what are the *Bhāvas* ? The word *bhāva* is derived from the root √*bhū*, 'to become or be' and means, becoming, being, existent, occurring etc. Semantically it is related to *bhāvanā* (from √*bhū* to become, to be) meaning, forming in the mind, conception, apprehension, imagination, supposition, fancy, thought, metitation and so forth. So the translation of *Bhāvas* as psychic states, by Keith is very apt.[2] The *Bhāvas* or the psychic states exist within the *Liṅga*, the psychic apparatus.[3] Within the gross body which dissolves after death, every living being has a subtle body. It consists of eighteen principles which we referred to, in the previous chapter on the *Liṅga*. It is this subtle body that goes on from birth to birth as the basis of the reincarnated *Puruṣa* or the personality. It departs, so to say, from the sheath of the gross body at the time of death and then determines the nature of the next existence, for in it are left traces, like scars or furrows, of all our actions, desires and inclinations. The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* mentions two sets of *Bhāvas*, the group of eight (*S.K.*43-45) and the group of fifty (*S.K.*46-51) which we will be refering to, towards the end of this chapter.

(2) It is quite clear that the doctrins of the *Bhāvas* is connected with the conception of *saṁsāra* (= *punar mṛtyu* = the transmigration of the souls) (*S.K.*44-45) and *saṁskāra* (*S.K.*67 and 40).[4]

The conception of the transmigration of the souls is very old. The germ of the idea seems to be vaguely reflected in the *Ṛgveda* I.164.30 (cp.chap.6, sec.4) where the soul is spoken of as departing to the waters.[5] (*anat-śaye turagātu jīvam, ejad dhruvam madhya ā pastyām,* breathing rests the *Jīva* and is yet of quick motion, it is stirring, yet is firm in the rivers, *R.V.*1.164.30).[6] Perhaps we may find another instance in the *Ṛgveda* iv.26.1A, where Indra says, 'I was aforetime Manu,I was Sūrya' and so on.[7] We have already traced the development of the concept of *saṁsāra* (see chap.6,secs.4-5). The beginning of the doctrine of *Karma* which is closely connected with the conception of the *Bhāvas*, is already found in the early *Upaniṣads* such as the *Bṛhad.* (*iii.2.19* and *iv.4.11*), the *Chāndogya Up.* (v.10.7) and the *Kauṣītakī Up.* (1.1.5). The *Bṛhad.Up.* says that: verily one becomes good by good actions (*puṇyena karmaṇā*) bad by bad actions (*pāpena*) (*Bṛhad.Up.* iii.2.13). Here we may find the most certain beginning of the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine presented in the *Kārikā* 44 where it is said: through virtue (*dharma*) (comes about)the departure upwards and through vice (*adharma*) departure down below. It is noteworthy that the two concepts of *puṇya* (good action) and *pāpa* (bad action) of the *Bṛhad.Upaniṣad* are simply replaced by *dharma* (virtue) and *adharma* (vice) in the teaching of the *Sāṅkhya Karikā*.

(3) (a) The term *Bhāva* (plural), for the first time, is found in an *Upaniṣad* belonging to the *Atharvaveda:* the *Muṇḍaka Up.* (ii.1.2). But it is not certain whether the word *bhāva* here really means the psychic states. Hume, however, translates the word as 'beings', and then he gives an alternative translation of it as 'states': 'Just as there shoot out from a blazing fire sparks by the thousands, resembling the fire, so do the various beings (*or states: bhāva*) proceed from that Imperishable: and into it verily they return'.[8]

(b) In the *Śvet.Up.* there is an important verse (1.4) which in the form of a riddle appears to allude to the two groups of the *Bhāvas* mentioned in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*:

tam eka nemim trvṛtaṁ ṣoḍaśāntaṁ
śatārdhāraṁ viṁśati pratyarābhiḥ
aṣṭakaiḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ viśva-rūpaika-pāśaṁ ,
trimārga bhedaṁ dvi-nimittaika-mohaṁ. (*Śvet.Up.*1.4)

(We understand) him (as a wheel) with one felly, with three tires, sixteen ends, *fifty spokes*, twenty counter-spokes, and *six sets of eights*,whose one rope is manifold, which has three different paths, whose one delusion (arises) from two causes.

Here the fifty spokes (*śatārdhāram*) represent the forces which move the wheel, the *Brahmacakra*.[9] Such is also the opinion of Śaṅkara. This view is also accepted by Radhakrishnan.[10] The next important point is the concept of 'six sets of eights' (*aṣṭaka-ṣaḍ*) which is traditionally explained as (*i*) *prakṛti:* with its eight evolutes of the five elements, *Manas, Buddhi* and *Ahaṅkāra* (ii) *dhātu;* with the eight constituents of the body (iii) *aiśvarya:* lordship with its eight forms (iv) *bhāva:* eight conditions (v) *deva:* gods with their eight classes and (vi) *ātma-guṇa:* the eight virtues.[11] What is important to us here is the fourth group which is considered to be representing the eight *Bhāvas*. The view that the two sets of *Bhāvas* are implied in the above verse is quite plausible. Deussen in fact connects them directly with the relevant verses of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*.[12]

(c) One of the most important passages for our study is found in the *Maitrī Up.* iii.2, where the *Bhūtātman* or the *Liṅga* is supposed to be affected by the fruits of one's actions (vide chapter 17, section 5). This passage agrees fully with the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of the *Bhāvas* presented in the *Kārikā* 44 (*dharmeṇa gamanam ūrdhvam, gamanam adhastād bhavaty adarmeṇa*). 'Bright' (*sita*), 'dark' (*asita*), 'upward course' (*ūrdhva-gati*) and 'downward course' (*avāñcya-gati*) in the above passage of the *Maitrī Up.*iii.2, reminds us of *dharma, adharma, ūrdhvagamana* and *adhastād gamana* of the *Kārikā* 44 respcetively. The *Maitrī Up.* being a work of a later date, it is difficult for us to conclude that it has influenced the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* in this conncetion. The influence might have been the other way about.

(4) We have mentioned in chapter ten (section 7) that the term *bhāva* is foud in the Great Epic (*M.Bh.*) as a common name for the Guṇas (xii.7081, 10500 and xiv.1564). Further we have mentioned there (sec.7) that the Epic had developed a moral concept of the *Guṇas*, according to which the action of the *Guṇas*

is fundamental to the fate of the individual. The passage number xii.11637 equates the action of the *Guṇas* with that of *puṇya* and *pāpa*. This function of the *Guṇas*, (the so-called *bhāvas* of the Epic.xii.7081,10500 and xiv.1554), is carried out by two of the eight *Bhāvas* mentioned in the same text (*S.K.*, verses43-45), *dharma* and *adharma*.

(5) As already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* presents two groups of *Bhāvas*. In the first instance it mentions a group of eight *Bhāvas* (verses 43-45) which are as follows :-

The Eight *Bhāvas*	Their Consequences
i. *dharma* (virtue).	going upwards.
ii. *adharma* (vice).	going downwards.
iii. *jñāna* (knowledge).	salvation.
iv. *ajñāna* (ignorance).	bodage.
v. *vairāgya* (non-attachment).	loosing the bond between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti (prakṛti-laya)* (Deussen *Hinschwinden der Prakṛti*) (cp. Keith, *S.S.* p. 103).
vi. *avairāgya (=rājasa rāga)* (attachment).	*saṁsāra*.
vii. *aiśvarya* (divine power).	freedom from obstacles and the possession of the eight *siddhis (avighāta)*.
viii. *anaiśvarya* (lack of divine power).	the reverse effect of the *aiśvarya*.[13]

We have to add a word here on *prakṛti-laya* or loosing the bond between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. The *Prakṛti-laya* which follows as a consequence of *vairāgya* or non-attachment does not seem to have been correctly interpreted by *Gauḍapāda* and other commentators. Thus says Gauḍapāda :-
'Then through that non-attachment preceded by ignorance comes about the absorption into nature.After his death, such a person is absorbed into the eight evolvents (*prakṛtiṣu*) viz. the nature (*pradhāna*), intellect, ego and the five subtle elements and

gets no liberation. He migrates again' (*tasmāt ajñānapūrvād vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ, mṛto' ṣṭāsu prakṛtiṣu pradhānabuddhyahaṅkāra-tanmātreṣu līyate na mokṣaḥ: tato bhūyo' pi saṁsarati) (Gauḍapāda* on *S.K.* verse 45). *Ajñāna-pūrva* (preceded by ignorance), the attribute qualifying *vairāgya* (non-attachment) in the above commentary, is a phrase added by Gauḍapāda himself and it does not occur in the original text of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 45. Now, according to *Gauḍapāda*'s interpretation, *prakṛti-laya*, the result of non-attachment, is the absorption into the eight *Prakṛtis*, that is to say, into the *Liṅga*. But this happens to every personality (*puruṣa*) that has not yet obtained salvation. The problem here is solved by the concept of *saṁsāra*, the result of attachment (*avairāgya*). If attachment results in *saṁsāra* (*saṁsāro bhavati rājasād rāgāt, S.K.*), then non-attachment results in loosing the bond between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*.[14]

Again the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* gives a group of fifty *Bhāvas* (verses 46-50) arranged under four different classes. The first consists of the *Viparyayas* or the erroneous views which are five in number. They are *tamas* (darkness), *moha* (confusion), *mahāmoha* (deep confusion), *tamisra* (gloom) and *andhatamisra* (dark gloom). The seond consists of *aśaktis* or lack of power which is considered to be of twenty-eight kinds. The third comprises the nine *tuṣṭis* or satisfactions and the fifth consists of the *siddhis* or perfections which are eight in number (vide chap.3.). Thus they are fifty in all.

It is difficult to reconcile these two lists of *Bhāvas* although they are very much alike. The *ajñāna* (ignorance) and *jñāna* (knowledge) of the first list can be compared with the *viparyaya* (the erroneous view) and the *Siddhi* (perfection) of the second group respectively. Perhaps the two groups may represent two opinions within the same school. But the fact that Īśvarakṛṣṇa was more inclined to accept the former list of *Bhāvas*, the group of eight (verses 43-45) is seen in several verses of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (verses 23, 63, 65, 67,) where only eight *Bhāvas* are implied.[15]

The *Bhāvas*, according to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, verse 43, are of three types. Īśvarakṛṣṇa sums them up as follows:

sāṁsiddhikāś ca bhāvāḥ
prākṛtikā vaikṛtāś ca dharmādyāḥ
dṛṣṭāḥ karaṇāśrayiṇaḥ
kāryāśrayinaś ca kalalādyāḥ.

> The *Bhāvas*, viz. virtue and the rest, are connate, natural and acquired. Some subsist in the instrument (*Karaṇa=Liṅga*), the others in its effect since (the time of) embryo (cp. Deussen: *A.G.P.* 1.iii.p.450).[16]

In the light of this teaching we may represent the concept of. *Bhāvas* as follows:-

THE BHĀVAS

Sāṁsiddhika	*Prākṛtika*	Vaikṛtika
Connate or as Deussen calls it *fertig mitgebracht*	Natural or as Deussen calls it *angeboren*	Acquired or as Deussen calls it *neu entstanden*
(A.G.P. 1. iii. p. 450)	(A.G.P. 1. iii. p. 450)	(A.G.P. 1. iii. p. 450)
Karaṇāśrayin		*Kāryāśrayin*
They subsist in the instrument or the *Liṅga* of the previous life.		They subsist in the effect or the *Liṅga* of the Present life

bhāvairadhivāsitam liṅgam (S.K. 40)
The *Liṅga* endowed with the *Bhāvas*, the psychic states.

Notes and References

1. *bhāvair adhivāsitam liṅgam, S.K.*, 40.
2. Vide *S.S.* p.103.
3. *ibid.*,
4. Cp. *'tathā' śeṣa-saṁskārā-dhāratvāt'* - *S.P.S.* ii.42.
5. Cp. Macdonell, H.S.L., p. 115.
6. Cp *āsīno dūram vrajati*
   sayāno yāti sarvataḥ. (Kaṭha Up. 1.2.21).
7. The Vedāntins take this as an instance supporting their *Advaita* point of view.
8. Hume, *Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*, p.370.
9. Cp. *E.S.* p.31.
10. Cp. *The Principal Up.* p.712.
11. Cp. *ibid.*,
12. Cp. *Sechzing Up. des Veda*, p.292.
13. *dharmeṇa gamanam ūrdhvam*
    gamanam adhastād bhavaty adharmeṇa.
    jñānena ca apavargo
    viparyayād iṣyate bandhaḥ. (S.K.44)
    vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ, saṁsāro bhavati rājasād rāgāt.
    aiśvaryād avighātaḥ
    viparyayāt tad-viparyāsaḥ. (S.K.45).
14. Cp. *A.G.P.* 1.iii p, 451.
15. (i) Cp. *A.G.P.* 1. iii. pp.454-455; (ii) Cp. *S.S.* p.105.
16. *Die Bhāvas, Pflicht und weitere, sind teile fertig,*
    Naturanhaftend, teile durch Umbildung.
    Die einen haften in Organ, die andern
    In seiner Wirkung seit dem Embryo.

XIX

The Bhūtas: The Gross Elements

(1) The term *Bhūta* conveying the sense of elemental matter also implies the idea of dynamism or change. The root √*bhū*, to become, gives rise to *bhūta* in its preterite passive participle form and it means, *that which has become.* The term *Bhūta,* in fact, occurs in the *Upaniṣads* in this sense as distinct from the conscious aspect of the universe (cp: *bhūta-mātra* and *prajñā-mātra* at the *Kauṣītakī Up.* iii.8)[1]. Applied to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, we may say that the *Bhūtas,* being the last stage of cosmic evolution, have ceased to become in the sense of evolving any further. But we must not also forget the fact that there is a continuous *svarūpa-pariṇāma* (change into the homogeneous) even in the *Bhūtas* although they have ceased to become in the sense of *virūpa-pariṇāma* (change into heterogeneous).[2] It is also important to note that the *Bhūtas* in the *Sāṅkhya* system are not the ultimate irreducible constituents of matter, for they are evolved immediately from the subtle elements (*tanmātras*) and ultimately from *Prakṛti.*[3]

(2) The *Ṛgvedic* thinkers seem to have known only a single element: Water (cp.*I.P.,* Vol.i, p.102). According to Griffith the conception of gross elements is already implied in the *Atharvaveda* vii. 9.16.

> *ṣaḍ jātā bhūtā prathamajā-ṛtasya*
> *ṣaḍu sāmāni ṣaḍ .... (2) vahanti.* (Hoshiarpur Ed.)

> Six elements arose, first born of order
> the six (day time) is carried by six *Sāmans.* (Griffith)

Commenting on this verse Griffith says that the six elements are: earth, air, fire, water, ether and the subtle elements.[4] Griffith's

opinion does not seem to be quite appropriate. In dealing with this verse one has to bear in mind two facts; namely that it occurs in a mystic hymn and also that there is no commentary on it. Therefore one has to take special care in interpreting it. The term *bhūta* here does not appear to mean 'elements'. Elements, in general, are the original substances and if they are described to have originated from something else (even in an ancient text like the Atharvaveda) it may appear to be somewhat odd. Therefore we propose that it is better to translate the term *bhūta* here simply as 'beings' in order that it may imply anykind of 'being' whether animate or inanimate. Hence we agree with Whitney in translating the above verse as : - six (are) born the beings, first born of righteousness, six *sāmans* carry the six days (?) sacrifice.

(3) As we have mentioned earlier the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,* x.1.3.4. divides the individual into five immortal parts and five mortal parts. The five mortal parts, here, are important in that they correspond in function to the great elements. Hence it is correctly observed by Johnston that, this division foreshadows the difference of aspect between the material and mental principles of the *Sāṅkhya* on its physical side; for the five mortal parts constitute the corporeal body, which dissolves at death, and they correspond therefore in function to the great elements.[5]

(4) The *Upaniṣad* thinkers have advanced on the *Vedic* conception of a single element: Water. Broadly speaking, there are more or less two different stages of the development of the idea of elements in the *Upaniṣads.* As we have noticed earlier a group of three elements, is admitted by the *Chāndogya Up.* (vi.23-24) (vide chapter 16, section 3). Next we notice five elements admitted by some *Upaniṣads.* The *Aitareya Up.* (iii.3) refers to *Pṛthivī, Vāyu, Ākāśa, Āp* and *Jyotiṣ.* The same five elements are mentioned next in the *Taittirīya Up.* (ii.I), but it uses the term *Agni* in place of *Jyotiṣ* in the former. Again we come across the same set of elements in the *Praśna Up* (vi.4) where the term *Kha* is found in place of *Ākāśa* of the the former *Upaniṣads.* The concept of the five elements is once again found in the *Śvet.Up.* (ii.2 and vi.2) by the names of *Pṛthivī, Āp, Tejas, Anila* and *Kha.* The *Upaniṣadic* data imply firstly, that a specific term for the element of fire had not been established till the time of the *Śvet.Upaniṣad.* Thus they have been using both *Agni* and *Jyotiṣ* to imply the

element of fire till the period of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*. During this period the term *Tejas* later famous among the *Sāṅkhya* thinkers seems to have got established. The linguistic evolution of the technical term for the element of fire may have, probably, taken place as follows: **Agni* → *Jyotiṣ* → *Tejas*. We may, next, notice that the terms *Kha* and *Ākāśa* were still being used as synonyms to indicate the element of ether. This may imply that the term *Ākāśa* was not yet fully established as a specific term to mean the element of ether. Again we notice that *Vāyu* and *Anila* were both being used to mean the element of air. But the fact that the term *Vāyu* has been used in three *Upaniṣads*, viz. the *Aitareya*, the *Taittirīya* and the *Praśna* as opposed to the *Śvetāśvatara Up.* where *Anila* occurs, may prove beyond reasonable doubt that the term *Vāyu* was, already, more or less established during this period. In the *Muṇḍaka Up.* (i.8.9) one comes across a gradation of categories which is supposed to develop from *Brahman*. It is interesting to note that the five elements are occurring in this gradation as the last step of development (vide ch. 5, sec.14). In the *Sāṅkhya* system too, the five (gross) elements are considered as the last step of evolution of *Prakṛti*, the world-ground. The concept of the five elements is clearly mentioned in the *Maitrī Up.* (iii.2) by the phrase *pañca-mahā-bhūta* which reminds us at once of the *Kārikā* verse 38, where one comes across the term, *pañca-bhūtāni*. Thus we may notice that the concept of the *Bhūtas* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* is closely related to the idea conveyed in the above passage of the *Maitrī Upaniṣad*. The date of the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* being very late it may not be very wrong for one to conclude that the former may have influenced the latter.

(5) An important *Sāṅkhya* doctrine is the three-fold division of the elements. According to this teaching, there are three kinds of elements. Thus it is said.

> *sūkṣmā mātā-pitṛjāḥ*
> *saha prabhūtais tridhā viśeṣāḥ syuḥ.*
> *sūkṣmās teṣām niyatāḥ*
> *mātā-pitṛjā nivartante.* (S.K.39)

> The specific is three-fold, as subtle (bodies), as gross (bodies) born of parents and as the great elements. Of these the subtle (bodies) are constant, (while bodies) born of parents perish.

The *sūkṣma* or the subtle elements mentioned here are the *Tanmātras* which we have studied in chapter 16. The *mātā-pitṛjās* and the *prabhūtas* are a two-fold division of the gross elements. This two-fold division which does not appear to have been mentioned clearly in the earlier texts such as the *Upaniṣads* may, probably, be an invention of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. According to the *Kārikā*, *mātā-pitṛja* means those elements born of father and mother. They build the gross body which grows from the *sūkṣmaṣ* occupying the place of a grain of seed and are, in fact, transitory (*S.K.*39). The *Kārikā* does not say anything about the *prabhūtas* by which one may understand the inorganic nature. It appears to us that the division of the gross elements into the *mātā-pitṛja* and the *prabhūta* is merely a 'much ado about nothing'. Here one has made a distinction where there is no essential difference, the *mātā-pitṛja* being the same as the *prabhūta*, the gross elements. The commentators hold different opinions regarding the great elements (*prabhūta*). Thus Vācaspati restricts it to inorganic matter:

> 'Subtle body is one variety of objects, generated bodies are a second and the great elements a third; water, jars and the like (inorganic bodies) are comprised in the class of great elements' (*sūkṣmam śarīram eko viśeṣaḥ. mātā-pitṛjā dvitīyaḥ. mahābhūtāni tṛtīyaḥ. mahābhūtavarge ghaṭādīnām viśeṣa iti*) - So also the *Candrikā*:-
> 'Subtle bodies are those called *liṅga-śarīra*, generated are gross bodies and the great elements are mountains, trees and the like' (*sūkṣmam liṅgaśarīrākhyāḥ, mātāpitṛjāḥ sthula-dehāḥ, prabhūtā parvatavṛkṣādayaḥ*)

It appears to us that in this three-fold division of bodies (or elements) mentioned by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (which is explained dif-

ferently by the commentators on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā)* we have merely two distinctions, subtle and gross, the latter being subdivided into two species, organic and inorganic.[6]

Notes and References

1. Cp. *'Vitalism and Becoming'* by O.H.de A.Wijesekera *U.C.R.* Vol.I, No.1 (April, 1943) pp.49-50.
2. Cp. *I.I.P.*, p.267.
3. Cp. Seal, *'Positive Sciences of The Ancient Hindus,* ch.1.
4. Cp. *The Hymns of the Atharva-Veda,* Vol.I.p.418.
5. *E.S.*, p.18.
6. Cp.Colebrooke and Wilson, *The S.K.,* p.171; Keith, *S.S.* pp.101-102; Deussen, *A.G.P.*, 1.iii,pp.447-448 and 497.

XX

Metaphysics

(1) In the following two chapters we propose to discuss a few other *Sāṅkhya* concepts under the two headings: Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind. Most of the important doctrines that come under these fields have already been individually studied in the preceding chapters. Hence we limit ourselves to the remaining few concepts. Metaphysics is the science that investigates the first principles of nature and thought. It is vaguely applied to anything transcendental and supernatural. The motive which inspired Aristotle throughout *the Metaphysics* is the desire to acquire that practical branch of knowledge which is worthy of the name of wisdom (cp.*The Metaphysics,* I.A.Ross, *Aristotle,* p.154). Wisdom, according to Aristotle, is the knowledge of the first and the most vital causes (*The Meta.* A 2). The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy too is marked by a great desire for knowledge *(jijñāsā)* of the causes of three-fold suffering.[1] For Aristotle, metaphysics leads to wisdom which as we may understand from his *Nichomachean Ethics* (Bk.I,1-4), 'is thought to aim at some good' of the human beings. For the *Sāṅkhyas, jñāna,* knowledge or wisdom is for the purpose of overcoming the three-fold misery; it is technically termed as the *puruṣārtha-jñāna*, knowledge aiming at the goal of man (*S.K.*69). Thus the *Sāṅkhya* interest in knowledge may even be said to be keener than that of Aristotle. Whereas epistemology is the theory of knowledge, metaphysics (or ontology) is the theory of being or reality. In the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa metaphysics or ontology (cp.verses 7-21),[2] in general, is preceded by epistemology (cp.verses 1-6) which deals with the ways of knowing the reality and so on. This is a fair index of the *Sāṅkhya* predilection for epistemology: in the history of philosophy it is normally metaphysics that has preceded epistemology.[3]

(2) Avidyā-Māyā

One of the fundamental questions of Indian philosophy is the problem of *Avidyā* and *Māyā*. We saw in chapter 9 that *Prakṛti*, the matter containing the possibilities of all things, has also been considered as *Māyā*. *Māyā* is cosmic and viewed from the side of the individual it is *Ajñāna, Avidyā* or *Aviveka* (*S.K.* 14, cp.also II) which brings about the psychological illusion that *Puruṣa* is in bondage (cp.*S.K.*62). The *Sāṅkhya* does not attempt to explain as to how this phenomenon has actually come about. Thus we notice that *Māyā* and *Avidyā* depict two aspects of the same doctrine. In fact the intimate relation between *Avidyā* and *Māyā* (= *Prakṛti* = *Avyakta*) is clearly seen in the *S.P.B.* where it is mentioned that *Avidyā* is also called the Unmanifest (*avidyām āhur avyaktam*, S.P.B.I.69). Whence comes this *Māyā* or Avidyā ? According to the *Sāṅkhya* it is begnningless (*S.P.B.*, I.67); in other words, the *Sāṅkhya* implies that human mind which operates within the spatio-temporal pattern is unable to understand it till one attains the *samyag-jñāna* (*S.K.*67). The concept of *Māyā* is also of historical interest. In the *Ṛgveda* the word *Māyā* occurs in many places (cp. *W.Z.R.V.*,pp.1034-1035). It is generally used to indicate the supernatural power attributed to different gods such as Varuṇa, Mitra and Indra. There are several hymns of the *Ṛgveda* where *Māyā* is viewed as a world-sustaining power (*R.V.*iii.38.7; ix.83.3). The *Ṛgveda* for example, says: *māyāvino mamire asya māyayā*, through (their) *Māyā*, the possessors of *Māyā* wrought the mass (of the World) [Geldner: *Die Zauberkundigen haben durch seine Zauberkraft die Masse (der Welt) gemacht*] (*R.V.*9.83.3). This means that the aggregate of the universe has been wrought through the *Māyā* of the possessors of *Māyā*. That is to say that *Māyā* has been responsible for the emergence or the evolution of the universe. We may thus notice that *Māyā* has been a cause of the origin of the universe. But it is not the *nimitta-kāraṇa*, efficient cause, for that part is played by the possessors of *Māyā*. The verse does not also refer to any original stuff out of which the universe is made. It merely says that the mass of the world was wrought (*mamire*) through the *Māyā*. Thus it may not be wrong to interpret the line as: Out of their *Māyā*, the possessors of *Māyā* wrought the universe. The stress laid upon the concept of *Māyā* may again be seen from the two words, *māyāvinaḥ* and *māyayā* found in this line. The verb used here to imply the act of forming the universe, namely *mamire* derived from $\sqrt{}$*mā*, to fashion, to form, to make or to build (cp. Macdonell, *P.S.D., q.v.*) too is very significant in that it has the same radical element as found in the other two words. Thus, according to this context, the universe seems to have been formed through the marvellous power of *Māyā* which one may take well-nigh as the *upādāna-kāraṇa* or the material cause of the universe.

(3) The Upādhis

The *Upādhis* constitute an important aspect of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy although they are not mentioned by Īvarakṛṣṇa in his concise work: the *Kārikā*. They are briefly referred to in the *Sāṅkhya Pravacana Sūtra* (i.150 & vi. 46). The term *upādhi* formed of *upa-ā+dhi* ($\sqrt{}$*dhā*, to palce) means literally the 'conditions'. In philosophy it means the conditioning or limiting attributes. Applied to the individual, *Upādhi*, in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy means, the limiting adjuncts through which *Puruṣa* is reflected in the sphere of space and time. On account of the *Upādhis*, the limiting adjuncts, *Puruṣa* appears as *Jīva*, the living endowed with the process of organism[4]. The *Upādhis* work themselves automatically. The *Antaḥkaraṇa* is generally reckoned as the centre of the life-process of the *Upādhis*. *Puruṣa* by virtue of the effulgence seems to be reflected in this process. This association, according to the *Sāṅkhya* has existed from all eternity. In other words, it is an eternal, beginningless process.[5] Human mind limited to the realm of perception and conceptions will not understand this puzzle till it attains *samyag-jñāna*, the knowledge par excellence (*S.K.*.67). Viewed from the side of the universe, the *Upādhis* mean the obstructions to the evolution of *Prakṛti*. What triggers evolution at the beginning of a cosmic period? Now, for example, in the case of the sesamum seed somebody will open its shell in order that oil could be had from it.In the case of *Prakṛti* something has to operate upon the *Upādhis*, the barriers to evolution, and remove them in order that evolution may take place.[6] Īśvarakṛṣṇa has not mentioned these obstacles (i.e. the *Upādhis*) among the causal factors. According to the *Sāṅkhya* commentators the *Upādhis* are negative in nature. The absence of the proper time and the proper place for

manifestation of *Prakṛti* (hitherto existed as *Avyakta*) are two such *Upādhis.*[7] But these views of the commentators may not be correct, for the notion of *kāla* and *deśa* results only after the evolution of *Prakṛti* (see secs. 4 & 5) and *not before.* We believe that it is the *daiva* (< *ādhidaivika, Gauḍa.* on *S.K.*I) or the collective *Karma* (vide ch.24, sec.3.) of the *saṁsāraic* beings that triggers the evolution of *Prakṛti.*

(4) & (5) Space & Time

Īśvarakṛṣṇa has hardly said anything about the concept of time except for the fact that it is twice referred to in two verses of the *Kārikā* (33 & 50). But we may gather an idea about the *Sāṅkhya* concept of time from the commentators. Commenting on the *Kārikā* 33 which refers to the *tri-kāla,* the three times, *Vācaspati* makes some useful observations on time from the *Sāṅkhya* point of view. It is mentioned by Vācaspati here that the *Sāṅkhyas* do not recognize time as an independent category. He points out that even if one does recognize time, as the *Naiyāyikas* do, one has to recognize three varieties of it, past, present and future; and to explain these, he says, one has to look to something other than time itself. Therefore Vācaspati says that it would be simpler to recognize and deal with these defining conditions, instead of postulating a superfluous entity called time (*kṛtam atra-antar-gaḍunā kālena-iti sāṅkhyācāryāḥ. tasmān-na-kāla-rūpa-tattva-antarābhyupagama-iti*). This appears to mean that there are *times* but no *time.*[8]

Again in the *Māṭhara Vṛtti* on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 61, there is a brief discussion on the idea of time. First *Māṭhara* rejects the doctrine that time is the cause of everything;[9] he says that there is no separate entity as time (*kālo nāma na kaścit padārtho' sti*). He further points out that there are only three categories, *Vyakta* (Manifest), *Avyakta* (Unmanifest) and *Puruṣa* (Soul) and that *kāla* or time falls within them (*vyaktamavyaktam puruṣa iti trayaḥ eva padārthāḥ; tatra kālo'ntarbhūtaḥ*). Thus it appears that the *Kārikā's* standpoint is that there is no independent reality of time over and above the two ultimate realities: *Prakṛti* (Matter) and *Puruṣa* (Soul). The *Sāṅkhya(-Yoga)* tradition admits two kinds of *ākāśa* or space, the *kāryākāśa* and the *karaṇākāśa.* The *kāryākāśa* means the space as an effect and the *karaṇākāśa* means the space as a cause. The difference between them is that the former is derivative,

for it is evolved out of *śabda-tanmātra,* the sound potential: the latter is original because it is a form of *Prakṛti,* the world-ground. As we shall see below the *Sāṇkhya(-Yoga)* tradition before *Vijñānabhikṣu* mentions only the derivative *ākāśa.*[10] The concept of space is implied by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 22, which deals with the process of evolution. Thus it is said:

> 'From *Prakṛti* proceeds *Mahat* (=the Great One = the Intellect), thence *Ahaṅkāra,* thence the group of sixteen and from five out of these sixteen, the five gross elements'[11]

Commenting on this verse Gauḍapāda observes: 'ether from the subtle element of sound (*śabda-tanmātrād-ākāśam...*) etc. It is seen from this observation that the concept of space is implied here by the term *ākāśa* and this is nothing but the derivative *ākāśa.* For a later theory of the *Sāṅkhya* concepts of space and time we may now turn to *Vijñānabhikṣu* who observes as follows:

> 'Eternal space and time are of the forms of *Prakṛti,* or the root-cause of *ākāśa,* and are only the specific modifications of *Prakṛti.* Hence the universality of space and time is established ... But these, space and time, which are limited, are produced from *ākāśa* through the conjunction of this or that limiting objects *(upādhi) (S.P.B.,* ii. 12; ii. 10).

The *'ākāśa* mentioned here is simply the *karaṇākāśa* referred to above. Thus, space and time arising from *ākāśa,* appear in the world of experience, as limited when *ākāśa* is conditioned by the co-existent things in space and moving bodies in time. Limited space and time are *ākāśa* itself particularised by different limiting objects, though they are said to be its effects. They are not substances as the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* thought but are relations binding the events of the development of *Prakṛti.* We have no perception of infinite time or infinite space; they are said to be constructed by understanding (*so khalu-ayam kālo vastu śūnyo' pi buddhinirmāṇaḥ śabdajñānānupāti, Yoga Bhāṣya,* iii.52). The important idea we obtain from the above observations is that space and time arise from *ākāśa* which is ultimately traced back to

Prakṛti. Then there is an apparent difficulty with regard to what the *Yoga Bhāṣya* (iii.52) says, namely that space and time are the *buddhi-nirmāṇas* or the constructions of understanding. The *Yoga Bhāṣya* may have meant that this *buddhi-nirmāṇa* itself is material in nature. Incidentally we may mention here that the Jaina tradition too admits two varieties of *ākāśa*. They are the *logāgāsa* (< Skt.*lokākāśa*) and the *alogāgāsa* (Skt:*alokākāśa*). Of these the former is the space containing the world and thus giving room for the existence of all extended substances (*astikāya*): here the souls and the other substances live. The latter is the infinite empty space beyond the world where the two conditions of motion (*dharmāstikāya*) and rest (*adharmāstikāya*) do not have their influence.[12] It has to be admitted that Īśvarakṛṣṇa has not paid sufficient attention to the concepts of space and time. Probably, this may have been due to the concise (*saṅkṣipta*, *S.K.* 71) nature of his work: the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*. We must, however, say that the *Sāṅkhya- Yoga* tradition was not blind to these important tenets of philosophy. When it is said that these concepts are constructed by understanding (Y.B. 111.52) the opinion of the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* tradition appears to be the same as that of the Critical Philosophy of the great Western philosopher, Immanuel Kant, wherein it is maintained that these are *à priori* concepts. This anticipation of Kant (1724-1804) by the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* thinkers who lived not later than the fourth century (R.K.*I.P.*11.p341-342) is not only a credit to them but also a very good example of their deep insight into the problems of philosophy.

(6) Causality

In addition to what we have already discussed (see chap. 7) we may mention here that the *Sāṅkhya* metaphysics recognizes only two causes such as the *Upādāna-kāraṇa*, the material cause (*S.K.* 9 and 50) and the *nimitta-kāraṇa*, the efficient cause (*S.K.*cp.42 and 57) with two different functions. While the material cause enters into the effect, the efficient cause exerts influence from outside . Thus it is seen that the effect contained in the cause is to be liberated by something else from the causal state. In fact these two causes have already been implied in the *Ṛgveda*, for example, in the *Puruṣa-sūkta* (R.V.x.90) where the gods are the agents of creation (= the efficient cause) and the

material out of which the world is made is the body of a primeval giant named *Puruṣa*.[13]

(7) Sufficient and Necessary Conditions

The concept of sufficient and necessary[14] conditions which play an important role in metaphysics and logic is also discernible in the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of causal model. This idea is reflected in the doctrine of the *saṃsāric* existence of the individual in the form of bondage, and getting rid of the same in the form of release and freedom. Whenever a proposition is introduced by 'only if', it is the 'necessary condition' of the other proposition on which it depends. Hence it is the consequence of the other proposition which implies it. It is related to the other proposition by implication-in-reverse. But it represents a different relation from implication, that of one proposition being a necessary condition of another rather than its sufficient condition. Even if the proposition introduced by 'only if' comes after the other proposition it is still its consequent.[15] If in a proposition the antecedent is a condition of the truth of the consequent, the antecedent is called the sufficient condition, for it is enough that it be true for the consequent to be true also.[16] The *Sāṅkhya* doctrine that : only if *Puruṣa* confuses itself with *Prakṛti* (i.e.matter) (=C), it will result in (the *saṁsāric*) bondage (=B) (*S.K.*63,64,65 and 66): is a conditional proposition of which the consequent is a necessary condition. We may represent it as: (B > C). Next the teaching that: discriminsation by *Puruṣa* of itself from *Prakṛti* (=D) results in release (=R) (*S.K.*64): is a conditional proposition with its antecedent as a sufficient condition, and it can be represented as follows: (D > R.) The above two propositions put together indicate the essence of the *Sāṅkhya* conception of causality which we may symbolically present in the following formula: (B > C). (D > R). The formula will read as: 'bondage comes about as a result of *Puruṣa* confusing itself with *Prakṛti*, and discrimination by *Puruṣa*, of itself from *Prakṛti*, results in release. Let us represent 'B' by 'p' and 'C' by 'q', and the first formula can be represented as: (p > q). Now discrimination is the opposite of confusion and since confusion is represented by 'q' we may represent discrimination by '-q'. Release being the opposite of bondage we may represent release by '-p' as we have already represented bondage by 'p'. Thus the for-

mula: (p > q). (-q > -p): is a valid form of logic which is technically known as the *modus tollens*[17] regarding the handling of which the *Sāṅkhyas* were very famous (vide ch.23,sec.4). The *Sāṅkhyas* had a very important purpose in introducing the notions of *necessary* and *sufficient conditions*. If they were to make the causal relation turn into a purely logically necessary relationship, there would not have been any room for liberation, for nothing could become other than what it was already.[18] One may not, thus, fail to notice that the *Sāṅkhya* conception of causality is a rational doctrine which clearly implies that in spite of the (present) bondage emancipation is certainly a possibility.

(8) Kaivalya

Freedom, according to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, is called *Kaivalya*. The term *kaivalya* derived from *kevala* (which in a general sense is already found in the *Ṛgveda*, e.g. 1.7.10; 13.10; VII.98.5 etc.), means an absolute state (*S.K.*64). This absolute state, the *Summum Bonum* of the *Sāṅkhya* is nothing but the final realization in the form of three judgments: (i) 'I am not that' (ii) 'that is not mine', and (iii) 'I am not' (vide chap.25. see.17, and chap.24, sec.12). Thus the release as taught by the *Sāṅkhyas* is nothing but an acquisition of the above knowledge (*samyagjñānādhigama, S.K.*67). Many scholars have not grasped the true significance of the *Sāṅkhya* conception of liberation (*kaivalya*) for the simple reason that they have failed to notice that the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* contains both *parā-vidyā* or the absolute view and *aparā-vidyā* or the conventional view. Therefore, Radhakrishnan's observation that one does not know whether the released souls hold social intercourse among themselves (*I.P.*,vol.ii.p.313) is not relevant, even as a doubt. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, who has been well aware of the impossibility of describing this transcendental state is rightly silent about it. It, indeed, is an unfathomable state, there is no measuring of him who has attained the goal (cp.*attaṁ gatassa na pamāṇam atthi, yena naṁ vajjū taṁ tassa natthi,* Sutta *Nipāta,* 1076). The *Sāṅkhyas* have given up the futile attempt of describing the indescribable, for it is an attampt to do the impossible. Thus we notice that the *Sāṅkhyas* have already presupposed the well-known teaching of Wittgenstein: 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent' (*The Tractetus*, 6.54).[19]

(9) Existence and Value

Existence and value are two important problems of philosophy. Existence implies the general problem of ontology, the problem of being. By value one understands the ideals.[20] The *Sāṅkhya* is a philosophy of dualistic realism. The realistic views of value are also the results of the acceptance of the existence of two ultimate entities neither definable in terms of the other.[21] Existence and value may be taken as almost equal to 'is' and 'ought'. *Puruṣa* exists (*puruṣo'sti,* S.K. 17; cp. also S.K. 18), but it neither constitutes pain nor causes pain, for if it were to be so, no liberation would be possible. In its pristine purity untainted by *Rajas* and *Tamas*, *Puruṣa* is essentially good. It is primarily because of this that virtue (*dharma*), non-attachment (*vairāgya*), and finally knowledge (*jñāna*) that brings about liberation are at all possible (S.K. 44 & 45). *Prakṛti,* on the other hand, is *Avidyā* or nescience which is directly opposed to the unfailing light (*sadāprakāśasvarūpa,* S.P.B.i. 75) of the consciousness (*cidrūpa*) of *Puruṣa*. According to Īśvarakṛṣṇa *Prakṛti* exists and acts by herself, but it is supposed to be for the benefit of another (i.e. *Puruṣa*) and not for herself (*parārtha.* S.K. 56). Elsewhere Īśvarakṛṣṇa in vain makes an attempt to imply that *Prakṛti* is better than *Puruṣa*. Thus it is said:

> *nānā-vidhair upāyair*
> *upakāriṇy anupakāriṇaḥ puṁsaḥ*
> *guṇavaty aguṇasya satas*
> *tasyārtham apārthakam carati. (S.K. 60)*

> Generous *Prakṛti* endowed with the *Guṇas* (or the good qualities) does by manifold means, accomplish without any benefit (to herself) the benefit of the ungrateful *Puruṣa*, devoid as he is of the *Guṇa* (or good qualities).

Being not satisfied with the two adjectives *upakāriṇi* and *anupakāriṇi* as applied to *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* respectively, Īśvarakṛṣṇa is also punning on the two adjectives *guṇavat* and *aguṇa* attributed again to the same two principles respectively. We cannot agree with Īśvarakṛṣṇa. If one were to look at the *Sāṅkhya* from an anthropological point of view one would rather say

that *Prakṛti's* display of cosmic powers is more an attempt to attract the male *Puruṣa* like an amorous woman rather than to liberate him (*prati-puruṣa-vimokṣa, S.K.*56, cp.57).[22] This activity on the part of *Prakṛti* causes the three-fold misery. Therefore it is to be concluded that *Prakṛti* cannot be termed as good as opposed to *Puruṣa* which is instrinsically good.This is the general standpoint of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. We may now see the absolute view of the *Sāṅkhyas*. Some philosophers maintain that values or ideals are in the nature of 'ought' and not in the nature of 'is'. The *Sāṅkhya* in its absolute point of view is inclined towards the former, for it clearly implies that the one bent on liberation ought to dissociate oneself, not only from the objects of sense-experience but also from the concepts of *Ahaṅkāra* and 'Self' (*S.K.64* and cp. also ch. 25, sec.16). Thus in the *Sāṅkhya* system we notice that what exists and what is valuable are set apart from each other.[23]

(10) The few concepts discussed in this chapter may not fail to convince one that the *Sāṅkhya* had a deep interest in the problems of metaphysics. Their technical term, *atīndriya pratīti* (lit.the cognition of the metaphysical entities, S.K.6; cp.ch.23,sec.10) was, probably the earliest, fairly complete term to convey the idea of metaphysical insight. The *Sāṅkhya* conception of *kaivalya* may be taken as one of the very satisfactory teachings of the *Summum Bonum* in Indian thought. The most important contribution of the *Sāṅkhyas* in the realm of metaphysics may probably be seen in their causal model consisting of *necessary* and *sufficient* conditions. Had it not been for the inclusion of the *sufficient condition*, the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine would have been a pure determinism devoid of any hope of liberation.

Notes and References

1. Cp. (a) *duḥkha-trayābhighātāt, jijñāsā tadabhighātake hetau, S.K..1.*
   (b) *tadviparītaḥ, śreyān, vyaktāvyakta-jña-vijñānāt, S.K.* 2.
2. Vide Deussen, *A.G.P.* I. iii, p.412.
3. Vide J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy - Thales to Plato,* London. (1943) pp.3.ff.
4. Cp. *'kāryopādhir ayam jīvaḥ - karaṇopādhir īśvaraḥ,*

   Vide C.D. Sharma, *I.P.*p.385.
5. Vide Zimmer, *P.I.* pp.286-287.
6. Cp. *The Yoga-Bhāṣya on the Yoga-Sūtra,* ii. 23.
7. Vide K.H.Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies,* p.152, and also R.Garbe, *S.P.* pp.305-307.
8. Cp. Suryanarayana Sastru, *The S.K.* p.63.
9. *kālaḥ sṛjati bhūtāni - kālaḥ saṃharate prajāḥ*
   kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti - tasmāt kālas tu kāraṇam.
10. Vide (a) Jhaveri, *The concept of ākāśa in Indian Philosophy. Annalas of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (Poona), vol.XXXVI: 1956. (b) Seal,* Positive Sciences of the Hindus, pp.27-28.
11. *prakṛter mahāṁs tato 'haṅkāras - tasmād gaṇaś ca ṣoḍaśakaḥ tasmād api ṣoḍaśakāt - pañcabhyaḥ pañca-bhūtāni. S.K.* 22.
12. Vide *Davva-saṅgaha,* pp.56-57; *Niyamasāra,* pp.16 ff; *Samayasāra,* p.99.
13. Cp. Macdonell, *V.R.* p.195.
14. Vide A.E.Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics,* p.183.
15. Vide E.W. Schipper and E. Schuh, *A First Course in Modern Logic,* p.95.
16. *Op. cit.* pp.81-82.
17. *Op. cit.,* pp. 87-88.
18. Vide K.H.Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies,* p.110.
19. *'Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen'.*
20. Vide J.N. Findlay, *Axiological Ethics,* pp. 1-15.
21. Cp. H.M.Bhattacharyya, *The Principles of Philosophy,* p.381.
22. Vide B. Heimann, Līlā, the Divine Play, U.C.R. vol.3. No. 2. (Nov. 1945), p.31.
23. Cp. Murti, *C.P.B.,* p.62 & William P. Goodwin, *Sāṅkhya and the Philosophy of Santayana in A.R. Wadia Felicitation Volume,* p.127.

XXI

Philosophy of Mind

(1) The philosophy of mind may be briefly described as a study that concerns itself with all mental phenomena. Here 'mental phenomena' is to be understood as all phenomena that exclusively involve beings capable of consciousness. Under mental phenomena, we would have sense-perception, memory, intuition, emotion, moods, motives, desires, deliberations and so on. Thus we see that the philosophy of mind overlaps at many places with other areas of philosophy such as ethics, theory of knowledge, metaphysics, the philosophy of religion and so on. Philosophy of mind is also known as philosophical psychology. But it differs from psychology in that it is mainly interested in the analysis of the concepts of consciousness whereas the latter has as its primary object the empirical investigation of the phenomena these concepts refer to.[1] In the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* there are a few concepts belonging to the philosophy of mind and we propose to study them here.

(2) Consciousness and the Related Concepts

In the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy consciousness is attributed only to one of its reals, namely to *Puruṣa* (*cetanaḥ-puruṣaḥ, S.K.*55). But, what does consciousness mean? Consciousness as Franz Brentano noticed, is not merely contrasted with unconsciousness. We often speak of being conscious 'of' this or that. Thus with an example from the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* we may say that a particular individual is conscious of the births and deaths of the other persons as a result of which he concludes that there are also other minds similar to his own (*S.K.*18). According to Brentano's theory which is called 'the thesis of intentionality', consciousness is always consciousness of something. This means that it is always 'about' something and is 'directed towards' something. The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy of mind, like many philosophies

of the day, does not appear to agree in full with the idea of intentionality. The *Sāṅkhya* conception of consciousness seems to be of two kinds. The first of these is the consciousness as applied to our empirical world and it is the consciousness of something or the other (*S.K.*5 & 65). This kind of consciousness is different from the other type of consciousness which is supposed to exist in the state of emancipation. This latter is the pure consciousness (cp.*viśuddham jñānam, S.K.*64) without any object as its target. Metaphorically speaking one may say that it is something like a mirror without any reflection in it or a light that illuminates nothing.

There is another related concept mentioned in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. This is the concept of *ālocana-mātra* (S.K.28). *Ālocana* (*ā*+√*loc*, to see, consider, reflect upon) related to *āloka* (a+√*lok*, to look at) meaning, looking, seeming, and beholding, conveys the sense of 'bare awareness'. This seems to be more or less the same as the concept of *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate perception[2] (cp.Chatterjee and Datta, *I.I.P.* p.180). Therefore Gauḍapāda's explanation: "The word *mātra* stands in the sense of uniqueness or the exclusion of what is not specified; as in the sentence, 'arms alone are received', that is no other speciality, so the eye functions with respect to colour only and not to taste and the rest', does not seem to clarify the point in question.[3] Keeping the etymology of the word in mind, we may say that *ālocana* is an acquisition of knowledge that comes not as an achievement on our part but as a passive reception. This idea is strengthened by the addition of *mātra* which conveys the sense of 'bare' or 'mere'[4]. We can become, remain and ceased to be aware of something. Again what we are aware of may either be a thing, event, feelings or an action (cp.*śabdādiṣu pañcānām, ālocana-mātram iṣyate vṛttiḥ, S.K.*28). Being aware of something (*S.K.*28) is different from perceiving something which in the terminology of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, is 'an application of senses to their special objects' (*prati-viṣaya-adhyavasāya*, S.K.5).

Another related concept can be seen in the idea of *sākṣin* (*S.K.*19). *Sākṣin* (< *sa+akṣ (a) + i + n*) means, seeing with the eyes, observing, or an eye-witness. In philosophy *sākṣin* means the ego or the subject as opposed to the object (*viṣaya*, S.K.5) or that which is external to the mind (*kartṛ-bhūteṣu sākṣitvaṁ siddhaṁ puruṣasya-iti. yo'yam adhikṛto bahutvam prati;* it follows that the

Spirit is endowed with the characteristic of witnessing, that (Spirit) which is the subject of plurality). It is more or less this same idea that is conveyed by the term *sākṣin* in the *Kārikā* 19. Gauḍapāda's explanation of the concept of *sākṣin* is interesting. According to him, a witness neither acts nor desists from action (*sākṣī na pravartate, nāpi nivartate eva*)[5]. While not being an object of sense, but a percipient of such objects the *sākṣin* observes and testifies to the existence of Nature (*Prakṛti*) and its products.[6] *Sākṣin* should be differentiated from that which is unconscious and irrational, for that which is irrational cannot observe. *Sākṣin* is that to which an object is apparent (*cetano hi draṣṭā bhavati nācetanaḥ, sākṣī ca darśita-viṣayo bhavati*).

There is another related concept, namely *draṣṭṛ*, he who sees or perceives (*S.K.*19). *Draṣṭṛ*, the one who perceives is supposed to be a passive onlooker devoid of any action (*akartṛbhāva, S.K.*19). This is clarified by the adjective *mādhyastha*, attributed to *Puruṣa* implying the condition of a middle man (or looker-on). Soul is like a wandering mendicant, lonely and unconcerned, while the villagers are busily engaged in agriculture: thus Soul is not active while the *Guṇas* alone are active. Hence the Spirit is endowed with perception and inactivity (Gauḍapāda, *S.K.*19). The concept of *sākṣin* is further elucidated by the term *udāsīna* (*S.K.*20) which may convey the sense of, 'neither rejoicing in pleasure nor sorrowing in in pain'. Vijñānabhikṣu restricts the term *sākṣin* to the sense of 'beholder' distinguishing it from *draṣṭṛ* to which it is more applicable. According to him *sākṣin* imports, 'one who has the object near to or before his eyes' whereas *draṣṭṛ* implies seeing in general; hence he observes *Puruṣa* is, indeed, the witness of intellect, and is the mere seer of the other principles (*buddher eva sākṣi puruṣo, 'nyeṣām tu draṣṭṛ-mātram-iti*, S.P.B. i.161)[7]. This means that *Puruṣa* witnesses Intellect, and merely sees the other principles.

(3) Knowing

The idea of knowing is implied by five important terms in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. They are *jñāna*, (*S.K.*44), *vijñāna* (S.K. 2), *samyag-jñāna* (S.K. 67), *viveka* (*jñāna*) (S.K. 11) and *kevala-jñāna* (*S.K.*64). We also come across the opposites of two of these, namely *ajñāna* (*S.K.*44; cp.also 57) and *aviveka* (*S.K.*11 and 14). In the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* the above terms *jñāna, vijñāna, samyag-jñāna*, *viveka-jñāna* and *kevala-jñāna* are all used promiscuosusly to convey the knowledge *par excellence* of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. But a conceptual analysis of these terms may, probably, imply that, at the beginning they had conveyed some different attitudes of mind. *Jñāna*, derived from $\sqrt{}$*jñā*, to know, implies knowledge in general. 'I know that *Prakṛti* is not mine' (*na me*, S.K.64) implies a certainty in one's mind. It indicates a certain attitude of mind directed towards something or somebody, in the present case the *Prakṛti*. The sense of certainty contained in the root $\sqrt{}$*jñā* (which gave rise to *jñāna*) can also be seen, for example, in the word *Jñāti*, he who is known, i.e. a relative. *Vijñāna* means *viśeṣa-jñāna* or a special knowledge and thus one may see that it is a state of mind with a greater certainty than that which is conveyed by *jñāna*. The next, *samyag-jñāna*, the right knowledge is characterized by the adjective 'right' which implies that the knowledge in question is the type of knowledge demanded by the 'enquiring mind' of a *Sāṅkhya* thinker. According to Gauḍapāda the right knowledge is the knowledge of the twenty-five principles (G. on *S.K.*67). We may contrast this concept with the idea of right knowledge of the Buddhist philosopher, Dharmottara according to whom it is knowledge that is not contradicted by experience.[8] According to Gauḍapāda 'right knowledge' makes one's mind free from several mental dispositions such as virtue, vice etc. (G.on *S.K.*67). Thus it is implied that the *samyag-jñāna* is uninterrupted by other mental dispositions. The nature of the origin of this knowledge seems to be implied by the term *adhi-gama* (*S.K.*67) according to which it must be a 'sudden flash' in the mind of the yogi. The *viveka-jñāna* means the discriminative knowledge. *Viveka*, derived from *vi*+$\sqrt{}$*vic*, to sift (especially grain by tossing or blowing) means to divide asunder, speparate from, true knowledge, right judgement and the power of separating Spirit from Matter. Next comes the *kevala-jñāna* which is semantically related to the *viveka-jñāna*. Although *samyag-jñāna* and *kevale-jñāna* are regarded as equal by the *Sāṅkhyas*, they seem to convey somewhat different mental dispositions. The former seems to be concerned with the validity of the knowledge whereas the latter appears to be primarily concerned with the strength, i.e. certainty of the same. These different concepts of knowledge may come under what Ryle calls the mental-conduct concepts.[9] *Ajñāna* and *avive-*

ka represent the two states, the lack of knowledge and the lack of discriminative knowledge respectively. This position, in general, is indicated in Indian philosophy by the term *Avidyā* or nescience.

(4) Actions

In the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* it it said that 'the organs perform their respective functions incited by mutual impulse: an organ is not caused to function by anyone' (*na kenacit kāryate karaṇam*), (*S.K.*31).[10] Thus the *Sāṅkhya* view is that the organs act of their own nature and that it is not in the power of anyone to compel them to act. Gauḍapāda's commentary on this line appears to have lost the particle *vā* at the end of the phrase, *kenacit īśvareṇa puruṣeṇa*, and with it the idea would have been quite clear. It is pertinently observed by Wilson that some particle, such as *vā* may have been omitted in the copy, making the sense 'neither by a deity nor a mortal'; or the phrase may imply that they are not compelled to action even by soul, as a divinity; but, fulfil soul's purposes through the innate property, undirected by any external agent.[11] Vācaspati's commentary in this case seems to fail to bring about the true significance of the concept under discussion. He compares the co-operation in the senses in the discharge of their respective functions to that of different soldiers in an army, all engaged in common assault, but of whom one agrees to take a spear, another a mace, another a bow (*yathā hi bahavaḥ puruṣāḥ śāktīka - yāṣṭīka - dhānuṣka - kārpāṇikāḥ kṛtasaṁketāḥ parāvaskandanāya pravṛttāḥ*). Vācaspati's statement only implies that the organs have separate functions, not that they are spontaneous (i.e.self-ácting). The *Sāṅkhya* view of action is important specially in view of the fact that it comes quite close to that of Wittgenstein who observes: 'when I raise my arm *voluntarily* I do not use any instrument to bring the movements about. My wish is not such an instrument either' (*P.I.* sec. 614). Thus it is seen that the *Sāṅkhyas* have attempted to give a natural explanation of the human actions and the *Sāṅkhya* conception may be taken as one of the most important theories of human actions.

(5) Emotions

Emotions, as pointed out by Ryle, may cover a few different kinds of things such as inclination (=motives), moods, agitations and feelings.[12] Hence we may safely include the three concepts of *prīti* (*S.K.*12), *aprīti* (*S.K.*12) or *duḥkha* (*S.K.*I & 55) and *viṣāda* (*S.K.*12) under emotions.

Prīti, derived from $\sqrt{prī}$, to please, means 'pleasure'. It also includes a few other shades of meaning such as 'gladness', 'cheer', and 'comfort'. The historical aspect of the concept is also important in that the word *prīti* is related to Gothic: *frijon, frijonds*, German: *friunt, freund*, Anglo-Saxon: *freōnd*, English: *friend*, Slavonic: *prijati*, Lithuanian: *pretelius*. This may show that originally the concept of *prīti* was related to the notion of friend and a friend is often characterized in Sanskrit as *sakhā* or he who eats together with oneself; hence a friend. A faint recollection of the historical relation between 'pleasure' (*prīti*) and 'friend' appears to be implicit in Aristotle when he says that there are three kinds of friendships, aimed respectively at utility, *pleasure* and goodness.[13] Here the *friendship* of pleasure[14] is relevant to us. The *Kārikā* concept of *suhṛt-prāpti* or gaining friends may also contain an echo of this ancient relationship between *prīti* and 'friend'. One may say that the concept of *prīti* as found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* is wider than its original meaning which appears to have been limited to the association of a friend. The *Kārikā* mentions that *prīti* is produced by the *Sattva Guṇa* (*S.K.*12). The *suhṛt-prāpti* or the gaining of friends (i.e. discussion with the friends) too leads to *prīti* in that it results in bringing about a sound understanding of what one has learnt from one's *Guru*. There may also be a third type of *prīti*, namely the transcendental pure joy (*priti*) resulting along with the attainment of the *samyag-jñāna* (cp.S.K.64 & 67). But the *Kārikā* is silent about this third possibility. Hence we are unable to say anything about it. In any case the concept of *prīti* in its mundane level has a target outside either in some situation or in some person.

The concept of *aprīti* really means 'lack or absence of pleasure'. But in the *Sāṅkhya* terminology, it has acquired the sense of pain which is also conveyed by the term *duḥkha*. The concept of pain, as mentioned by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, is quite clear. It is the three-fold misery (vide chapter 23). It is mentioned in the

Sāṅkhya Kārikā (55) that the pain is inflicted on one's mind as a consequence of different phenomena such as, decay (*jarā*) and death (*maraṇa*). Pain, according to the *Kārikā*, is not only due to these external phenomena but also is due to the conditions prevailing in oneself: this is the *ādhyātmika* type of pain (vide chapter 23). According to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, man's commonest experience is pain (*duḥkham svabhāvena*, S.K.55).

The concept of *viṣāda* (*vi* + √*sad*, to be exhausted or dejected) means a drooping state of mind, languor or lassitude. Applied to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy it means 'dulness of mind'. *Gauḍapāda* explains it as *moha*, dulness or stupidity. *Viṣāda* may thus imply a loss of enthusiasm or intuition in one's mind. *Nārāyaṇa's* exlanation of these three types of feelings is somewhat different. Thus *prīti* is said to consists of rectitude (*ārjava*), gentleness (*mārjava*), modesty (*hrī*), faith (*śraddhā*), patience (*kṣamā*), sympathy (*anukampā*) and knowledge (*jñāna*); *aprīti*, besides misery, implies hatred (*pradveṣa*), violence (*droha*), envy (*matsara*), abuse (*nindā*) and wickedness (*nikṛti*); and *viṣāda* is not only dullness (*moha*) but tardiness (*vipralambha*), fear (*bhaya*), infidelity (*nāstikya*), dishonesty (*kauṭilya*), avarice (*kārpaṇya*) and ignorance (*ajñāna*). Nārāyaṇa does not show how these other concepts are semantically related to the three concepts of *prīti*, *aprīti* and *viṣāda*. Therefore any attempt at a conceptual analysis of them in relation to the above three concepts, may at least be partly conjectural.

(6) Dispositions

A disposition is a natural tendency in the mind. They include mental capacities like *śakti* (cp.S.K.15), *a-śakti* (46 and 47) and so on. *Aśakti* means 'lack of ability' to behave in a particular way. Thus it seems to relate to a weak condition of the mind. Although Īśvarakṛṣṇa refers to a set of twenty-eight kinds of disabilities (*S.K.*49) we are not in a position to go into a conceptual analysis of them, for they are nowhere mentioned in the text of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. There are again some mental occurrences in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* which may be classified under dispositions.[15] The three propositions, 'I am not (that)', (that is) not mine' and 'I am not' (*S.K.*54), are three mental occurrences according to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. They give us a glimpse of an idea of the tendency of the mind of the released individual

in whom there will be no more room for virtue (*dharma*), vice (*adharma*) and so on (*S.K.*67).

(7) Self-Knowledge

Under self-knowledge[16] we include the three terms, self (*Puruṣa*), *Abhimāna* and *Ahaṅkāra*. According to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Self possesses the characteristics of witnessing (*sākṣitva*), isolation (*kaivalya*,) neutrality (*mādhyastha*,) perception (*draṣṭṛtvam*) and inactivity (*akartṛbhāva*) (*S.K.*19). According to this description Self ought to be something like a mirror in which nothing is reflected.

Abhimāna and *Ahaṅkāra* (*S.K.*24) together represent but one concept. *Ahaṅkāra* meaning 'I-ness' has as its function *Abhimāna*. *Abhimāna* derived from *abhi*, over or above + √*man*, to think, means, high opinion of oneself, self-conceit, pride or haughtiness. In the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy it means, self-reference or referring all objects to self as the act of *Ahaṅkāra*. Thus *abhimāna* appears to assert the importance of *Ahaṅkāra* in the form of 'I exist', 'I understand' etc.[17]

(8) Intellect

Intellect, reason and understanding may roughly depict the same concept. The function of intellect (*Buddhi*), according to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, is called *adhyavasāya* (*S.K.*23). *Adhyavasāya*, derived from *adhi* + *ava* + √*so*, to consider, means in philosophy, a mental effort, an apprehension, ascertainment or a determination. According to Gauḍapāda determination is the definition of intellect (*adhyavasāyo buddhi-lakṣaṇam*. G.on S.K.23). Thus it may appear that *adhyavasāya* represents an active state of mind. It is contrary to the state of mind represented by the term *viṣāda* which we saw above.

There are two other concepts that come under this section: they are *saṅkalpa* (S.K.27) and *vikalpa* (S.K.53). *Sāṅkalpa* derived from *saṁ* + √*kḷp*, to be adapted, to be brought about, means conception, idea or notion formed in the mind, especially will, volition, desire, purpose, definite intention, determination, decision or wish for. Gauḍapāda does not give sufficient help to understand this concept. His explanation that it (=mind) determines and hence the term *saṅkalpaka* (*saṅkalpayati-iti-saṅkalpakam*)

is not very helpful. Vācaspati, on the other hand, gives some important traits of the concept. He points out that: 'the mind carefully considers an object perceived by an organ of sense (and determines), this is simple, that is not so; or discriminates them by their conditions of predicates and predicable' (*ālocitam-indriyeṇa vastu-idam iti sammugdham idam-evam naivam iti samyak kalpayati viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvena vivecayati-iti*). Thus we may say that *saṅkalpa* is the process of consideration of the object of simple perception which may eventually lead to a difinite idea of it in the mind. *Saṅkalpa* performs the function of arranging (Deussen; *anordnend*) the sense-data. Thus it orders the sense-impressions into definite ideas or notions in the mind.

The term *vikalpa* formed of, *vi* + *kalpa* (< √*kḷp*) may mean 'dividing' or 'division' since originally *kalp* meant to *cut up* (in I.E.). In *Vedic* it means *to distribute.* Thus the word may semantically imply a movement outwards as opposed to *saṅkalpa* implying a movement inwards in the sense of ordering together. Therefore considering both the etymology of the word and the context in which it occurs one may translate *aṣṭa-vikalpa* (S.K.53) as, 'conceived to be divided into eight'. Thus when it is said, *aṣṭa-vikalpo daivaḥ,* it may not be wrong to translate the line as - the divine order is conceived to be divided into eight classes. If this translation can be accepted, it would clarify the conceptual significance of the term in question. Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati are silent about the philosophical import of the term. We may, nevertheless, explain the idea of *vikalpa* as referring to the function of conceiving in the form of division, in one's mind.

Pratīti

The term *pratīti* derived from *prati* + √*i*, to go or come, conveys the sense of 'approaching' : In philosophy it means,'clear conception' or 'understanding'. In the *Kārikā* (verse 6) it occurs in the phrase, *atīndriya pratīti,* meaning the cognition of the objects beyond the senses, namely the understanding of the metaphysical entities. Metaphysical principles, as implied here, cannot be grasped by the senses, for they are super-sensuous (*atīndriya*). It is by inference that one acquires a conviction of them. Gauḍapāda does not elucidate the concept of *pratīti.* Vācaspati, on the other hand, sheds some light on this idea by commenting on it as, *cit-chāyā-āpattir buddher adhyavasāya-iti-arthaḥ,* the occurrence of the shadow of the *Puruṣa* in the *Buddhi* means the resolution of the intellect. According to this interpretation it is a process which functions with the falling of the shadow of the *Cit* or the consciousness (or *Puruṣa*) in *Buddhi* leading, ultimately, to the state of resolution. Almost this same idea is again found in clearer terms in the *Sāṅkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya* of *Vijñānabhikṣu* where it is said thus: *cit-pratibimbo, buddhau cit-chāyā-pratītir iti,* the reflected image of consciousness, the shadow of consciousness (of *Puruṣa*) in Buddhi is (called) *pratīti* (*S.P.B.* I.99); but he does not equate the process with resolution (*adhyavasāya*). It may be seen that *pratīti* is an approach (*āpatti,* Vāc.) or an occurrence (*pratipatti,* Vijñānabhikṣu) of an understanding in oneself by means of an inference (*anumānāt, S.K.*6) which is, naturally, based on one's previous experience. Therefore *pratīti* has no objective target outside: it has merely a vivid conception as its object. This view is indirectly supported by *Dharmakīrti's* definition of *kalpanā*: *abhilāpa-saṁsarga yogya-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ, kalpanā,* construction (or judgment) is an occurrence (*pratīti*) of a mental reflex (*pratibhāsa*) which is capable of coalescing with a verbal designation (*N.B.I.*5). The origin of the term *pratīti* can be traced back to the *Ṛgveda* where the word is found in several contexts (as an instance of infinitive, *pratītaye, R.V.* 1.36.20; the accusative case, *pratītyam,* R.V.7.58,6, and the instrumental case, *pratītyena, R.V.*4.5.14) among which the general etymological meaning of 'approaching' (Geldner, *anzukommen*) can be seen at the *R.V.*1.36.20.

(9) Some Attention Concepts Attending as a Spectator

The term *prekṣaka,* derived from *pra* + √*īkṣ to see,* occurring in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 64, presents the concept of 'attending as a spectator'. Here the Soul is compared to a spectator seated at a play beholding an actress (*yathā raṅga-prekṣako....nartakīṁ paśyati,* Gauḍapāda). If we accept the variant reading *svastha* (calm, collected in the self) in the *Kārikā* 65, in place of *svaccha* (pure), it may add an important characteristic of the concept of 'attending as a spectator', namely the relative calmness of mind as a consequence of mind's being directed towards one particular target. Thus the position of attending as a spectator conveys the two especial characteristics of 'being unagitated (*nirākūla*) and remaining calm' proceeding as a result of one's mind being

concentrated on one particular object. In fact this concept is also of historical interest. The line of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 65: *prekṣakavad avasthitaḥ svasthaḥ* - '(*Puruṣa*) remaining fixed like a spectator' is seen more or less in the same phraseology in the *Maitrī Up.* ii.7, where it is said: *prekṣakavad avasthitaḥ svasthaḥ*, he (=the self) remains fixed like a spectator.

Inattention

We may next refer to the concept of *mano'navasthāna* (*S.K.*7). Here *anavastha* (< *an- ava* + √*sthā*, to stand) means unsettled or unstable. Therefore *mano'navastha* means the unsettled or unstable condition of mind or inattention. When a person whose thoughts are distracted does not apprehend what is said to him however intelligently (*mano'navasthānād yathā vyagracittaḥ samyak kathitam api nāvadhārayati.* Gauḍa), one names his condition as 'inattention'. In an explanation of anything in terms of inattention, it is necessary that one would distinguish between what is explained as an instance of our inattention and what is expalined as the effect of our inattention.[18]

Intention

The term *ākūta* occurring in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 31 is important. It is derived from √*kū* (< I.E.(s)keu-) meaning to sound, to make any noise, to cry out, to moan, to coo or to hum (as a bee). Thus the term implies an intention (Deussen: *Absicht*). According to Gauḍapāda, *ākūta* conveys the sense of respect or zeal (*ākūtād ādarasambhrama*). *Ākūta* as intention in this context implies a direction of mind. This means the application of thought to an object. The concept of *ākūta* is also of historical significance. The idea can be traced back to the *Ṛgveda* where it occures under the form of *ākūtya* (cp. *śraddhām hṛdayyayākūtyā*, (they honour) faith with a cordial intention, R.V. X.151.47). This concept is again found in the *Atharvaveda*, XIX.4.2 under the garb of a goddess. Thus it is said: 'The blessed divine Intention (*ākūti*), I keep before me, the mother of mind, may she be easy of invocation for us; whatever hope I cherish, let that be wholly realised ; may I see that hope filling my mind completely'. It is important to notice that the concept of *ākūti* has been regarded

here as a divine inspiration. This verse is again found in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* X.36.

Desire

The concept of desire is found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (v.58) under the form of *autsukya*. The term *autsukya* is a hyper-Sanskritization for the Middle Indian *icchuka* from *icchati*, meaning 'desire'. In the *Vedic* we have *icchu* (vide Macdonell, *P.S.D.*q.v.) conveying the sense of desirous. Thus *autsukya* means 'longing for' or 'desire' (Deussen, *Verlangen*). Īśvarakṛṣṇa mentions that people undertake actions in order to release their desires (*S.K.*58). Thus it is seen that desire (*autsukya*) contains a sort of attention towards a particular thing or an action a satisfaction of which alone will rid oneself of the particular desire. This may show that desire (*autsukya*), hope (*āśā*)[19] and wish (*icchā*) are very closely related to each other. In fact Vācaspati has clearly explained *autsukya* as *icchā* or wish (*autsukyam icchā*). He, further, mentions that desire (*autsukya*) ceases to exist the moment it obtains that which is wished for (*sā khalu-iṣyamāna-prāptau nivartate*).

Enjoyment

The idea of enjoyment is found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* under the forms of *bhoktṛbhāva*, the state of an enjoyer (*S.K.*17) and *upabhoga*, enjoyment (*S.K.*37). The enjoyment (*S.K.*37) implies something to be enjoyed, for the act of enjoyment without an object of the same is logically an empty concept. The enjoyer directs his attention to that which is enjoyed: hence the suitability of the concept being classified under the attention-concepts. Gauḍapāda points out that fruition or enjoyment (*upabhoga*) means several or respective enjoyment, through the instrumentality of the organs of perception and action, (*buddhīndriya-karmendriya-dvāreṇa*) whether in gods, men or animals. There will, naturally, arise the question, here, whether the concept of enjoyment can be extended to the plant kingdom which is but another stage of the one and the same evolution? Unfortunately the question seems to have escaped the notice of the *Sāṅkhya* thinkers.

Dāna

Finally we may refer to *dāna* (*S.K.*51) which is mentioned as one of the eight attainments (*siddhis*). The *Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī* and the *Chandrikā* agree in rendering *dāna* by *śuddhi* or purity meaning the purity of discriminative knowledge. Gauḍapāda explains it as a gift, liberality particularly to holy men who being propitiated will impart the saving knowledge. Vijñānabhikṣu also gives the same interpretation (*dāna-ādi-dānena paritoṣāj-jñāna-lābha-iti, S.P.B. iii.45*). Among modern scholars Deussen understands it as *Klärung* by which is meant clarification. Keith clearly points out the problem involved here in saying that *dāna* would normally be deemed to refer to generosity, but has been rendered purification of the mind, since otherwise the *Siddhis*, do not seem to contain anything corresponding to knowledge (*S.S.*p.104). The problem of *dāna* may, perhaps, be clarified with the help of the same concept in Early Buddhism. *Dāna*, according to the *Dakkhiṇāvibhaṅga Sutta*[20] (the Analysis of Offerings) in the *Majjhima Nikāya* of Early Buddhism, may accompany four types of 'purification'. It is also clearly mentioned at the end of the same discourse that *dāna* ought to be accompanied by a mind well-pleased. Perhaps the *Sāṅkhya* concept of *dāna* may implicate the above Buddhist concept of *dāna* and thereby may imply the concept of purification of mind.

(10) From the foregoing discussion one may not fail to notice that the *Kārikā* has introduced a fairly important number of concepts into the philosophy of mind. The general function of mind being shared by a trio of internal organs, the concepts are attributed either to the mind, I-consciousness or intellect. A comparison of the *Sāṅkhya* concepts with those that have been discussed by Ryle in his famous work, *The Concept of Mind*, may convince one that the *Sāṅkhya* contribution in this field is not insignificant. It was probably in the hands of the *Sāṅkhyas* that many Sanskrit words such as *buddhi, pratīti* and *vikalpa* received a technical significance for the first time, and in this sense the position of the *Sāṅkhyas* was not unlike that of Hegel who maintained that his was ' an attempt to teach Philosophy to speak German[21]. The theory of action is probably one of the most important contributions of the *Sāṅkhyas* in the field of the philosophy of mind.

Notes and References

1. Cp. J.A. Shaffer, *Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 4-8.
2. Cp. (a) *asti-hi-ālocanajñānaṁ prathamaṁ nirvikalpakam, Vācaspati* on *S.K.*27.
   (b)Cp. J. Hartland-Swann, *'Being aware of' and 'Knowing'*, The Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (1957).
3. Cp. Suryanarayana Sastri, *The S.K.*, p.54.
4. Cp. A.R. White, *Attention*, p.37.
5. Gauḍapāda on the *S.K.*, 19.
6. Cp. Wilson, *The S.K.*, p.98.
7. Vide Garbe, *S.P.B*, p.73.
8. Cp. *The 'ṭīkā' on the the Nyāyabindu*, chap. 1, ii.
9. Cp. *The Concept of Mind*, p.26.
10. Cp. Deussen, *Doch keiner sonst macht wirken die Organe, A.G.P.* I.iii, p.442.
11. Cp. Wilson, *The S.K.* p.148.
12. Cp. *Op. cit.*, p.81.
13. Vide *The Nichomachean Ethics*, Bk., viii, chap.2, translation by Ross.
14. Cp. Ross, *Aristotle*, p.230.
15. Cp. Ryle, *Op.cit.* p.130.
16. Cp. Ryle, *Op.cit.*, pp. 148-149.
17. Cp. Suryanarayana Sastri, *The S.K.*, p.49.
18. Cp. A.R. White, *Attention*, p.117-118.
19. Cp. *āśā-bandhaḥ kusumasadṛśaṁ prāyaso 'hyaṅganānāṁ sadyaḥpāti praṇayi hṛdayaṃ viprayoge ruṇaddhi. (Megha-dūta*, 10)
20. This discourse is also called the *Dakkhiṇā-Visuddi-Sutta* in the M.A. i. 187, (Cp. *M.L.S.*, vol. iii, P.T.S., p.303 f.n.2).
21. Cp. Wallace, *Prolegomania to the Logic of Hegel*, p.16.

XXII

Cosmology

(1) *Cosmology*, the science of the universe as a whole, forms part of every complete system of philosophy. In fact the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy is a sort of rational cosmogony in that it discusses the evoloution of the world from *Prakṛti*, considered as the world-ground. Apart from the verses dealing with *cosmogony* (S.K.9, 10-16, 21-25, 38, 45-46, 53-54, and 58 etc.) there are a few verses in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (53, 54 and 55) which deal with *cosmography*. Some cosmological ideas implicit in the *Kārikās* are also explained by different commentators on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. Cosmology, in gerneral, plays an important part in almost all the schools of Indian philosophy except in the *Cārvāka* materialism[1]. This interest in cosmological speculations is a tendency which can be historically traced back to the *Ṛgveda*. We have already seen most of the cosmological speculations of early Indian literature (see chap.5). It appears that in the *Sāṅkhya* cosmology there are two types of data, the original *Saṅkhya* ideas and the ideas read into by the commentators from the non-*Sāṅkhya* traditions. It may not be very easy to distinguish the one from the other.

(2) Ādi-sarga or the First Evolution

It is important to note that Gauḍapāda in his commentary on two verses of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (40 and 43), has referred to the concept of *ādi-sarga* or the first evolution. In the first instance (S.K.40) he says, *yadā ... pradhāna-ādisarge tadā*, then at the first evolution of Nature; and in the second instance (S.K.43) he observes, *yathā bhagavataḥ kapilasya-ādisarge utpadyamānasya catvāro bhāvāḥ sahotpannāḥ*, the four dispositions, which at the first evolution were born along with the revered Kapila. The concept of first evolution does not agree with the teaching of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, according to which the evolution is an eternal process

(S.K.69). The *Sāṅkhya Pravacana Sūtra*, I.67, says that *Prakṛti* is a rootless root (*amūlam mūlam*), and commenting on this Vijñānabhikṣu clearly mentions that *Prakṛti* is devoid of any beginning (*pradhānam mūla-śūnyam*). Thus when *Parkṛti* is beginningless, then it logically follows that its activity, i.e. evolution too is beginningless. Hence it is difficult to agree with Gauḍapāda's concept of first evolution. If, on the other hand, *ādi-sarga* is taken to mean 'at the beginning or at the early period of evolution' one may overcome the difficulty. But if the idea of first evolution is a genuine *Sāṅkhya* doctrine, it may be a tenet coming down from the proto-*Sāṅkhya* period in which the *Sāṅkhya* doctrines were not well synthesized in the form of a system of philosophy based on rational grounds.

(3) Evolution, Dissolution and Aeon

The concepts of origination (*utpatti*), dissolution (*pralaya*) and Aeon or *Kalpa* (*sthiti*) is very briefly mentioned in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (69). Vācaspati gives an idea of the picture of evolution and dissolution in his commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 15; here he illustrates the evolution of effect from the unseparated cause (i.e.*Prakṛti*) by comparing *Prakṛti* to a tortoise the limbs of which are at one time protruded and at another retractred within the shell[2]. Vācaspati's simile is not inappropriate as a means of illustrating a metaphysical phenomenon by means of a physical example. Commenting on the same verse Gauḍapāda gives a brief account of dissolution. At the time of dissolution the five gross elements, viz. earth, water, fire, air and ether merge into the modified five subtle elements in the order of evolution; the five subtle elements and the eleven organs (merge) into *Ahaṅkāra; Ahaṅkāra* (merges) into *Buddhi; Buddhi* (merges) into Nature[3]. Thus, the three worlds merge into Nature (*Prakṛti*) at the time of disssolution. Īśvarakṛṣṇa refers to the period between the evolution and dissolution as *sthiti* or existence (S.K.69) which in Indian cosmology is generally called *Kalpa* (Aeon) meaning the period of time 'conceived' or 'speculated' by the cosmologists.

(4) Condition Before the World was Evolved

Commenting on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*,v.40 Gauḍapāda refers to the period or time (*yadā*) when the world, that means the universe, was not yet created (*yadā lokā-anutpannāḥ*). Then, at the first evolution of *Pradhāna* (*Prakṛti*), according to Gauḍapāda, the subtle body was formed with the capacity to move unimpeded even through the mountains and so on (*parvatādiṣu- apratihata-prasaram*). Strictly speaking it is a problem whether one could speak of a time or a period before the universe was created, for the *Sāṅkhyas* believe that time along with space come into being during the stage of evolution of the elements (vide chap.20, secs. 4 and 5).

(5) The Element of Darkness

Gauḍapāda's commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (v.25) contains an expression which presents a notion familiar to most of the ancient cosmogonies. In the above verse the term *Bhūtādi* occurs and it means the *Tāmasika Ahaṅkāra,* the *Ahaṅkāra* with a preponderance of *Tamas*. The ancient teachers, according to Gauḍapāda, named this particular kind of *Ahaṅkāra Bhūtādi* and it is of interest for our study. The early authorities have called it *Bhūtādi*, the primitive element, because it was considered as the first of the elements (*bhūtānām ādibhūtaḥ*). It abounds in Tamas or darkness (*tamo-bahulaḥ*), so it is also called *Tāmasa* or that which abounds in darkness. We may, thus, notice that it is the first of elements, and not the first of things as it is preceded by the evolved Nature (*Prakṛti*) and *Mahat* (*Buddhi*) and is itself a modification of *Ahaṅkāra*. Thus this primitive element, full of darkness, seems to harmonize well with the prevailing ideas of the ancient world concerning the state of things anterior to the elementary creation such as 'darkness was hidden by darkness' (R.V.X.129.3).[4]

(6) Three Kinds of Creation

We have already mentioned two kinds of creation viz. *Bhautika-sarga*, the creation of beings and *Tanmātra-sarga*, the creation of the five subtle essences, which together constitute the periodic evolution of the universe (vide chap.5,sec.16). Once the universe consisting of the organic and the inorganic aspects is formed, a third kind of creation called the *Pratyaya-sarga* (S.K.46) will continue to take place. The term *pratyaya* derived form *prati* $\sqrt{+i}$, to go, meaning 'going to', 'turning to', or 'recourse' conveys the idea of cause (Macdonell, *P.S.D.q.v.*). In the philosophical literature the word is often coupled with *hetu* as *hetu-pratyaya* (cp.*L'Abhidharmakoṣa de Vasubandhu*, chap.II,p.299,n.I)[5] conveying at times the sense of cause and condition. In the present context it would be better to take *pratyaya* as condition and render the term *Pratyaya-sarga* as the conditional creation (i.e.creation conditioned by different psychological phenomena). *Pratyaya-sraga* is also known as *Buddhi-sarga*, the creation determined by the conditions (i.e.*pratyayas*) of *Buddhi* or Intellect. *Pratyaya-sarga* or the conditional creation operates within the period between evolution (*utpatti*) and dissolution (*pralaya*) and one understands by it the various vicissitudes of human life caused by the exercise of the faculties of the Intellect (*Buddhi*) such as virtue (*dharma*), vice (*adharma*), ignorance (*ajñāna*), passionate attachment (*rājasa-rāga*) and power (*aiśvarya*) (S.K. 44-45). In other words, it may be termed as the *saṁsāra* that lasts between the evolution and dissolution. Whereas the above *Pratyayas* (conditions) bring about the *pratyaya-sarga* or conditional creation, dispassion (*vairāgya*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) operate the other way about. Dispassion brings about the dissolution of *Prakṛti* (*prakṛtilaya*,S.K.45) and knowledge results in the termination[7] (*apavarga*,S.K.44) of *saṁsāra*. Therefore we have to point out that Wilson is not accurate in maintaining that; 'By...*pratyaya-sarga*, is to be understood the various accidents of human life occasioned by the operations of the intellect, virtue, knowledge, dispassion.....' (*The S.K.*p.197).

The two technical terms *pratyaya-sarga* and *Buddhi-sarga* describe the same doctrine from two different angles. Whereas *Buddhi-sarga* refers to the concept from the side of the *āśraya* or locus, *pratyaya-sarga* refers to the idea from the side of the *āśrayin* or what is seated in the locus. The two terms which refer to the same *Sāṅkhya* conception from two opposite directions may be taken as a case of polarity of human mind which is often found in the realm of psychology.

(7) We have already seen that the *Sāṅkhya* conception of the triple division of the universe (i.e. upper, middle and lower) with the three *Guṇas (Sattva, Rajas and Tamas)* predominating in

them respectively (S.K.54) is of *Vedic* origin (vide chap.8,sec.2). In all these planes of existence, according to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the sentient soul experiences pain, arising from decay and death, until it be released from its (subtle) body. He emphatically says that misery is the nature of things in all these worlds (S.K.55). Therefore we disagree with Gauḍapāda's opinion, expressed in his commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 16, that gods are *extremely* happy (*atyanta sukhinaḥ*) as opposed to the human beings who are *extremely* miserable (*atyanta-duḥkhinaḥ*). Deussen says that under creation wandering souls are understood: hence the creation itself is only so wide as this, that is to say, it extends from the highest (abode) of gods (S.K.53) down to the plant kingdom. Thus he appears to imply that the world pictured in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (verses 53 and 54) is a limited one[8]. If that is Deussen's opinion, it may not be correct. It is true that Īśvarakṛṣṇa refers to the world by *ūrdhva* (above), *mūla* (lower part) and *madhya* (middle). This is merely a way of reference. It is unthinkable that the *Sāṅkhya* which clearly accepts that the world has no beginning in time (cp.*mūla-śūnya*) would ever be committed to the opposite of the corollary of the same view in maintaining that the world has limits in space.

(8) The Inhabitants of the Universe

According to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (v.53) the universe is inhabited by three classes of beings belonging to three different orders, namely the gods (*daiva*),the human beings (*mānuṣaka*) and animals (*tairyagyona*) (vide ch.10). The divine beings are supposed to be of eight kinds (*aṣṭa-vikalpa*). They are, according to, Gauḍapāda, *Brahma, Prajāpati, Soma, Indra, Gandharva, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa and Piśāca*. Human beings together form but one class (*mānuṣakaś caikavidhaḥ*). Thus according to the *Sāṅkhyas*, mankind is not a genus under which species can be admitted. The animal order, consists of five classes including the plant kingdom. They, according to Gauḍapāda, are domestic animals, wild animals, birds, serpents and also plants[9]. The idea that animlas are divided into or distributed into five ways (*pañcadhā*) is of historical significance. It can be traced back to the *Savitṛ*-cult of the *Ṛgveda* where a connection between the deity and the animal kingdom is discernible. We may, for example, refer to the *Ṛgveda* 11.38.7-8 wherein it is clearly implied that *Savitṛ* has distributed

the animal world into several differrent kinds. Hence it is rightly observed by Geldner *Svitṛ verteilt die Tierwelt* (*Der R.V.* iv. p.121). The *Vedic* conception of the distribution of the animal kingdom into different ways may have exercised sufficient influence on the formation of the *Sāṅkhya* idea of the five-fold division of the animal world. It is curious, though perhaps an accidental coincidence, that the Syrians and the Egyptians too enumerated, according to Plato[10], eight orders of heavenly beings; their places however seem to be planets exclusively as seen from the names such as the star of Aphrodite, the star of Ares, the star of Zeus, the star of Cronus and so on.[11]

(9) Heaven

Vācaspati, the author of the *Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī*, commenting on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 44, says that by 'ascent (*ūrdhva-gamanam*) is meant the birth in the super-terrestrial regions such as the *Dyu-loka* and the others (*dyuprabhṛtiṣu lokeṣu*). Nārāyaṇa explains these worlds as the five worlds such as *Dyu-loka, Mahar-loka, Jana-loka, Tapo-loka* and *Satya-loka* (p.337 *dyauḥ svargalokaḥ, mahar-jana-tapaḥ-satyādayaḥ*). Commenting on this passage H.H. Wilson includes another region, namely the *Svar-loka* in the above list of super-terrestrial regions (cp.*The Sāṅkhya Kārikā*,p.194). The *Yoga-Bhāṣya* iii.26, and also *Die Kosmographie der Inder* by W.Kirfel (pp.128 and 142) lend support to Wilson's inclusion of the *Svar-loka* in the above list. Wilson understands *Dyu-loka* by the name of *Bhuvar-loka*. Thus we may take the expression of Vācaspati, *dyu-prabhṛti-lokeṣu*, 'in the *Dyu-loka* and the others' to mean the six super-terrestrial regions such as (1) *Dyu-loka* or *Bhuvar-loka* (11) *Svar-loka* (111) *Mahar-loka* (1V) *Jana-loka* (V) *Tapo-loka* and (V1) *Satya-loka*. It is difficult to know the nature of these cosmic-spaces (*bhuvana*) specially from the *Sāṅkhya* point of view as they are not described by the comentators of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. Therefore the best source for us to obtain any adequate description of these super-terrestrial regions will be the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* as the *Yoga* philosophy is generally considered to be genetically connected with the *Sāṅkhya* thought. We may base our discussion on the *Yoga-Sūtra* iii.26. (1) Beginning from the summit of *Meru* and going as far as the Pole-Star (*dhruva*), is the world of intermediate space diversified by planets and asterisms and stars. This appears to be the *Dyu-*

loka or the *Bhuvar-loka* which, as Wilson observes, is the atmosphere (*The S.K.* p.194). As seen in the *Yoga-Bhāṣya*, it is situated above the *Bhū-loka* or the Earth-world which is not included in the *Sāṅkhya* cosmography. (11) Beytond the *Dyu-loka* is situated the five-fold *Svar-loka* or the Heaven-world. (111) The *Mahar-loka*(=the Great World) of Prajāpati is situated above the *Svar-loka*. But the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* adds another world, namely the world of *Mahendra* in between the *Svar-loka* and the *Mahar-loka* although it does not come within the field of the *Sāṅkhya* cosmography. In the *Mahar-loka* of Prajāpati there is a five-fold group of gods, the *Kumudas*, the *Ṛbhus*, the *Pratardanas*, the *Añjanābhas* and the *Pracitābhas*. These gods have the mastery over the great elements; their food is contemplation; their lives are for a thousand mundane periods. (IV) In the first of the worlds-of-*Brahma*, in the *Jana-loka*, there is a four-fold group of gods, the *Brahmapurohitas*, the *Brahmakāyikas*, the *Brahmamahākāyikas*, and the *Amaras*. These have the mastery over the elements and the organs. (V) In the second (of the worlds-of-*Brahma*), in the *Tapo-loka*, there is a three-fold group of gods, namely the *Ābhāsvaras*,[12] the *Mahābhāsvaras* and the *Satyamahābhāsvaras*. These gods have the mastery over the elements and the organs and evolving-matter. Each lives twice as long as the previous (group); their food is contemplation; their lives are chaste (*ūrdhvaretas*). Upwards there is no impediment to their thinking and in regions below there is no object obscure to their thought. (V1) In the third (world) of *Brahma*, namely in the *Satya-loka*, there are four groups of gods, the *Acyutas*, the *Śuddhanivāsas*, the *Satyābhasas*, and the *Saṁjñāsaṁjñins*. By them no laying down foundation for a dwelling is made; they are grounded in themselves and placed one above the other; they have the mastery over the primary cause and live as long as there are creations. Of these (four) the *Acyutas* delight in deliberative contemplation; the *Śuddhanivāsas* delight in reflective contemplation; the *Śatyābhāsas* delight in contemplation where there is nothing but joy; and the *Saṁjñāsaṁjñis* delight in contemplation where there is the feeling of personality and nothing more. These also remain in the three worlds.[13]

(10) Gods

We may now make an attempt to understand the *Sāṅkhya* conception of gods. In fact, Gauḍapāda's commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 2, seems to imply that the supposed immortality of the *Vedic* gods is only a temporary condition. He refers to a discussion amongst Indra and the other gods as to how they have become immortal. In explanation it was said; 'We have drunk soma,(consequently) we have become immortal, we have gone to the light, we have found the gods. What can hostility now do to us and what the malice of mortal man, O immortal one?'[14], The immortality mentioned here is nothing but a peculiar condition of mind brought about by the influence of the alcohol of Soma. On the other hand, the *Sāṅkhya* thinkers do accept the existence of gods (S.K.53), but their conception of gods is different from the common traditional belief. According to the *Sāṅkhyas*, the gods like Indra and others, as denizens of the universe, are not immortal and almighty, athough they live in the upper region (*ūrdhva*) of the universe where there is a predominance of the *Sattva Guṇa* (S.K.54). They, like other inhabitants of the universe, are subject to the misery of old age and death (*tatra jarā-maraṇa-kṛtam, duḥkham prāpnoti cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ*,S.K.55). Thus, for example, Indra lives for a certain period of time, after his death another Indra will be born in his place and in this manner the process will continue. Hence it is observed by Gauḍapādas in his commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse No.2 that 'many thousands of Indras and (other) gods have passed away in successive cosmic ages overcome by time, for time is hard to surpass'[15]. This *Sāṅkhya* conception can be traced back to the R.V.VIII.37.7, where it is implied that Indra being subject to *Nirṛti*, the goddess of 'disorder' is not all powerful although he lives for a long time. Gauḍapāda in his commentary on the *Kārikā* 38 points out a special capacity of the gods; he says that only gods can perceive the five subtle elements which are produced from *Ahaṅkāra*. This may imply that the power of perception of the gods is far more acute than that of the human beings and others. This special capacity on the part of the gods may be attributed to the predominance of *Sattva* prevailing in their existential conditions.

(11) Kapila, a Son of Brahma

Gauḍapāda, in his commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (v.10) points out that, according to the tradition, Kapila was a son of *Brahma*. In this traditional opinion which maintains that the seven great sages (*sapta maharṣayaḥ*) Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana the third, Āsuri, Kapila, Voḍhu and Pañcaśikha were the seven sons of *Brahma*, one may notice an attempt to admit Kapila and the other *Sāṅkhya* teachers into the orthodox line of sages and saints.

(12) Hell

Vācaspati in his commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (v.44) says that by downward departure (*adhastād-gamana*) is meant the rebirth in the sub-terranean regions and so on (*bhūtalādiṣu lokeṣu*). According to the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* iii.26, these are the *Pātālas* or the 'lower-worlds' which are seven in number: *Mahātala, Rasātala, Atala, Sutala, Vitala, Talātala* and *Pātāla*. These names appear to have been coined with a view to produce a sort of melancholy in the mind of the hearer.

(13) Existence in Bondage

It is mentioned in the *Sāṅkhya KāriKā* (v.44) that through the reverse of knowledge, i.e. ignornace, there results bondage (*viparyād iṣyate bandhaḥ*). According to Vācaspati this bondage is of three kinds, resulting from three different erroneous views. They are (1) *Prākṛtika*, the bondage of the materialists who assert Soul (*Puruṣa*) in Nature (*Prakṛti*). (11) *Vaikārikas*, the bondage of another class of materialists who confound Soul with any of the evolutes (*vikāra*) of *Prakṛti* such as the elements (*bhūta*), the senses (*indriyas*), *Ahaṅkāra* and *Buddhi*. (111) *Dākṣiṇa*, the bondage of those who, ignorant of the real character of *Puruṣa* or Soul and misled by the hope of advantage, engage in traditional religious observances such as *dakṣiṇā*. (1) Those who assert Soul in Nature are said to remian in bondage for a period of hundred thousand *manvantaras*[16]. (11) The second type of bondage is as follows: those who identify the Soul with the senses are said to remain in bondage for ten *manvantaras* (*daśa-manvantarāṇīha tiṣṭanti-indriyacintakāḥ*), those who identify the Soul with the elements for a hundred *manvantaras* (*bhautikās tu śatam pūrṇaṁ*), those who identify the Soul with *Ahaṅkāra* for a thousand *manvantaras* (*sahasraṁ tu-abhimānikāḥ*) and finally those who identify the Soul with *Buddhi* for ten thousand *manvantaras* (*bauddhā daśa sahasrāṇi*). (111) Vācaspati does not give the length of the period of the third bondage the *Dākṣiṇaka*. Nārāyaṇa. too is silent about it. The nature of these different types of bondage continuing for different protracted cosmic periods (*manvantaras*) is described by Vācaspati as *vigata-jvara* or being free from the (enjoyments of the) gross body (*sthula-bhoga-rahita*), that is to say that these different bondages confine the Soul to its subtle material form (*sūkṣma-śarīra-sahita*) for different long periods. The nature of bondage is described by Nārāyaṇa, as being devoid of any enjoyment (*bhojanādi-rahita*) and movement (*nigaḍita*) and thus being similar to the position of the life of a prisoner (*kārāgāra-vāsi-iva*). In this case the commentators do not tell us anything regarding the region or the regions of the universe where one suffers the consequences of the three erroneous views in the form of bondage. These souls in bondasge, as Gauḍapāda observes, are not liberated by anything other than (*na-anyena-mucyate*, comy. on S.K.,44) the knowledge.

(14) Planets and Stars

The *Sāṅkhyas* have made a very few references to the planets, stars and the other heavenly bodies. Gauḍapāda'a commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 5 shows that they had an idea about the movement (*gati*) of the moon and the other stars (*tadvaccandratārakam iti*). It is interesting to note that Gauḍapāda also observes in his commentary on the *Kārikā* verse 7, that planets, asterisms and stars are invisible when their rays are overpowered by those of the sun (*sūrya-tejasābhibhūtā-graha-nakṣatratārakādayo nopalabhyante*).

(15) It appears from the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (v.53) that the genuine *Sāṅkhya* cosmology is comparatively simpler than the same found in the other schools of Indian philosophy. The *Sāṅkhyas* too seem to have accepted the existing cosmological ideas so far as they were not contrary to the fundamental teachings of their philosophy. The super-terrestrial regions may, for example, belong to this category. The attribution of divine origin to Kapila may not have been a part of the original *Sāṅkhya*. The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 70 clearly refers to Kapila as

an enlightened human being who through compassion imparted the supreme knowledge to Āsuri. Thus we are inclined to conclude that a good part of the traditional Indian cosmology has found its way into the *Sāṅkhya* system through the commentators of the *Sāṅkhya* texts such as the *Kārikā*.

Notes and References

1. For a general study of the Indian cosmology see, *Die Kosmographie der Inder* by W.Kirfel (Bonn und Leipzig, 1920).
2. *yathā kūrmaśarīre santyevāṅgāni niḥsaranti vibhajyante, idam kūrmaśarīram, etanyetasyāṅgāni - iti. evam niviśamānāni tasmin avyaktī bhavanti.*
3. *pañcamahābhūtāni pralayakāle sṛṣṭikrameṇaiva vibhāgam yānti tanmātreṣu ... ahaṅkāro buddhau, buddhiḥ pradhāne.*
4. Cp. Wilson, *The S.K.* pp. 125-127.
5. *'Le sabhāgahetu est à la fois hetupratyaya et adhipatipratyaya ......'*
6. Vijñānabhikṣu: '....*atra ca sa* (i.e. *pratyaya-sarga*) *eva buddhisargaḥ*....' S.P.B. 111.23.
7. Vide Macdonell, *P.S.D.*, p. 295.
8. *Unter Schöpfung werden die wandernden Seelen verstanden : daher die Schöpfung sich nur so weit wie diese, d.h.von dem obersten der Götter (Verse 53) bis in die Pflanzenwelt erstreckt A.G.P.*, iii. p. 457.
9. *paśu-mṛga-pakṣisarīsṛpa-sthāvarāṇi bhūtāni, evaṃ pañcavidhas tairaścaḥ.*
10. Vide *the Epinomies*, 986e-987d.
11. Cp. also Taylor, *Plato*, p. 500, f.n. 2.
12. The name indicates that these godss are self-luminous. Cp. Jacobi's article in Hastings *Encyclopaedia of Religions and Ethics*, Vol. 1, p. 202.
13. Cp. *The Yoga System of Patañjali* by J.H. Woods, pp. 256-257.
14. *apāma somam; amṛtā abhūma*
    aganma jyotir; avidāma devān.
    kiṃ nūnam asmān kṛṇavad arātiḥ?
    kim u dhūrtir, amṛta, martyasya?
    Gauḍapada has quoted this verse from the *Ṛgveda* 8.48.3. See Macdonell, *V.R.*, p. 156.
15. *bahūnīndrasahasrāṇi*
    devānāṁ ca yuge yuge
    kalena samatītāni, ...'

16. *manvantaras* are the intervals between the *Manus*. Fourteen *manvantaras* are said to form one *Kalpa*. Cp.Renou, *Religions of Ancient India*, p. 75.

XXIII

Theory of Knowledge

(1) Introduction.

Indian thinkers were greatly interested in knowledge and this is clearly seen in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. Love of knowledge is not altogether a novel feature of the *Sāṅkhya* system alone. It is a gradual development of a tendeney which can ultimately be traced back to the *Ṛgvedic* period. The composers of the hymns, the *Vedic Ṛṣis*, were really interested in seeing into the true nature of things. Their enquiring mind and also their interest in knowledge is clearly seen in some verses of the *Ṛgveda*. We may, for example, refer to the *R.V.*10.71.7, wherein reference is made to friends (*sakhā*) who may be equal to one another in the possession of their senses like the eye and the ear. We are further told, there, that they may betray inequality in respect of their power or speed of mind (*asamāḥ manojaveṣu*): some are like tanks which are full upto a man's mouth; others upto the breast only and still others with only a little water. As Sāyaṇa points out this verse refers to three kinds of students with three levels of knowledge: the *mahā-prajñā*, the *madhyama-prajñā* and the *alpa-prajñā*, the high, medium and little knowledge. The craving for knowlege regarding the metaphysical problems, as Wittgenstein would call it,[1] is seen in the *R.V.* X.120.6, where more or less, the same question is asked twice: (1) who knows truly (the origin of the world?) (*ko addhā veda?*) and (11) who, then, knows when it (i.e.the world) has arisen? (*atha ko veda yatha ābabhūva?*). The expressions like *ahṁ manur abhavam...ahaṁ kakṣīvān*, I was Manu,... I was Kakṣīvān(R.V.IV.26.I), may perhaps indicate that at least some *Vedic* seers had had an idea of that type of knowlege which is technically known as the *pubbenivāsānussati ñāṇa*, the knowlege of remembrance of one's former states of existence, referred to in early Buddhist thought. All these may give

us a glimpse of the background from which the *Sāṅkhya* theory of knowledge has gradually developed in course of time.

(2) Role of Knowledge in the Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

The great desire of the *Sāṅkhyas* for knowledge (*jijñāsā*)[2] is obvious (S.K.1). Hence their teaching is mainly intellectual. Their goal is *samyag-jñāna* (<*sam-y-añc =right* + *jñāna*=knowledge), the right knowledge by which is understood the perfect wisdom (S.K.67 etc.). The very *raison d'être* of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy is to bring about this saving knowledge (cp.*jñānena ca-apavargaḥ*, S.K.44) which they considered as the knowledge *par excellence*. This is the discriminative knowledge of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* (*viveka-jñāna*, cp.S.K.11 and 14). The knowledge that the *Sāṅkhyas* demand is that which is extremely pure (*viśuddhi*), free from error (*aviparyaya*) and is absolute (*kevala*) (cp.S.K.64). They do not accept the traditional method of gaining knowledge through the scriptural means, for they think it to be linked with impurity (*aviśuddhi*), destruction (*kṣaya*) and inequality (*atiśaya*) (S.K.2). However, we see that the *Sāṅkhya* conception of knowledge is not devoid of the general spiritual discipline (cp.*dharmeṇa gamanam ūrdhvam*...S.K.,44) that is common to almost all the other schools of Indian philosophy. The value of knowledge that results as a culmination of a spiritual discipline consists in freedom - freedom from evil (*duḥkha*, S.K.I). Īśvarakṛṣṇa believes that pain cannot be got rid of by mundane means (cp.*dṛṣṭe sā-apārthā' cen?/na! ekānta-atyantato'bhāvāt*,S.K.I). It is to be known or realised that pain is not one factor among others constituting our empirical experience, but that the whole of experience is pain (*tasmād duḥkhaṃ svabhāvena* S.K.,55). Thus we notice that the *Sāṅkhya* theory of knowledge is at once epistemological, ethical and metaphysical.

(3) Nature and Form of Knowledge.

Epistemology is the portal to philosophy. One of the first problems which every system of Indian philosophy attempts to settle is, 'how do we know?' The process of knowing implies the subject who knows, and the object that is known. The act of cognition implicates the triple forms (*tripuṭī*), the cognizer, the object cognised and the means of cognition. *Manas*, an

evolute of *Prakṛti* merely gathers the sense-impressions. *Ahaṅkāra* being inert cannot be the cognizer. *Buddhi* the faculty of judgment too is an evolute of *Prakṛti*. They all function because of the unfailing light of *Puruṣa* falling upon them. Therefore *Puruṣa* alone is the knower (*jña*,S.K.2). The *Sāṅkhyas* may argue that even though a non-agent (*akartṛ-*, S.K.19),*Puruṣa* becomes agent as it were, as a result of its association with *Prakṛti* (*tatsamyogāt....kartā-iva bhavati-udāsīnaḥ* S.K.20). Hence *Puruṣa* is the cognizer; it manifests objects because it is self-luminous intelligence (cp.section 20). In a study of the problem of knowledge it is customary to discuss the concept of error (*viparyaya,S.K.47*) too. Error has its root in *ajñāna* or ignorance (S.K.44, cp.also A.G.P, i.111.p.451) which is promiscuously referred to by many a technical term in Indian philosophy such as *adhyāropa, adhyāsa, avidyā, bhrama and bhrānti*. Ignorance is admitted to be beginningless and thus it is a rootless root[3]: if it is not so considered the inquiry into causes will lead to an infinite regress. In fact ignorance is somewhat paradoxical; it is indeterminable (*sad-asad-anirvacanīya*). Ignorance bears in itself contradiction in the form of, I recognize that I am in error; yet it cannot be characterized as mere nothing or as non-existent, as it has been shown by Joachim. 'So long as I am genuinely in error, it is essential that I should believe myself to be thinking truly. As soon as I recognize that I am in error, I have passed beyond error itself and am on the road to truth. This is somewhat paradoxical'[4]. Error is something which is not the case which it appears to be. According to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, it is an error to identify the Self (*Puruṣa*) with the body (*Prakṛti*). Error or *Viparyaya* is thinking something which is not. This is similar to the well-known problem of *to me on* (that which is not) of Plato which we come across in the *Sophist* (257-258 B.C.). To think what is not is not to think of nothing but of something which is different from the truth. Epistemologically the man who holds a false belief or an erroneous view, is not performing the logically impossible feat of thinking in non-existent terms, but is making the mistake of relating his terms in thought differing from the way in which they are actually related.

(4) Valid Knowledge and its Method.

The role of knowledge is the most important problem in the realm of epistemology. It may not be quite correct to speak of valid and invalid knowledge, for knowledge must always be valid or true. If what we grasp through our senses is not valid it may be anything but knowledge. According to the *Sāṅkhya* what is to be known depends on the *Pramāṇas*, means or methods by which knowledge is obtained.[5] The things to be known, says Gauḍapāda are the Pre-established one (*Pradhāna*), Intellect (*Buddhi*), I-ness (*Ahaṅkāra*), the five subtle elements, the eleven organs, the five gross elements and the Spirit (*Puruṣa*). Out of these some are to be known by perception, some by inference and others by *Āgama* or the valid testimony. The *Sāṅkhyas* do not accept the *Vedas* as a special source of knowledge. According to them, *Śruti* or the knowledge derived from the *Vedas*, considered as the revealed texts (*ānuśravika*,S.K.3), is nothing more than the perceptible (*dṛṣṭa*,...S.K.2) or that which is grasped through the sensuous perception.[6] The *Sāṅkhyas*, as we will see later in this study, do accept perception as a source of knowledge (cp.S.K.4). Then what is the need for another *Pramāṇa* which does not do anything over and above perception? This appears to be a very subtle way of getting rid of the *Vedas* often considered as a source of knowledge. Thus we may agree with Radhakrishnan that the *Sāṅkhya* discards many an old dogma and silently ignores others (*I.P.* ii p. 302). Having got rid of the Scripture (*ānuśrava*) as a source of knowledge, Īśvarakṛṣṇa proposes some other means of knowledge. According to him this new type of knowledge is not only different (*viparīta*, S.K.2), but is also better (*śreyān* S.K.2) than the Scriptural knowledge. The new means of knowledge adopted by Īśvarakṛṣṇa is that which is derived from the discriminative knowledge of the evolved, the unevolved and the knower (*vyakta-avyakya-jña-vijñāna*, S.K.2). Valid knowledge, as mentioned earlier, consists of the three factors of subject, object and the method of valid knowledge. The subject is (*jña*) the knower (S.K.2); the object is that which activates or stimulates the mind; hence it is called *viṣaya* (< $\sqrt{viṣ}$, to be active) (S.K.5). The method of valid knowledge is the new means advocated by the *Sāṅkhya* (S.K.2) which we referred to above.

(5) The Test of Truth and Error.

We use, in this discussion, the terms truth and error (falsity) as synonymous with validity and invalidity. Indian philosophers often discusses the question whether truth is intrinsic (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) or extrinsic (*parataḥ-prāmāṇya*). The *Sāṅkhyas* regard both truth and error as inherent in knowledge. This means that they regard both truth and error as intrinsic (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*). According to this doctrine knowledge is made both true and false simply by the conditions of knowledge itself. Thus according to the *Sāṅkhya*, validity and invalidity cannot be produced in any kind of knowledge *ab extra*, but must undoubtedly belong to it *ab initio*. Truth is as much internally conditioned as error. This view follows from the *Sāṅkhya* theory of immanent causality (*satkāryavāda*) according to which causation is simply a manifestation of the effect that potentially pre-exists in the cause. Nothing is produced *de novo*. A cause is capable of producing only that which is inherent in the causal complex. When it is granted that *ex nihilo nihil fit*, that every product is pre-existent in its cause, it follows eventually that even validity (truth) and invalidity (error) exist in their own right; hence they are intrinsic. Therefore the *Sāṅkhya* theory of knowledge is generally known as *svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda* or a theory that accepts the self-validity of cognition. The very same technical term is used by the *Advaitins* and the *Mīmāṁsakas* to designate their positions. But there is a difference. The *Sāṅkhya* differs from the *Advaita Vedānta* and the *Mīmāṁā* in view of the conditions of invalidity. While the *Advaita Vedānta* and the *Mīmāṁā* assign invalidity to extraneous conditions (*parataḥ-apramāṇya*), the *Sāṅkhya* urges that even invalidity of knowledge is rooted in the very conditions of its origin.[7]

(6) Definition of Perception.

In the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* perception is called *dṛṣṭa* (S.K.4), that which is perceived through the senses. According to Īśvarakṛṣṇa perception is the ascertainment of objects in sense-contact (*prati-viṣaya-adhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam*,S.K.5). This, as Gauḍapāda observes, is the application of the senses such as ear and the rest to their special objects viz.,sound and the rest. *Dṛṣṭa*, as a technical term to convey the idea of perception, is not adequate. It refers only

to one sense-faculty, the eye. It appears that the term *dṛṣṭa* of the *Sāṅkhya* system (which does not convey the full implication of perception) belongs to an earlier stage of the development of the Indian theory of knowledge. The *Sāṅkhyas* seem to have adopted the term *dṛṣṭa* for perceptual knowledge in order to distinguish perception by the eleven sensory-motor organs from the perfect knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*) which dawns upon (*adhi*+√*gam*) the one who is engaged in the repeated study of the truth *(S.K.64)*.

(7) Psychology of Perception.

The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* refers to the concept of *vṛtti* (S.K.28 & 29): the term *vṛtti* derived from the root √*vṛt*, to turn,[8] conveys the sense of function. In philosophy it means psychosis: psychosis is a mental condition the function of which is to manifest objects. Thus it is observed in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* that, 'bare awareneess of mind' (*ālocana-mātra*) in respect of sound etc., is acknowledged as the function (*vṛtti*) of the five organs of cognition (S.K.28). Change or becoming is the central conception of the *Sāṅkhya*. According to this philosophy the world is an eternal flux and this teaching of the *Sāṅkhya* comes very close to the Heracleitean doctrine, *pantha rhei*. The *Sāṅkhyas* believe that all our changing perceptions are psychological reflections devoid of consciousness in themselves but receiving a borrowed consciousness from the light reflected upon them by the *Puruṣa* or the Soul. The *Sāṅkhya* philosopher holds the view that all feelings of pleasure, pain, etc., are unconscious by themselves since conscious is only the *Puruṣa* or the Soul. But the Soul is not subject to change and hence it can only illuminate. Being changeless it cannot contain any feelings. Thus the feelings, according to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, are evolutes of eternal matter. Therefore the evolutes such as *Buddhi* and *Ahaṅkāra* are eternal for oneself because their stuff is matter which exists from eternity. Thus even the perception of external objects by the senses is regarded as a process unconscious in itself but receiving consciousness through a reflection of the *Puruṣa* or the Soul.

(8) Function of the Senses.

We may now have a glance at the *Sāṅkhya* conception of the function of the senses. The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* mentions that the senses can perceive only those objects which are in sense-contact in some way or other (S.K.5). There are again objects which cannot be grasped by the senses (S.K.6). These objects which cannot be directly perecived by the senses are, according to Gauḍapāda, the Pre-established One (*Pradhāna*) and the Spirit (*Puruṣa*). Gauḍapāda's observation is correct but it needs further elucidation. *Pradhāna* or *Prakṛti* represents the objective aspect of the world of experience. Logically it is the object or that which is to be known and is thus very different from *Puruṣa*, the knower (S.K.2) who alone is the subject. *Pradhāna* or *Prakṛti* cannot be known through the sense-organs, for it is a metaphysical (*atīndriya*,S.K.6) entity. The case of *Puruṣa* is more complex. Firstly it cannot be known through the organs of sense because it too, is a metaphysical concept. Again, there is a logical difficulty too. *Puruṣa* is the knower. Therefore, *Puruṣa*, the knower cannot be known in the ordinary sense of the word. To attempt to know the knower in the ordinary sense of the word at a mundane level is to try to do the impossible, for it is something like attempting *to light the light* or *feel the feeling*. The *Samyag-jñāna* alone can illuminate oneself regarding the nature of these super-sensuous ontological principles.

(9) Non-Perception.

Non-perception is generally known as *anupalabdhi* or non-apprehension of objects. The doctrine of *anupalabdhi*, non-perception or negation[9] is implied in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (*saukṣmyād tad anupalabdhiḥ*,S.K.8) although it is not accepted as a separate source of knowledge. The *Anupalabhi* is the same as the *abhāva* or the 'non-existence' of the *Nyāya* system. In fact, it is interesting to note that the word *abhāva* is also found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* but only in a semi-technical sense (*na! ekānta-atyantataḥ-abhāvāt*,S.K. I). The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* enumerates eight causes of non-perception. They are the (extreme) distance,(extreme) proximity, injury to the organs, non-steadiness of the mind, subtlety, veiling, suppression and blending with what is similar (S.K.8). According to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy the non-existence

of a particular thing in another or in something else means the mere existence of the latter. The non-existence of a jar, for exmple, on the table means the mere existence of the latter, namely the table *per se*. Therefore the non-existence is the bare existence of a locus (*adhikaraṇa- kaivalyam*,S.T.K.,Cal.ed.p.50; *Śāstradīpikā*,N.S.ed, pp.83-84). Thus the *Sāṅkhyas* hold that non-existence is an objective determination (*viśeṣaṇa*) of some positive entity (*bhāvapadārtha*); therefore it can be perceived by the senses. We may now notice another aspect of the *Sāṅkhya* view of non-perception (or *anupalabdhi*). The *Anupalabdhi* of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy is partly an *adṛśya-anupalabdhi* or a non-perception of entities due to their subtle nature, which keeps them beyond the grasp of sense-organs. In this connection it refers to entities which are not *sensibilia*, not individually distinct. According to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, as mentioned earlier, *Prakṛti* (matter) and *Puruṣa* (Soul) are metaphysical (*sūkṣma* or *atīndriya*) entities. The mere fact of their non-perception does not entail apodeictic negative judgments (*abhāva-niścaya*).

(10) Two Kinds of Perception.

The *Sāṅkhyas* accept two kinds of perception, namely the ordinary perception and the extraordinary perception. (A) The ordinary perception refers to the general cognition of things in one's daily life. It is a *laukika-jñāna* or a knowledge pertaining to our world of experience. Hence it is an *indriya-pratīti* or a cognition of things by *indriyas*, the human organs of sense (cp.S.K.5 and 6). Gauḍapāda points out that the gods (*deva*) alone can perceive the 'non-specific' (*aviśeṣa*) or the subtle elements (vide ch.16). This implies that the human beings cannot see the subtle elements because their perception is not so sharp as that of the gods. This acute occular perception on the part of the gods is still within the range of the ordinary perception because the extra-ordinary perception (as we shall see below) is not a mere perception of material elements but a vision of truth for all time (ch.25,sec.17). The ordinary perception of the *Sāṅkhyas*, can be termed as a concrete view of preception. For the *Sāṅkhyas*, any perception, *nirvikalpaka* (lit. conceptual,i.e.simple), the indeterminate or *savikalpaka* (lit.conceptual,i.e.complex), the determinate is but a direct cognition of the real individual. Hence, according to this philosophy, *nirvikalpaka*

and *savikalpaka* are equally valid: therefore they are necessary modes of the ordinary perception. The *Sāṅkhyas* are full-fledged realists but they are not mere empiricists. They accept wholeheartedly that what one perceives is real in the widest sense of the term. Yet they believe that this is not the only type of knowledge. Their epistemology extends beyond the horizon of empirical knowledge. (B) Thus they also accept an extraordinary perception which consists of three categories: (I) The first is the cognition of metaphysical entirties (*atīndriya-pratīti*,S.K.6)[10]. (II) The second is the transcendental knowledge (*parokṣa*, S.K.6)[11]. (III) The third is known by four names as follows: (a) the perfect knownledge (*apariśeṣa-jñāna*,S.K.64), (b) the absolute knowledge (*kevela-jñāna*,S.K.64), (c) the right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*,S.K.67), and (d) the esoteric knowledge (*guhya-jñāna*,S.K.69). These different names appear to indicate the different aspects of this particular kind of knowledge. Of these three kinds of knowledge we propose to discuss here, the third kind of the extra-ordinary knowledge, as we will be discussing the other two under analogy and valid testimony. The perfect knowledge, according to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, is a knowledge which springs up (*ut-padyate*,S.K.69) in the person who is engrossed in deep meditaion in order to have a vision of the truth (S.K.64). Epistemologically it is described as a knowledge that dawns upon or flashes into the mind (*adhi* + *√gam*,*S.K.67*) of the *Yogi* as a result of meditation on the transcendental realities (*tattva-abhyāsa*,S.K.64). The *Samyag-jñāna* of the *Sāṅkhyas* is very close to the *Yogi-jñāna* or the Mystic Intuition of the *Nyāya Bindu* (ch,I) which is described as, *bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryanta-jam yogi-jñānam*, the (mystic) knowledge of the *yogi* produced at the end of the sub-culminational state of mediation on transcendental reality. The perfect knowledge is characterized by the adjective *kevala* as it is both *complete* and *beyond doubt*. Hence it is a *kevala-jñāna* or an absolute knowledge. It is also called *samyag-jñāna* because it is the kind of knowledge which brings about liberation. Thus we see that it is not an ordinary type of knowledge. It is revealed only to those who engage in deep meditation on the transcendental realities (*tattva*, S.K.64). Therefore it is rightly called a *guhya-jñāna* or an esoteric knowledge.

(11) Inference.

Inference is called *anumāna* (S.K.5). The term *anumāna* consists of two parts *anu* and *māna*. *Anu* means, 'after' and *māna* derived from *√man*, to think, means cognition. Therefore *anumāna* means a cognition that takes place after some other cognition. This other cognition has to be a special kind of cognition which at once acts as the cause of inferential cognition: it is the cognition of pervation (*vyāpti-jñāna*) or the invariable concommitance which is also known as the recollection or consideration (*parāmarśa*) of the proband (*liṅga*,S.K.5). The main difference between the perceptual cognition and the inferential cognition is that the former does not at all depend on the latter whereas the latter necessarily depends on the former. In fact, it is this idea that is conveyed by the preposition *anu* present in the term *anumāna*. Thus whatever be the object of a piece of inferential cognition and whatever be the type of problems causing it, it is certain that all such cognitions must have some sort of perceptual cognition somewhere as its basis. It is this, necessity, that has been expressed by Gotama in his well-known phrase, *Tat pūrvakam*, preceded by it, i.e. perceptual knowledge, occurring in the *Nyāya Sūtra* (I .I. 5). It is this very same idea that we come across in the defintion of the inferential cognition given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa: *tad-liṅga-liṅgi-pūrvakam*, that is preceded by the (knowledge of) *liṅga* (the middle term) and the *liṅgin* (the major term). The inference, according to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, is three-fold (*trividham anumānam*, S.K.5). Unfortunaterly he does not say any more than this. Therefore we have to seek the help of the commentators to understand these three types of inference. The *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of inference does not seem to be an independent one although A. Bürk has suggested such a view long ago in the *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, xv, pp.259 and 261. We may agree with Chatterjee and Datta when they say, 'with regard to the classification of inference the *Sāṅkhya* adopts the *Nyāya* view although in a slightly different form'.[12] In fact the phrase, *trividham anumānam*(S.K.5) (already) occurs in the *Nyāya Sūtra* (I.I.5). Gauḍapāda's opinion of these three kinds of inference is quite close to the theory of inference as given in the *Nyāya Sūtra* (I.I.5). Therefore we will follow Gauḍapāda's

explanation in this study. The three kinds of inference, as given by Gauḍapāda, are as follows: (1) *Pūrvavat* (11) *Śeṣavat* and (111) *Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*. *Pūrvavat*, meaning, preceded by or containing something,[13] is an inference which is based on the observed uniformity of concommitance between two phenomena. For example, one infers rain, seeing the rising cloud, as seen before. *Pūrvavat* is, thus, an inference from cause to effect. It is the inference of the unperceived effect from the perceived cause. *Śeṣavat* can be illustrated as follows: After finding, for example, a *pala* of water from the sea to be saltish, one infers that the rest (*śeṣa*) of the water is also saltish. *Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* (lit. commonly seen) is illustrated as follows: when one observes Caitra leaving one place and reaching another place one infers that he was locomotive: similarly, when one sees the moon and the stars in different places in the sky one infers their locomotion. Again, observing a mango tree in blossom at a particular locality, one infers that the mango trees in other places too are in blossom. We may now examine the nature of these different kinds of inference. The *Śeṣavat*, in principle, is close to the inductive method (i.e. induction) in Western logic. The two examples given by Gauḍapāda under the *Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* seem to be slightly different from each other. The first example of the movement of the moon and the stars explained with the case of Caitra is practically an example of analogy in Western logic. The second example of the mango tree would have, perhaps, been more appropriate under the *Śeṣavat*. This triple division of the inference of the *Sāṅkhyas* is also found in the *Nyāya* philosophy. As to *Pūrvavat*, there is no difference. The *Śeṣavat* is differently explained in the two systems, for the *Nyāya* interprets *Śeṣavat* as that inference which infers cause from an effect (*śeṣa*)[14]. It appears, that this difference is due to a modification of the concept of *Śeṣavat* by the *Sāṅkhyas* in order that their concept may be in conformity with their inference of *Prakṛti*: 'the Manifest is composed of the three *guṇas*....so also is the Unmanifest' (or *Pradhāna*) (S.K.II).

(12) The Syllogism.

The syllogism of the *Sāṅkhya* is not different from that of the *Naiyāyikas*. Thus it is correctly observed by Chatterjee and Datta: 'as regards the logical form of inference, the *Sāṅkhyas* admit like

the *Naiyāyikas*, that the five-membered syllogism is the most convincing form of inferential proof' (*I.I.P.*283). The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (verse 5) mentions the role of *liṅga* or the mark in the process of inference. By *liṅga* is understood the *kāraṇa* or cause that leads to a successful inference. The *liṅga* is the same as the middle term in Aristotelean terminology. It is said in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, 'that (=inference) is preceded by the (knowledge of) *liṅga* (=the middle term) and the *liṅgin* (the major term) (S.K.5). This, we can illustrate with an example. We may present the five-membered syllogism (*pañca-avayava-vākya*) in the form of the Aristotelean syllogism, as an example of the Barbara mood:

> In all cases of fire, there is smoke,
> On this hill there is smoke,
> Therefore on this hill there is fire.

Here smoke is the *liṅga* and fire is the *liṅgin* (=that which contains the *liṅga*). The *Sāṅkhyas* may have been influenced by the *Naiyāyikas*, with regard to their concept of *liṅga* and syllogism.

(13) Analogy.

The *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* (S.K.5), a form of inference which we saw above, is very much similar to analogy in Western logic[15]. The idea of analogy is also found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, v.15, where the term *samanvayāt* is found. *Samanvayāt* literally means,'on account of going together'. By *samanvaya* or 'going together' is understood the similarity (*sādṛśyatā*) of things. This similarity in technical language is nothing but analogy. Hence we may translate *samanvayāt* as 'on account of analogy' (cp.Deussen:*wegen der Analogie*, A.G.P.,i.111.p.430). The similarity discussed here (S.K.15) is the similarity in different material entities that are found in the world. According to the *Sāṅkhya* they are similar to one another in that they all partake of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference: hence they all consist of the three *Guṇas*, *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. All these material entities are the effects of *Prakṛti*. Therefore, the *Sāṅkhyas* argue on the analogy of the effects of *Prakṛti*, that *Prakṛti* the cause of the effects too must consist of

the three *Guṇas*. Gauḍapāda elucidates the point with an empirical example:

> Those who perfrom sacred rites are Brahmins
> and their parents are also Brahmins.
> This boy performs a sacred rite,
> Therefore his parents are Brahmins.

Again we may notice the role of analogy in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* where it is said: 'Just as people engage in action for relieving (i.e. satisfying) (their) desires, even so does *Avyakta* (=*Prakṛti*) evolve (into this world) for the release of *Puruṣa* (S.K.58)(cp.A.G.P. i.111,p.459). The validity of this analogy is another question which need not delay us here, but it may be the best example of analogy found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*.

(14) Modus Tollens or the Avīta.

One of the most important contributions of the *Sāṅkhyas* in the field of logic and theory of knowledge is what is known as the five *avītas* (*avīta-pañcaka*). The *avīta* (lit.not straight) is a negative syllogism (*vyatireka-mukhena pravartamānam niṣedhakam avītam*) in the form of *modus tollens* (S.K.,9).[16] The *modus ponens* and the *modus tollens*, just as they are admitted by the *Nyāya* have, probably, been admitted by the *Sāṅkhya* before them. The *Sāṅkhyas* seem to be the first to make an extensive use of the *modus tollens* for the purpose of establishing their conception of causality, the *satkāryavāda*, the theory of the pre-existence of the effect in its cause. Their aim was to support the concept of an eternal matter and also to include the universe of effects (*viśva-rūpa*) in this universal cause (*vaiśvarūpya*). For this purpose they brought forward five arguments expressed in the form of *modus tollens* (*avīta-pañcakam*).[17]

i. If the effect did not pre-exist (*asat*), it could never be produced out of nothing (*akaraṇa*),
It, nevertheless, is produced,
Therefore it pre-exists in its (material) cause.

ii. If the effect did not pre-exist in its material cause, it would not be homogenous with that,
But the cloth is homogenous with threads (*upādāna-grahaṇa*), (and not with the weaver who also is a cause),
Therefore, the effect pre-exists in its material cause.

iii. If the effect did not pre-exist in its material cause and if it did pre-exist elsewhere, then the cloth would not be produced out of thread, but could be produced out of any thing such as straw,
The cloth, however, is produced out of threads and is not produced out of any thing such as straw (*sarva-sambhava-abhāva*),
Therefore it pre-exists in the threads.

iv. The capacity or force to bring about something requires an object upon which it is directed; if this object does not pre-exist, the force cannot be efficient,
The forces, however, are efficient (*śaktasya-śakya-karaṇa*),
Therefore their objects pre-exist (in their material cause).

v. An effect is relative to its cause (*kāraṇa-bhāva*); if the effects did not pre-exist, there would be no causes at all,
But the causes exist,
Therefore the effects must pre-exist in their causes.[18]

The *modus tollens*, a form of valid inference, can be presented symbolically as folows:
[(p > q). - q] > - p

(15) Valid Verbal Testimony.

In the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* the verbal testimony is called *āpta-vacana*, the words of trust-worthy persons (S.K.5),*āpta-śruti*, that (i.e. a verbal statement) which is heard from the trust-worthy

persons (S.K.5) and also *āpta-āgama* (S.K.6) that (i.e. a verbal statement) which is coming [*āgama* < *ā*+ $\sqrt{gam}$, *to go*] from the trust-worthy persons. Gauḍapada, in his commentary on the *S.K.*4, has discussed the concept of *āpta-vacana* with some details. Thus says he:

āgamo hi-āpta-vacanam,
āptam doṣakṣyād viduḥ.
kṣīṇadoṣo' nṛtam vākyam
na-brūyād-dhetv-asambhavāt.
sva-karmaṇy-abhiyukto yaḥ,
saṅga-dveṣa-vivarjitaḥ,
pūjitas tadvidhair nityam,
āpto jñeyaḥ sa tādṛśaḥ.

Āgama (a traditional doctrine) is a speech of an authoritative person. They recognize one as authoritative from one's being free from blemish. He who is free from blemish will not tell a lie because there is no occasion for it. He who is engaged in his duties, free from attchment and hatred, and is always respected by persons like himself; - such a person is known as an authoritative person.

However, it is somewhat doubtful, at least on epistemological grounds, whether Gauḍapāda has been successful in giving an adequate and rational account of the concept of *āpta-vacana*. The main characteristic of an *āpta-vacana* is that is should be supported by valid reasons, but Gauḍapāda's account does not mention this important characteristic of the *āpta-vacana*. It was, probably, as a reaction to this traditional conception of *āpta-vacana* that Aniruddha at a later date, brought forward a new definition of the same doctrine. Thus says he:

na hi-āptavacanān nabhaso
nipatanti mahāsurāḥ.
yuktimadvacanam grāhyam
mayānyaiś ca bhavadvidhaiḥ.
(*Sāṅkhya-Sūtra-Vṛtti*,1.26).

Huge *Asuras* do not drop from heaven merely because an *āpta* or competent person says so. Only statements which are supported by reason should be accepted by me and others like yourself.

Valid verbal testimony, as we saw in Gauḍapāda's, commentary is that which proceeds from the lips of a person considered to be an unimpeachable authority (*āpta-āgama*) by the person listening to it. Thus we notice an implicit faith included in this source of knowledge, because the person receiving such knowledge will neither argue against it nor cast any doubt about it. The value of this source of knowledge depends on the character of the person imparting such knowledge. Such persons should, primarily, be rational. We may notice that the concept of *āpta-āgama* is marked by two features: (1) that it comprises words which are actually uttered, and (11) that the words should be those of an admitted authority. Therefore, according to the *Sāṅkhya*, the knowledge derived from a study of books is not *āpta-āgama*. The *Sāṅkhya* conception of *āpta-āgama* may contain an attempt to reject the study of the *Vedas* regarded as a source of knowledge. Considered as a source of knowledge *āpta-āgama* can rank only as a belief because we accept it simply on faith in the person concerned. The concept of *āpta-vacana* or the valid verbal testimony of the *Sāṅkhyas* occupies the parallel position of *Śabda* of the *Naiyāyikas*; it is very much similar to the role of authority in induction. Reliance on testimony is a condition which is necessary for individual knowledge and social continuity.[19]

(16) Belief.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not discuss belief as a separate source of knowledge except for the fact that his *āpta-āgama*, logically, reduces itself to belief. However we come across *mati*, opinion or belief in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, v.61 wherein he says that 'it is his opinion or belief that there is nothing more delicate than *Prakṛti* (*prakṛteḥ sukumārataraṃ na kiñcid astīti me matir bhavati*, S.K.61). Here Īśvarakṛṣṇa has expressed a personal conviction in the form of a belief (vide Colebrooke and Wilson, The S.K.p.235). Knowledge which we derive from perception etc., should always be true; knowledge cannot be anything but true whereas opinion or belief (*mati*) can be true or false. It is a contradiction

to say that one's knowledge is false ; but it is quite right to say that one's belief is false. It appears that Īśvarakṛṣṇa was aware of this epistemological problem. This may be the reason why he uses the word *mati* in connection with his personal belief regarding the delicate nature of *Prakṛti*.

(17) Degrees of Knowledge.

We have already seen six sources of the *Sāṅkhya* epistemology among which analogy comes within the field of inference (*anumāna*). When we examine these different epistemic levels in their ascending order of significance we may notice as to how one should exert oneself to go up, step by step, on the ladder of *Sāṅkhya* epistemology in order to have the vision of reality. It is also implied that the *Sāṅkhya*-ladder of knowledge consisting of different epistemic levels gradually leading to the *Samyag-jñāna* is, like Wittgenstein's ladder (cp.The *Tractetus*,6.54 and J.Passmore,*H.Y.P.*p.529), to be thrown away being of no further use (*akāraṇa-prāptau*,S.K.67) the moment one has climbed to the top of it (*samyagjñānādhigamād*,S.K.67). The epistemic levels as admitted by the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* can be illustrated as follows:[20]



(18) Process of obtaining knowledge.

The process of obtaining knowledge is very briefly referred to in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (cp.verses 20, 23, 27, 28 and 35 - 37). The general principle of the *Sāṅkhya* seems to be more or less

similar to the teaching, ***nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu***. In the first stage there is only a bare consciousness in respect of sound and the rest, and it is acknowledged to be the function of the five organs of cognition (*śabdādiṣu pañcānām, ālocana-mātram iṣyate vṛttiḥ*,S.K.28). Then in the next stage *Manas* (mind) performs the functions of assimilation and discrimination (cp.*manaḥ...saṅkalpakaḥ*,mind is...explicative,S.K.27). Next *Ahaṅkāra* (the empirical self) makes a synthetic unity of different sensations and presents it to *Buddhi* (intelligence) which is the faculty of judgment (*adhyavasā yobuddhiḥ*, S.K.23). *Buddhi*, which takes up an affective-conative attitude towards it, presents the same to *Puruṣa*, the transcendental self (cp.*kartā-iva bhavati-udāsīnaḥ*,S.K.20). Thus the final perception is enjoyed by *Puruṣa*, the Spirit[21]. This process briefly described by Īśvarakṛṣṇa is well illustrated by Vācaspati Miśra with an empirical example as follows (comm. on S.K. 35) : Village headman collects taxes from his villagers and hands them ever to the Goovernor of the province. He hands them over to the Minister. The Minister hands them over to the King. In a similar way the sense-organs, obtaning immediate apprehensions of external objects pass them on to the *Manas*. After having reflected on them *Manas* transmits them to *Ahaṅkāra*. *Ahaṅkāra* appropriates them itself by its unity of apperception and then hands over these apperceived impressions of external objects to *Buddhi*. Then *Buddhi* resolves what action is to be taken on them. The process of obtaining knowledge is again viewed from the point of views of the gateways and the gate-keepers. The external organs are called the gateways (*dvārāṇi*) of knowledge while the three internal organs the gate-keepers (*dvāri*) (S.K.35). The external organs receive impression from external objects. Then they communicate them to *Antaḥkaraṇa* or the Internal Organ which by reflection (*manana*), self-consciousness (*abhimāna*) and determination (*adhyavasāya*) makes them definite for the enjoyment of *Puruṣa* or Soul. The *Sāṅkhya* also holds the view that the thirteen organs operating perception are themselves insentient principles. Hence they are incapable of conscious apprehension of objects. In fact, it is the reflection of *Puruṣa* or the soul that makes the organs apprehend objects. With the reflection of Self's consciousness in the unconscious *Buddhi*, *Ahaṅkāra* and *Manas* they become as if sentient. This process is compared to a jar

with cold or warm water appearing cold or warm respectively. In this manner the perception takes place (Gauḍapāda on S.K.20). It is seen that the *Sāṅkhya* theory of knwoledge implicates two distinct epistemic factors, the existence of a thing that is known, namely an extra-mental object (*viṣaya*, S.K.5) and the existence of a knower (*jña*, S.K.2) or the Self (*Puruṣa*).[22] The process of obtanining knowledge can be illustrated as follows:



Objects.	The experience of the outer senses and	it is collected by *Manas*,	and *Manas* presents it to *Ahaṅkāra* and *Ahaṅkāra* presents it	to *Buddhi*, the faculty of judgement and *Buddhi* will finally present it to	Puruṣa who enjoys the final perception

The *Sāṅkhya* method of obtaning knowledge is somewhat parallel to that of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* systems. According to these schools of Indian philosophy, it is through *Manas* that the relation of Self to the senses and the body is established.[23] This process can be represented as follows:



(19) Other Minds.

The concept of 'other minds' is a very old problem in philosophy. But it has received great attention (as a question of epistemology) only in recent times. J.S.Mill was, perhaps, the earliest to present the problem in clear terms. He puts to himself the question, 'By what evidence do I know, or by what consideration am I led to believe, that there exist other sentient creatures; that the walking and speaking figures which I see

and hear, have sensations and thoughts, or in other words, possess Minds?'[24] Thus we see that the problem of other minds is related to the question of solipsism.[25] When one wants to establish the existence of other minds, one will have to disprove solipsism directly or indirectly as the idea of solipsism and the concept of other minds are contradictories. Īśvarakṛṣṇa has clearly understood this problem. In the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, the question of other minds appears under the notion of *puruṣa-bahutva*, the plurality of persons or souls. Īśvarakṛṣṇa attempts to establish it with three arguments (S.K.18) which we may present as follows:

(i) If there were only one *Puruṣa*,then there would be only one birth, one death and one (set of) organs (of cognition and action). But birth, death and organs are different for different individual cases (*janana-maraṇa-karaṇānām pratiniyama*). Therefore there must be many *Puruṣas* (*puruṣa-bahutvam siddham*).

(ii) If there were only one *Puruṣa* (and not many), then the activity of one would, simultaneously be the activity of all individual beings in the world. But the activities of the individual beings are not taking place simultaneously (*a-yugapat pravṛtti*). Therefore there must be many *Puruṣas*.

(iii) If there were nothing that is opposed to the world of the three *Guṇas* (i.e.*Prakṛti*), then everything would be *Prakṛti* (Matter) and there would be no *Puruṣa* (Selves) at all. But there are those that are opposed in nature to the world of the three *Guṇas* (*traiguṇya-viparyaya*). Therefore there must be many *Puruṣas*.

These arguments based on one's empirical knowledge is of considerable importance both logically and historically. They belong to a very early period of the history of philosophy. In all probability, they may represent a pioneer attempt to prove the existence of other minds on rational grounds. We must also mention here that upto date nobody has been fully successful

in performing this difficult task. Logically it is important to note that Īśvarakṛṣṇa has attempted to establish the existence of other minds with the help of the well-known method of Zeno, the *reductio ad absurdum* which is technically called the *prasaṅga-vākya* in Indian Logic.

(20) Scripture, Reason and Intuition.

A study of the epistemology of any given school of Indian philosophy would not be complete unless one has also discussed the attitude of that system towards Scripture (*śruti, āpta-śruti* or *āpta-vacana,* S.K.5), Reason (S.K.51) and Intuition (*adhigama,* S.K.67). Scripture or *śruti* in its narrow sense of the revealed texts is rejected by the *Sāṅkhyas* (S.K.2). But they accept a particular kind of *Śruti* which is technically termed as the *Āpta-śruti* or that which is heard from, or revealed by, the authoritative persons. As we have seen above the *Sāṅkhyas* do not accept *Āpta-śruti* on blind faith, for they believe that nothing unsupported by reason is of any consequence (S.S.V., i.26). This shows the great importance they have attached to Reason. But the *Sāṅkhya,* at least to some extent, is a religio-philosophy (cp. S.K.44-45); thus it maintains that Reason devoid of moral training consisting of non-violence (S.K.2), generosity (*dāna,*S.K.51), and purity (cp.S.K.70) is of no significance. According to the *Sāṅkhya* only those with a sound moral training, engaged in constant contemplation of truth (*tattva-abhyāsa,*S.K.64) will, at the end of their great effort, obtain an intuition of reality which is certain and final (S.K.64). Hence they accept the supremacy of Intuition over pure or unaided Reason and Scripture. We notice here a very important feature of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. Philosophical pursuit, for the *Sāṅkhyas,* was the most vital problem of life. Thus they belong to the very opposite side of those to whom philosophy has appeared to be, more or less, a matter of luxury.[26]

(21) The foregoing discussion shows that the *Sāṅkhyas* have touched upon almost all the important aspects of Indian epistemology. It is significant that they have done this task at an early period of Indian history when there was no other *system* of philosophy besides theirs. The *Sāṅkhyas* were original thinkers in certain respects such as the handling of the argument of *reductio ad absurdum* with regard to the problem of other minds. Taking into consideration the many problems tackled by them, one may safely conclude that theirs is a fairly complete theory of knowledge.

Notes and References

1. Cp. Wittgenstein, *The Blue Book,* pp. 17-18 and Pitcher, G: *Wittgenstein,* p. 187.
2. Cp. Ch. Lassen translates, *jijñāsā ....hetau (S.K.I),* into Latin as, *....desiderium cognoscendae rationis, (Gymnosophista,* No. I. See also the *S.K.* by Colebrooke and Wilson, p.5). The word *jijñāsā* is found in the same sense in the *Brahmasūtra* too. Cp. *athātho brahma-jijñāsā,* now therefore the desire to know *Brahman. Jijñāsā* conveys the sense of, desire to know, to enquire into, and to examine and test. See Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sūtra,* p. 227.
3. *'mūle mūlābhāvād amūlam mūlam,'* S.P.B.i. 67.
4. Nature of Truth, p. 138 ff.
5. *Prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇād-hi, S.K.4.*
6. Cp. Max Müller, *Indian Philosophy,* Vol. iii, *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga,* p. 18.
7. Cp. H.M. Bhattacaryya, *The Principles of Philosophy,* (1959) p. 176.
8. Cp. Whitney, *The Roots, Verb-Forms and Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language,* p. 164.
9. Cp. Stcherbatsky, *B.L.* Vol.. ii. chap. ii.
10. Cp. *abhilāpasaṃsargayogya-pratibhāsa - pratītiḥ, Nyāya-Bindu,* i.5.
11. Cp. Deussen, *A.G.P.* I.iii, p. 420.
12. *I.I.P.,* p. 282.
13. Cp. Macdonell, *P.S.D. q. v.*
14. Cp. S.C. Chatterjee, *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge,* p. 291.
15. Cp. *A.G.P.,* 1.iii. p. 419.
16. On *avīta,* see The *Nyāya-kaṇikā* (reprint from *the Paṇḍit*), p. 30; The *Nyāya-vārtika* (Bibliotheca Indica), p. 123 and H. Jacobi, *Aus Indiens Kultur,*p. 8 ff.
17. Cp. *B.L.,* Vol., I, pp. 293-294.
18. *asad-akaraṇād upādāna-grahaṇāt, sarvasambhavābhāvāt śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt, kāraṇa-bhāvāc ca satkāryam, S.K.9.*
19. Cp. Max Black, *Critical Thinking,* p. 266.
20. The epistemic levels propounded by Plato too seem to take the shape of a ladder. It consists of four epistemic levels. Vide

S. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, volume I, part I (IMAGE Books), p. 176.
21. Cp. J. Sinha, *Indian Psychology : Perception, pp. 127-128.*
22. Cp. R.K. Mookerji, *Ancient Indian Education, pp. 293-294.*
23. Cp. Hiriyanna, *O.I.P.* p. 230.
24. Cp. J.S. Mill, *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 6th ed. (New York, 1889) pp. 243-244.
25. Cp. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, sections, 24, 402-403.
26. See Radhakrishnan, *I.P.*, vol.I, p. 22 and R.K. Tripathi, *Spinoza in the Light of the Vedānta*, p. 3.

XXIV

Ethics

(1) The term *Ethics*, derived from the Greek substantive, *ethos/ethikos*, means custom, usage or habit. Ethics is also called moral philosophy. The word 'moral', is interesting for it is derived from Latin, *moralis* by which is understood custom, habit and character. Customs are not merely habitual ways of acting: they are ways approved by the group. Thus the word 'ethics' literally means the science of customs or habits of men. Hence ethics becomes the science of character and conduct. It considers the character of persons and evaluates its merit (*dharma*) or demerit (*adharma*). So ethics is the science of rightness or worngness of conduct. But rightness and wrongness refer to the Good which is the ideal of human life (*puruṣārtha*).[1] Therefore, ethics may be described as the science of the highest Good. In this sense ethics forms an essential part of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy.

(2) The faint beginning of some concepts of the *Sāṅkhya* ethics may ultimately be traced back to the early *Vedic* civilization. The importance of an ethical life is already reflected in the *R.V.*10.34, where it is said, 'Play not with dice, ply thy tillage; rejoice in thy property, thinking much of it' (10.34.13). Again in the *Ṛgveda* we come across an important position accorded to women. Female seers are referred to in the *Ṛgveda*. They are called *Ṛṣikās* and *Brahmavādinis*. The *Ṛgveda* knew many *Ṛṣikās* such as *Romaśā* (I.126.7), *Lopamudrā*, *Apālā* (VIII.91.1-7) and *Kadru*, (ii.6.8). In an important passage in the *Yajurveda* (XXVI.2), it is said that the *Vedic* knowledge should be imparted to all: *Brāhmaṇas* and *Rājanyas*, *Śūdras*, *Anāryas* and *Caraṇas* (i.e. *Vaiśyas*) (*yathemām vācam kalyāṇimāvadāni janebhyaḥ brāhmaṇa-rājanyābhyām śudrāyacānāryāya ca svāya cāraṇāya*).[2] All these may have exercised some influence on the evolution of the moral philosophy of the *Sāṅkhyas*.

(3) The *Sāṅkhyas* agree with the general standpoint of Indian philosophy that life is full of misery. For them it is not only the human life that is subject to misery but also the life of the gods. Whatever is the form of life, it is full of misery: whether in the form of god, man or beast. Hence they say:

> *tatra jarā-maraṇa-kṛtam*
> *duḥkham prāpnoti cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ.* (S.K.55)

> There the intelligent *Puruṣa* experience pains consequent on old age and death.

The concept of *duḥkha* or the universal suffering was so firmly established in the Indian mind that it was hardly necessary for the *Sāṅkhya* to prove it on rational grounds. Admitting that misery is of the nature of things (*duḥkham svabhāvena, S.K.*55), the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* begins with the 'triad of pain' and says that it is desirous (*jijñāsa*) to know the means of terminating it (i.e. the misery). Thus they imply that the path could be paved for the supreme end of life (*puruṣārtha*), the Highest Good. The misery mentioned in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* is of three kinds (*duḥkha traya*, S.K.I), The three-fold misery, according to the commentators, is: (a) the internal misery (*ādhyātmika duḥkha*), (b) the misery coming from the *bhūta*, the animate beings and the inanimate objects (*ādhibhautika duḥkha*), and (c) the misery due to one's *daiva* or *Karma* (*ādhidaivika duḥkha*). Of these the internal misery is said to be two-fold,bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of several humours, wind, bile and phlegm: mental pain is due to desire,wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, etc. The *ādhibhautika* misery is caused by man, beasts, reptiles, and inanimate things. We may now examine the *ādhidaivika* misery. Applied to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy it is incorrect to keep to the etymology and render this term as the 'misery coming from the gods' (as done by the ancient commentators like Gauḍapāda and also by the modern scholars like Radhakrishnan)[3] for the simple reason that in the *Sāṅkhya* system the *devas* or gods are not considered as the givers of *sukha* and *duḥkha*. In fact the lot of the gods is not very different from that

of the human beings (cp.*S.K.* 53 and 55). Therefore it is better to translate the term as the 'misery due to one's *daiva*' as Deussen translates it (cp.*A.G.P* 1.iii.p.414). But Deussen cannot be quite correct when he translates the term *daiva* as *Schicksal* meaning 'destiny' or 'fate' as it may imply a divine being causing destiny or fate: the misery resulting from the *daiva* as taught in the *Sāṅkhya* (which is a *nirīśvara-vāda* or an atheism) is simply the misery due to *Karma* or one's own previous actions which are considered to be *anādi* or beginningless.[4] *Prakṛti*'s evolution into this world is for the purpose of creating an opportunity for the suffering beings to obtain *samyag-jñāna* or right knowledge (*S.K.*57) by *tattva-abhyāsa* or the 'repeated study of the truth' and thereby to free themselves from pain for ever (*S.K.*64). Therefore this third type of misery is nothing but the misery resulting from one's own *Karma* or actions. The idea of the first type of pain can be traced back to the *Ṛgveda*. A good example is the *R.V.*10.34, the pathetic monologue in which the gambler bemoans the ruin he has brought to his wife, mother and family by gambling. We may also refer to the *R.V.*10.95, where we come across *Purūravas* full of grief as a result of the disappearance of his beloved *Urvaśī*. The *ādhibhautika* pain too can be traced back to the earliest stage of Aryan civilization in India. In the *R.V.*i.116.2-5 we see how cruelly *Tugra* has acted on *Bhujju* by putting him back into the sea. *Bhujju* suffered there for three days and there nights and thanks to the *Aśvins* he was able to get out of his terrible plight. An example of the trouble coming from animals is implied in the *R.V.*X.127.6 which says: 'Ward off the she-wolf and the wolf.....0 Night; so be easy for us to pass (*yāvayā vṛkyaṃ vṛkaṃ ....ūrmye; athā naḥ sutarā bhava*). The misery coming from inanimate objects is also implied in some places of the *Ṛgveda* such as X.39.3 where reference is made to a person with a broken (*ruta*) limb (Geldner: *der etwas gebrochen hat*). We may now examine the *ādhidaivika* pain. This is described by Gauḍapāda as: 'The divine misery, i.e. *daiva*, because it belongs to gods or comes from heaven, that which arises with reference to these is, cold, heat, storm, rain, thunderbolt and the rest (*devānām idam daivam, divaḥ prabhavatīti vā daivam. tadadhikṛtya yad upajāyate - śītoṣṇa-vātavarṣāśanipātādikam).*[5] The *ādhidaivika* pain as we have already seen, is not the misery coming from gods but the misery coming

from one's own *Karma* which may be what Gauḍapāda means by 'that which arises from heaven' (*divḥ prabhavatīti*).

The *Sāṅkhya* interpretation of pain is rational. It maintains that we become unhappy (or happy) not only due to our previous actions (*ādhidaivika*), but also due to things that happen by chance (*ādhibhautika*) and also due to our present *Karma* (*ādhyātmika*). Man is a social being, so he lives in society, for, as Aristotle observes, 'He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must either be a beast or god.[6] Living in society man has to engage in various activities and will have to face different situations which may result in the *ādhibhautika duḥkha* which one should not always take as pain due to one's previous *Karma*. The *Ādhyātmika* concept also leads to the same end. According to this teaching one becomes unhappy (or happy) not only due to one's previous *Karma*, but also due to one's actions (physical or mental) in this life itself. Thus, it is implicit in the *Sāṅkhya* ethics that man should be prudent and take precautions to avoid difficulties that may happen by change or as a result of our own imprudent acts. Herein is implied an important ethical notion of the *Sāṅkhyas*, namely the freedom of the will. The *Sāṅkhyas*, would say that one is subject to one's previous *Karma*, but one may modify it to a good extent with one's present *Karma*. If somebody is unhappy on account of his painful inner feeling, he may very well be happy as a result of his joyful feeling produced in him by the *dharma* (cp.*dharmeṇa gamanam ūrdhvam S.K.*). Thus it is seen that the *Sāṅkhyas* have recognized the freedom of will at an early period of human history and this is extremely important expecially in view of the fact that it saves the *Sāṅkhya* from being a *Niyativāda* or determinism.[7]

(4) The *Sāṅkhya* ethics is related to its metaphysics, and its attitude being a *contempus mundi* was favourable to the ascetic ideals of ancient India. The *Sāṅkhya* thinkers found out that *Avidyā* or Ignorance is the rootless (*S.P.B* 1.69: *māyām tu prakṛtim; pradhānam mūla śūnyam*, 1.67) root of misery (*S.P.B.anādir aviveko*, VI.12); it is to be replaced by the right knowledge, if we are to see things as they are and then to obtain the final emancipation. That the *Sāṅkhya* ethics is related to religion is clearly seen in such concepts as *dharma, adharma* (*S.K.*44), *rāga* and *virāga* (S.K. 45). The upward (*ūrdhva*) and downward (*adhaḥ*) journeys (*gamana*), as mentioned in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (44), are simply due to the religious background of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. In fact religion is the ideal ground of morality and morality is the outward manifestation of religion.

(5) The psychological basis of the *Sāṅkhya* ethics is very significant, and its fundamental postulate is that whatever we think and whatever we do will bear fruit accordingly. The doctrine of *Guṇa* has a great ethical and psychological significance. The beings of the world are classified on the basis of their having a predominance of *Sattva, Rajas* or *Tamas*. When we take the volitional side of our conscious life, it must be mentioned that *Tamas* predominates in our lower appetites with their endless demand for wants and satisfaction. *Rajas*, the element of attachment prevails in our craving for power and action, adventure and victory. The element of *Sattva* brings about a happy balance in the Soul leading to peace of mind which should be the cardinal feature of moral man. The upward ascent takes place as a result of the gradual increase of the *Sattva* element and the diminution of the other two *Guṇas, Rajas* and *Tamas*. Thus we see that the relative strength of the *Guṇas* determines our mental character. It is with great difficulty that one has to eliminate the influence of *Rajas* and *Tamas* and thus increase the qualities attributed to *Sattva*. The increase of the *Sattva* element in man is of great importance, for *Sattva* develops the critical, balanced and thoughtful nature of man.[8]

(6) Ethics being a science of the morality of conduct, the *Sāṅkhya* is interested in many moral concepts such as *apavarga* (*S.K.*44), *aviveka* (*S.K.*11,14), *aviśuddhi* (*S.K.2*), *dharma, adharma* (*S.K.*44), *puruṣa-vimokṣa* (S.K.57,58), *muni* (*S.K.*70), *prīti*, and *viṣāda* (*S.12*). An action can be termed as a right action (*dharma, S.K.*44) if it brings about what is good and an action is a wrong action (*adharma, S.K.*44) if it results in what is evil (cp.*saṁsāro bhavati rājasād rāgād, S.K.*45). Virtue is the excellence of character and vice is the taint of the same. It seems that to be moral is a sort of natural law in the *Sāṅkhya* ethics. The universe, according to the *Sāṅkhya*, is purposive. *Prakṛti* evolves into this world for the purpose of creating an opportunity for the suffering beings -

whether god, man or beast - to realize the true state of things and thereby to attain liberation (*kaivalyārtham, S.K.*21). Hence to be moral is to be in accordance with nature which possesses an immanent teleology.[9] For the *Sāṅkhyas*, the concepts of right and wrong, are preliminaries but not final. According to them one should start with them, build one's philosophy on them, but when one reaches the highest stage one will have to discard both right and wrong (*dharmādīnām akāraṇaprāptau;* virtue and the rest, ceasing to function, S.K.67) as being of no avail at that time. This reminds us of the famous teaching of Wittgenstein: 'My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps-to climb up beyond them. He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climed up it'[10].

(7) We may now examine the place accorded to reason and conscience in the moral philosophy of the *Sāṅkhyas*. Reasoning plays a very important role in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā.*[11] Īśvarakṛṣṇa attempts to reason out his teachings not only by his usual method of argument but also with similes and examples (cp.*S.K.*,1,2,3,6,8,9,15,16,17,18,21,31,41,57,58,59 and 67). A clear conscience is impossible without the help of good reasoning and this can be seen in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*,51, where Īśvarakṛṣṇa has recognized reasoning (*ūha*) as one of the *Siddhis* or attainments. Gauḍapāda has elucidated the role and the purpose of reasoning very clearly. Thus say he: "Reasoning - e.g. somebody might always reason: What is truth here? What is the future? What is the Highest Good? By doing what can I be successful? To him who thinks in this manner there arises knowledge that, *Puruṣa,* indeed, is different from *Pradhāna,* the Pre-established One, i.e. *Prakṛti; Buddhi* is (quite) different; *Ahaṅkāra* is quite different; the subtle elements, the organs and the five gross elements are quite different; the knowledge of the principles that arises in this way will result in the attainment of release. Like Aristotle, Īśvarakṛṣṇa too recognizes the value of *phronesis* or the practical reason and this is seen in the concept of *suhṛt-prāpti,* winning of friends (*S.K.*51) which implies discussion with others. Virtue is a practical matter where discussion is very important to form

a sound judgment regarding what we ought to do. It may make us want what is good; it may enable us to attain what we want.

(8) We may now examine the *Sāṅkhya* position of the individual in society. Universal brotherbood and *ahiṁsā* are the fundamental features of the moral philosophy of the *Sāṅkhyas.* They had unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind, nay of the entire world of beings (*S.K.*I). This attitude on the part of the *Sāṅkhyas* is a direct outcome of the ontological position of their philosophy, namely that the world, both animate and inanimate, is simply an evolution of *Prakṛti.* Therefore gods, human beings, and animals represent merely different planes of the same evolution. They all stand in blood relation to each other. Therefore the individuals have to regard and respect each other as members of the same family, a position which will lead to great social harmony. Individuals living in society have the necessity of good friends (*S.K.*51, *suhṛt-prāpti* : winning of friends), for, as Aristotle points out, even a good man needs friends to be happy, because man is a social animal and there is therefore a natural basis for friendship.[12] The social outlook of the *Sāṅkhyas* is clearly seen from the concept of *Prakṛti* which is depicted as someone working for the benefit of others. We may, for example, refer to the *Kārikā* 56:

iti-eṣa prakṛti-kṛto
mahadādi-viśeṣa-bhūta-paryantaḥ.
prati-puruṣa-vimokṣārtham
svārtha-iva parārtha-ārambhaḥ.

Thus, this work (*ārambha,* lit. beginning) undertaken by *Prakṛti,* from *Mahat* down to the gross elements, is for the liberation of each *Puruṣa;* it is for another's benefit, as if it were for one's own benefit.

Gauḍapāda's commentary on this verse reveals the great socio-ethical significance underlying the concept of *Prakṛti.* Thus says he: '*Prakṛti* behaves like that man, who having forsaken his own business, is attending to that of his friend' (*yathā kaścit svārthaṃ tyaktvā mitra-kāryāṇi karoti, evaṃ pradhānam).*

(9) The *Sāṅkhya* interest in education as a socio-moral institution is conspicuous in the *Kārikā*. Īśvarakṛṣṇa refers to the oral instruction from a teacher (*śabda, S.K.*51), study (*adhyayana*, S.K.51), discussion with friends, (*suhṛt-prāpti, S.K.* 51, literally meaning acquisition of friends) and also the repeated study of the principles (Deussen: *des Studium der Grundwesen*)[13] (*tattva-abhyāsa, S.K.*64). Study (*adhyayana*) as explained in the *Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī*, means receiving the syllables (and also the words) of the scriptural sciences as they fall from the lips of the teacher (*Guru*). The effect of the *adhyayana* is the comprehension of the meanings of the words learnt and hence it is oral instruction (*śabda*). The next stage is reasoning (*ūha*) which attempts to examine the meaning of *Āgama* by a process of logic not opposed to the same: this, in other words, means supporting the *Āgama* by solving all doubts and objections that could be levelled against it. *Āgama* in this context means 'tradition' and it is the *āptavacana*, trustworthy utterance or verbal testimony (ch.23, secs 17 & 22). The final stage is discussion with friends (*suhṛt-prāpti*); the technical meaning of this is that though one may arrive at truth by his own process of reasoning, yet he may have no confidence in his conclusions until he has discussed them with his friends, that is to say, with his teacher, pupils and fellow disciples (*nyāyena svayaṃ parīkṣitam api-arthaṃ na śraddhatte, na yāvad guru-śiṣya-sabrahmacāribhiḥ saha saṃvādayate*).[14] Īśvarakṛṣṇa's emphasis on repeated study (*S.K.*64) as an educative method is also significant. By repeated study is meant concentrated and uninterrupted study carried on with faith for a long period in order that the apprehension be made to take root.

(10) Next we may examine the problem of rights and duties in so far as it is applied to the *Sāṅkhya* ethics. This, in fact, is determined by two principal teachings of the system. According to the teachings of the *Sāṅkhya*, all human beings together form one class without any distinction of caste, creed and sex (*S.K.*53). Thus, they boldly and rightly discard the *Brāhmaṇic* conception of the *varṇa-āśrama-dharma* and accept the equality of human beings. This is very important from the point of view of the social justice. But according to the doctrine of the *Guṇas*, people differ in their temperament, ability etc. Still, unlike Plato, they do not prescribe different duties to be performed by different

human beings according to their capacities determined by a preponderance of *Sattva, Rajas* or *Tamas*. It is up to the individual to realize and discharge his duties according to his ability and strength.

(11) The doctrine of *Puruṣārtha*, undoubtedly, is the central concept of the *Sāṅkhya* moral philosophy. Īśvarakṛṣṇa clearly shows that *Puruṣārtha*, the goal of *Puruṣa* is the highest ideal of the *Sāṅkhya* ethics (cp. *S.K.* 42, 63, 69 and also 21). The term *Puruṣārtha* literally signifis, that which is sought by *Puruṣa* or man, hence it may be taken as equivalent to a human end or purpose.[15] Thus *puruṣārtha*, as a technical term, is very closely related to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, especially in view of the fact that it is directly connected with the *Puruṣa* which is the main interest of the system (cp.*puruṣārtha-hetuka*, prompted by the goal of *Puruṣa, S.K.*42; *puruṣārtha-jñānam idam*, this doctrine which is accessory to the attainment of the goal of *Puruṣa*, S.K.69). It is interesting to note that the *Sāṅkhya* ideal comes very close to that which is advocated by Aristotle (384/3 B.C.) in his *Ethica Nicomachea*, Book I, section I: 'Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim'. The *Puruṣārthas* were recognized in India from very early times and the early literature bears ample testimony to this fact. We may, for example, notice that the faint beginning of the concept of *Dharma*, one of the four cardinal *Puruṣārthas*, is already implicit in the *Ṛgveda* i.160.1 [*antar īyate ...dharmaṇā sūryaḥ*., the sun travels between (Heaven and Earth) according to fixed law] and X.90.16 (*tāni dharmāṇi prathamāni-āsan*, these were the first ordinances). A very developed stage of this very same concept is again found in the *Taittirīya Up.* i.11.1, where we come across the admonition, *dharmaṃ cara*, practise virtue, as one of the practical precepts to a departing student. The other *Puruṣārthas* such as *Vairāgya*, the cultivation of 'detachment' (cp.*Kaṭha.Up.* 1.ii.1 and 2; cp. also *āpta-kāma, Śvet.Up.i.11*) and *Jñāna*, the acquisition of 'knowledge' (cp.*Br.Up.*IV.4.23) are already mentioned in many *Upaniṣads*. In the *Mahābhārata* one comes across the elaboration of the orthodox social code, with the four aims of life, the *Puruṣārthas: artha* or wealth, *kāma* (lit.desire) or happiness, *dharma* or virtue and *mokṣa* or liberation (*MBh. Śānti Parva*, 167.8.9).[16]

It is to be mentioned here that almost all the concepts of the *Sāṅkhya* moral philosophy are related to its doctrine of *Puruṣārthas* in some way or other.

We saw above that the ancient Indian thinkers have recognized four supreme ends (*Puruṣārthas*): *artha, kāma, dharma* and *mokṣa*. Īśvarakṛṣṇa's view in this connection seems to be reflected in his doctrine of the *Bhāvas* (S.K.44-45) where only two of the above-mentioned four ends of the classical thinkers are adopted; namely *dharma* (S.K.44) and *mokṣa* (*apavarga*, S.K.44). To these, two others are added. Thus the four ends accepted by Īśvarakṛṣṇa appear to be as follows:-

The *Puruṣārthas*:	their consequences
i. *Aiśvarya* or power (*S.K.*45).	i.Non-obstruction (*avighāta*, *S.K.*45).
ii. *Dharma* or virtue (*S.K.*44).	ii. Upward departure (*ūrdhva gamana*, S.K.44).
iii. *Vairāgya* or non-attachment (*S.K.*45).	iii. Loosing the bond between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* (*Prakṛtilaya*, *S.K.* 45)
iv. *Jñāna* or knowledge (wisdom) (S.K.44).	iv. Liberation (*apavarga* S.K.44).

It seems that Īśvarakṛṣṇa has considerably deviated from the traditional conception of the *Puruṣārtha*. *Aiśvarya* of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* may roughly correspond to the traditional idea of *Artha*. Regarding *Dharma*, and *Jñāna* which bring about *Apavarga* or *Mokṣa* there is no difference. But the *Kāma* of the traditional teaching is left out and it is replaced by the very opposite of it, *Vairāgya* or the non-attachment. This is not only a bold act on the part of the *Sāṅkhya* but also an original contribution in the field of Indian ethics.

(12) One who has obtained the highest goal, namely the liberation in this very life is called the *Jīvanmukta* (cp.*S.K.*67). We may add a few remarks on this ideal of life according to the *Sāṅkhya* ethics. When one (*Puruṣa*) attains liberation no physical changes take place in him. The attainment of liberation, as we mentioned earlier, consists of three judgements: (i) 'I am not that', (ii) 'that is not mine', and (iii) 'I am not' (vide chapter 20, section 6 and chapter 25 section 17). It is possible for any *Puruṣa* to come to this stage and thus to attain liberation while living in this life provided that he follows the correct path. This kind of liberation is technically known as *Jīvanmukti* or the emancipation (*mukti*) while living. But a *Jīvanmukta* is still subject to the momentum of the past actions although he does not acquire any new *Karmas*. Īśvarakṛṣṇa compares this position to the whirl of the potter's wheel (*cakra-bhramavad, S.K.*67) which persists for a while by virtue of the momentum imparted by a prior impulse. Īśvarakṣṛṣṇa's simile which is also found in the earlier part of the *Maitrī Up* (ii.6,*cakram iva*) explains the doctrine in question quite clearly. Thus we see that the place of the *Jīvanmukta* is the penultimate stage of the *Sāṅkhya* moral philosophy; its final aim is the *Videhamukti*, the disembodied (*vi-deha*) emancipation which ensures absolute and complete freedom (*S.K.*67-68). But from the point of view of this (worldly) life and society, the *Jīvanmukta* can be taken (as a matter of fact) as the general ideal, not only of the *Sāṅkhy* ethics but also of all Indian ethics.

People desire *aiśvarya* or power (*S.K.45*) as much as they long for *artha* or wealth. In this enterprise man may land himself in *adharma* or vice. Hence *dharma* or virtue is higher than the power (*aiśvarya*), because it is not mere power but moral power that should be aimed at. *Dharma* satisfies man's rational and moral needs and consists in living in accordance with the Moral Law (*dharma*) - control of instincts, desires and emotions by reason. *Vairāgya* or non-attachment is higher than *dharma* (virtue). *Dharma* or virtue is the hall-mark of a law-abiding citizen. But even a person of this category may have some craving which may create difficulties in his inner life. But *vairāgya* or the non-attachment of a *Yogin* is conducive to perfect harmony both internally, and in society. Such a one has no craving, consequently he has no problems. Higher than all these is the *samyag-jñāna* (cp.S.K.67), the source of *apavarga* or liberation. *Apavarga*, the liberation is the Highest Good, *summum bonum*. It is the transcendental, unfathomable goal which is aimed at by the doctrine of *Puruṣārtha* of the *Sāṅkhya* moral philosophy. The *Sāṅkhyas* do not describe this state in words (cp.ch.25, sec.17 and ch.27, sec.12). This shows that they have steered clear of the category mistake,[17] namely the error of using language relevant to physical

things while discussing things that are non-physical. It is remarkable that the *Sāṅkhyas* have very wisely avoided the ego-centric predicament which is not very uncommon in many systems of philosophy.

(13) We have briefly referred to the problems of non-violence (cp.sec.8) and equality (cp.sec.10). We may, here, add a few more remarks on these problems. Equality among human beings is one of the cardinal principles of the *Sāṅkhya* ethics. This social justice is a direct reaction to the concept of *varṇāśrama-dharma,* the duties relating to castes and stages of life, accepted by the *Brahmin* teachers. According to the idea of *varṇāśrama-dharma* there are different duties relating to the different castes and the stages of life. Thus the *Brahmins* should learn the *Vedas,* the *Kṣatriyas* should join the army, the *Vaiśyas* should tend the cattle and the *Śūdras* should serve the higher castes. In the eyes of the *Sāṅkhyas* this was a social injustice; neither the *āśrama* nor the caste, according to the *Sāṅkhya,* is of any avail for one who is bent on realizing the Highest Good. Hence it is correctly observed by *Gauḍapāda* in his commentary on the first verse of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*:

pañcaviṃśai-tattvajño
yatra tatrāśrame vaset
jaṭī muṇḍī śikhī vāpi
mucyate nātra saṃśayaḥ.

> One endowed with the knowledge of the twenty-five principles will undoubtedly obtain liberation, no matter whatever stage of life he is living, whether he has mattered hair, or is shaved, or has top-knot.

Thus the *Sāṅkhya* discarded the concept of caste and regarded the whole humanity as but one class (*mānuṣakaś caika-vidhaḥ, S.K.53*). This lofty idea of the *Sāṅkhyas* is a very great contribution in the field of Indian ethics; it also implies another important concept of the *Sāṅkhyas,* the idea of universal brotherhood which is a logical outcome of their doctrine of evolution. Universal brotherhood and non-violence together form but one concept. We have already seen that according to the

evolutionary process accepted by the *Sāṅkhya* thinkers, gods, men and animals, and even the plant kingdom, stand in blood relationship to each other. This being the case the *Sāṅkhyas* are opposed to the animal sacrifice (cp.S.K.2) which was generally accepted by the traditional Vedic schools. This attitude of the *Sāṅkhyas* is clearly shown by *Māṭhara* with a *śloka* quoted in his commentary on the second verse of the *Kārikā* (vide ch.2,sec 5).

(14) The contribution of the *Sāṅkhyas* in the field of moral philosophy may be second only to the Jain and Buddhist systems of ethics. The *Sāṅkhya* was, perhaps, the earliest school to reject the institution of caste, and also to accept the equality of the male and the female as human beings: their rejection of *kāma* as one of the four supreme ends of human beings is an original contribution to the Indian ethics. In all these they were one with Jainism and Buddhism. The *Sāṅkhya* attitude towads animal sacrifice which is also shared by both Jainism and Buddhism, seems to go back to an ancient non-*Vedic* culture which is faintly reflected in the *Ṛgveda* X.82.7 (vide ch.2, sec.5).

Notes and References

1. Cp. H. Sidgwick, *History of Ethics* (1967), p.1.
2. Vide R.K. Mookerji, *A.I.E.*, p. 51.
3. Cp. *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, p. 426.
4. *S.P.B.* VI. 12.
5. *Gauḍapāda's comy. on the S.K.*, 1.
6. *The Politics*, bk. 1, chap. 2, 1253ᵃ, 25-30.
7. Vide chap. 20, sec. 7 (sufficient and necessary conditions).
8. Zimmer, *P.I.* pp. 295-298.
9. Cp. Dante, *Considerate la vostra semenza:*
   fatti non foste a viver comme bruti
   ma per seguir virtute e conoscenza. (*Inferno*, Canto 26).
   (Reflect on your origins. You were not
   made to live like brutes but to pursue
   virtue and knowledge.)
10. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 6.54 (cp. chap. 23, sec.17).
11. See my article : *Reasoning and Argument in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Theory of Knowledge*, - Journal of the Vidyalankara University of Ceylon, vol. 1, no. 1 (January, 1972) pp. 92-102.
12. Cp. The *Nicomachean Ethics*, bk, viii, chap. 1. 1155ᵃ, 5-10.

13. *A.G.P.*, 1. iii, p. 462.
14. *S.T.K.*, on *S.K.* 51.
15. Cp. Hiriyanna, *Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy*, p. 65.
16. Cp. also *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, pp. 99-100.
17. See Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, pp. 20-24: Category mistake, literally means, the error of taking language that is appropriate for one category and applying it to another, thus distorting the meaning of the words. See also J. Passmore, *Philosophical Reasoning*, (1961) pp. 131.

XXV

Sāṅkhya and Buddhism

(1) Kapilavatthu.

According to tradition Prince Siddhārtha Gautama passed his youth in the capital of the *Śākya* realm: Kapilavatthu. The name of the city occurs in some *suttas* such as the *Mahāsaccakasutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* and the *Piṇḍolyasutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*. *Kapilavatthu*, the *Sākyan* capital has been considered as the home of Kapila, the supposed founder of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy (S.K. 69-70).[1] It has been explained as meaning the 'red place' or the 'red earth' as suggested by Oldenberg.[2] But it is doubtful whether this interpretation is at all necessary. Proper names can often be seen in the toponymy of ancient India: *Rāma-giri*, *Kāli-kṣetra* (Calcutta) and *Kṛṣṇā-nadī* are only a few examples to be mentioned in this connection. Moreover, it is important to point out here that the name Kapila is very old, and was an established one already during the period of the *Ṛgveda*. Even if the town *(Kapilavatthu)* is not named after Kapila the traditionally accepted founder of the *Sāṅkhya* system, it may well have been named after some other person by the same name. The name Kapila occurs in the *Ṛgveda* (X.27.16), probably as the prototype of *Ṛsi*,[3] Sāyaṇa believes that Kapila in this context is the sage Kapila, the founder of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. It is not certain whether Sāyaṇa's interpretation is correct. Geldner is probably correct in identifying this same figure with the *einzige* or *eingeborene* (first, chief or native) *Ṛṣi* depicted in the *A.V.* viii.9.25; 26; x.7.14; *Bṛh.Up.* ii.6.3; v.15. 1; *Muṇḍ. Up.* vi.10 and *Praśna Up.* ii.11. Thus we are unable to conclude that the town *Kapilavatthu* is definitely named after Kapila who is considered as the founder of the *Sāṅkhya* system. The most we can say is that it is quite likely that *Kapilavatthu* has been named after one Kapila about whom we hardly know anything.

(2) The name *Pañcaśikha* too is intriguing. It is found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 70 as a name of one of the early teachers of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. The name *Pañcaśikha* occurs in the *Sakka-pañha Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* and the *Salāyatana-Saṃyutta* (No.119) of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* as the name of a *gandhabba*, a sort of semi-divine being. The *Kārikā* maintains that it was *Pañcaśikha* who really spread the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine *(tena ca bahudhā kṛtam tantram, S.K. 70)*. According to the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, *Pañcaśikha* visited the Buddha who was staying at *Gijjhakūṭa* and asked him how it is that some beings are wholly set free in this very life whereas others are not. We thus see that *Pañcaśikha's* is merely a question concerning, what the *Sāṅkhyas* would call, the *puruṣa-vimokṣa* (S.K. 56, 57 & 58). Analysing the problem presented by *Pañcaśikha*, the Buddha told him that some beings are not wholly set free as a result of their clinging, amongst other things, to objects *(rūpa)* which are *kāmupasaṃhita* and *raja-nīya*. *Kāmupasaṃhita* means passion-fraught; *raja-nīya* as explained in the *Dīgha Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā* 1.311 (P.T.S.) is *rāga-janaka* or producing *rāga* or attachment. Continuing, the Master said that, on the other hand, those beings who are not clinging to (or detached from) these, as well as some others, are wholly set free. The essence of this teaching is practically the same as found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 45, where it is said that, 'from non-attachment results the dissolution of *Prakṛti*, and *saṁsāra* from passionate attachement *(vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ, saṁsāro bhavati rājasād rāgāt)*. This, in fact, is the central doctrine of the *Sāṅkhya*. It is quite likely that these circumstances may have resulted in the *Sāṅkhyas* naming the true promulgator of their philosophy as *Pañcaśikha*, the Five-crest, a name which is also not unsuitable from a metaphorical point of view to symbolize the great wisdom of the teacher. Our argument becomes stronger when we consider the names of the other two *Sāṅkhya* teachers mentioned in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Āsuri which simply mean 'Lord *Kṛṣṇa*'[4] *and 'the divine one' (cp.M-W S.E.Dic., q.v.)* respectively.

(3) Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta.

Tradition maintains that Siddhārtha Gautama at an early stage received spiritual guidance under the two *Sāṅkhya* teachers Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta.[5] These two teachers are mentioned in several places in the Pāli *Tipiṭaka* such as the *Mahāsaccakasutta* (cp. the *Mahāvagga*, v.13.1) and the *Ariyapariyesanasutta* (cp.*Lal.Vist.* p.295 seq.)[6]. The *Bodhisattva* first placed himself under the guidance of Āḷāra Kālāma at Vesāli having a following of three hundred disciples. Āḷāra taught him the successive stages of meditation and also the doctrine of the Ātman. The teaching did not appeal to the *Bodhisattva*, consequently he left Āḷāra on the ground that it was 'not leading to absence of passion, cessation, quiescene, knowledge, supreme wisdom, and *Nirvāṇa*, but only as far as the *Ākiñcaññāyatana*, the realm or sphere of nothingness (cp. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 336). Gautama, next, came to Uddaka Rāmaputta of Rājagṛha under whom seven hundred disciplies were seeking spiritual guidance. Uddaka's doctrine of Soul did not attract the *Bodhisattva* (Aśvaghoṣa, *the Buddhacarita*, xii, 62, S.B.E.49), therefore he gave up training under Uddaka in order to search for a better method of understanding the riddle of life. We may, thus, notice that the *Sāṅkhya* in its earliest form (i.e. Proto-*Sāṅkhya)* is pre-Buddhistic.

(4) Priests and the Veda.

In the *Sāṅkhya* system there is no place for priests and sacrificial gifts *(dakṣiṇā)*. This is seen in Gauḍapāda's commentary on the *Kārikā* 44 where it is implied that the concept of *dakṣiṇā* as a sacrificial gift producing good effects is itself a wrong view resulting in bondage of the individual. It is also implied that one bound in this way will not obtain release through any other means save through the means of knowledge. We may also remind ourselves of the *Sāṅkhya* antipathy towards the *Veda (S.K.2)*. In Buddhism too there is no place for priests who perform sacrifices on behalf of their votaries. Buddhist *Bhikkhus* are not priests and so they do not perform sacrifices. They, like the *Sāṅkhyas*, aspire after right knowledge. Their main interest is in *sīla* (virtue), *samādhi* (concentration) and *paññā* (wisdom), and their duty is to propagate the *dhamma* for the welfare and the happiness of the many (*bahujanahitāya, bahujanasukhāya)*. They live on something which they get by way of alms *(piṇḍapāta)*.[7] Again, Buddhism, like the *Sāṅkhya*, does not accept the authority of the *Veda*.[8] Thus we notice that in the

above respects the similarity between the *Sāṅkhya* and Buddhism is undeniable.

We have already seen that the *Sāṅkhyas* were directly opposed to the institution of sacrifice. We have also seen *Māṭhara* ridiculing the *Vedic* practice of immolating animals and plants for the purpose of attaining Heaven by posing the question that if by such activites people attain Heaven, who, in fact, would ever go to Hell (vide ch,2, sec.5). It is interesting to note that the same idea is found in a different form in the *Kūṭadantasutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* where the Buddha refers to a certain king in whose sacrificial performance no life of sentient creatures was taken, no cattle and sheep were killed and no trees were hewn down[9] This may indicate not only the common approach of *Sāṅkhya* and Buddhism towards the Vedic religion but also the similarity of their critical attitude directed to it.

(5) God and gods.

The classical *Sāṅkhya* and Buddhism are greatly similar to each other in that they both have no place for an *Īśvara* or a creator God. The *Sāṅkhya* being an evolutionism there is no place for an *Īśvara* who creates the world, for that place in this system is attributed to *Prakṛti*, a mystic entity which functions in accordance with the *Karma* of the individual beings. In Buddhism too there is no place for an *Īśvara*, and this position is replaced by the concept of *Karma*. Thus, according to these schools, there is no *Īśvara* granting happines or misery; one is responsible for one's lot. In Buddhism it is maintained that one has to work out one's own salvation *(attā hi attano nātho)*. This similarity between *Sāṅkhya* and Buddhism is quite significant. While rejecting the existence of a creator-God, *Sāṅkhya* and Buddhism do not deny the existence of gods, as divine beings who are also subject to the three-fold misery (S.K. 53-55). It must, however, be pointed out that the *Sāṅkhya*-Buddhist belief in gods (*deva* or *devatā*) is not essential, but is marginal.[10] Incidentally, we may mention that in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* the divine beings are conceived (vi *kalpa*,*S.K.*53) to be of eight classes, a fact that clearly shows their lack of any special pre-eminence.

(6) Mahā Puruṣa (=Buddha) and Māra's Daughters.

The appearance of *Māra's* daughters before the Buddha, the *Mahā Puruṣa* after his Enlightenment seems to breath a *Sāṅkhyan* atmosphere. The story implied in the *Sutta Nipāta*, IV.9.1, is described in several places of the *Tipiṭaka* such as the *'Dhītaro' Sutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya. Māra's* three daughters, *Taṇhā, Arati*, and *Ragā* are represented as attempting to tempt the Buddha. They assume numerous forms of varying charm, full of winning expressions and appear before the *Mahā Puruṣa* in vain and finally desist and disappear. The appearance of *Māra's* daughters before the *Mahā Puruṣa* after his Great Enlightenment reminds us of the appearance of *Prakṛti*, the cosmic dancer (*nartakī*, *S.K.*59) (consisting of *Tamas*, *Sattva* and *Rajas*), in vain, before the *Puruṣa* (*S.K.* 65) at his absolute enlightenment *(kevala-jñana*, S.K.64) and finally desisting and disappearing. Thus it is said:As a dancer *(nartakī)* desists from dancing, having shown herself to the audience, so does *Prakṛti* desist having shown herself to *Puruṣa* (*S.K.*59).

(7) The Four Cardinal Truths.

The four cardinal truths of Buddhism are well-known. The idea of four cardinal truths may be discernible in the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* systems too. The *Sāṅkhyas* believe that *duḥkha*, pain or misery is the nature of the *saṁsāric* existence *(tatra.....svabhāvena duḥkham*,*S.K.*55). Now what is the cause of the *saṁsāric duḥkha?* The *Yogasūtra* would say, *tasya hetur avidyā*, the cause of that is *Avidyā* or nescience (*Y.S.*ii.24). Next is the cessation of the *duḥkha*.According to the *Kārikā*, *Apavarga* is the end of the *duḥkha* (*S.K.*44). The last is the path leading to the cessation of *duḥkha*. According to the *Kārikā* it is the *Samyag-jñāna* (*S.K.*67) based on *dharma* (*S.K.*44) and *virāga* (*S.K.* 45), that forms the path leading to the end of *duḥkha* (cp.sec.17 below). The four truths of the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* tradition is clearly mentioned in the *Yogabhāṣya* as follows:

> 'Just as the science of medicine *(cikitsāśāstram)* has four divisions, (on) disease (and on) cause of discease (and on) health (and on) remedy, so this science also has four divisions, (on) the *Saṁsāra* (and on) the cause of

> the *Saṁsāra* (and on) release (and on) the way to release. Of these (four), the *Saṁsāra* with its mass of pains is that which is to be escaped; the union of *Pradhāna (Prakṛti)* and *Puruṣa* is the cause of this which is to be escaped; the final destruction of the union is the escape; the means of escape is the focussed insight *(samyag-darśana)* (Y.B.,ii.5).

The four truths implied in the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* systems may be compared with those of early Buddhism, namely the existence of misery or suffering *(dukkha-sacca)*, the cause of suffering *(samudaya-sacca)*, the cessation of suffering *(nirodha-sacca)* and the path leading to the cessation of suffering *(magga-sacca or dukkha-nirodha-gāmini-paṭipadā)* (vide *S.N.*ii.4.10 and *M.N.*, the *Saccavibhaṅgasutta)*. The general similarity of the methodology of the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, Buddhism and the Indian medical science may not be insignificant. The Buddha, often called a Master Physician *(bhaiṣajya-guru)*[11], as seen, for example, in the *Mahā-vagga* of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, was well-acquainted with medicine. The four-fold method of the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, Buddhism and the Indian science of medicine may have been adopted from a pre-classcial medical tradition of ancient India.[12] The four-fold method has been applied in the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* and Buddhism to the spiritual healing of the suffering of mankind.[13]

(8) Paths of knowledge.

Both *Sāṅkhya* and Buddhism are paths of knowledge. For them *dharma* or virtue is only a means to right knowledge and it too will be of no more use the moment one attains the goal. This idea is clearly seen in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 67 where it is said: *samyag-jñānādhigamād, dharmādīnām akāraṇa-prāptau*, virtue and the rest having become causeless by the attainment of right knowledge. The same idea is found in the *Alagaddū-pama-sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (No. 22) where it is said by the Master: *kullūpamo mayā dhammo desito nissaraṇatthāya na gahaṇatthāya*, I have declared to ye O Brethren, a doctrine which is like unto a raft, it is for the purpose of crossing over and not to cling to. The very same idea is again conveyed by the expression *ohita-bhāro* (<*ava*, away, down + √*dhā*, to put or place and √*bhṛ*, to bear) meaning literally *one who has laid down the burden*. According to the commentators the term *bhāra* (lit.load) in this context is equal to *puñña-pāpa* (merit and demerit), for *puñña* - not to speak of *pāpa* - is also a burden in that it brings about *saṁsāra* in the form of rebirth in the *deva-lokas* or the super-terrestrial regions (vide chap. 22, sec.9). Thus the term *ohita-bhāro* (*Dhammapada*, 402) idiomatically means an *Arahant* who having relinquished both merit *(puñña)* and demerit *(pāpa)* is in possession of the highest cognition which is technically termed, for instance, as *paññā* (cp.*Sutta Nipāta*, 343 and 352), or *vijjā* (cp.*Dīgha Nikāya*, II.33). Both these schools advocate freedom through knowledge. In Early Buddhism the idea is clearly seen in many places. We may, for example, refer to the *Māgandiyasutta* (verse 13) in the *Aṭṭakavagga* of the *Sutta Nipāta* where we come across the doctrine of freedom through knowledge *(paññā-vimutti)*. The same teaching is again found in other places such as the *Ānāpāṇasatisutta* (No.118) of the *Majjhima Nikāya* where one comes across the term *vijjā-vimutti* which also means, 'freedom through knowledge'.[14] This same doctrine is also found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* as, *jñānena ca-apavargo*, through knowledge release is acquired (*S.K.*44).

(9) Enumerartive Analysis.

Analysis as a method of discourse is clearly seen in Buddhism. In fact, refering to himself the Buddha once said: 'I am an analyser and not a dogmatist *(vibhajjavādi aham...nāham ekaṁsa vādo, Subha-Sutta, Majjhima Nikāya*, P.T.S. ed. Vol.ii, p.197). The concept of analysis, for example, is seen in many discourses in the *Vibhaṅga Vagga* or the Division of Analysis of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (cp.P.T.S. ed. Vol.iii pp.233 - 250). Enumerative analysis is clearly seen in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* which is simply an enumerative analysis of various doctrines and tenets. There are many other places in the *Tipiṭaka* where this feature is conspicuous. We have already seen in chapter 3 that this feature also plays a very important role in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. It must, however, be mentioned that there is also a difference between the two schools. Whereas in Buddhism analysis was a functional trait, the *Sāṅkhya*, on the other hand, does not seem to have consciously made a method of it. Therefore we cannot say that the similarity is due to the influence of one school over the

other. The similarity may, probably, be due to a common heritage of the two doctrines, the *Sāṅkhya* and Buddhism.

(10) Caste.

Buddhism rejects the institution of caste. This is clearly seen in many *Suttas* of the Pali Canon of which the *Vasalasutta* of the *Sutta Nipāta* is one of the most important. Denouncing the concept of caste, the Buddha says here that: 'one does not become either an outcast or a *Brahmin* by birth (*na jaccā vasalo hoti, na jaccā hoti brāhmaṇo*, verse 21). A very important analysis of the problem in question is found in the *Vāseṭṭhasutta* of the same text where the Buddha clearly explains his teaching regarding the 'division in the kinds of living things'*(pāṇānaṃ jātivibhaṅgam)* to the young *Brahmin Vāseṭṭha*. According to the teaching of the Buddha there does exist division of kinds among the *grass and trees* which are devoid of any faculty of reasoning (verse 8).[15] He also points out that there is division among animals such as insects *(kīṭa-pataṅga*, verse 9), four-footed creatures *(catuppada*, verse 10), reptiles *(uraga)* and snakes *(pādudara)* (verse II), birds *(pakkhi)* and winged creatures *(pattayāna)*, and the fowls of the air *(vihaṅgama)* (verse 13). Continuing the Master says that, on the contrary, there does not exist 'manifold' or caste among the human beings *(evam n' atthi manussesu, liṅgam, jātimayaṃ puthu*, verse 14). The gist of this teaching is that a biological classification of living beings based on genus *(jāti)* and species *(liṅga)* may be tenable, purely on the basis of similarity or difference in bodily forms, habits and other features. On the other hand, the application of such a criterion cannot establish that human beings belong to species more than one. As a matter of fact there is but one species among men.[16] This great teaching of the Enlightened One is very similar to the *Sāṅkhya* point of view briefly mentioned in the *Kārikā* verse 53 and explained in the commentaries on it by Guḍapāda and others (vide chapter 24, section 13). The *Sāṅkhya* too accept division among animals such as birds and reptiles. They also accept division in the plant kingdom (and also among the divine beings). Like the Buddha, the *Sāṅkhyas* too deny the concept of caste emphatically and assert that all human beings together form but one class.

(11) Discussion with Friends.

The importance of good friends *(kalyāna-mitta)* is clearly seen in early Buddhism. In fact, one of the most important doctrines of Buddhism is *mettā* (Skt.*maitrī*) which being derived from *mitta* (Skt.*mitra*), a friend, coveys the meaning of 'the state of being a friend'.[17] Buddhist interest in *Brahmacārins* living together on friendly terms and harmony[18] is clearly seen in many sermons such as the *Upakkilesasutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*. The great importance attached to discussion with friends regarding the different points of *dhamma* *(dhamma-sākaccā)* is clearly seen in the *Mahāmaṅgalasutta* (ii.4.9) of the *Sutta Nipāta* where it is described as one of the most auspicious *(maṅgala)* things in life. The same idea is found in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy under the concept of *suhṛt-prāpti* (*S.K.*51) regarded as one of the eight perfections (vide chap. 24, sec.7).

(12) Virāga or Non-attachment.

Buddhism lays great emphasis on the importance of *virāga* or non-attachment. According to early Buddhism, *rāga* or lust together with *dosa* (Skt.*dveṣa*) hatred, and *moha* bewilderment form the three main causes of *saṁsāra*. Detachment or *virāga*, therefore, is a necessary condition for the attainment of *Nibbāna*. The great ethical significance attributed to the doctrine of non-attachment *(vi-rāga)* is clearly seen in many texts of early Buddhism such as the *Sutta Nipāta* (e.g. *disvāna taṇhaṃ aratiṃ ragañ ca, nāhosi chando api methunasmiṃ S.N.*iv.9.1). *Rāga* is attachment to various sense - objects which will lead to the repeated births *(saṃsāra)*. This same doctrine is found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*,45, where it is said that 'from passionate attachment there results *saṁsāra*' *(saṁsāro bhavati rājasād rāgat)*.

(13) Doctrine of Change.

Change or becoming occupies a very important position in early Buddhism. According to Buddhism nothing is permanent in this world. All component things, both physical and psychic are subject to continuous change *(sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā ti, yadā paññāya passati*, whenever it appears to the wise that all component things are impermanent, *Dhamma-pada*, 279). Thus, according to Buddhism, the phenomenal world is a flux behind

which there is nothing abiding. This is the Buddhist view of change as applied to the world of experience which is also known as a *saṅkhata dhamma,* a phenomenon which has arisen as a composition of several elements. But Buddhism also refers to an *asaṅkhata dhamma (i.e. Nirvāṇa)* (cp.*A.N.* 1.152; *S.N.* iv.35.9 etc) which has never originated and, therefore, to which the concept of change is inapplicable.

The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy bifurcates reality into two worlds, the material world *(Prakṛti)* and the spiritual world *(Puruṣa).* According to the *Sāṅkhya* change is found only in the material world. *Prakṛti* consisting of three reals, the *Guṇas,* is undergoing an uninterrupted eternal change both in *pralaya* (dissolution) and *pariṇāma* (evolution). In the former the change is called *svarūpa-pariṇāma* or change into the homogeneous whereas in the latter it is called *virūpa-pariṇāma* or change into the heterogeneous. Thus, according to the *Sāṅkhya,* change is a change of matter which is permanent energy-stuff. Herein we also notice a difference between the two concepts of change, the Buddhist and the *Sāṅkhya.* Whereas Buddhism does not accept any thing abiding behind the change or becoming, the *Sāṅkhya* does admit a permanent matter abiding behind the phenomenon of change. Therefore, in spite of the above-mentioned similarity, one has to point out that the difference between them is very wide.

(14) Avidyā and Saṁsāra.

The concept of *avidyā* is found in early Buddhism but its corollary *māyā* has no place in it. According to Buddhism, beings are subject to *saṃsāra* as a consequence of their *avidyā.* Therefore Buddhism says, *avijjā paccayā saṅkhārā* etc. depending on *avidyā* there arise the *saṁskāras* and so on. The phenomenon of *saṃsāra* which exists as a result of one's own *avidyā* is considered to be beginningless *(anamataggo 'yaṁ saṃsāro pubbākoṭi na paññāyati, S.N.*ii.178). We also find the concept of *avidyā* in the *Sāṅkhya* system (cp. chap.20,sec:2). The *Sāṅkhya* philosopher would say that *saṃsāra* which results from *Prakṛti* or *Avidyā* (cp. *avidyām āhur avyaktam, avidyā* is called *Avyakta* or *Prakṛti S.P.B.*i.69), the rootless root *(amūlam mūlam, S.P.B.*i.67) is beginningless. The *Sāṅkhya* comes very close to Buddhism when it says that *'saṃsāra* is due to passionate attachment' (S.K.45).

Along with these similarities we have also to point out an important difference. The *Sāṅkhya* concept of *avidyā (Prakṛti)* is primarily ontological, it is the uncaused cause, the world-ground; thus the world is ultimately traced back to this uncaused cause (cp.17 below). On the other hand, the doctrine of *avidyā* in Buddhism is purely ethical, for it does not accept an uncaused first cause as in the case of the *Sāṅkhya.*

(15) Karma.

The idea of *Karma* is implied in the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of *ādhidaivika duḥkha (S.K.*I) or the misery due to one's *daiva* or *karma.* The same doctrine would say that man is subject to his previous *karma;* but he may modify it to a good extent with his present *karma* (vide chap.24,sec.3). The concept of *karma* is one of the most important doctrines of early Buddhism. It is too well known to be discussed in detail here. *Karma* and its fruits are often mentioned as, for example, in the *Dakkhiṇāvibhaṅgasutta* (cp.the last verse, 'firmly believing in the rich fruit of *karma*', *M.L.S.*iii,p.305), of the *Majjhima Nikāya.* Buddhism also accepts the possibility of modifying one's previous *karma* to a good extent. This can be seen in many places of the Pali Canon such as the *Aṅgulimālattheragātha* (872) (vide also the *D.P.*173) where it is clearly mentioned that one can close and seal up the effects of one's previous *karma* in the form of ill deeds by a subsequent good life *(yassa pāpaṃ kataṃ kammaṃ, kusalena pithīyati).* Buddhism, thus, maintains the freedom of will and rightly differs from determinism.

(16) Non-agency and Non-concern of the Empirical Self.

The individual, according to the *Sāṅkhya,* is neither an agent *(akartṛ* - S.K.19) nor has he any concern *(udāsīna, S.K.*20). This idea which can, historically, be traced back to the doctrine of *avākī-anādaraḥ* (non-agency and non-concern of self) occuring in the *Sāṇḍilya-vidyā* section of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (3.14.1-4) finds its full expression in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* as follows :

tasmān na badhyate-addhā
na mucyate na-api saṁsarati kaścit

saṁsarati badhyate mucyate ca
nānā-āśrayā prakṛtiḥ. (S.K.62)

> Of certainty, therefore, not any (Spirit) is bound, or liberated, nor (does any) migrate; it is *Prakṛti*, abiding in manifold forms, that migrates or is bound or liberated.

The same idea is again implied in the *Kārikā* verse 31, where it is said that, 'An organ is not caused to function by anyone' *(na kenacit kāryate karaṇam, S.K.*31). This teaching of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* reminds us at once of the following doctrine found in the *Visuddhimagga* ch. IX, *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇa-visuddhi-niddesa*, sec.20:

kammassa kārako natthi
vipākassa ca vedako
suddha-dhammā pavattanti
evetam samma dassanam,

> There is no doer of action, nor a feeler of the consequence (of the same), pure *dhammas* (elements) (alone) continue to exist and this, indeed, is the right seeing.

This teaching is attributed to the *Porāṇas* by the author *ven.* Buddhaghosa. We find a parallel doctrine in the *Vajirā Saṁyutta* of the *Saṁyutta Nikāya* where it is said that a (human) being is merely a bundle of the component things and as such there is no permanent being in the absolute sense *(suddhasaṃkhārapuñjo 'yam, naidha sattūpalabbhati)*. This means that there is no permanent entity *(kūṭastha-nitya)* over and above the *pañca- skandha*, the five-aggregates. The Buddhist teaching becomes clearer in the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhya Sutta* of the *M.N.* where a *Bhikkhu* called Sāti is found fault with by the Buddha for 'misunderstanding his teaching as meaning that the same *(tadeva)* consciousness *(viññānam)* runs on and continues (i.e. after death) without break of identity *(anaññaṃ)*'. Having rejected Sāti's view that there is a permanent speaker and feeler *(vado vedeyyo)* experiencing the results of good and bad acts, the Buddha told Sāti that such a *viññāna* must be purely empirical, arising only by way of causation *(paṭicca samuppanna)* and not taking place with-

out assignable conditions *(aññatra paccayā natthi viññānassa sambhavo)*. It is very important to note that this discussion is immediately followed by an emphatic assertion of an extra-expirical factor at conception which also must be present along with the physical elements in order that the latter be successful; now this extra factor appears to be nothing other than the *saṁvattanika viññāna* (M.II.262), consciousness that evolves (in *saṃsāra)* which is also termed as *gandhabba*. Thus it is seen that early Buddhism has accepted the doctrine of the *saṁsāric* consciousness devoid of any empirical relationship with sense-functions etc. and is therefore unable to be regarded as agent and experiencer.[19] The Buddhist teaching is not far from the above *Sāṅkhya* doctrine which denies agency *(S.K.*19) and concern *(S.K.*20) to the concept of *Puruṣa*. As we shall see below in section 17, there are two types of teaching in the *Sāṅkhya*, the absolute *(parā vidyā)* and the conventional *(aparā vidyā)*. The absolute teaching of the *Sāṅkhya* as reflected in the *Kārikā* 64, denies even *Aham* or Self. This, indeed, is the highest stage of the final realization of the one bent on liberation. Thus, one may notice that the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of *Kaivalya* from the absolute sense can hardly be different from the doctrine of liberation in early Buddhism (vide below 'Liberation'). This may perhaps be the reason why the *Sāṅkhyas*, as pointed out by Max Müller, were often called Crypto-Buddhists or the *Pracchanna-bauddhas*.[20]

(17) Liberation.

According to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 44, it is *jñāna* or knowledge which brings about liberation. Thus it is said by Īśvarakṛṣṇa:

evaṃ tattva-abhyāsāt-
nā' smi, na me, nāham, ity-apariśeṣam
aviparyayād viśuddhaṃ
kevalam utpadyate jñānam. (S.K. 64)

> Thus, from the repeated study of the truth, there arises the knowledge, *'I am not that' (na-asmi), 'that is not mine' (na me)', I am not' (na-aham)* which is complete, absolute and pure, because there remains no doubt.[21]

The third step of this realization deserves our attention. Gauḍapāda connects *aham* in this context with *Ahaṅkāra*, the second stage of the *Sāṅkhya* evolution (cp. *na-aham iti, ahaṅkāra rahitam)*. But this does not seem to be correct. Why should one refer to *Ahaṅkāra*, the second stage of the *Sāṅkhya* evolution in this highest step of realization? In the first two steps all this is realized. Thus observes Gauḍapāda himself.

> *'nāsmi nāhameva bhavāmi, na me mama śarīraṃ tat, yatho' ham anyaḥ śarīram anyat'.*

> I am not (that), i.e. I do not be that: (that is) not mine, i.e. this body is not mine, for I am one thing and the body (is) another.

We, thus, see that in the first two steps one has clearly understood (probably from the conventional point of view) the difference between *Puruṣa*, and *Prakṛti* with all its evolutes and evolvents including the category of *ahaṅkāra*. Therefore in the third step there is no necessity to refer to *Ahaṅkāra* the second stage of evolution once agin. By *na-aham* one appears to have referred to the state of *nirātmakatva* mentioned in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* which, as we have already seen, bears very close similarity with a number of important teachings of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. In fact, the passage in question in the *Maitrī Up.* is also dealing with the same problem of *kaivalya* or liberation which we too are, here, concerned with. Thus it is said in the *Maitrī Up.* (VI.21):

> *'.....tato nirātmakatvam eti, nirātmakatvāt-na sukha-duḥka-bhāg bhavati, kevalatvaṃ labhatā (ity evaṃ hy āha)'.*

> Thence he goes to Selflessness. On account of selflessness, he is not (i.e. ceases to be) an experiencer of pleasure and pain. He obtains *kevalatva* or aloneness. (For thus has it been said).

Thus it appears to us that this concept of 'I am not' *(na-ahaṃ* S.K. 64)[22] is the same as the *nirātmakatva* or the state of 'selflessness'. Thus it is correctly observed by Chatterjee and Datta that all *Sāṅkhyas* agree that liberation is only the complete destruction of the three-fold misery and not a state of joy as conceived in the *Vedānta* for where there is no pain there can neither be any pleasure as the two are related and inseparable.[23] In fact it is extremely important to note that an exactly similar teaching is found in early Buddhism, more or less in the same phraseology as follows:

> *'n' etam mama, n'eso 'haṃ asmi, na me'so attā* (*M.N.* 28. P.T.S. i.p. 185).

> This is not mine, I am not this thing, (and) the self is not mine.

In summing up we may say that the *Sāṅkhya* understands *Puruṣa* or self (i.e. *Aham*, not *Ahaṅkāra*) both from the conventional and absolute points of view. Conventionally, *'Puruṣa'* is *('puruṣo' sti*, S.K. 17), and this position is not unlike the *sammuti sacca* or the conventional truth of *satta* or *puggala* in early Buddhism (cp. *Puggalapaññatti, S.N.* iii. 3.1). The final realization, which we believe to represent the absolute point of view of the *Sāṅkhya*, denies *Ahaṁ* or Self. Then who attains *kaivalya* or liberation? None in the absolute point of view *(na mucyate nāpi saṁsarati kaścit*, S.K. 62). The *kaivalya*, thus, appears to be nothing but the cessation of the three-fold misery which is due to the 'nescience' *(cp. tasya hetur avidyā, Yoga Sūtra*, ii - 24) of believing in the existence of an eternal 'I'. One may look at the problem of misery in two ways. Ethically it is due to *Avidyā* or nescience; ontologically it is to be traced back to *Prakṛti (Avidyā)* whose evolution is the cause of the three-fold misery. It appears to us that the ethical explanation is the absolute doctrine of the esoteric philosophy of *Sāṅkhya (guhya-jñāna*, S.K. 69). If our view is acceptable, one may then notice that the *Sāṅkhya* conception of liberation bears important similarity with that of early Buddhism *(anattavāda)* (cp. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *The Sākya* p. 196).

(18) Plurality of Individuals.

The *Sāṅkhya* admits a plurality of *Puruṣa* or Selves: the term *Puruṣa* from the conventional point of view, means an 'I' (= *Ahaṃ*) or a Self. This *Sāṅkhya* conception is technically known as *Puruṣa-bahutva* or the plurality of *Puruṣa* (S.K. 18). We have already seen that the *Sāṅkhya* in its absolute teching does not accept a permanent 'I' (= *Ahaṃ*) or Self (cp. secs. 16 and 17). We also noticed the important fact that the *Sāṅkhya* has not given a clear description of *Puruṣa* (cp. ch. 8 sec:2). Buddhism, on the other hand, does not accept the concept of *Puruṣas* or Selves. But, in place of *Puruṣas,* it admits the doctrine of a plurality of individuals which is technically called *puggala-paññatti* (cp, the *Dhammapada* verse 160: *Attāhi attano nāto,* one is the saviour of oneself).[24] In other words, Buddhism appeals to the obvious fact of the existence of separate individuals *(satta* or *puggala).* This, in fact, is the conventional teaching *(sammuti sacca)* of Buddhism. From the absolute point of view Buddhism too does not accept any permanent *sattva* or *pudgala.* Thus it is seen that the *Sāṅkhya* conception of the plurality of *puruṣa (puruṣa-bahutva)* in the absolute point of view may be quite close to the Buddhist doctrine of the plurality of individuals *(puggala-paññatti)* considered from the same point of view.

(19) Pariṇāma and Pratītyasamutpāda.

The *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of *pariṇāma* or evolution and the *pratītyasamutpāda* or the Dependent Origination of Buddhism seem to be somewhat parallel ideas; but they cannot be equated with one another as done by some scholars. By way of an example we may refer to Pischel's comparison which is as follows:[25]

	I Buddhism	II Sāṅkhya
(a)	*Saṅkhāra*	Vāsanā (=*Saṃskāra,* S.K.67).
(b)	*Viññāna*	*Liṅga-śarīra* (cp. *S.K.*40).
(c)	*Nāma-rūpa*	*Buddhi* (cp. *S.K.*23).
(d)	*Upādāna*	Dharma and *Adharma* (cp. *S.K.*44).
(e)	*Bhava*	*Saṃsāra* (cp. *S.K.*45).

This comparison does not seem to be satisfactory. *Vāsanā* is not different from *Saṅkhāra. Bhava* (derived from √*bhū,* to become or be) means 'tendency to be born. Depending on *bhava* there arises *jāti* or rebirth. In fact it is *jāti* that is closer to the notion of *saṃsāra* of the *Sāṅkhya.* The other comparisions do not seem to be correct. *Viññāna* cannot be compared with the *Liṅga-śarīra.* It is true that early Buddhism considers *viññāna* as evolving and hence it is also termed as the *saṃvattanika-viññāna* or the consciousness that evolves (in *saṁsāra*) (M. II. 262); this consciousness is also said to descend into the mother's womb for successful conception and parturition.[26] *Liṅga-śaīra* consisting of the 18 categoies from *Mahat* to the subtle elements, also, evolves from a sort of mystic material entity: *Prakṛti.* With this apparent similarity, one cannot compare the two concepts, for the nature of the one is very different from that of the other. *Buddhi,* considered to function with the help of *Puruṣa* is not the same as *Nāma-rūpa. Dharma* and *Adharma* have some faint similarity to *upādāna* especially in view of the fact that these two, according to the *Kārikā* (verse 44), simply create the upward going and the downward descent respectively. *Prakṛti* which at times is called *Avidyā,* bears *prima facie,* some resemblance to *Avijjā* of Buddhism. But it is regarded as the uncaused cause of the *Sāṅkhya* evolutionism. But in Buddhism *Avijjā* is not considered as an uncaused cause.[27] Historically the doctrines of *pariṇāma* and *Pratītyasamutpāda,* seem to have been presupposed by the teaching of *paratantratā* of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (ch. 5, sec. 12). But they have developed it in two different directions. The *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Pariṇāma* as resulting from *Prakṛti* is ontological whereas the Buddhist doctrine of *Pratītyasamutpāda* is psychological and ethical. Therefore a genuine comparision between them is impossible.

(20) Two Stages of Liberation.

We have already discussed the two stages of liberation of the *Sāṅkhya*: the *Jīvanmukti* and the *Videhamukti* (cp. ch.24, sec.12). We may see that these concepts have their closest parallels in early Buddhist doctrines of *Upādisesa* (cp. *S.N.* V. 129. 181; *A.N.* iii. 145; *Iti.* 40) and *Anupādisesa* (D.N.. iii. 135; *A.N.* ii. 120 and iv. 75). The term *upādi* derived from, *upa*+√*dhā,* to place, literally means, the 'limiting adjuncts' (Deussen, *einschränkende*

Bedingung[28] by which one understands the *khandhas* or the five aggregates; *sesa* (√śiṣ, to leave) conveys the sense of 'that which is left'. Thus *upādisesa* means, 'having some fuel of life, i.e. the *khandhas* or substratum left'; that is to say, that one who has attained this stage is not yet completely free in the sense that he is still dependent on his physical body. In other words, an *Upādisesa* is yet materially dependent; in spite of his final realization he is yet subject to the (purely) bodily phenomena such as hunger and decay. This stage corresponds to the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Jīvanmukti* or emancipation while living. After the death of an *Upādisesa,* his position is called *anupādisesa* which literally means, 'having no fuel of life left', that means that he is free from the elements (i.e. body or the *khandhas*). *Anupādisesa* is release which is complete and final. The final release is often mentioned in early Buddhism as, for example, *anupādisesa suvimutta,* completely released having left no *khandhas* (*A.N.* iv, 75.17). This emancipation mentioned in early Buddhism corresponds to the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of *Videhamukti.*

(21) The foregoing discussion may show that there can be some relationship between *Sāṅkhya* and *Buddhism.* Buddha appears to have accepted some of the proto-*Sāṅkhya* tenets in so far as they were in agreement with his teachings. It is important to note that the attitude of the Buddha to the institution of caste agrees with that of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* to a great extent even with regard to the phraseology. The concept of the four cardinal truths may have been accepted by both doctrines from a common heritage. On the other hand, it appears that the *Kārikā* conception of liberation may have been influenced, at least to some extent, by the teachings of the Buddha.

Notes and References

1. Vide Garbe, *S.P.* pp. 3, 29; and Oldenberg, *Buddha* (1897), p. 109.
2. Vide Oldenberg. *Op. cit*, p. 109.
3. Vide *Der Rig-Veda*, iii, p. 168, f.n. 16.
4. Cp. Mrs. Rhys Davids, 'They are known as the aphorisms of the *Sāṅkhya-kārāka*, and are attributed to one Īśvarakṛṣṇa, simply on the strength of the claim put forward in the penultimate verse of the seventy-verses of the Aryan metre in which the work consists. No attempt is made to name an author. *The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism* p. 143.

5. Vide *C.P.B.*, pp. 22 & 60.
6. Cp. Oldenberg, *op.cit.* pp. 421-424.
7. Cp. The *Piṇḍapātapārisuddhisutta* (151) of the *Majjhima Nikāya.*
8. Cp. The *Kūṭadantasutta* and the *Ambaṭṭasutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* and also the *Caṅkisuttanta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya.*
9. It is practically this same idea that is put forward by Māṭhara in his well-known verse: *vṛkṣān chitvā* etc. (vide ch. 2, sec. 50).
10. Vide Ninian Smart, *World Religions: A Dialogue (Penguin Series* - 1966) p. 19.
11. Cp. The *Catuḥ Śataka* viii. 20 quoted in the *Mādhyamika Kārikā Vṛtti*, p. 372 and *C.P.B.*, p. 247.
12. That even at the time of the *Vedic* period there were hundreds of physicians is implied by the *A.V.* II. 9.3,
13. Vide Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, pp. 46-47.
14. Cp. *M.L.S.* III (P.T.S.), pp. 124 and 129.
15. *tiṇarukkhe pi jānātha,na cāpi paṭijāṇare, liṅgam jātimayam tesaṃ, aññamaññā hi jātiyo.* (S.N. 601).
16. The arguments in the *Vāseṭṭhasutta* are, again, found in the *Divyāvadāna* where they are re-stated more effectively for the purpose of establishing the same doctrine (cp. e.g. *ekaiva jātir loke'smin, sāmānyā na pṛthagvidhā*, The *Divyāvadāna*, p. 625).
17. Vide O.H.de A. Wijesekera, *A linguistic analysis of Pali mettā. Geiger Commemoration Volume* (Colombo-Ceylon, 1967) pp. 114-116.
18. Cp. *M.L.S.*, III (P.T.S.) p. 201.
19. Vide O. H.de A. Wijesekera, Pali *"Vado Vedeyyo" and Upaniṣadic" Avākī-Anādaraḥ,"* *U.C.R.*, vol. iii. 2 (November 1945) pp. 89-94.
20. Vide Max Müller : *Indian Philosophy*, Volume iii, *Sāṅkhya and Yoga*, p. 91.
21. Cp. Deussen : *So bringt als Frucht das Studium der Grundwesen, Das absolute, durch Nichtirrtum reine Bewusstsein, das nicht übrig lässt zu wunschen : 'Das bin ich nicht! das ist nicht mein! ich bin nicht!*
   (*A.G.P.* I. iii.p.462).
22. M. Cousin thinks that this verse (i.e. the *S.K.*, v.64) amounts to *'le nihillisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme"* (the absolute nihilism, last furit of scepticism) (*The S.K.* by Colebrooke and Wilson, p. 243). I am unable to agree with this opinion.

23. Cp. *I.I.P.*, pp. 289 - 290.
24. Vide B.C. Law, *Concepts of Buddhism*, ch. 7, *Puggala*, pp. 42-46.
25. Cp. E.J. Thomas, *The Life of Buddha*, pp. 193-194.
26. Cp. O.H.de A. Wijesekara, *Vedic Gandharva and Pali Gandhabba*, UCR., Vol.3, No.1, April 1945, pp. 83-94.
27. Vide *L.B.*, p. 194.
28. Vide *A.G.P.*, 1.iii, p. 726.

XXVI

Some Parallels Between the Sāṅkhya and the Avesta

(1) Goddesses.

We have already pointed out in chapter 9 that the concept of goddesses in the *Ṛgveda* was a proto-type of the idea of *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṇkhya* philosophy. As in the *Ṛgveda*, we also find in the *Avesta* some goddesses who may represent the same concept underlying the goddesses of the *Ṛgveda* . Ashi Vanguhi (*Yasts* and *Sirozahs*: XVII, *Ashi Yast*), Pārendhi (*Yasna* XIII.I), the Waters (*Yasna* XXXVIII), and Ardvi Sūra Anāhita (*Yasts* and *Sirozahs*: V. *Ābān Yast; Yasna* LXV) are some of the important ones among them. In the *Avesta*, as in the *Ṛgveda*, Waters are not only goddesses but also are mothers. These Waters, the Mother goddesses are further said to possess the nature of being productive (*Yasna*, XXXVIII.4). The fertility of these Water-goddesses is quite explicit in the *Avesta*. Thus it is mentioned in the *Avesta* that the wind blows the cloud forward, bearing *the Waters* of fertility, so that the friendly showers spread over the seven Karashvares.[1] Among the goddesses in the *Avesta*, the river goddess Ardvi Sūra Anāhita is the most important. She is quite similar to the river-goddess Sarasvatī in the *Ṛgveda* [2]. The *Ābān Yast* or the *Yast* of Waters in full, and the *Yast* LXV in part, are devoted to the praise of this great river-goddess. Ardvi Sūra Anāhita (the high, powerful, undefiled) is the heavenly spring from which all waters on the earth flow down. Anāhita's fountains are on the top of the mythical mountain the Hukairya, in the star-region, and incidently this description is quite parallel to that of the Indian legend of the celestial Gaṅgā.[3] Anāhita's descent from the heavens is described in the *Ābān Yast* (sec:85 seq.)[4] and this reminds us of the *Vedic* river goddess Sarasvatī who is requested to descend from the sky to attend the sacrifice

(Ṛgveda.v.43.II). We notice an important similarity between Anāhita, and Sarasvatī, the Great Mother Goddess (cp.*ambitame, nadītame, R.V*.ii.41.6), a precursor of *Prakṛti*. We may, for example, examine a few of these similarities. It is said that Anāhita 'makes the womb of females pure for bringing forth' (*Ābān Yast*, 2). This can be compared with a request made to Sarasvatī, *garbham dhehi sarasvatī*, bestow (lit. place) a *garbha* (lit. foetus) or a child (for us), O Sarasvatī (X.184.2). Again, it is said in the *Avesta* that, 'Anāhita puts milk in the breasts of all females' (*Ābān Yast*, 2). This can be compared with a supplication wherein they have entreated the Mother Sarasvatī to allow them to drink (milk) from her breast (*yas te stanaḥ....sarasvatī tam iha dhātave, R.V*. I.164.49). Apart from this there are some other descriptions of Anāhita which deserve our attention. In the *Ābān Yast* IV.15, Anāhita is referred to as 'strong and bright, tall and beautiful of form, and sending down by day and night a flow of *motherly waters* and this reminds us at once of the Water-goddesses, the *motherly waters* (*āpaḥ....mātaraḥ*) of the *Ṛgveda* (X.17.10). In the *Avesta*, Ardvi Sūra Anāhita is depicted as a maid, fair of body with a golden crown on her head (*Ābān Yast*, XVI.64 and XXX. 128)[5] These details of the river goddess Anāhita can easily convince us that she represents, more or less the concept of the pre-*Vedic* Mother Goddess or *Jagan-Mātā*[6]. The *Avestan* goddesses, in general, seem to be an echo of this same concept (which is again represented by the *Ṛgvedic* goddesses too). The cult of the Mother Goddess as we saw earlier (see chap.2) is a very old one. We believe that H. Zimmer is not wrong in pointing out that the cult of the Mother Goddess goes back to the Neolithic age and that it was distributed throughout Western Asia and the lands surrounding the Mediterranean sea.[7] We have attempted to show that the cult of the Mother Goddess in India gave rise to the concept of *Prakṛti* (cp.9 sec.3): however, this particular concept is not found in the *Avesta*.

(2) Dualism.

The general idea of dualism appearing in some places of the *Avesta* may not be unimportant. We may refer to two of these instances without laying emphasis on them. The very first question tackled in the *Gatha Ahunavaiti* of the *Avesta* is the problem of good and evil in the world. The good and evil are represented

by *Spento Mainyu* (the good spirit) and *Angra Mainyu* (the evil spirit) respectively. This reminds us of the question of *dharma* and *adharma* which forms an aspect of the central problem of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy (*S.K.*44). Taraporewala pertinently points out that just as *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* in the *Sāṅkhya* are jointly responsible for the creation of the universe, so also the *Mainyus* have together brought forth all these manifestations. Viewed from a different angle *Angra Mainyu* is a mere *Māyā* or a negation. His creation is *a-jyāiti* or 'not- life'.[8] We may remind ourselves, here, that *Prakṛti*, a *Māyā*, is also a sort of 'not-life' giving rise to the material manifestations in the World. Next, we may refer to the case of 'Heaven and Earth'. We have attempted to show, in chapter four, that *dyāvāpṛthivī*, the oldest of the dual divinities of the *Ṛgveda* was a possible precursor of the *Sāṅkhya* dualism. The dualism of Heaven and Earth is also implicit in the *Avesta* (*Yasna* XLII.3) where it is mentioned that : 'and we sacrifice to both *earth and heaven* and the stormy wind'. In the *Avesta*, as it exists today, the dualism of Heaven and Earth does not play an important role as it does in the *Ṛgveda*. Nevertheless, this instance clearly implies that it was in vogue in Iran at an early age as it was in India.

(3) Concept of Evolution.

The idea of evolution is not clearly implied in the *Avesta* as it is found in the *Ṛgveda* . We have already seen that this concept is referred to in the *Puruṣa-Sūkta* of the *Ṛgveda* (vide chap.5 sec.7). However the *Māh Yast* of the *Avesta* which appears to correspond to the *Puruṣa-sūkta* displays some faint traces of the concept of evolution. Commenting on the phenomenon in question occurring in the *Māh Yast*, Darmesteter briefly points out with the help of the Pahlavi commentary on this *Yast* that the Moon proceeded from *Bahman* and can be seen, but cannot be seized with the hand; *Gôs* proceeded from the Moon and can both be seen and seized with the hand[9]. Thus it is seen that *Bahman*, the good thought has given rise to the Moon which in its turn has given rise to *Gôs*. The concept can be shown as follows:

Bahman
↓
Moon
↓
Gôs

Bahman is *Vohu-mano* or good thought. Thinking is the characteristic that is traditionally associated with the mind.[10]. Therefore *Bahman*, the good thought, may imply a cosmic mind somewhat similar to the same mentioned in the *Ṛgveda* , X.90.13. The birth of the Moon from *Bahman* is thus seen to be very similar to the *Ṛgvedic* conception of the birth of the Moon from the Mind of *Puruṣa*, the Cosmic Man (*R.V*.X.90.13)[11]. The *Māh Yast* rightly observes that *Bahman* can neither be seen nor be sized with hand. The Moon which proceeded from *Bahman*, on the other hand, is explicit and thus it can be seen though it cannot be sized with hand.[12] In the *Ṛgveda* we don't have the *Avestan* idea of *Gôs* or Ox being born from the Moon, but instead, it is said that oxen were born from the sacrifice of the *Puruṣa* (*gāvo ha jajñire tasmāt, R.V*.X.90.10), whose Mind gave rise to the Moon (*R.V*.X,90.13). Now *Gôs* (< *Gāus, Skt, Gauḥ*) or Ox which is said to proceed from the Moon is a fully explicit phenomenon and this idea seems to be meant in the *Māh Yast* when it is said there that it can both be seen and seized with hand. *Bahman, Māh* (Moon) and *Gôs* together constitute the evolutionary process. *Bahman* and *Gôs* are so closely connected with *Māh* (Moon) that all three are called *gaocithra*. This may indicate that they are representing three different categories, nevertheless, they possess the same *urstoff;* thus they may simply present three stages of manifestation of the same principle. *Bahman* the Good Thought in this process is an implicit state with the *śakti* or potentiality to manifest itself under favourable conditions. Thus it may be somewhat similar to *Asat* (a precursor of *Prakṛti*), the cause of *Sat* which the sages are said to have found out *in deep meditation* (*R.V*.X.129.4). The Moon which evolves from *Bahman*, a source of light, may remind us of *Buddhi* of the *Sāṅkhya* considered to be full of the *Sattva Guṇa* (vide chap.10,sec.5), a prominent characteristic of which is the quality of illuminating objects (*sattvam laghu prakāśakam, S.K.* 13). *Gôs* or Ox the final stage of this process may represent the *tairyagyona*, standing in between the human order and the plant kingdom. Ox symbolizes procreation (*mithuna*, S.K.12) and struggle for existence (cp. *P.I*.297). It will not be far-fetched if this last stage of the process reminds us of the fully evolved stage of the world of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy which is full of activity and strife. In short, we may say that the process implies a faint concept of evolution from the implicit to the explicit which is similar to that which is implied in the *Ṛgveda* X.129 (vide ch.5, sec.8).

(4) The Upward Departure and the Downward Departure.

The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (v.44) refers to the departure upwards and the departure down below. This idea can be compared with an account found in the *Avesta, Yast* XXII[13] where a description of the fate that attends the soul after the death is given. According to this description, the soul should spend the first three nights either among the highest enjoyments or pain. (This depends on the respective merits of individual souls). Next, they are met by their own conscience in the form of a heavenly maiden or a fiendish old woman as the case may be and are brought in four steps up to heaven or down to hell. The souls of the righteous will be brought to heaven through three paradises, Good-Thought, Good-Word and Good-Deed. The souls of the wicked will be brought to hell through the three hells of Evil-thought, Evil-Word and Evil-Deed. The souls receive treatment according to their merits. The good souls are praised and glorified by *Ahura* and they are fed with ambrosia. The wicked souls, on the other hand, are rebuked and insulted by *Angra Mainyu* who feeds them with poison.[14] The *Avestan* doctrine can be shown as follows:

(a) The Upward Departure (*Yast* XXII.15 -17)

↑ 4th Step	:	Endless Light.
↑ 3rd Step	:	Good-Deed Paradise.
↑ 2nd Step	:	Good-Word Paradise.
↑ 1st Step	:	Good-Thought Paradise.

(b) The Downward Departure (*Yast* XXII.33-34)

↓ 1st Step : Evil-Thought Hell.
↓ 2nd Step : Evil-Word Hell.
↓ 3rd Step : Evil-Deed Hell.
↓ 4th Step : Endless Darkness.

Here the different steps of the soul of the righteous remind us of the *Sāṅkhya* liberation which results with the birth of the *apariśeṣa-jñāna* (*S.K.*64) or the complete knowledge. This knowledge brings about what is known as the *jīvan-mukti* or the liberation while living. But a *jīvan-mukta* continues to live for some time: at his death there takes place the *videhamukti* (lit. the disembodied liberation) or liberation *par excellence*. Simultaneously there takes place the following process:

(I) The gross body will be reduced to the five gross ele ments. The *Liṅga* (*śarīra*) which consists of eighteen principles too has to undergo a change: it dissolves itself.

(II) The *Manas* and the ten sensory-motor organs on the one side, and the subtle elements on the other side, will reduce themselves to *Ahaṅkāra*.

(III) *Ahaṅkāra* will reduce itself to *Buddhi*, and

(IV) *Buddhi* to *Prakṛti*.

Liberation means perfect enlightenment (*kevalam jñānam*, *S.K.*64) and this comes closer to the *Avestan* ideal of Endless Light. The *Sāṅkhya* conception of 'the upward departure through virtue, (*dharmeṇa gamanam ūrdhvam*) and 'the downward departure through vice' (*gamanam adhasthād adharmeṇa*), in essence, agrees fully with the above-memtioned *Avestan* doctrine.

(5) The Animals.

It is interesting to note that the *Avesta* XIII, *Farvardîn Yast*, I, sections 10 and 11 and sec. 44 (vide *Z.A.* II, pp. 182 and 191) refer to five kinds of animals. These five kinds of animals, according to the commentators, are as follows:

I. *Upāpa* or those living in water,

II. *Upasma* (Upa-zeme) or those living under the ground,

III. *Fraptarjat* or the flying ones,

IV. *Ravascarant* or the running ones, and

V. *Cangranghâc* or the grazing one.[15].

The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* also refers to five classes of animals (cp. *tairyagyonaś ca pañcadhā bhavati, S.K.*53) : these five classes, according to the commentator Gauḍapāda, are as follows:

I. *Paśu* or the cattle (domestic animals),

II. *Mṛga* or the wild beasts,

III. *Pakṣi* or the birds,

IV. *Sarīsṛpa* or the reptiles, and

V. *Sthāvarāṇi bhūtāni* or the immovable objects such as vegetables and minerals.

The idea of classifying the animal world into five classes may be an old one although there is little agreement between the two types of classification. The two concepts, the *Avestan* and the *Sāṅkhya* (which we have already attempted to connect with the *Savitṛ* cult; vide ch.22, sec.8) may go back to a common source although there are differences in their details.

(6) Priests, Sacrifice and Sacrificial Gifts.

It is well-known that the *Sāṅkhya* does not believe in the efficacy of sacrifice. An idea which is very close to this can be seen in the *Ābān Yast* (XXVII) of the *Avesta* where it is implied that sacrifice is not all important. Here it is mentioned (in xxvii, 118) that the great river goddess Ardvi Sūra Anāhita did not

grant the solicited favour to those who were offering sacrifices to her. Thus it is said:

> '118. Ardvi Sûra Anâhita did not grant them that favour, though they were offering up libations, giving gifts, sacrificing, and entreating that she should grant that favour' (Z.A.II, p. 81).

In another context of the *Avesta* (the *Gathas, Yasna* XXXIV.2) we find an interpretation of the sacrificial gifts (*dakṣiṇā*) which deserves our attention. According to this view the kind of gifts to be offered is not sacrificial beasts or fruits but (as Mill aptly observes) the very action of the truly pious whose soul is closely connected with 'righteousness' (vide verse 5, and also *Yast* XXII).[16] This attitude of the *Avesta* towards the sacrifice and sacrificial gifts is very close to that of the *Sāṅkhyas*. We have already seen that the *Sāṅkhya* antipathy towards priests, sacrifice and the sacrificial gifts is of historical significance (vide ch.2 sec.5). In this connection we also pointed out an important verse in the *Ṛgveda* (X.82.7) condemning the priests and their activities. This same tendency to a good extent can be seen in the *Fargard* XVIII of the *Avesta* which condemns, at least, the cunning type of professional priests. A true priest, according to the teaching of this section, is one who possesses the Law and is also striving to obtain the holy wisdom (XVIII.I.6). With great effort should such a one obtain the knowledge of the ultimate reality. This knowledge he should impart to others. The ideal priest depicted in the above passages seems to be very much similar to an individual endeavouring earnestly to obtain the *viśuddha-jñāna* (*S.K.*64), the pure knowledge of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy.

(7) Although the parallel concepts in the *Avesta* are comparatively few, yet they are not without significance. The different doctrines and concepts we have discussed so far, strongly remind us of the parallel teachings in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. Hence it is impossible to deny any possible historical relation between them. It appears that most of the relevant *Sāṅkhya* concepts are genetically connected with those of the *Avesta via* the *Upaniṣads*, the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Ṛgveda*. The *Sāṅkhya* attitude towards priests may, in all probability, be due to the influence of the *Avesta* through such channels.

Notes and References

1. *The Zend-Avesta*, Vol. II (S.B.E. XXIII) p. 104.
2. Vide H. Lommel, *Anāhita-Sarasvatī* in *Festschrift Friedrich Weller*.
3. Vide Z.A., II, p. 52.
4. *ibid.*
5. Vide Z.A., II, pp. 53-83.
6. Vide O.H.de A. Wijesekera, *Ṛgvedic river goddesses and an Indus Valley seal, Dr. Kunhan Raja Presentation Volume*, Madras, pp. 428-441.
7. *P.I.* p. 259.
8. Many have translated the word *a-jyāiti* as 'death' and consequently marred the philosophical significance of the term very badly. Cp. J.S. Taraporewala, *Zoroastrianism, The Cultural Heritage of India*, vol. ii, p. 334.
9. Vide *Z.A.* II. 88.
10. Vide A.R. White, *The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 87.
11. Vide *Ormazd et Ahriman*, p. 74, note 3.
12. *Z.A.* II., p. 88.
13. *Z.A.* II, pp. 314 - 323.
14. Similar developments are found in *Yast* XXIV, 53-65; *Ardâ Vîrâf* XVII; *Minokhired* II, 123-194.
15. *Z.A.* II, p. 182, f.n. 2.
16. *Z.A.* III, p. 80.

XXVII

Some Parallels Between the Sāṅkhya and Greek Thought

(1) Apeiron.

Anaximander (about 611 B.C.-547) believed that the ultimate principle or 'urstoff' of the universe was something boundless. He named it *apeiron* or a boundless something from which all things arise and into which they all return (cp.Burnet, *G.P.*p. 22). Anaximander's doctrine, partly, reminds us of *Aditi*, the boundless, considered as a prototype of *Prakṛti*, the ultimate principle of the material universe (vide ch. 9, sec.3a). Anaximander's conception of *apeiron* is very similar to the *Sāṅkhya* idea of *Prakṛti*. Like *apeiron*, *Prakṛti* is also boundless, being extended everywhere (*vyāpi pradhānaṃ sarvagatatvāt*, Gauḍa. on S.K. 10). There is another important similarity which *Prakṛti* bears to *apeiron*, namely, that it is also the source from which all material things arise, and also into which they all return at the end of a cosmic period. *Prakṛti* is, again, similar to *apeiron* in that the term *Prakṛti* also implies that it precedes (*pra*) all production (*kṛti*).[1] Like *Prakṛti* in Indian philosophy, *apeiron* also seems to have played an important role in Greek thought, for this same concept is found in the teachings of a few other thinkers such as Pythagoras and his followers.[2]

(2) Evolution and the Periodic Cycles.

Anaximander has taught a particular type of evolution. He says that there was an eternal motion in the course of which was brought about the origin of the worlds. According to this doctrine the worlds were not created but evolved. He further says that the living creatures arose from the moist element as it evaporated by the sun. All animals including man have descended from fishes.[3] It is seen that Anaximander's theory of

evolution is not in agreement with that of the *Sāṅkhya*: what is important to us, here, is the concept of evolution which is common to both the *Sāṅkhya* and *Anaximander*.

Heracleitus (about 535 B.C.-475) has taught the doctrine of periodic cycles. According to his teaching the world forms itself out of fire, and by conflagration passes back to the same primitive fire. Heracleitus has also urged the uselessness of blood sacrifice, [4] and this reminds us of the *Sāṅkhyas* who were well-known for their dislike towards the sacrifices of the orthodox Brahmins.

Empedocles (about 495 B.C.-435) also has put forward a particular theory of evolution. According to this teaching, there were, originally, countless tribes of mortal creatures; they were endowed with all manners of forms. These things joined together as each might chance; thus there were many awkward creatures such as those with countless hands, creatures with faces and breasts looking in different directions, creatures with bodies of oxen and faces of men etc. In the end only some forms survived.[5] What is important to us, here, is Empedocles' general conception of evolution which is also common to the *Sāṅkhya*. In detail, of course, the *Sāṅkhya* theory is widely different from that of Empedocles'.

Aristotle also taught a doctrine of evolution. He was the founder of a philosophy of evolution because he noticed that evolution implies movement towards an end, and because he attempted to point out the different stages in the attainment of that end. According to this particular kind of evolution each species is fixed: hence, for Aristotle, there is no transformation from one species to another. E.L.Allen aptly observes that it is as if a graded series of text-books on a subject were written at the same time but quite independently and when the series was complete, we could see how each formed an advance on what was in the one below it. [6]

(3) Number.

The fundamental doctrine of Pythagoras is the proposition that the nature of things is number. This reminds us, at once, of the term *Sāṅkhya* which is etymologically related to *saṅkhyā* meaning number, and also the *Sāṅkhya* predelection for number (cp. ch.3). The number three was regarded by Pythagoras to be

of special significance. In fact, this number has also played a very important role in the *Sāṅkhya* system (cp.ch.3).

(4) Transmigration.

The doctrine of transmigration of soul appears in Greece already at an early period, and Pythagoras is well-known for this. The whole idea of universal brotherhood which formed the basis of the Pythagorean order has rested on the doctrine of transmigration. It is very interesting to note that all living and *organic beings including the plant-world,* were regarded as inter-related since they all represent the embodiments of the soul-daemons.[7] This Pythagorean doctrine reminds us of the striking parallel concept in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. According to the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine *Liṅga* or the internal body, being the vehicle of merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*pāpa*) which are the basis of transmigration, accompanies the soul (*Puruṣa*) on its wanderings from one gross body (*sthula-śarīra*) to another whether the latter be that of a god (*daiva*), a man (*mānuṣaka*), an animal or a tree (*tairyag-yona*) (*S.K.*53).[8] We, thus, see that the *Sāṇkhya* conception is very close to the Pythagorean doctrine.

Empedocles (495 B.C.- 435) has expressed his horror towards the bloody sacrifices and has justified his position on the basis of the doctrine of rebirth or transmigration.[9] Empedocles' doctrine found in his work, the *Katharmoi* or the Purifications[10] (which is in a fragmentary state) is very important to us. In justifying this doctrine he even refers to his past: 'for I have already been in the past a boy and a girl, a *shrub* and a bird and a fish which lives in the sea.[11] Empedocles' doctrine is very similar to the *Sāṅkhya* as he, like the *Sāṅkhya* has accepted the possibility of one's being born as a man, animal, or even as a plant.

Socrates' (about 470 B.C.) views of soul and rebirth bear some resemblance to those of the *Sāṅkhya* system: he was a firm believer in the immortality of the soul and in the life to come which, according to Burnet, were 'doctrines which were strange and unfamiliar to the Athenians of the day'[12]. His conception of rebirth is quite significant. As pointed out by Burnet, Socrates believed that *the boby is a tomb in which the soul is kept in custody.* The soul cannot attain perfect purity till it is released from the prison of body.[13] The *Sāṅkhya* too accepts, not only the doctrine

of transmigration but also the view that the body (*Prakṛti*) is a hindrance to the soul (*Puruṣa*) : hence their final aim is *videha-mukti* the disembodied (*vi-deha*) emancipation which is absolute and complete (*S.K.*67-68).

Plato's conception of the immortality of soul and transmigration is seen in his writings, especially in the *Phaedo.* Here he brings forward a number of arguments with regard to the immortality of the soul which eventually leads to the doctrine of the wheel of rebirth (*The Phaedo* 70d-72e).

It is interesting to note that Diogenes the cynic has also accepted, like the *Sāṅkhya,* the universal brotherhood. It seems that he decided to live like a dog and was, therefore, called 'cynic' which means 'canine'. It is observed by Russell that he lived like *an Indian fakir, by begging* and also proclaimed his brotherhood not only with the whole human race but also with animals.[14].

Plotinus (A.C.204-269) who is well-known for his expeditions to the East[15] has not only believed in transmigration but also held that spirit and matter were different and independent realities. According to him, spirit is really unaffected by misery which is truly the lot of matter.[16] The doctrines of rebirth and *Karma* are clearly seen in his teaching which is admirably summed up by Russell: 'when the soul leaves the body it must enter another body if it has been sinful, for justice requires that it should be punished. If, in this life, you have murdered your mother, you will, in the next life, be a women, and be murdered by your son (III.2.13). Sin must be punished: but the punishment happens naturally, through the restless driving of the sinner's errors.[17] We may also refer to Porphyry (A.C. 232-304), pupil of Plotinus whose ideas bear similarities to those of his Master. Porphyry lays great emphasis on the need of ascetic practices such as abstinence from flesh-meat, and celibacy (cp. Copleston, *H.P.* IMAG series, Vol.i. part ii, p.217). He taught the leadership of spirit over matter and the doctrine that the world has no beginning. He also forbids the slaying of animals and rejects sacrifice.[18] Thus it may clearly show that there has been an important connection between the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy and the teachings of these two philosophers.

Abammon was a late contemporary of Porphyry, the pupil of Plotinus. It is interesting to note that he has mentioned the

wonderful powers obtained by the exercise of contemplative ecstacy (cp. Keith, *S.S.* p.81).

(5) Position of Women in Society.

The *Sāṅkhya* attitude towards women was a reaction against the prevailing *Brāhmaṇic* conception in that they accepted women as being equals of men (*mānuṣakaś caikavidhaḥ*, *S.K.*53). This generosity of outlook may also be seen in the *Mahābhārata* XIV. 19.56 where it is clearly mentioned that the path is open to all irrespective of caste and sex: it is further mentioned that in this manner even women and the *Śūdras* can obtain the *summum bonum* (*parām gatiṃ*).[19] The teaching of Pythagoras which resembles the teaching of the *Sāṅkhyas* to a good extent, seems to have created a similar atmosphere in ancient Greece too. Hence it is explicitly pointed out by Zeller that the Pythagorean idea of universal brotherhood resulted in a strong social tendency in ancient Greece which found its expression in the admission of women of an equal basis as that of men.[20]

(6) Two Paths.

The doctrine of the two paths with a full-fledged ethical significance is found in Plato's masterpiece, *the Republic.* The Platonic myth of Er, son of Armenius is important. Here we come across the concept of the two paths (which is also found in the *Avesta* (vide ch.26, sec.4), the *Ṛgveda* I, 164.51, the *Bṛhad.Up.* 111.2.13, the *Chānd.Up.* V.10.7 and the *Maitrī Up.* 111.2). Thus it is said.

> '... Er, son of Armenius, was a native of Pamphylia. He was killed in battle...he came to life again and told the story of what he has seen in the other world... Between the chasms sat Judges, who having delivered judgment, ordered the just to take the *right-hand road that led up through the sky....* while they ordered the unjust....to take the *left-hand road that led downwards....(BK.X.614).*

The concept of the two paths mentioned in this myth (which Renou considers to have influenced the episode of Naciketas in

the *Kaṭha Up.*, cp. *Vedic India,* p.36) is very similar to the concept of the two paths described in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (*dharmeṇa gamanam ūrdhvam, gamanam adhastād bhavaty adharmeṇa, S.K.*44) The Greek myth may have influenced the *Sāṅkhya* concept via the *Upaniṣads.*

(7) Dualism.

In Greek Philosophy we come across certain doctrines which deserve our attention. We Know that Pythagoras' teaching embodies a certain kind of dualism. It is clearly pointed out by Zeller that his dualism of body and soul was also extended to the cosmic dualism of matter and form (cp. *O.H.G.P pp. 35-36).* The Pythagorean dualism may remind us at once of the *Sāṅkhya* dualism of matter and soul. On account of the important similarities between Pythagoreanism and the *Sāṅkhya* dualism Winternitz concludes, not unreasonably, that Pythagoras was influenced by the Indian *Sāṅkhya.*[21]

The dualism of mind and matter is again found in the Philosophy of Anaxagoras (500 B.C. - 428). His teaching, in fact, is a clear-cut dualism of *nous* (or mind) and matter. It is true that both Aristotle and the Platonic Socrates find fault with Anaxagoras for not having made full use of the concept of 'mind' in his philosophy (cp.Russell. *H.W.P.* p.80). Nevertheless, the dualism of mind and matter is quite patent in his teaching.

Again, one comes across the same dualism in Aristotle (about 384 B.C. -322). Aristotle's philosophy, as correctly pointed out by Ross, is mearly a dualism of matter and form (cp. *Aristotle,* pp.167 - 173). The world, says Aristotle, is composed of matter and form (cp.Stace, *C.H.G.P.*p.335). We must, however, mention that Aristotle's conception of 'form' is not the same as the concept of 'mind' or 'soul' in other dualisms. But still we may say that it is not unreasonable to point out that the Aristotelean dualism of matter and form occupies, more or less, the place of the dualism of matter and mind in other systems of philosophy.

(8) The Doctrine of Universal Flux.

One of the most fundamental doctrines of Greek philosophy that bears a striking resemblance to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy is the concept of the universal flux which we come across for the

first time in clear terms in Heracleitus. He is well-known for his famous doctrine *panta rhei* or 'all things are in a state of flux'. This theory which is technically known as the doctrine of the flux of things (cp. Gompertz, *G.T.* part I, p.66) is very close to the concept of the dynamism of *Prakṛti.* According to this doctrine, *Prakṛti,* the material nature is subject to a continuous change. In short, it is an eternal and everlasting change. However, it must be pointed out that this similarity between the two doctrines, the Greek and the (Indian) *Sāṅkhya,* is also limited though very significant. According to Haracleitus, everything, both physical and mental, is subject to change; so he believed that there was nothing that was not subject to change. This position is almost the same as that of Buddhism. But in the case of the *Sāṅkhya* which bifurcates reality into mind and matter, the concept of change applies only to matter which comprises only a part of reality, for the soul according to the *Sāṅkhya,* is inactive (cp.*S.K.*19) and hence it is not subject to any change.

The same doctrine of flux of things is again found in Plato (born 429 - 7 B.C.) who, according to Aristotle (*The Metaphysics* 987^a 32- 987^b), was originally an admirer of Cratylus, the Heracleitian.[22] But in Plato's philosophy, which deals with two worlds, the empirical world and the world of Forms, the flux is restricted only to the former and not to the latter. The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy also deals with two worlds, but they are different from those of Plato; the two worlds dealt with by the *Sāṅkhyas* are the material world (*Prakṛti*) and the spiritual world (*Puruṣa*) and they attribute the phenomenon of 'flux' only to the former. What is important to us is the fact that the general doctrine of flux is found both in Plato and the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy.

(9) Causality.

Empedocles' conception of causality is important. He, like the *Sāṅkhya,* believes in the pre-existence of the product in the cause (cp. Keith, *S.S.*p.79). This concept is seen in his well-known teaching that what is called creation and and destruction is, in reality, the mixture and separation of eternal and unchangeable basic substances (fr. 8.9.).[23] In his doctrine of causality, Democretus, the atomist agrees with Empedocles (cp.*S.S* p.79) and his view is implied in his fundamental doctrine of the impossibility of an absolute creation or destruction.[24]

(10) Temporary Existence of Gods.

Democretus' conception of gods is similar to that of the *Sāṅkhya.* He, in fact, accepted the existence of a class of higher beings by the name of gods, who live longer than men, but he believed them to be mortal like the human beings with temporary existence (cp. Copleston. *H.P.*IMAGE.Vol.I, part I, p.146).

(11) The Tripartite Division of the Human Soul.

We may now add a word regarding the tripartite division of the human soul and its analogy in the state which we come across in the *Republic,* the *magnum opus* of Plato (The *Republic,* pp.183-201,*P.C.S.*). According to this teaching the human soul consists of three parts: the rational part, the spirited part (*Gk.thumos; thumoeides*) and the appetitive part. The respective strength of these parts decides the nature of the particular individual. The three types of activities of the soul as taught by Plato are very much similar to those that are ascribed to the three *Guṇas: Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas* (vide ch.10) which are said to prevail (by the *Sāṅkhya*) in the human nature. Extending this very doctrine to the state, Plato roughly divides the people of the state into three classes such as the philosopher-kings, the guardians, the auxiliaries or the soldiers, and the 'indisciplined mob'. This doctrine is not unlike the conception of the three *Guṇas* which when applied to the state would result in three main classes of people with a preponderance of one *Guṇa* over the other two[25].

(12) Aristotle's View of Blessedness.

Radhakrishnan is of opinion that the *Sāṅkhya* view of freedom is not unlike Aristotle's view of blessedness as eternal thinking free from all activity (vide. *I.P.* Vol. II, p. 313). But we do not think that this idea is quite correct. Radhakrishnan's opinion is based on certain *Sāṅkhya* teachings such as liberation is a state of complete isolation (*S.K.*68) devoid of all pain (*S.K.*I) where *Puruṣa* is in his true nature as pure (*svaccha*) consciousness (*S.K.* 65). We have to take all these as the *aparā vidyā* or the conventional view for, the *parā vidyā* or the absolute view as presented by the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (v.64) negates even the very self (vide ch. 25, sec.17). According to this teaching, the *Sāṅkhya,*

from the absolute point of view, has not said anything about the nature of freedom.

(13) Teleology.

The concept of teleology found in the philosophies of Anaxagoras, Plato and Aristotle also deserves our attention. In fact it was Anaxagoras who first introduced the idea of teleology into Greek philosophy. For this reason Aristotle praises him very highly and contrasting him with the mechanists, Leucippus and Democretus, says that he appears like 'a sober man among vain babblers' (*The Metaphysics*, Bk.1; vide also Stace *C.H.G.P.* p.104). Plato's idea of the Good as the source of knowledge and knowability, found in the *Republic* (505 a 2-4) clearly shows that his philosophy is out and out teleological (cp. Stace *C.H.G.P* p.201). The fact that Aristotle had a very precise and developed conception of teleology is seen in many places of his writings where we come across the idea that nature does nothing in vain (cp. *De Caelo* 271^a 33 and also Ross, *Aristotle*, p.186). This is the notion of an unconscious teleology (cp. Ross, *Aristotle* p. 186) and it is very much similar to that of the *Sāṅkhya Kārika* (cp.57 & 58).

(14) Gnosticism.

One may, perhaps, notice certain *Sāṅkhya* influence on the Christian Gnosticism during the second and third centuries. The doctrine of the opposition between soul and matter and the conception of the personal existence of intellect appear to have been derived from the *Sāṅkhya* system. The Gnostic division of human beings into three classes of *pneumatikoi*, *psychikoi* and *hylikoi* is, very probably, based on the *Sāṅkhya* conception of human beings with a preponderance of *Sattva*, *Rajas*, or *Tamas*. It is also believed that the conception of a subtle ethereal body by Bardesanes, a Gnostic of the Syrian school, too is due to the influence of the doctrine of *liṅga-śarīra* of the *Sāṅkhya* system.[26].

(15) It is clearly seen from the above discussion that there are some important similarities between the *Sāṅkhya* and the Greek thought. We believe that some of these ideas have become common to both, probably, not due to any borrowing by one country from the other, but simply due to the fact that

they have inherited the germs of these ideas from a common Indo-European source. For example, the *Apeiron* and *Prakṛti*, the limitless world-ground may belong to this category. There are concepts such as teleology which may be taken as independent developments in the *Sāṅkhya* and the Greek philosophy. The concepts such as dualism of body and mind, the doctrine of two paths, the transmigration as animals and plants may be due to the influence of the one over the other. We may say that the doctrine of the two ways mentioned in Plato's *Republic* has influenced the Indian (i.e. *Sāṅkhya*) idea of two paths via the *Upaniṣads*. These connections might have been affected, probably, through Egypt, Babylonia and Persia. The opinion that there has been a lively intercourse between Greece and India is accepted by many scholars of Greek thought such as Guthrie (*H.G.P.* Vol.1 p.252), Zeller (*O.H.G.P.*p.16) and Gompertz (*G.T.*, Vol.1, p.95).

Notes and References

1. Vide, Colebrooke and Wilson, The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, p. 109.
2. Burnet, *G.P.* pp. 39, 44, 51 & 90.
3. Russell, *H.W.P.* p. 47.
4. Cp. Stace, *C.H.G.P.* p. 79 and Burnet, *G.P.*, p. 62.
5. *H.W.P.* p. 72.
6. *G.B.W.T.* p. 43.
7. *O.H.G.P.* p. 34.
8. Vide Macdonell, *India's Past*, p. 329.
9. Vide Burnet *G.P.*, p. 71 and Stace, *C.H.G.P.*, p. 85.
10. Vide *G.P.* p. 71.
11. Vide Diels and Kranz: *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Frag. p. 117.
12. *G.P.* p. 130.
13. *Op. cit.* p. 131.
14. *H.W.P.* p. 241.
15. *Op. cit.* pp. 291-292.
16. Cp. Keith, *S.S.* p. 81.
17. Cp. *H.W.P.* p. 296.
18. Cp. Keith, *S.S.* p. 81.
19. Vide Keith, *S.S.* p. 123.
20. *O.H.G.P.* (1955) p. 34.

21. Vide *Calcutta Review*, (1924) p. 21.
22. Vide Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, pp. 18-21.
23. Vide *O.H.G.P.*, p. 36.
24. *Op. cit.*, p. 65.
25. Cp. Radhakrishnan, *I.P.* Vol. 1, p. 503.
26. Vide Macdonell, *H.S.L.* pp. 427-428; Keith, *S.S.* pp. 80-81; E.O. James, *Comparative Religion*, p. 166.

XXVIII

Conclusion

(1) The doctrines of dualism (vide chap.4), evolution and involution (*pralaya*) (vide chap.5) seem to represent the three main phases of the history of the *Sāṅkhya* thought. In the development of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy *Prakṛti* appears to have played a more important role than *Puruṣa*[1]. At an early period of the history of the *Sāṅkhya* thought *Prakṛti* seems to have been considered as the pre-established principle or the Chief One (*Pradhāna*) (vide chap.9). However the *Sāṅkhya* thinkers may have felt that taking *Prakṛti* as the Chief Category (*Pradhāna*) alone was insufficient to explain the origin of the universe with its diverse phenomena. Thus they seem to have thought of the necessity of another principle, the (Plurality of) *Puruṣa*. Under the concept of *Puruṣa* they included an infinity of souls *vis-a-vis Prakṛti*, probably to have an equal partner for the same, so that they could explain the everlasting process of evolution and involution of the universe.[2]

(2) The *Sāṅkhya* is a sort of philosophical anthropology, in that it views man as man, especially as a problem to himself (cp.S.K.I). It is primarily a philosophy as it relates to man and his place in nature[3]. The *Sāṅkhya* in fact is both anthropocentric and anthropomorphic. The anthropocentric character of the *Sāṅkhya* system can be clearly seen from the names of *Pumān* (S.K.II), *Puṁsa* (S.K.60) and *Puruṣa* (S.K.13,17 etc.) meaning *man* as applied to the animating principle of the system. The aim of this philosophy is the goal of *man* (*puruṣārtha*). The anthropomorphism is strongly marked in this system of philosophy.[4] *Puruṣa* is man, and *Prakṛti*, a *nartakī* or danseuse, is a woman (S.K.59). According to lexicographers, *Prakṛti* means, amongst other things, womankind[5] and is thus *vis-a-vis Puruṣa*, the plurality of *men* (*puruṣa-bahutva*). We have already seen that Gauḍapāda has likened *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* to two human beings

(chap.4, sec.7,i). Anthropomorphism is, indeed, a very significant feature of the *Vedic* gods and goddesses. The anthropomorphism of the *Sāṅkhya* too may have been due to an indirect influence of the same found in the *Ṛgveda*.

(3) The connection between the *Sāṅkhya* and the Indian school of medicine is quite patent (vide chap.1, secs.2 and 7; chap.10,sec.8). The *Sāṅkhya* may have been influenced to some extent by the analytical insight of the Indian school of medicine which according to Filliozat, may go back to the Mohenjo-daro and Harappa civilization.[6] Important medical terms such as *kalala* (S.K.43), *janana* (S.K.12), *prasava* (S.K.II & 65), *prāṇa* (S.K.29), *mātāpitṛja* (S.K.39) and *mithuna* (S.K.12) found in the *Kārikā* imply that the *Sāṅkhyas* were well-versed in the human physiology. In fact the very *Sāṅkhya* conception of evolution appears to have been based on the analogy of the biological development of the living organism. *Puruṣa*, *Prakṛti* and their *saṁyoga* (S.K.21) mentioned in the *Sāṅkhya* system may represent on the human (or microcosmic) side father, mother and their union respectively. *Buddhi*, *Ahaṅkāra* and *Manas* may represent three different stages of the development of the foetus. The idea of the ten organs and the *Tanmātras* too seems to have been based on the same conception. On the other hand, the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Guṇa* appears to have exercised considerable influence on the Indian medical science too.

(4) The contribution of the *Sāṅkhya* to the development of Indian psychology is not insignificant. Not only did they differentiate psyche (*Puruṣa*) from matter (*Prakṛti*), but also postulated a psychic apparatus consisting of three levels of experience - that of *Manas* (mind), *Ahaṅkāra* (I-ness) and *Buddhi* (intellect, understanding or reason). This is an original contribution on the part of the *Sāṅkhya* although the concept is not beyond the range of criticism. This three-fold Inner Organ (*Antaḥkaraṇa*) reminds us of the Kantian doctrine of the three levels of experience - that of sense, of understanding, and of reason[7]. The *Sāṅkhya* conception of *adhiṣṭhāna*, a presiding power (S.K.17) coordinating all our experience is also significant at least in that it has presupposed the concept of 'transcendental unity of self-consciousness'[8] postulated in the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The concept of *vṛtti* in the *Kārikā* (verses 28 & 29) implies that the *Sāṅkhyas* had recognized the idea of psychosis or the mental condition of manifesting objects at an early period (vide chap.23, sec.8). The *Sāṅkhya* idea of psychic states is also of considerable importance. Under the doctrine of the *Bhāvas*, the exponents of the system had recognized a series of principal mental states (vide chap. 18, sec.8). The notion of *saṁskāra* or the impressions in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 67 is, again, the corollary of the concept of the psychic states (*Bhāvas*), for it merely means that which is gathered in human mind in the form of the effects of previous actions.

(5) The sociological attitude of the *Sāṅkhyas* is very conspicuous. The term *sociology*, derived from Latin *socius* meaning *friend* and Greek *logos* meaning *science*, is not very different from the *Sāṅkhya* technical term *suhṛt-prāpti* or the winning of friends (S.K.51). The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy which centres its sole aim on the problem of human suffering (*duḥkha-traya-abhighātād/jijñāsā tad-abhighātake hetau*, S.K.I) is a sort of social pathology (cp.Abraham, *Sociology*, p.175). It is very significant of the *Sāṅkhya* sociology that at an early period of Indian history, it not only rejected the institution of social grades based on the concept of colour (or race-)superiority and caste system (*varṇāśrama-dharma*) but also proclaimed boldly and openly that human beings together form but one homogeneous (*eka-vidha*) unit. The *Sāṅkhya* method of social upliftment was not through the method of class-struggle but by the very opposite way of creating a social harmony between the haves and the have-nots on the fundamental principle of universal brotherhood. *Dāna* which is regarded by the *Sāṅkhyas* (S.K.51) as one of the eight perfections (*siddhis*) of an ideal man recognizes the great importance of generosity towards the needy as a duty of man towards man as a social being. While being a philosophy of non-violence, the *Sāṅkhya* clearly maintains that social crimes are subject to punishment in the form of natural consequence (vide section 12 below). This teaching may be taken as an indirect decree for people to abstain from social injustice. The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy resting on the foundation of *Karma* admits, like Heracleitus, that change is an abiding force in the world, both in the physical world and the mental world; therefore, human society consisting of kings, ministers, governors,village headmen, villagers (vide chap.23,sec.18), soldiers (vide chap.21, sec.4) and others, according to the *Sāṅkhya*, is subject to constant

change (cp.*salilavat pariṇāmataḥ*, S.K.16). The *Sāṅkhya* sociology aims at peace (*duḥkha-vighāta*, S.K.51): however it also implies that the world will not be completely free from battles and strifes urged by the unceasing desires of man resulting from an eternal and ever-lasting aspect of reality, the *Rajas Guṇa*. The remedy for the unrest in society, as implied in the *Sāṅkhya* thought, is the social control emerging from its religio-philosophy. The religious control of the *Sāṅkhya* is one in which a transcendent,that is,extra-personal sanction (*karma-phala*) is given to social acts. The social stability resulting from the Kantian thought is based on the abstract principle of universalisation; the *Sāṅkhya* in this connection, rests on the universal principle of *Karma*. The former is a logical view whereas the latter is a religious one; although they approach the same problem from two different angles, they both move towards the same goal.

(6) Certain words and phrases in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* seem to suggest a sort of connection between the *Sāṅkhya* terminology and the technical terms of the Indian science of grammar. Without laying much emphasis, we may, for example, refer to the following : *(sam)ākhyāta* (S.K.5 &69), *karma(indriya)* (S.K.26), *karaṇa* (S.K.43), (a)*kartṛ (S.K.19* and *20), -gaṇa* (S.K.22), *guṇa* (S.K.29), *guru* (S.K.13), *parokṣa* (S.K.6), *puruṣa* (S.K.3,17etc), *prakṛti* (S.K.3,22 etc.) and *prākṛtika* (S.K.43), *pratyaya(sarga)* (cp.S.K.24), *laghu* (S.K.13), *liṅga* (S.K.10,20 etc.), *vikṛti* (or *vikāra*) (S.K.3), *viṣaya* (S.K.5,11 and 15), *(vi)vṛddhi* (S.K.57), *vyakta* (S.K.2), *samāsa(taḥ)* (S.K.53), *sarga* (S.K.53) and *siddhānta* (S.K.71). These terms may remind us of *ākhyāta* or finite verb, *karma* or direct object; *karaṇa* or the notion of the instrument, *kartṛ*, agent or logical subject, *gaṇa*; group of roots or words to which a grammatical rule applies (e.g.*tārakādi-gaṇa*), *guṇa* or the first strong grade of vowels, *guru* or the long vowels, *parokṣa* or the past completed action, the three persons or *puruṣas*, and also the *tatpuruṣa* compound, *prakṛti* nature (the *Nirukta*) or *prākṛta*, *Volksprache* (Mayrhofer,C.E.S.D.,q.v.) (vernacular dialect spoken by woman and inferior characters in Sanskrit plays), *pratyaya* or the connecting vowel,*laghu* or the short vowels, *liṅga* or the grammatical gender, *vikaraṇa* the modifier, namely an affix producing the base and inserted between root and personal terminaion, *viṣaya* or the object, *vṛddhi* or the strongest grade of vowels, *vyañjana* or consonant, *samāsa* or compound, *visarga* or the final aspiration and *siddhānta* or settled conclusion respectively. It is not easy to account for this connection. Very probably the *Sāṅkhyas* may have borrowed a good number of their terms from the *vyākaraṇa-śāstra*. On the other hand the technical terms such as *puruṣa* and *guṇa* may have found their way into the science of grammar from the *proto-Sāṅkhya* thought. The term *sāmprata-kāla* (S.K.33) in place of the *vartamāna-kāla*, the present, may faintly suggest the *Sāṅkhya* interest in grammar.

(7) The *Sāṅkhya* have exercised considerable influence in the field of literature. Their use of certain devices of poetics can be seen, for example, in the *Kārikā* (v.60), where Īśvarakṛṣṇa clearly makes pun on *guṇavati* (endowed with the *Guṇas* or the good qualities) and *aguṇa* (devoid of the *Guṇas* or the good qualities). Similes such as *cakra-bhramavat (S.K.67), pradīpa-kalpa* (S.K.36) and *salila-vat* (S.K.16) are not insignificant. The three terms *śānta, ghora* and *mūḍha* (S.K.38) implying the *Sattva, Rajas* and the *Tamas* aspects of the elements are undoubtedly words of emotive meaning.[9] It is interesting to note that the term *pratibimba*, copy or image, already occurs in a verse from the early *Sāṅkhya* literature presenting a graphic description of the *Mahān-Buddhi* with a vivid simile of the reflection of the rising moon in a reservoir of water (vide ch.I,sec.6). That they have (unconsciously) contributed to the development of image and symbol of Indian poetics may be seen from some concepts such as *viśva-rūpa*, the many coloured or the variegated (i.e.the world) (S.K.15), *Prakṛti*, the primordial one which manifests and unmanifests itself from time to time and *Mahat*. In fact the very origin of *Mahat* as described by Vijñānabhikṣu: *"guṇa-kṣobhe jāyamāne mahān prādur babhūva ha"* (S.P.B. I, 64), is of poetic significance with assonance and suggestive meaning (*dhvani*). The aphorism may suggest an image of the evolution of *Mahat* with a great tremor. The capacity to form images in human mind has, indeed, been a subject of intense discussion ever since the beginning of philosophy.[10] The *Sāṅkhyas* are very well-known for their parables or the *ākhyāyikās* (S.K.72). A whole chapter of the *Sāṅkhyasūtra*, the fourth, is assigned to a collection of stories and parables each of which is employed to illustrate a particular doctrine of the *Sāṅkhya* system. In this connection the *Sāṅkhyas* seem to have influenced the early Buddhists. It is very likely that they have

suggested to the Buddhists their method of teaching by similes and parables[11]. Technical terms such as *bhāva* and *pratīti* in poetics seem to have been borrowed from the *Sāṅkhya* by the *ālaṅkārikas* of ancient India. The influence of the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Guṇa* can be clearly seen in the principal characters of the Sanskrit dramas. For example, we may point out that the hero of a drama is said to possess a preponderance of the noble quality (*Sattva Guṇa*).

(8) The *Sāṅkhya* in a sense is the history of the universe. In fact it is the story of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* including the evolvents and the evolutes. An important aspect of the aim of the *Sāṅkhya* is to demonstrate the course of unfolding and folding of *Prakṛti*, the world-ground. The story of man is interwoven into this evolutionary pattern. Evolution in the *Sāṅkhya* is different from that of Hegel[12] which presents the pictures of a triadic forward movement: it creates an image of a wheel that turns but does not move forward[13]. The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy of history, therefore, does not claim the possibility of an absolutely new state or society in the world.

(9) That a certain amount of mathematical understanding is faintly implicit in the *Sāṅkhya* thought is undeniable. At the beginning (Indian) mathematics was dealt with in special chapters of the works of the early Indian astronomers, and the earliest works of scientific astronomy can be dated after about 300 A.C. (vide Macdonell, *H.S.L.* p.439). We have already seen the *Sāṅkhya* interest in 'analysis' and 'division' which rests primarily on the basis of *Saṅkhyā* or number (vide chap.3). The *Sāṅkhya* can, indeed, be summarily described as a philosophy of the *one* (*Prakṛti*) and the *many* (*Puruṣa*). In building up their school of philosophy, the *Sāṅkhyas* have utilized the method of *reductio ad absurdum* which has also been an important tool in the development of the system of Euclidean geometry. We agree with Deussen in maintaining that the term *Guṇa* being developed as - *gaṇa* (troup) —> *gaṇayati (to count)* —> *guṇayati* (to mutiply) —> *dviguṇa* (two-fold) —> *triguṇa* (three-fold) —> *Guṇa* - has originally meant a factor in multiplication and this meaning is still to be connected with the word *Guṇa* as found in the *Sāṅkhya* system (vide chap.10,f.n.3). The *modus tollens*, an important formula of mathematical logic: $[(p > q).-q] - p$: regarding the handling of which the *Sāṅkhyas* were famous (vide

chap.23,sec.14), betrays not only the fact that they were somewhat mathematics-minded but also the possibility that they had a fairly clear idea of the mathematical negative. The *Sāṅkhya* chain of causality with *Prakṛti* as the uncaused cause was certainly a device adopted (rightly or wrongly) by the *Sāṅkhyas* for the specific purpose of avoiding the problem of *regressus ad infinitum*. The notion of 'infinity' is clear in the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of *puruṣa-bahutva* (lit.plurality of *puruṣas*), the infinity of *Puruṣas* (S.K.18) (or the life-monads,vide Zimmer,P.I.p.314) which is just the same as the Leibnizian conception of the infinity of monads giving rise to the theory of the identity of indiscernibles based on the principle of mathematical calculus (vide R.Falkenberg. *History of Modern Philosophy*, p.279). As a term of early Indian thought *bahutva* (lit.plurality) was not inadequate to convey the mathematico-philosophical idea of 'infinity' which in later times was synonymed by the term *ananta* or the endless in some Pali texts (cp.*ākāsa-ānañca-āyatana*, the sphere of the infinity of space; *ananta-aparimāṇa loka dhātu*, the endless and limitless systems of the universe). (P.T.S.Dic.q.v.). The term *bahutva* derived from *bahu* meaning *many* (of which the Vedic counterpart was *puru*, cp.Greek, *poly*) stands in opposition to *ekatva* derived form *eka* or one, and which is advocated as the true picture of reality by the *Upaniṣadic* monism. The last two of the three negative judgments of the final realization as taught in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy (vide chap.25,sec.17) may imply that the *Sāṅkhyas* were already conversant with the idea of 'zero'. The *Sāṅkhya* conception of evolution being one which regards the phenomena to be both beginningless and endless is similar in principle to a beginningless mathematical series proceeding *ad infinitum*. All these may, very probably, suggest that the *Sāṅkhya* thought itself vaguely represents an aspect of the development of the *gaṇita-śāstra* of ancient India. The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* which is generally regarded as a work of the fifth century A.C. may probably, have been contemporaneous with Āryabhaṭa (born at Pāṭalīputra in 476 A.C.), a pioneer mathematician of ancient India (vide *H.S.L.*p.439 and the Āryabhaṭīya, third section,ed.with com. by H.Kern, Leyden,1879).

(10) The *Sāṅkhyas* seem to have had a fairly developed idea of physics and biology. In their conception of *Prakṛti*, the *Sāṅkhyas* have arrived at the idea of an indestructible matter at

an early period of human history. That they have recognized the existence of energy in matter is seen from their conception of *svarūpa-pariṇāma* taking place even in the state of equilibrium. Another improtant thing they have noticed is the idea of inorganic or dead matter found in their doctrine of the *Bhūtas* (vide ch.19). The ethical doctrine of action and reaction of the *Sāṅkhyas* (S.K.44 and 45) reminds us of the Newtonian view that every action will have an equal and opposite reaction.[14] The *Sāṅkhya* interest in biology too is not without significance. Their classification of plants as living organisms is important (Gauḍa on S.K.53). They also presented the quasi-scientific idea that the plant kingdom (a realm of primary organisms) possesses the potentiality to develop into higher beings and thus they bridged the gap between the plant and the animal kingdoms. This may at least, imply the great enthusiasm of the *Sāṅkhyas* to have an insight into the true nature of things.

(11) The *Sāṅkhyas* exercised considerable influence on the other schools of Indian philosophy. Their theory of *Guṇa* has penetrated into almost all the other systems. We may also refer to the concepts of *Antaḥkaraṇa* and *Prāṇa* which are, again, found in several other systems such as the *Vedānta*. Some scholars such as H.Zimmer doubts whether the passivity of the self (*Ātman*) in the *Vedānta* is partly due to the influence of the *Sāṅkhya*. If the passivity of the *Ātman* as represented in the *Vedānta* philosophy is due to the influence of the (*Jaina-*)*Sāṅkhya* idea of the absolutely passive (*Jīva-*)*Puruṣa*, it may reveal an interesting chapter of Indian philosophy and civilization[15]. The *Sāṅkhya* conceptions of the *Jīvanmukta* and the *Videhamukta* (S.K.67 & 68) have become common doctrines of almost all the Indian schools of philosophy excepting the *Cārvāka* materialism.

(12) Like the *Sophists* of ancient Greece the *Sāṅkhyas* were, perhaps, some of the earliest to address themselves to a general philosophy of education.[16] The contribution of the *Sāṅkhya* to the advancement of the phiosophy of education is important. The *Saṅkhya* philosophy of education is therapeutic, for it applies the method of katharsis[17] for the healing of mankind suffering from the malady of *avidyā* (S.K.1 &2). The history of the *Saṅkhya* thought shows that there has been a long line of *Sāṅkhya* teachers and pupils. One of the most important characteristic of a teacher, as implied in the *Kārikā*, is the compassion

(*anukampā*, S.K.70) he should bear towards his pupils. The idea of the equality of educational opportunity results from the *Sāṅkhya* conception of social justice extended to everybody irrespective of caste and sex. The general pattern of the *Sāṅkhya* education is briefly mentioned in its doctrine of the *Siddhis* (S.K.51). The *Sāṅkhya* conception of punishment is fairly clear (cp.S.K.44). The *Sāṅkhyas*, in general, seem to agree with the principle of natural consequence advocated by Rousseau. The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy would say that punishment is something that comes on its own, but not meted out by anybody. Mc Taggart's view of punishment that the criminal has a right to be punished (by nature) in order that his crime may be annihilated and he himself rendered guiltless[18] reads like a commentary on the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of justice (S.K.44 & 45) which maintains that the crime causes its doer to suffer in hell for the wrong he has committed. It is implied in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy that every human being should get an opportunity for training and instruction so that everyone may have a vision of reality (*samyag-jñāna-adhigama*, S.K.67). The ideal man is one with a vision of reality. The aim of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy of education is to lead people to this stage which is beyond space and time. The ideal man will naturally be a great guide (cp.*magga-desaka*,Sn.84) of humanity. Kapila and Mahāvīra are but a few examples of these saviours of mankind.

(13) The *Sāṅkhya* contribution in the field of philosophical terminology too is significant. This is clearly seen in the *Sāṅkhya* literature consisting of texts and commentaries. We may, for example, give the synonyms of *Puruṣa, Prakṛti, Mahat* and *Ahaṅkāra*. The synonyms of *Puruṣa* are *Akṣara* (indestructible), *Ātman* (self), *Kavi (poet)*, *Kṣetrajña* (knower of the objects or of the body),*Cit* (observer), (Vāc. on S.K.6), *Jña* (knower,S.K.2), *Nara*(man), *Pumān*(male S.K.II), *Puruṣa* (S.K.3,17etc), *Puṁsa* (S.K.60), *Pumaguṇajantujīva* (a male living creature),and so on.[19] Gauḍapāda's commentary on the *Kārikā* verse 22 refers to six synonyms (*paryāyaḥ*) of *Prakṛti*: *Avyakta* (the unmanifest), *Prakṛti* (that which preceded production)[20], *Pradhāna* (the pre-established one), *Brahman* (that which bursts forth), *Bahudhanaka* (the multi-comprehending) and *Māyā* (the marvellous power). Māṭhara's commentary on the *Kārikā* 37 gives twelve synonyms of the third principle of the *Sāṅkhya* system: *Āsuri* (the divine

one,f.), *Khyāti* (discrimination), *Citi* (understanding or intellect), *Prajñā* (wisdom), *Buddhi* (intellect), *Mati* (thought), *Mahān* (the great one), *Saṁvitti* (consciousness or understanding), *Smṛti* (memory), *Haraḥ* (grasp or grip), *Hariḥ* and *Hiraṇyagarbha*. The fourth principle is known by several synonyms of which the most important are: *Abhimāna* (self-consciousness), *Asmitā* and *Ahaṅkāra* (I-ness) (cp.Gauḍa.on S.K.22). The other *Sāṅkhya* concepts too have their synonyms which need not delay us here. Many of these technical terms which are limited to the commentaries may undoubtedly imply that there has once been an extensive *Sāṅkhya* literature, a great part of which is lost to us for ever.

(14) Reasoning and argument plays a very important role in the *Kārikā* which is a concise work of 70 *Āryā* verses. Īśvarakṛṣṇa begins his work with the argument that the *Vedic* method (i.e. *ānuśravika-dṛṣṭa*, S.K.I. & 2) cannot solve the problem of misery. Arguing in support of his theory of causality, Īśvarakṛṣṇa brings forward five reasons in the form of the *modus tollens* (S.K.9). He also argues in support of the existence of *Puruṣa* (S.K.17), *Prakṛti* (S.K.15), the *Guṇas* (S.K.12) and the plurality of *Puruṣa (S.K.18)*. The validity of these arguments is another question. They may, nevertheless, give us a glimpse of the dialectical skill of the early exponents of the *Sāṅkhya* thought. The *Sāṅkhyas* were, probably, the first to make an extensive use of the *modus tollens* as an instrument of rigorous argument (vide ch.23, sec.16). They were bold enough to reject many traditional beliefs, and thus gave no room for an *Īśvara* and the *varṇāśrama-dharma*.

(15) Viewed from the point of view of toponymy and anthroponymy too the *Sāṅkhya* is of considerable significance. Kapilavastu and Vindhyā are some of the important place-names in the toponymy of the *Sāṅkhya* civilization. Kapila, Āsuri, Pañcaśikha, Āḷāra Kālāma, Uddaka Rāmaputta and Īśvarakṛṣṇa are some of the important proper names in the anthroponymy of the *Sāṅkhya* culture. The name Kapila already occurs in the *Ṛgveda* 10.27.16; if this refers to a historical person the name may, probably, be of Eastern origin. The name Kapila may, very probably, have been originated as a nick-name meaning the tawny-coloured one (cp. Mr.Brown, vide Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p.109), i.e. the one wearing the tawny-coloured garments. Kapila as we notice in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 70, is referred to as the

Muni par excellence. The *Muni* depicted in the *Ṛgveda* 10.136.2, too is described as wearing tawny-coloured garments (*piśaṅga vasate*) (vide chap.2,sec.1). This may perhaps imply that there has been a connection between the name Kapila and the picture of *Muni* already during the *Ṛgvedic* period. The name Pañcaśikha, the five-crests, seems to have originated as an honorific title of the first promulgator of the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine (vide chap.25 sec.2). Āsuri and Īśvarakṛṣṇa are proper names which seem to have been of psychological origin (*ibid.,*). The historian Mookerji things that Kapila has taught his doctrine at Mathura or Taxila.[21] Kapilavastu, as we know, is situated on the slopes of the Himalayas.[22] The two *Sāṅkhya* teachers, Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka (Rudraka ?) Rāmaputta under whom the *Bodhisattva* received instructtion at first were at Vesālī and Rājagṛha[23] respecitvely. Āḷāra who is known for his powers of concentration seems to have lived near a highway (at least for some time), for it is mentioned in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* (iv.35) that sitting on the road he neither saw nor heard five-hundred carts rolling past him.[24] The association of the *Sāṅkhya* with the Vindhyā region, is well-known. In fact it is surprising to note Aśvaghoṣa connecting Āḷāra's *Sāṅkhya* doctrine directly with the Vindhyā region (vide B.C.Law: *Buddhaghosa*, chap.3). Again it is interesting to note that both Māṭhara and Gauḍapāda in their commentaries on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verse 4 refer to the country lying between the Vindhyā mountains on the north and the Sahya mountains on the south, and which is extending up to the sea. It is mentioned that this is a pleasant country[25]. Further it is implied that the country abounds in agreeable circumstances (*śobhana-guṇa*). It is possible that this may be (a part of) the cradle of the *Sāṅkhya* thought. The geography of the *Sāṅkhya* civilization may thus represent an area including Kapilavastu, Vesālī, Rājagṛha, the Vindhyā and the Sahya mountains. This may probably be the area of the eastern cultures mentioned by Zimmer.

(16) The *Sāṅkhya* civilization had not been limited to the subcontinent of India. Surpassing the boundaries of the land of its origin, the *Sāṅkhya* thought has reached several different lands in the East and the West in diverse ways. While writing his great work, the *Visuddhimagga*, the Path of Purification at the Mahāvihāra in Anuradhapura, the ancient capital of Ceylon,

somewhere in the firth century (the period during which the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* seems to have been written or compiled by Īśvarakṛṣṇa) Ven. Buddhaghosa has entered into a scholarly discussion of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, specially the concept of *Prakṛti* in contrasting it with the Buddhist doctrine of *Avijjā* (*cp.B.C.Law, Buddhaghosa,* chap.3). The idea of *Prāṇākṣara* (*Paṇakuru*), the vowels and *Gātrākṣara* (*Gatakuru*), the consonants found in the Sinhalese Grammar, the *Siddhānta Saṁgraha* (*Sidat Sangarā*) written much later somewhere in the thirteenth century has very probably been influenced by the Tamil conception of *Uyir Eluttugal* (life-letters), the vowels and *Mey Eluttugal* (body-letters), the consonants which may have originated under the influence of the dualism of *Puruṣa* (soul or life) and *Prakṛti* (matter or body). The influence of the *Sāṅkhya* in the land of Tibet has been subject to an admirable discussion by Vidhyabhusana in his well-known article, 'Sāṅkhya philosophy in the land of the Lamas' (JRASB, n.s.3,1907,pp.571-578)[26]. That *Sāṅkhya* ideas have reached China at an early date is seen from the Chinese version of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* which is recently translated into French by Takakusu and which is now rendered into English by Suryanarayana Sastri. Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism in the West which appeared in the opening centuries of our era have shared many of the tenets of the *Sāṅkhya* which was in a flourishing state in India during this period (vide chap.27 sec. 14, and also E.O.James, *Comparative Religion*, pp.165-166). The *Sāṅkhya* doctrines may have reached the West, probably, through the sea-traders who brought not only wealth but also knowledge to the people of the Greek islands (vide L.Hogben, *Man Must Measure: The Wonderful World of Mathematics, p.31).* We may also point out that the *Sāṅkhya* ideas have reached the Arabic scholar-world as early as the eleventh century through the important work of Alberuni which is now available to us under the title of *Alberuni's India*, thanks to the zealous efforts of the German scholar E.C.Sachau (vide chap.1, f.n.46).

(17) Thus we see that the significance of the *Sāṅkhya* system is very great. Covering a fairly vast geographical area it possesses a long history extending from the *Vedic* times up to the fifth century A.C. in which the (only availabe) orthodox text of the classical *Sāṅkhya* system was written. We have seen that the origin of almost all the concepts of the *Kārikā* can be traced back to the previous literature, the *Upaniṣads*, the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Vedas*. The *Sāṅkhyas* have clearly recognized the dignity of man and the freedom of thought: thus they were convinced of the possibility of self-awakening. The part played by the *Sāṅkhyas* in the realm of free thinking was immensely great and this, perhaps, was the greatest heritage they have bequeathed to the *Sindhu-deśa*, the *Indus incolis.*[27]

Notes and References

1. See chap.4, secs., 3(i), 4, 5, 7(i); chap. 9, secs., 2.3.etc.
2. *kṛtārtham prati naṣṭam api anaṣṭam tad anyasādhāraṇatvāt, Y.S.,* II. 22.
3. Cp. Max Scheler, Problem of the Sociology of Knowledge, London, 1980, pp. 67-80.
4. Vide K.H. Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies*, p. 153.
5. Vide Mayrhofer, *C.E.S.D.q.v.*
6. Vide *I.C.*, tome ii, p. 139, sec. 1616.
7. Cp. J.Kemp, *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 39; S.P. Atreya, *A Critical Introduction to Modern Western Philosophy*, p. 124 and D.W. Hamlyn, *The Theory of Knowledge p. 200.*
8. Vide *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. N.K. Smith (Abridged Edition, The Modern Library - New York), pp. 92-93.
9. Urmson, J.O., *The Emotive Theory of Ethics*, ch. 3, pp. 24-37.
10. Vide Tilakasiri, *Image and Symbol in Sanskrit Poetry, Añjali* - Wijesekera Felicitation Volume, p. 185.
11. Vide Max Müller, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. iii, *Sāṁkhya & Yoga* (1952) pp. 89-90.
12. A.K. Majumdar, the author of the *Saṅkhya Conception of Personality*, thinks that the *Sāṅkhya* idealism is essentially identical with the Hegelian one, vide *S.C.P.* especially, editors's note, p. vii: *"The Sāṅkhya idealism, according to the author, is essentially identical with the Hegelian one and also..."* But I am unable to agree with him.
13. Vide Renou, *Religions of Ancient India*, p. 75. For an account of the *Purāṇic* concept of history, see M. Eliade, *Le Mythe de l'Eternel Retour*, especially, p. 207.
14. Vide D. Humphrey, *Intermediate Mechanics, vol. i, Dynamics, ch. 2. sec. 67.*
15. Vide Zimmer, *H.P.I.* pp. 459-460.

16. Cp. J.S. Brubachar, *A History of the Problems of Education, p. 251.*
17. Cp. J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy* p. 41 and D. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, vol. iv, pp. 295 sqq.
18. Vide *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, ch. 5, and M.Gingberg, *On Justice in Society*, p. 174.
19. Vide Max Müller *I.P.* vol. iii, *Sāṁkhya* and *Yoga*, p. 39.
20. Vide Wilson, *S.K.* p. 109.
21. *Hindu Civilization*, p. 249.
22. *ibid.*, p. 357.
23. *ibid.*, p. 247.
24. *ibid.*, pp. 247-248.
25. *dakṣiṇena tu vindhyasya, sahyasya ca yad uttarām, pṛthivyām āsamudrāyām, sa pradeśo manoramaḥ.*
26. I may also mention here some oral information I have ıeceived from Kamalesh Bhattacharya, a research student on Cambodian history at the Sorbonne when I too was a student at the same seat of learning. He says that some *Sāṅkhya* teachers are mentioned in a certain Cambodian inscription: but unfortunately I have not been able to verify the validity of this statement.
27. Pliny, *Historia Naturalis*, 6.20.71.

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